

VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution Through Information Peacekeeping

Robert David Steele¹
President, OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS, Inc.

In an age characterized by distributed information, where the majority of the expertise is in the private sector, the concept of "central intelligence" is an oxymoron, and its attendant concentration on secrets is an obstacle to both national defense, and global peace. The underlying threat to peace and prosperity—the cause of causes—is the ever-widening chasm between policymakers with power, and private sector experts and participants with knowledge. Neither classified information nor information technology alone can bridge this gap—but both can make a positive contribution if they are managed within a larger information strategy which focuses on content as well as connectivity, and enables policymakers to draw upon the expertise available in the private sector. We thus require a strategy to create a "virtual intelligence community" able to both inform governance, and also carry out a new kind of virtual diplomacy, "information peacekeeping". Information peacekeeping can help avoid and resolve conflict, and represents the conceptual, technical, and practical foundation for successful virtual diplomacy—virtual intelligence "is" virtual diplomacy.

This article presents the concepts of "virtual intelligence" and of "information peacekeeping". Part I discusses the nature of conflict as an analysis problem—what do we need to know, and how. Part II reviews a number of now publicly acknowledged deficiencies of the classified national intelligence community, and makes reference to some inherent related problems in government mis-management of unclassified information. Part III examines the perils as well as the promise of information technology as now developed and applied by governments and corporations—why are we substituting technology for thinking but also, how can technology help us think and also gain access to external expertise. Finally, Part IV discusses the "information continuum" comprised largely of private sector centers of expertise; defines a theory of "information peacekeeping"; and outlines a specific strategy for creating a "virtual intelligence community" which can both inform governance, and conduct "information peacekeeping" operations—how do we harness distributed expertise from the private sector and use "tools for truth". The article concludes that the "core competency" for diplomats, whether real or virtual, must be the management of information *qua* content—its discovery, discrimination, distillation, and dissemination as intelligence. It follows from this that diplomats must take the lead in developing a national information strategy as an element of national power, and also master the art of "information peacekeeping".

¹ Direct all correspondence to the author via electronic mail to <ceo@oss.net>, facsimile to (703) 242-1711, or post mail to 11005 Langton Arms Court, Oakton, Virginia 22124-1807. Final dtd 1 Apr 97.

Part I: What Do We Need to Know, and How?

The policymaker needs an intelligence-support system which is directly related to their daily schedule; which provides just enough intelligence just in time, at the lowest possible level of classification; and which enables direct access to private sector experts whenever needed. This system must be firmly grounded on a foundation of complete global geo-spatial data at the 1:50,000 level, and must provide the policymaker with both strategic generalizations and a full range of multi-dimensional assessments, which include a full understanding of the cultural, technological, and geographic aspects of a potential or on-going conflict. Organizationally, this system must fully integrate the information available to civilian, military, and law enforcement authorities as well as business leaders; and it must offer a seamless architecture which transitions easily from domestic to international locations under conditions of both peace and war. Above all, it must allow the policymaker to deal with emerging threats on a "come as you are" basis, and to harness private sector expertise in real-time.

Unclassified Intelligence. Intelligence is information, which has been discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated in a form tailored to the needs of a specific policymaker at a specific time and place. Intelligence is most often *not* classified, and its utility in fact decreases dramatically with every increase in its level of classification. In today's global environment, intelligence which can be shared and which does not compromise the political standing of the sponsors of the intelligence by relying on covert means, is critical.²

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Require every "intelligence" report to offer varying degrees of classification beginning with unclassified, to clearly mark all paragraphs with their inherent level of classification, to footnote primary and secondary customers and their telephone numbers, and to specify in detail the open sources and experts as well as the classified sources which were drawn upon to create the report. Provide consumers with an electronic means of documenting whether they actually read the report, and an electronic means of grading the report (at its various levels) in real time.

Just Enough. The policymaker does not have the time or the inclination to digest vast quantities of information, however much they may feel that only their intellect could possibly comprehend all the nuances. The successful analyst supporting the policymaker

² "If it is 85% accurate, on time, and I can share it, this is a lot more useful to me than a compendium of Top Secret Codeword materials that are too much, too late, and require a safe and three security officers to move around the battlefield." Paraphrase of comment by Navy Wing Commander who led the lead flight over Baghdad, made at Technology Initiatives Game 1992, where the author served as chairman of the National Intelligence Cell. See also Sir David Ramsbotham, "Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations" in *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment* (Frank Cass, 1996), and especially his citation of Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping" in *Survival* (36/3, Autumn 1994), page 39, to wit: "...the concept of UN intelligence promises to turn traditional principles on their heads. Intelligence will have to be based in information that is collected primarily by overt means, that is by methods that do not threaten the target state or group and do not compromise the integrity or impartiality of the UN."

will have gained their trust and understanding, and will provide “just enough” intelligence to permit the policymaker to grasp the essence of the value-added information (i.e. insights the policymaker did not already have), and to provide the analyst with guidance if additional detail or other related analytical paths are to be pursued.

