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The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain

Since the end of the Cold War, many voices have advocated the suppression of national intelligence services,¹ but the birth of the “post-post-Cold War” indicates that intelligence is now perhaps more necessary than in earlier times. In this first decade of the twenty-first century a profound transformation of the role of intelligence has occurred. The intelligence services and the issue of security are always on the agenda, whether in political debates around the world or in the press in Western countries. In this sense, the expectations of citizens today regarding the role of intelligence, whether realistic or not, are possibly bigger than at any other point in history. This means that the need for a better understanding of the role of the intelligence services and their importance within the national security of even a country such as Spain has never been more apparent.

In these years of change, finding the correct relationship among intelligence, the intelligence services, Spanish democracy, and the free flow of information is paramount, and its negation is always the exception. To correctly understand the role and the limits of the intelligence services, their

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practices, and the different dimensions of intelligence is important in order to break, or at least to lighten, the existing tension induced by secrecy and democracy. In a democratic system, the intelligence services should act within a legal framework and respect the democratic dialogue, with a clear vocation of public service.² Therefore, Spanish citizens should have a correct understanding of what intelligence means in order to develop within society what the intelligence services call the *culture of intelligence*.

Developing the field of Intelligence Studies is also important in order to avoid situations in which intelligence makes the news only because of its failures (intelligence failure),³ its corruption scandals, which were so prevalent in the 1990s in Spain,⁴ or because current politicians are using it for their own benefit, violating the constitutional rights of citizens. To achieve this, strict supervision must be placed on the role of the intelligence services. On numerous occasions, citizens not only ignore the role and limits of the intelligence services, but politicians ignore the fundamental role that these institutions carry out in Spanish society, leaving the field open not only for failures in intelligence, but also for the dangerous conspiracy theories that have done so much damage to this area of study.⁵ Intelligence has always been a fascinating topic for movie directors, and enthusiastic audiences have confirmed that it will always be a hot topic. The fictitious representation of international politics has played an important and perhaps even dominant role in the concept that the public has of these organizations. As British author Nigel West has observed, "There is a clear distinction between the authentic operations of the intelligence services and those represented in works of fiction."⁶ Therefore, being rigorous is required when approaching a subject that has been for so long poorly understood in Spain. In order to do this, the collaboration of the citizenry is also important to expose the intelligence services to the democratic sphere of public scrutiny and not lose sight of their limitations.

Since the 1980s, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the academic discipline of Intelligence Studies has undergone a progressive revolution in Spain. Even though secrecy is still a principal characteristic of intelligence, intelligence has gradually been accepted as part of the public debate about the general activities of a democratic government. Although for a long time everything related to intelligence in Spain was taboo, even in the academic sphere (and outside of the Intelligence Community in general), Intelligence Studies today undeniably contributes to diverse disciplines, functioning as an important tool for the correct understanding of the international community.⁷ But, if the end of the Cold War has meant a great push in questions related to intelligence, these issues continue to be undervalued in Spain, although with notable possibilities, as a field of investigation.

In the last thirty years, the subject has been increasingly dealt with in the mass media and the academic sectors through discussions, writings, the

development of diverse doctoral theses,⁸ the creation of the Juan Velázquez de Velasco Institute, and the appointment of a chair on Intelligence Services at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.⁹ This nomination was sponsored by the Spanish intelligence services and, although still taking its first steps, it could over time contribute enormously to the development of Intelligence Studies in Spain through sponsorship of seminars, publications, and the creation of a Website which blends together everything related to these subjects. Two important events should be added: First, the efforts that in recent years the Ministry of Defense has dedicated three of its CESEDEN (Spain's Center for National Defense Studies) monographs to subjects related to intelligence and, second, the Master's degree in Intelligence Services developed by the Gutiérrez Mellado Institute, and the M.A. in Intelligence Analysis by the chair on Intelligence Services at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.¹⁰

Despite all these efforts, however, Intelligence Studies remains only an incipient discipline in Spain, and great ignorance persists outside Spain's Intelligence Community about the concept of intelligence and how it works. In fact, Spain still does not have its own intelligence school. Nevertheless, even though the journey is difficult, firm steps are being taken to chart the course for an intelligence school. The former director of the National Center of Intelligence, Alberto Sainz Cortes, following ex-director Jorge Dezcallar Mazarredo's initiatives, has affirmed: "It is also indispensable... that the citizens are able to know the aspects that affect their security to be able to exercise their rights freely."¹¹

THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES IN SPAIN

In spite of the optimism of the Spanish Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Studies is today still an incipient subject, approached mainly by various disciplines and with a scarce and insufficient foundation.¹² Studies of intelligence do exist, and different authors have dealt with this controversial subject over the years. But, sadly, Intelligence Studies in Spain has been bound to historical and military approaches that have mainly sought to preserve secrecy and hierarchy.¹³

Over time, however, these studies, through the interest of the journalistic and investigative sectors, have become seen as favorable, alongside the development of democracy. Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, in the shadow of different scandals and failures of Spanish intelligence,¹⁴ an abundance of books and articles related to intelligence were published. Through the participation of ex-officials of Spanish intelligence and other somewhat shady characters tied to these events and specific operations, these studies have been informative. Despite this new proliferation of material related to intelligence, theoretical precision is largely absent since the writings are still centered on partial studies of situations, concrete

operations, and personal experiences with the clear aim of divulging information, rather than putting the data into a more rigidly structured discipline.

Yet, these have been the beginnings of Intelligence Studies in Spain, so much so that today, the journalistic and investigative disciplines are considered its pioneers since they make most of the contributions to the field while putatively acting as the defenders of democratic liberties and denouncing any abuse that the “monster of intelligence” commits with its tunic of secrecy.¹⁵ As Fernando Rueda put it,

In the end, the only ones who control the CNI (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, the Spanish national intelligence center) with their information are the media, who, with their investigative journalism, they are the ones who allow us to know about illegal happenings such as the espionage network discovered in 1995...¹⁶

But the reality is that Intelligence Studies is something more.¹⁷

In recent years, Intelligence Studies has been increasingly supported by the Ministry of Defense, and by the CNI itself. This increase has come in response to a clear institutional desire to publicly promote through the universities what has been called the culture of intelligence. In addition to the lack of conceptual precision, however, has developed the need to be politically correct. But what should be avoided at all costs is the use of this type of initiative as simply a tool for Intelligence Community propaganda.

The CNI's attempt to take the reins of Intelligence Studies and bring it into universities as a discipline has had very direct and visible consequences.

First, once knowledge develops that the CNI is tied to Intelligence Studies, whether at universities or in different forums where seminars and conferences are organized, the subject awakens an innate interest. Everyone seems to be interested in this topic, and every person seems to have some conception, right or wrong, of what the word *intelligence* means. Yet, this is very dangerous for the correct development of Intelligence Studies, since it runs the risk of hearing the siren call of conspiracy theories, the various legends and topics that accompany all the intelligence services. Giving into these might results in stirring up a distrust of the nation's intelligence officials. Thus, Intelligence Studies proponents must keep in mind that the Intelligence Community's sources must be protected and the field's own methods must respect its subject matter.

Another danger to be taken into account is that the linkage of the CNI to this type of studies multiplies its value, and the private sector is conscious of this. To include the word *intelligence* in the activities of any business is beneficial, although in many cases those activities may have nothing to do with the intelligence profession. The word intelligence thereby turns into an important asset. The need also arises for finding necessary private

financing for Intelligence Studies, given that the CNI's funds are not designated to meet those needs.

Advancing the conceptual clarification and terminology of Intelligence Studies requires an understanding that different disciplines offer different points of view on what intelligence means. This does not have to be a limitation. Rather, understanding that, by adding rather than subtracting, intelligence can be approached from many different perspectives, many questions can be highlighted and firm steps can be taken toward the consolidation of Intelligence Studies in Spain.

The next positive consequence of the introduction of Intelligence Studies as an academic discipline is the development of diverse doctoral theses, articles, and conferences whose papers are periodically published, all of which is, without a doubt, highly positive. But again, however, a main characteristic of the works published up until now is their lack of conceptual precision reflecting the fact that with exceptions, there is still no agreement in Spain about what the different disciplines understand by intelligence.

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ADVANTAGES OF MULTIDISCIPLINARIANISM

At this stage, four different approaches to Intelligence Studies exist in Spain: the historical/military approach, the journalistic approach, the economic approach, and the International Relations and Political Science approach.

(A) The **historical approach** helps to better understand not only history, but also the operations of the intelligence services.¹⁸ Until now the most common type of studies related to intelligence have been bibliographic. These tend to be very useful when explaining both the operations of the various intelligence services and the development of different historical events.

This type of approach tends to be descriptive, since it accomplishes the clarification of events and clearly contributes to a situation many times forgotten: the role that intelligence plays in historical events.¹⁹ A good example can be found in the biographies written by such experts as Nigel West and Thomas Harris about the contributions of Juan Puyol (*Garbo*), the Spanish double agent, during World War II.²⁰ In this sense, the diaries of participants and biographies are an excellent source for understanding how intelligence is carried out in times of war. Within this discipline can also be included the different approaches to military intelligence from a historical perspective of past operations and concrete situations.²¹ Particularly useful are the contributions of different authors about the role of intelligence and espionage in the Spanish Civil War.²² The historical and military perspectives view the study of intelligence as a means for acquiring new information that might help to explain different decisions taken by government, in times of both peace and war.²³ This approach

overlaps the journalistic approach, which focuses on concrete operations, espionage cases, the violation of rights, and biographies of intelligence officials.²⁴

(B) The **journalistic approach** and, more concretely, investigative journalism, is greatly nourished by former intelligence service employees, collaborators, and people who have had contact with the different services. Its main mission is to denounce the abuses that the intelligence services can occasionally commit in the implementation of their missions. This approach seeks information on concrete cases and irregular situations. In Spain this has been called the journalistic control of the intelligence services.²⁵ But this approach presents two main problems: first, the difficulty of corroborating sources, since, as a general rule, the information these people supply is usually a response to concrete and personal interests; and second, as a consequence of the former, it frequently contributes to the false image that the public has of “spies,” meaning shady characters who carry out undercover and illegal actions. Of necessity then, Intelligence Studies seeks to correct this largely false image.²⁶

(C) The third approach has to do with business, and is consequently termed the **economic approach**.²⁷ Its importance has increased in recent years because business is interested, in a greater or lesser degree, in including the word *intelligence* in its assets. If many Intelligence Community initiatives that are launched can count on the sponsorship of business, the realization must be that they somehow serve the specific interests of the company. And so companies have a contribution to make to Intelligence Studies. If, during the Cold War, military intelligence was pivotal in understanding the happenings of the international situation, then today economic intelligence and private sector contributions are the keys to such understanding.

Revolutionary technology and the commercial capacity of harvesting information have experienced an exponential growth in the last decades,²⁸ as has the proliferation of risks and threats coming from the international arena.

As José Martín Juárez, president of Interligare S.L., has pointed out, economic intelligence is not espionage; on the contrary, he notes, “Economic intelligence is focused on using the socioeconomic and corporate information available with the aim of taking advantage of the windows of opportunity in the economic standpoint, while utilizing elaborate knowledge to avoid or manage forthcoming economic risks.”²⁹ Interligare has been the first private company to organize an international conference on intelligence issues, and its contribution to the development of Intelligence Studies in Spain has been significant.³⁰ By early 2010, other business initiatives had developed, such as the creation of the Global Corporate Intelligence Advisors around the Winterman Group,

and the Spanish Association for the Promotion of Competitive Intelligence, based in SEPIC (Sociedad Española para la Promoción de la Inteligencia Competitiva), created on 30 May 2008, and chaired by Carlos Blanco.³¹

Since 1992, the journal *El profesional de la información* has published interesting papers on Competitive Intelligence, and another journal specializing in the subject, *Puzzle: Revista Hispana de la Inteligencia Competitiva*, appeared in 2002.³²

Other efforts at spreading an awareness of Competitive Intelligence include programs at Barcelona's Pompeu Fabra University, and monographic courses produced by firms such as INFOCENTER, INTELLPOT, and INFOLINE.³³

(D) Last is the **International Relations and Political Science approach**, which encompasses several university disciplines, such as Philosophy, Philology, and Law. Since the job of intelligence has been practiced in its many different forms since the beginning of society, the fact that it has been considered a discipline of study since fewer than fifty years ago is paradoxical.³⁴ But the fact remains that, even today, the study of intelligence has captured the attention of scholars of International Relations and Political Science in only a very limited way. Even more, Intelligence Studies does not fit comfortably into any of the subcategories of International Relations, such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism, or the postmodern approaches. And, although Intelligence Studies has been said to fit within realism, neorealist authors have practically ignored this type of study.