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Require that intelligence be delivered via Web-like applications which begin with a paragraph and allow the policymaker to drill down to a page or a longer document, or to navigate into original sources if desired. This is completely distinct from the “Intel-Link” concept, which does nothing more than convert the intelligence production fire-hose into electronic form. This idea also requires aggressive commitment to the digitization of supporting documentation, and hence facilitates inter-agency access to basic multi-media and multi-lingual raw information sources. This idea can be applied on behalf of the large number of policymakers who require hard-copy products, by automating the production process so that four levels of details are provided.

Just in Time. Twelve month research plans and eighteen month editing cycles have made most “intelligence” (actually no more than classified information) irrelevant to the day-to-day needs of the policymaker. The policymaker needs intelligence that is pertinent to the decisions they are making that very day (including decisions, which set in motion longer term endeavors by others).³

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: To the extent that the policymaker is willing (some operators are worse than spies in their obsession with secrecy), ensure that the daily agenda of the policymaker is electronically available to all analysts supporting them, kept up to date, and used as the electronic “hot link” foundation for providing intelligence support. As the policymaker looks at their daily agenda on their screen, they should see a little “icon” that says, in essence “Intelligence Available”, and from that be able to go directly to a paragraph, then a page, and then to supporting documentation.

Direct Access. In the 21st century, the “acme of skill” for the master analyst will be the ability to put a policymaker with a hot question in direct touch with a world-class expert (generally in the private sector) who can create new knowledge on the spot, and in a few minutes “cut to the chase” and provide the policymaker with an informed judgement in real time that is tailored to the precise nuances of concern to the policymaker.⁴

³ Mr. Paul Evan Peters, Executive Director of the Coalition, has articulately related this fashionable phrase, perhaps first associated with logistics, to global networks for networking information. Speaking to the International Document Acquisition conference in 1994, he noted that it makes no sense to archive vast volumes of material centrally if one can reach out and get exactly what is needed on a “just in time” basis. To this the author would add two observations: first, that only 10% of what one needs is generally online, although online means can be used to reach experts who have access to the other 90%; and second, that the most exciting aspect of distributed information is that *someone else* bears the cost of creating and updating such information as *is* available online, and for maintaining the expertise which can generate “just in time” products at a fraction of the cost that would be required if one were to maintain a centralized think tank intended to cover all topics all the time. Such distributed expertise also tends to be vastly more current, deeper, more insightful, and indeed cheaper than “central intelligence” funded by the taxpayer.

⁴ The most common objection to this idea, generally from intelligence analysts rather than the policymakers themselves, has been founded on an extreme reluctance to reveal their organizational interest or the nature of their question. The reality is that most issues that are “hot” are hot for everyone—CNN and the Maryknoll nuns are all asking about the same issue. The author has generally found that

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Using existing Web technology, including security technology, establish a "virtual intelligence community" directory which is constantly updated by the Institute of Scientific Information, and permits any analyst or indeed any policymaker to quickly identify world-class experts in any topical area.⁵

Earth Map. The policymaker, counterparts, and staffs all require an accurate map of those portions of the earth under consideration at any given time. This is not only essential as the foundation for decision-making, it is critical as the foundation for fusing information from various collection disciplines (imagery, signals, human) and for automating the visualization of information in the aggregate. Hard as this is for most Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs to understand, none of us have the world mapped accurately or comprehensively. The United States has less than 10% of the world mapped at the 1:50,000 level (10 meter resolution with contour lines), and most of that is severely out of date.⁶ In both Somalia and Burundi, the next best alternative to tourist maps has been previously classified Soviet military topographic maps at the 1:100,000 level, only recently made available through a U.S. company, East View Publications.

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Earmark \$250 million dollars a year to the Department of State with which to procure commercial imagery sources and related processing services in support of both peacekeeping initiatives and EARTHMAP Report requirements of other civilian agencies. These commercial imagery sources will still require orientation (ortho-rectification) using either precision imagery from the National Reconnaissance Office or positioning of key features using hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, but such a fund would be responsive to civilian and peacekeeping requirements without being subject to realignment by unappreciative intelligence and defense bureaucrats, and would help resolve decades of active neglect in this area.

Strategic Generalizations. The policymaker requires strategic generalizations with which to plan and direct operations. Analysts and their managers too frequently inundate the policymaker with thousands of "current intelligence" updates, and also exaggerate the threat, for lack of a model of analysis which requires them to address the

policymakers "just want the damn question answered" and are not really concerned about what others might speculate about their interest. Finally, it has been the author's experience that private sector experts are by definition discreet, for they understand the value of discretion as it pertains to future business.

⁵ While there are various ways of establishing who the world-class experts are in any given discipline, by far the most reliable is that provided by the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) and its exclusive international, multi-lingual database of those who have not only published in peer-reviewed journals, but also been cited by their peers in a manner which easily establishes their general influence and credibility. These experts in turn generally know their peers in government and non-government institutes and organizations that are world-class authorities but cannot publish.

⁶ The EARTHMAP Report, signed out in October 1995 by Undersecretary of State Tim Wirth and other principals, represented an eighty-person multi-agency finding which essentially specified the critical nature of comprehensive global mapping in support of economic and environmental initiatives. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the President of the United States considered economic initiatives important enough to create a National Economic Council, and his Secretary of State (then Warren Christopher) publicly elevated the environment to the high table of national security, the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense (first the Defense Mapping Agency and then the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) have both chosen to ignore the EARTHMAP Report and declined to respond to the urgent civilian agency needs for maps in support of peacemaking and diplomacy.

peacekeeping environment in a comprehensive manner which readily brings out useful generalizations.

- In 1989, after the Marine Corps Intelligence Center was established, a review of available Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) production was found⁷ to contain no intelligence of general value to the Marine Corps. Everything was a “snapshot” (generally dated) of a specific weapons system, personality, organization, event, or location.
- A more useful model for integrated analysis was developed, and tested, with the finding that *the threat changes depending on the level of analysis, and also upon the relationship between the military capability being considered, and the pertaining civil and geographic factors in the area of operations.*
- Below is a high-level view of the model:⁸

	Military	Civil	Geographic
Strategic	Sustainability: Ability to sustain operations over time and space	Allies: External relationships of strategic import	Location: Strategic geo-political location or source of materials
Operational	Availability: Quantities of military power available for commitment	Instability: Internal precipitants and preconditions of volatility	Resources: Internal natural resources affording self-sustainment
Tactical	Reliability: Impact of training and maintenance on existing capabilities	Psychology: Internal group dynamics affecting cohesion and operations	Terrain: Internal geographic conditions affecting mobility
Technical	Lethality: Effectiveness of specific capabilities assuming no constraints	Infrastructure: Transportation, power, communications, and other infrastructures	Atmosphere: Internal climate affecting system performance

Figure 1: Concept for Integrated Intelligence Analysis

⁷ By the author, then the founding Special Assistant and Deputy Director of the Center, the newest national intelligence production facility in the United States.

⁸ A complete copy of the model, including war-fighter definitions of high, medium, and low degrees of difficulty for each of 107 factors (43 military, 35 civil, and 29 geographic) is now available to U.S. government personnel as Appendix F-1 in *Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.1* (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, October 1996). All others may purchase the original version of the handbook, published in the same title as Volume I of the *Proceedings* of the Fifth International Symposium on “Global Security and Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions”, from OSS, Inc. A copy of the handbook less chapter 6 and appendices F and G, is available for free at <<http://www.oss.net>>. The author’s contribution to the model (developed by a team) was significantly influenced by Edward N. Luttwak and his book *STRATEGY: The Logic of War and Peace* (Harvard, 1987), where he demonstrated the inter-relationship between weapons systems at different levels of war, each perhaps irrational in isolation, but most sensible when considered as part of the whole.

Two examples of this model's utility are offered because its implications are so important to policymakers dealing with complex conflict situations.

- **Middle Eastern Tank Threat.** In a test case discussed with the appropriate analysts from all of the major intelligence agencies in the U.S. governments, we discovered that the tank threat in a particular Middle Eastern country, historically classified as *high* because it was comprised of Soviet T-72 tanks, at the time the most powerful main battle tanks outside our own, changed dramatically depending on the level of analysis—it was only *high at the technical level (lethality)*.
 - **At the tactical level (reliability)**, because of very poor troop training, the long-term storage of most tanks in warehouses, and the cannibalization of tanks at random for parts, the threat fell to *low*;
 - **At the operational level (availability)**, because of the quantity of tanks scattered around the country, the threat rose to *medium*; and
 - **At the strategic level (sustainability)**, where various constraints would not permit this country to sustain tank operations for more than two weeks, the threat again fell to *low*.

We considered this very significant to the perspective of the policymaker or commander making decisions about the over-all structure of the force to be deployed to this region, even in the absence of related information about civil and geographic factors.

- **Integrated Analysis.** In a second example, which illustrates the importance of civil and geographic factors to the over-all analysis of any peacekeeping situation or related acquisition and employment decisions, the Commandant of the Marine Corps asked us to evaluate the Marine Corps requirement for a follow-on procurement of the M1A1 tank. We examined civil and geographic factors for the sixty-nine countries (now eighty) which comprised the expeditionary environment, and discovered these “strategic generalizations”:⁹
 - **Intervisibility (Line of Sight Ranges).** 91% of the countries in the Marine Corps environment offered line of sight distances of 1,000 meters or less, making the M1A1 irrelevant to operations in those countries;

⁹ *Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World* (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 1990) was a unique first effort for the U.S. Intelligence Community as a whole in that it developed strategic generalizations founded on a close working relationship with the warfighter customers who specified the sixty-nine countries to be considered; defined the military, civil, and geographic factors of greatest interest to them as well as their perception of what constituted high, medium, and low degrees of difficulty; and also relied exclusively on open sources of information while publishing the results in unclassified form.

- **Cross-country mobility.** 79% of the countries offered *zero* cross-country mobility; the terrain would require all mobility platforms to use normal roads (most of which have bridge loading limitations of 30 tons or so, making the M1A1's 70 ton weight a distinct liability);
- **Ports.** 50%—fully half—of the countries did not have a port usable by a U.S. Navy or Maritime Pre-Positioned Force (MPF) ship—they lacked an adequate depth, turning radius, and/or piers and cranes. This means that the 70-ton M1A1 would have to be off-loaded in mid-stream using scarce and often-inadequate landing craft.