Similarly, from the theoretical perspective of Political Science and Law Studies, a recurring theme is the search for models that seek to show what determines intelligence success or failure. The emphasis from this perspective is on the preconceptions, images, and use of intelligence in Spain. These approaches see intelligence as a tool for foreign policy and for the defense of the state. By the same token, intelligence also tends to be perceived as the state's tool to control society, and this aspect of research relies on, even requires, policies of declassification that are very weak in Spanish law. For this reason, academic investigators usually consider themselves outside the realm of Intelligence Studies, since their fundamental contribution is based on a better understanding of the different forms of power, the development of ideology, and the social and cultural life of a state.³⁵

Thus, Intelligence Studies in Spain remains predominantly virgin territory for scholars interested in a subject with a multitude of possibilities. The advantages of Intelligence Studies as an incipient field are, in all aspects, more numerous than its limitations. Indeed, the disciplinary diversity of those who approach the subject makes the lines of investigation more

abundant and interesting.³⁶ The development of Intelligence Studies will depend on the successful creation of an academic culture in which academics understand that the study of intelligence in a democratic society such as Spain is not only normal, but actually fundamental, and that intelligence is part of the machinery of the modern state. Today more than ever, Intelligence Studies has the opportunity to occupy the place it deserves as an area of debate and study outside the closed doors of intelligence assignments and secret debates. In this sense, academics from Political Science and Law have successfully conducted research about the structure and functions of the Spanish Intelligence Community, the laws that govern the CNI, and the function of the intelligence services in the Spanish democracy.³⁷

Putting Things in Perspective

From the four approaches explained herein, Intelligence Studies can be described in four perspectives: description, political formation, normative prescriptions, and explanations.

(A) The **descriptive perspective**: Intelligence Studies should be objective and present all the relevant facts that define a concrete reality. Among the main problems in obtaining and maintaining this objectivity are the barriers to access of information, since much of it is classified according to security requirements. Today, however, enough declassified material is now available, even in Spain, to tackle intelligence topics from various perspectives and disciplines.³⁸ Another limitation is the extent to which data and the available sources represent reality and are not guided by the needs of the services themselves. That is, evaluating the veracity of the data and sources is important. The services are able to justify data and actions simply because they are the ones who contribute them.³⁹ Similarly, certain myths, topics, and popular beliefs have occasionally been accepted as true facts. Therefore, to obtain a certain consistency in the description of concrete events, identifying the particular interests of those who supply the information is mandatory. After all, objectivity depends on the personal perspective of the investigator.

(B) The **political recommendation perspective**: Intelligence Studies deals with pragmatic questions related to the relationship between intelligence and politics, well understanding that intelligence should be viewed as knowledge, including an acceptance that intelligence is an integral part of the decisionmaking process. Intelligence failures are one of the most prominent themes of the studies, and understanding that action, undercover efforts, counterintelligence, and different other activities are elements of the kind of work these services carry out. But a main problem in this approach is that the majority of intelligence researchers have no

personal experience in the activities of the services, and those who do are limited in discussing them by the laws governing secret officials. Therefore, although the literature on the undercover actions of the various national intelligence agencies is prominent, the materials are usually based on either historical events that happened many years ago or consist of stories having little to do with the academic aspect because they are very often written by deserters, collaborators, and non-reliable sources. A best-seller of that kind can thereby contribute even more confusion to popular beliefs about intelligence, while its contribution to Political Science literature is rather insignificant.

(C) The **normative prescription**: Intelligence Studies should clarify the objectives the state seeks to attain from the different intelligence services and its justification of their presence in the framework of different political and military agendas. These studies encompass the ethical and moral questions always related to the law and the judicial structure of the area where the activity is to take place, as well as any related philosophical and democratic questions. In this type of approach are found studies on national security and governmental prerogatives and debates about freedom and security, as well as the role and limitations of intelligence services, among others.

(D) The last category is the **explanatory perspective**. This is the most complicated objective to achieve, given that it implies the acceptance of a strict theoretical framework and a specific clarification of the terminology. This type of study tries to define what is understood by intelligence (in the ontological sense), looking at what it does, meaning the way it functions. This type of study is focused on the different elements of intelligence, their functions, and their products. This approach permits a comparison of the different intelligence services to begin to establish theoretical and conceptual bases for the definition of intelligence in different countries. Another type of study focuses on the structures of intelligence and its relationship to the decisionmaking process.