A similarly strategic observation was subsequently made with respect to aircraft, which are designed by the U.S. Navy for the U.S. Marine Corps based on a standard aviation day that is warm (around 65°F) and with average humidity.

- The Marine Corps aviation day is in fact *hot* (routinely over 80°F) with very high humidity. Translation: Marine Corps aviation can carry half as much half as far than the book says it can—both range and lift are dramatically reduced under these conditions...yet policy makers and the military commanders that advise them consistently fail to plan for these civil and geographic realities. This is of special concern with respect to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).
- We also discovered that :
 - most U.S. Embassies were well beyond the round-trip range of the CH-46 from a naval platform at the five fathom line even at optimal performance;
 - most countries in the Third World can out-gun the standard U.S. Navy five-inch gun with their existing shore batteries; and
 - we are completely lacking in digital imagery and 1:50,000 combat charts for operations in 90% of the world¹⁰, as well as 200 ship-years behind in shallow-water (100 fathom and less) hydrography.

Why is this so important? The sad fact is that policymakers are often ignorant of the realities of the military, civil, and geographic elements in relation to one another and the levels of analysis, and this ignorance leads to woefully inadequate estimates of what it will take to achieve stated objectives. At the same time, the military is uninformed as to

¹⁰ The 90% figure has not changed in the seven years since the study was done. In September 1996 official unclassified briefings from the Defense Mapping Agency (now the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) documented the fact that while most of the world is charted at the 1:1,000,000,000 level and much of it at the 1:250,000 level, down at the 1:50,000 level (10 meter resolution) where the hard work of coalition and fire support coordination takes place, only 10% of the world is available, and this is generally old data. For the specific Marine Corps study, we found that of our 69 countries of high interest, most in the Third World, we had no 1:50,000 maps at all for 22; old 1:50,000 maps for the ports and capital cities only for another 37, and very old 1:50,000 coverage for ten countries.

the “intangible” aspects of the situation, and generally is not trained, equipped, and organized for operations which require that they deal with people rather than kill them.¹¹

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Post the Marine Corps study as a public document.

Multi-Dimensional. Consider the following table:

	Political-Legal	Socio-Economic	Ideo-Cultural	Techno-Demographic	Natural-Geographic
Perception	Isolation of elites; inadequate intelligence	Concentration of wealth; lack of public disclosure	Conflicting myths; inadequate socialization	Acceptance of media distortions; inadequate mass education	Reliance on single sector or product; concentrated land holdings
Identity	Lack of elite consensus; failure to define priorities	Loss of economic initiative; failure to recognize need for balanced growth	Loss of authority; failure to provide and honor national myth system	Failure to accept and exploit new technologies and new groups	Failure to integrate out-lying territories into national system
Competence	Weak or inefficient government; too much or too little bureaucratization	Break-down of fiscal, monetary, development, or welfare policies	Humiliation of leaders; loss of confidence by population	Failure to enforce priorities, with resulting loss of momentum	Failure to prepare for or cope with major natural disasters
Investment	Ego-centric or parochial government	Excessive or insufficient mobility; lack of public sector	Cynicism; opportunism; corruption	Failure to nurture entrepreneurship or extend franchise to all groups	Failure to preserve or properly exploit natural resources
Risk	Elite intransigence; repression; failure to recognize new sources of power	Failure to deal with crime, especially white collar crime	Failure to deal with prejudice; desertion of the intellectuals	Failure to develop national research & development program	Failure to honor human rights; failure to protect animal species
Extroversion	Ineffective tension management; failure to examine false premises	Structural differentiation; lack of national transportation	Elite adoption of foreign mores; failure to deal with alienation	Failure to develop communications infrastructure, shared images	Failure to explore advantages of regional integration
Transcendence	Foreign control of government; arbitrary/excessive Government	Loss of key sectors to foreign providers; loss of quality control	Media censorship; suppression of intellectual discourse	Failure to control police, army, or terrorists; failure to employ <i>alphas</i>	Failure to respect natural constraints or support organic growth
Synergy	Failure to assimilate all individuals or respond to groups	Status discrepancies; lack of economic motivators	Absence of sublimating myths; failure of religion	Failure to provide program and technology assessment	Failure to distribute political benefits between urban and rural
Complexity	Garrison, industrial, or welfare states	Unstable growth; external diseconomies; excessive DoD \$\$	Cultural predisposition toward violence; fanatic elements	Excessive urbanization, pollution, nuclear development	Lack of land for expansion, inefficient land use or land tenure

Figure 2: Framework for the Observation of Conflict

¹¹ We still do not have a Table of Organization and Equipment for a unit to handle refugees and prisoners of war—in the Gulf War, this became an undesirable duty for the nearest infantry battalions.

The policymaker is poorly served when analysts focus only on the political-legal situation, or the military situation, or even—to the extent they can gain access to the necessary open sources—on the economic situation. Every emerging and on-going conflict has a multi-dimensional nature, and must be understood across a spectrum, which includes ideological, cultural, technological, demographic, natural, and geographic conditions. At the same time, culturally astute experts must study the aspects of human development and the local psychology, and these informed judgements factored into the decision-making process.¹²

The average analyst¹³, pre-occupied with cutting and pasting miscellaneous “current facts”, and lacking access to sources of cultural and other forms of “intangible” intelligence as well as access to tools for visualizing complex integrated problem sets, is rarely if ever going to provide the policymaker with insights into the multi-dimensional nature of the conflict and the consequently unanticipated consequences of revolutionary change in the non-traditional dimensions such as the ideo-cultural or techno-demographic.

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: First, do a case study of a single country, and completely re-define the idea of a “Country Study” so as to move far beyond the cursory coverage of the CIA World Fact Book or the useful but largely “tangible” Army Country Studies. Then develop a Web-based network of sites and publications organized by country and within country so as to allow any policymaker to quickly access multi-lingual and multi-cultural perspectives in each of these matrix areas, using only open sources of information which can be easily shared with coalition and non-governmental partners. Use automated gisting and clustering technology to quickly visualize the aggregate data while comparing “points of view” from different sites and organizations.

Emerging Threats. There are two aspects to the changing nature of the threat as we approach the 21st century, and both merit brief discussion because the lack of knowledge among policymakers, and the mind-set inertia of the analysts supporting them, suggest that we are avoiding making significant changes to how we direct, collect, process, and analyze information, and this will continue to generate “intelligence failures”.

¹² In *Theory, Risk Assessment, and Internal War: A Framework for the Assessment of Revolutionary Potential* (MA Thesis, Lehigh University, 1976), the author undertook an examination of all available secondary literature on the causes of revolution, devised a framework for studying revolution which addresses all pre-theoretical requirements then set by Dr. Harry Eckstein of Princeton University, developed many new probable causes of revolutionary change within non-traditional dimensions, and operationalized all posited pre-conditions by identifying public sources and methods which could be used to predict revolutionary change in each dimension. The brilliant book by Charles Hampden-Turner, *Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development* (Anchor Books, 1970), was used as the basis for integrating the human factor into the study, and the nine aspects of personality adopted from his work.

¹³ The “average analyst” in this article is generally the government analyst, trapped in a bureaucratic system which demands and rewards a form of work where it is presumed that the classified and other government-provided sources represent all information that is pertinent, and production is recognized in relation to a master plan addressing generic requirements rather than specific day to day needs of the ostensible customer for the analysis.

- First, it is important to recognize the dramatic difference between the conventional threat that everyone has grown comfortable following since the end of World War II, and the emerging threats which we are not trained, equipped, or organized to identify and evaluate.¹⁴
 - The *conventional threat* has been governmental in nature, comprised of conventional and sometimes nuclear forces arrayed in a static order of battle, developing their capabilities linearly over time, fighting by known rules of engagement, with known doctrine, providing ample strategic warning of attack, and using known intelligence assets.
 - The *emerging threat* is generally non-governmental, unconventional, dynamic or random in event initiation, non-linear in its development due to the availability of off-the-shelf equipment, fighting without any constraints or rules of engagement, with unknown doctrine, with no established indicators of attack, and with an unlimited fifth column.
- Second, it is important to reflect on how the emerging threats, looked at in a different manner, require a completely different form of “intelligence” as well as a completely different form of “defense” organization.
 - **High-Tech Brutes** are the ones we understand, and are represented by the conventional powers. They practice medium and high intensity warfare, have as their source of power money, and rely on physical stealth and precision targeting of munitions for their effect.
 - **Low-Tech Brutes** are the ones we are beginning to fear, and are represented by the transnational terrorist and criminal organizations. They practice low-intensity conflict, have as their source of power ruthlessness, and rely on natural stealth and random targeting for their effect.
 - **Low-Tech Brains** are the “wild card” of history, and are presented by the Islamic Fundamentalists (who merit respect for their religious beliefs) and also cults (which do not merit religious status). They practice Jihad, have as their source of power ideology, and rely on mental stealth and mass targeting for their effect.
 - **High-Tech Brains** are the threat *de jure*, and are represented by friendly and unfriendly nations practicing economic espionage, transnational

¹⁴ This significant difference was first articulated by General Alfred M. Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his article “Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990’s”, *American Intelligence Journal* (Winter 1989-1990). The author has subsequently developed this theme with an illustrated chart in his article “The Transformation of War and the Future of the Corps”, in *INTELLIGENCE: Selected Readings—Book One* (Marine Corps Command and Staff College, AY 1992-1993), and in various other articles such as “Private Enterprise Intelligence: Its Potential Contribution to National Security”, in *Intelligence and National Security* (Volume 10 Number 4, October 1995),

corporations exercising electronic privateering, and individual information terrorists and information vandals as well as criminal hackers stealing what they can from an unwitting world of nations, corporations, and citizens. They practice information warfare, have as their source of power knowledge, and rely on cyber-stealth and database targeting for their effect.