As American Professor Stafford T. Thomas points out well, “An indicator of maturity in any field of investigation is the transition from disputes over conceptual definitions to the use of concepts that explain cause and effect relationships.”⁴⁰ Clearly, the maturity of Intelligence Studies in Spain is a large task, but the steps taken so far have been firm and in the right direction. With time, more contributions to this field of study will come from the different perspectives that approach it. What is certain, too, is that the theoretical and conceptual efforts of Intelligence Studies in Spain have been, and still are, very limited. For that reason, the quicker the meaning of the different concepts used in Intelligence Studies in Spain are clarified, the sooner a Spanish school of Intelligence Studies will be consolidated.

As noted, Intelligence Studies can be approached from various perspectives with different objectives. But, adequate criteria of declassification are necessary in order to obtain firsthand, trustworthy sources and to be able to properly develop this type of study.

DECLASSIFICATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL TOOL

Declassification is the only definitive way by which to gain access to primary sources for the study of intelligence events which, for the most part, occurred many years ago.⁴¹ Evidently, the continued lack of access to primary sources of information existing in Spain can be a limitation. But this limitation is little more than a reflection of the damage that conspiracy theories have done to these studies, causing them to lose their rigor and academic interest, and, in the majority of the cases, relegating them to a simple collection of fantastic stories and invented situations. The main cause of this great limitation on a rapid development of Intelligence Studies is the preconception of pop culture, based on spy novels and conspiracy theories, which puts another important limitation on these studies: the idea that a smoking gun always lies behind the actions of the intelligence services. While the tendency to think that classified information is sensitive to national security is true, this does not entail a reality that information is classified because it incriminates somebody.⁴² In intelligence operations, the protection of methods and sources of information is fundamental, even years after the retirement of those involved.

For these reasons, Intelligence Studies necessarily involves great precision that can be achieved only with objective data about the studied events. However, one of the main problems when assessing the importance of the declassification of intelligence materials is the impossibility of seeing all the information. And researchers have no way of knowing for sure about the amount of material that remains classified or its contents.

In the past two or three decades parliamentary oversight mechanisms have shed considerable light on the intelligence services of the Western countries. Historians in Spain, therefore, should keep in mind that this progressive liberalization will likely allow them access to a greater number of documents. In that way, the field of study of Intelligence Studies will be significantly enhanced, and, obviously, numerous subareas of study will emerge. As a general rule, a major limitation on the declassification of documents in Spain is the “national interest,” whose definition is somewhat ambiguous. A reasonable interpretation is the requirement to protect methods and sources of intelligence. Again, scholars and others must understand that no intelligence service can, under any circumstances, and for more than obvious reasons, betray the confidence of those who have collaborated; the risks in the world of intelligence are always very high.

Materials related to intelligence operations are the most difficult to declassify. Understandably, according to some authors, they would be the most useful for the development of Intelligence Studies from the historical, military, and journalistic perspectives. Paradoxically, what sells commercially usually has the least interest for Intelligence Studies advocates, since, as a general rule, this type of material adds very little value to the correct understanding of intelligence and its foreign involvements. To the contrary, those documents related to final intelligence, usually much less captivating than spy novels and the great best-sellers, are of the most help when seeking to understand what intelligence was trying to communicate to decisionmakers.

Clearly, the declassification of intelligence materials in Spain continues to be a long, slow, and complicated process that passes through a multitude of filters and, not being a cutting edge activity, is limited by its budget. The revision of the list of materials eligible to be declassified is a job that requires a lot of time and manpower and, in current times, declassification remains a secondary activity. To help them, however, Spanish authorities might find that retired intelligence officials can be useful in accomplishing the task as they are in the United States, where the associations of intelligence veterans collaborate actively with their former employers in this type of work.