TECHNOLOGY IDEA: Establish an inter-agency working group, with extensive representation from the private sector and especially including law enforcement, hackers, and non-governmental organization analysts, and devise a completely fresh directory of “indications and warnings” for the three threat categories that comprise the unconventional threat. Undertake an effort to automate multi-lingual content analysis, including the digitization of important foreign language publications not now covered by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and unlikely to be widely monitored.

Come As You Are. Finally we must come to grips with the fact that “the water’s edge” is as dangerous to our security as the “iron curtain” once was, in that it is imposing—on our governmental policy organizations, and on our national and law enforcement intelligence communities—a dangerous and likely catastrophic barrier to the development of seamless lines of communication and shared knowledge about transnational criminal gangs and terrorist organizations moving freely between overseas and domestic locations; major religious as well as cult organizations and alien-smuggling operations; and individuals participating in economic espionage, information terrorism, and information vandalism, in association with international partners, be they governments, corporations, gangs, or other individuals. Consider the following illustration:¹⁵




Figure 3: Come As You Are

¹⁵ Mr. John Peterson, President of the Arlington Institute, developed the original matrix to show how we are too focused on “war, over there” while failing to develop our capabilities for defending ourselves here at home, within a “violent” peace. The author has added the third dimension of time.

What does this chart mean to how we devise policy and execute operations? It has two meanings:

- First, it demonstrates the urgency of creating a seamless architecture for linking policymakers, financial authorities, law enforcement, the military, and all others including non-governmental organizations, into a global information network where shared knowledge is the foundation for preventing conflict and damage to mutual interests including financial stability. Conflict is no longer simply unilateral, military, or “over there”.
- Second, it emphasizes that conflict avoidance and resolution against the emerging threats represent “come as you are” situations, and that we do not have the luxury of time to gradually recognize threats, devise means of monitoring them, and finally come to consensus on means of dealing with them, after which the means can be gradually constituted. An underlying implication of this lack of time is that we must find a means of harnessing all available citizens as voluntary sensors in a global “warning system”, and that we must engage all available expertise from the private sector so as to be able to respond rapidly to threats beyond the ken of the conventional government policymaker, bureaucrat, or analyst.

What does this mean in terms of what we need to know, and how? It means that we now have to cover a much vaster range of “threats” (and also opportunities), each much more subtle, more diffuse, more obtuse, than the traditional conventional threat we have grown to rely on for our feeling of security (that we understand our world). As we shall see in the next section, the U.S. Intelligence Community is neither prepared, nor inclined to become prepared, for this more complex world. At the same time, the private sector now offers a “virtually” unlimited range of open sources, systems, and services, which are directly applicable to meeting the needs of international policymakers, and which have the added advantage of avoiding the constraints associated with classified information.

Part II: Why Don't We Know What We Need to Know?

*The policymaker today suffers from a triple liability: an intelligence community optimized for processing secrets out of context (without adequate access to open and especially multi-lingual sources of information); a government information handling system unable to deal with the flood of unfiltered and unanalyzed information directed at the policymaker from hundreds of international advocacy sources all pressing their own agenda; and a policy process which is inherently focused on domestic political decision criteria acted upon with little time for reflection.*¹⁶

¹⁶ In his first few days as Secretary of Defense, former U.S. Senator William S. Cohen told news media that his greatest problem was coping with the enormous flow of information that floods his office

No person who really understands the roots of the intelligence function in support of policy can fail to be dismayed by the existing situation. Both the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), relative newcomers to the global intelligence community, were created to carry out strategic intelligence analysis and to coordinate inter-agency information and intelligence assessments. Both were intended on inception and into the future to rely predominantly on open sources. Unfortunately, the allure of clandestine operations and then the failure of these same clandestine operations against the Soviet Union, led the United States to invest very heavily in narrowly focused satellite technology, to the detriment of both its clandestine human intelligence collection capability, and its severely degraded analysis capability.¹⁷

In general terms, the U.S. Intelligence Community fails to meet the needs of the policymakers because:

1. It is optimized for secrecy and does not have adequate access to the substantive, contextual, and culturally critical information available from open sources—it cannot claim, with credibility, to be “all source” because of its gaps in access to multi-lingual open sources.¹⁸

and crowds out any time for reflection. “The unrelenting flow of information, the need to digest it on a minute-by-minute basis, is quite different from anything I’ve experienced before.” *The Washington Post*, Wednesday, 5 March 1997, page A22. This is not an intelligence failure—this is a management failure and a staff failure, and requires attention to all three sources of information (classified, unclassified government, and unclassified private sector) and to how the information is converted into usable *digestible* “intelligence”, most of which will *not* be classified.