RESTRUCTURING THE APPROACH

Although, as noted, Spain's CNI has tried to push Intelligence Studies as a university discipline among diverse faculties, rigorous study from these perspectives is still rare. The situation is changing though, and both the Head of Intelligence Studies and Democratic Systems and the Institute Juan Velázquez de Velasco, are developing Intelligence Studies. The inclusion of Intelligence Studies as a subdiscipline of International Relations is pending in Spanish universities. Even though, in other countries, Intelligence Studies has been taught in diverse departments, this is not yet the case in Spain, where there is still no university department of International Relations that has either intelligence experts on faculty or imparts obligatory courses on this subject. Studies on diplomacy, security, the armed forces, and terrorism are common, but Intelligence Studies in Spain are limited. Equally, another limitation in the development of Intelligence Studies in Spain is the lack of specialized literature in foreign languages, thereby hindering international collaboration. Nevertheless, this inconvenience is not specific to Spain since other countries also face this problem.

If Spain seriously wants to develop Intelligence Studies, rather than treating the topic as merely the latest trend, it should be able to establish a

clear conceptual and theoretical definition, with the goal of finding a well-deserved spot not only within the various fields of academic investigation, but to contribute its share to Intelligence Studies at the international level. Countries such as Canada, France, Great Britain, and the United States have taken the lead in Intelligence Studies, and Spain should also get aboard this train.

Nevertheless, this will not be an easy task, because various factions in Spain do not have a clear understanding of the term *intelligence*, and have no clear implications of the use of some concepts and not of others. A common statement holds that the language that conditions the reasoning later on leads to some conclusions rather than others. This is even truer when talking about intelligence. The question of having a common understanding of intelligence by the Spanish Intelligence Community—a term exported from the American federal intelligence system and which encompasses only the sixteen agencies in charge of gathering, analyzing, and spreading information—seems in Spain to be used to include everyone who, at some point in time, has pronounced the word *intelligence*.⁴³ It therefore nullifies the correct term used by Francisco Galvache, *intelligence reserve*, as the characters outside the community of intelligence that have assets to contribute to the same, such as corporations, institutes, professors, and researchers, that in some way are dedicated to spreading the culture of intelligence.⁴⁴

In this sense, the services that, in a more or less formalized way, count on some type of external advising, are numerous. Also growing is the number of those who, supported by such services, develop Intelligence Reserve programs about questions directly related to their immediate interests, or that provide them with frames of reference and reports informing them about non-high-priority areas and scenes that, in any other way, for reasons of high-scale economics, would not be minimally attended to.⁴⁵

As Antonio Díaz well points out, with the attacks of 11 March 2004, Spain suffered the consequences of not having a structured community of intelligence.⁴⁶ In this sense, according to Galvache, promoting the culture of intelligence is an important requirement for the development of a community of intelligence in Spain *that would substitute the philosophy of isolated action with that of intercommunication and concrete action. The knowledge and appreciation of the specific work of each organization and their complementariness, and an awareness of their transcendental importance is necessary to their success.*⁴⁷ Díaz, in turn, points out that “the CNI possibly, by its predominant role, should be more interested in that the community starts to work, since much of the information needed has its origin in other parts of the Administration.”⁴⁸ Finally, the CNI’s former director, Alberto Sainz, points out that “one of the most novel aspects of the new regulations of the Spanish intelligence and information

services . . . is the creation of a community of intelligence with the purpose of achieving an adequate cooperation and coordination between the different organisms that have responsibilities in the security sphere.”⁴⁹

These are only a few examples of the importance of terminological clarification in the development of Intelligence Studies in Spain. Moreover, such terminological clarification could bring closer the chimera of establishing a consistent theoretical base in which all of the disciplines that are involved in Intelligence Studies can find their place.⁵⁰ This is not an easy task, given that, as David Kahn has noted, “no researcher has proposed concepts that can be proven in what intelligence studies refer to.”⁵¹

The rapid growth of intelligence as an area of study in Spain will surely continue in the years ahead. Advances on the declassification of government archives in other countries, the lengthening period since the end of the Cold War, and the changes in attitudes about secrecy, have facilitated the development of Intelligence Studies and, indeed, a better and more correct understanding of intelligence in Spain.

The advantages of Intelligence Studies as an incipient field of study are obviously more abundant than its limitations. The diversity of academic disciplines and their scholars make the lines of investigation more abundant and interesting. The development of Intelligence Studies in Spain will depend on the successful creation of an academic culture that understands that the study of intelligence in a democratic society is not only normal, but fundamental, and that the Intelligence Community is part of the machinery of the modern state.

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