¹⁷ The author has been privileged to serve for two decades in national and defense intelligence, including three overseas tours as a clandestine service case officer, three Washington assignments focusing on offensive counterintelligence, overhead satellite planning and programming, and the application of advanced information technology to intelligence operations—all with the Central Intelligence Agency—and experience as the founding civilian deputy director for a new national intelligence production facility (the Marine Corps Intelligence Center), and primary action officer for the Marine Corps dealing with National Foreign Intelligence Program and General Intelligence Defense Program matters, in which capacity the author served as the Service representative to the Foreign Intelligence Priorities Committee, the Council of Defense Intelligence Producers, the General Defense Intelligence Program staff, the Open Source Council, the Information Handling Committee, and the Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Working Group within the Intelligence Research and Development Council, among others. All comments in this paper about deficiencies are offered in the spirit of correcting those deficiencies and restoring the U.S. Intelligence Community to its intended role as the linch-pin for strategic analysis in support of policymakers. This is a personal commentary, but a cursory reading of the memoirs of key policymakers easily supports many of the conclusions reflected in this paper. To take just one example, the following pages in George Shultz’s *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), bear reading in this light: 50 (unreliable), 297 (wild plan), 307 (out of control), 312 (faulty intelligence to the President), 425 (intelligence pattern alarming then vague), 492 (is the Secretary cleared—dumbfounded), 493 (so much for our intelligence), 544 (ridiculous imposition), 595 (CIA botches), and 619 (intelligence cooking the books).

¹⁸ “In some areas, such as economic analysis, it is estimated that as much as 95% of the information utilized now comes from open sources...an adequate infrastructure to tie intelligence analysts into open source information does not appear to exist...[this] should be a top priority for the DCI and a top priority for funding.” *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996), page 88.

2. It is extremely dependent on overhead satellite collection assets¹⁹ and severely lacking in commensurate investments in data processing, human clandestine collection²⁰, and human analysis capabilities.²¹
3. It is completely isolated from the larger worlds of government and private sector information and intelligence—by inclination in terms of management and culture, and by design in terms of budgets and technology.
4. It persists in using a priorities-driven requirements system in which repetitive collection against generically monitored high-priority targets (e.g. Russia, China, Iraq) consistently eliminates the possibility of even the most cursory coverage of specific aspects of Third World and other lower-priority targets.

¹⁹ Overemphasis on very expensive and narrowly focused technical collection has been a consistent concern in every major review of the U.S. Intelligence Community since technical solutions came into vogue in the 1960's. For a very fine summary of the "Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence" identified by the Church Commission in 1975, see the article by the same name from Dr. Loch Johnson, in *World Affairs* (Fall 1983). Dr. Johnson's many books, including his most recent, *Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World* (Yale, 1996), stand as one of the more balanced collections of commentary on this important topic. This theme is repeated in the two major reviews completed recently within the U.S. Government, the first in *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996); the second in *IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century* (Staff Study, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 4 March 1996). An interesting insight into "why" this problem persists can be found in the personal experience of the author, who had occasion to review correspondence from the (then) Deputy Director of Intelligence, Mr. Richard Kerr, to the (then) Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator David Boren, declining the offer of "Boren's billions" for another satellite system, but requesting funds for the processing of the volumes of information already being collected. According to authoritative senior officers, we process less than 10% of what we collect on both the imagery and the signals sides of the technical collection function. Sadly, it is a bureaucratic reality that very large and very expensive "one of" systems with single focal points for management in the Administration and for authorization on the Hill, are far easier to work with than inter-agency cross-committee systems of lesser cost and much greater importance to improving government operations as a whole.

²⁰ In the author's direct experience as a clandestine case officer, including subsequent overt discussions with the directors or deputy directors of seventeen intelligence organizations world-wide, fully 75% or more of the case officers and agents in any given country are known to the local service, and at least half the agents (and perhaps 50 of the case officers world-wide) are probably under the control of the host country counterintelligence service. For intimate looks at the human and bureaucratic failings that make this possible, see Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men* (Simon & Schuster, 1995), and David Corn, *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusaders* (Simon & Schuster, 1994). The latter book, on page 163, provides a memorable quote from Shackley's deputy in Laos, Bill Lair, to wit: "We spent a lot of money and got a lot of people killed, and we didn't get much for it."

²¹ Among the better books on the topic of analysis are David A. Charters, Stuart Farson, and Glenn P. Hastedt (eds.), *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment* (Frank Cass, 1996); John A. Gentry, *Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation* (University Press of America, 1993), and Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (Free Press, 1992). Sadly, even the recently retired Deputy Director of Intelligence at CIA, Mr. Douglas McEachin, has been heard to say on many occasions that "it is impossible to do good strategic analysis with a bunch of 19 year-olds on two-year rotations". While he was assuredly exaggerating for effect, the reality is that "hiring to payroll" and the deliberate focus on technical collection rather than human analysis, has left both the national and defense intelligence communities with insufficient funds to hire world-class analysts across the board, and with almost no funds with which to consult world-class experts in the private sector.

5. It lacks a model of analysis and a process of analysis.

Consider this table:²²

Quick Looks	Direction	Collection	Analysis	Dissemination
Strategic Customers: 1. Policymakers 2. Coalition Partners 3. Acquisition Managers 4. Public 5. Media	No tracking system for consumer satisfaction; no integrated multi-disciplinary requirements database; non-traditional consumers not well represented.	Superb but ossified technical capability with limited utility against emerging threats. Very deficient human (clandestine) and open source capabilities.	Cut-and-paste community, a few bright lights kept under tight control, too many young people with little idea of overseas realities and with very limited language/cultural skills.	Cumbersome compendiums of limited utility to day-to-day decisions.
Operational Customers: 1. Theater commanders and staffs 2. Embassy Country Teams 3. Coalition Partners 4. Media	Self-imposed overemphasis on "worst-case" threats continues, with almost complete lack of focus on such basics as Third World mapping data and communications intelligence.	Virtually no support for human contingency requirements, limited low intensity conflict indications and warning capability.	Highly motivated and responsive analysts in the joint intelligence centers, but without adequate access to open source information and especially information in host country foreign languages.	Excellent dissemination to the theater headquarters, very poor capability to support theater (forward), Joint Task Force commanders, or Country Team members.
Tactical Customers: 1. Tactical Military Commanders 2. Non-governmental organizations 3. Host governments 4. Media	From whom? How? At the mercy of national capabilities not designed to support the tactical commander, with a theater staff between the tactical units and the national organizations.	Adequate organic capabilities with the exception of wide-area imagery; ground reconnaissance skills appear to have atrophied; completely inadequate prisoner and refugee handling.	Mixed bag, with personnel generally consumed by volumes of traffic and additional duties—overloaded with raw data, and very inadequate hardware and software.	Lack of realistic communications architecture for sharing data with coalition and civil counterparts, lack of digital mapping data, very vulnerable to electronic attacks at source (home front) and in field.
Technical 1. Tactical commanders and pilots 2. Acquisition project managers 3. Vendors	Well-established mechanisms but not always focused on the right questions. Slow to focus on C3I vulnerabilities.	Very good against denied areas, less so against rogue states, emerging non-state actors, and present-day allies and their religious partners.	Too much emphasis on technical countermeasures and single system threat assessments, with no strategic generalizations.	Adequate in relation to fixed sites; will be completely inadequate when "tactical" technical collection and analysis is needed.

Figure 4: Critical U.S. National Intelligence Deficiencies

²² This table is adapted and updated from the author's "A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligence Capabilities", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (Summer 1993), where extensive commentary is provided on each of the above deficiencies.

In systemic terms, in relation to the four major functions of intelligence and in relation to the four major consumer groups, the U.S. Intelligence Community is not trained, equipped, and organized to be effective against the complex threats *and opportunities* which face U.S. policymakers and their international partners today.

What about with respect to the vaunted individual disciplines or aspects of classified intelligence which are intended to provide policymakers with "plans and intentions" intelligence as well as a full gamut of encyclopedic intelligence, current intelligence, indications & warning intelligence, estimative intelligence, general military intelligence, and scientific & technical intelligence? Below are some unclassified extracts from the evaluative comments that received policy and security approval within the Marine Corps but were never published:²³

- **General Military Intelligence (GMI) Production.** More attention should be devoted to integrating intelligence about operational geography and civil factors pertinent to military operations into over-all estimates.
- **Scientific & Technical Intelligence (S&TI) Production.** Our Service planners and programmers would benefit from expanded analysis of S&TI function to include Third World arms production programs, weapons sales and thefts, and technology transfer. We look for improved integration of both HUMINT reporting and annotated imagery into S&TI production. S&TI databases on the Third World appear lacking.
- **Indications & Warning (I&W).** Many non-military crises require a commitment of military resources for stability or humanitarian reasons. We are concerned by the absence of an estimative methodology and dedicated resources for anticipating such crises. Our community must have a "peacetime engagement" indications & warning capability, together with a capability to produce estimates relevant to national security planning and programming for Third World stability operations.
- **Human Intelligence (HUMINT).** There are several general trends of concern: the most fundamental is that the existing national intelligence capability is simply not able to meet our needs for military and non-military plans and intentions; nor can it provide for contingency support, and stay-behind ground reconnaissance and support assets. This is especially the case in the Third World.
- **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).** The proliferation of commercial technology, the reduction of our overseas basing infrastructure, and the rapid emergency of multiple threat groups in new areas of concern (e.g. criminal and narco-

²³ "Improving National Intelligence Support to Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces: General Areas of Interest", unpublished unclassified paper staffed by author in the aftermath of the Gulf War and as part of Marine Corps contribution to the defense intelligence restructuring effort undertaken in the early 1990's. The author will fax a copy to anyone requesting it via letterhead to facsimile number (703) 242-1711.

revolutionary splinter groups in areas of the world not previously covered) will make it extremely difficult for the SIGINT community to realign its resources and develop new capabilities with the declining dollars it receives under the defense draw-down. The SIGINT community is beset by other challenges, including a lack of qualified linguists for many lower priority languages.

- **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).** The emergence of multi-spectral imagery (MSI), and its commercial availability, together with possible economies achievable by modifying airborne targeting radar, offer innovative alternatives for meeting some of our most pressing requirements.
- **Collection Management.** Our national intelligence community must strive to establish a national requirements system that is useful in the management of resources, is cross-disciplinary, automated, and is responsive to individual customers by allowing them to track their requirements resolution by discipline, country, topic, and time frame.
- **ADP and Intelligence Communications.** The intelligence community as a whole must have a global data-driven C4I2 architecture, which encompasses all mission areas and provides for multi-level communications and computer security oriented toward near-real-time sensor-to-shooter support in Third World operations. The same architecture must also satisfy our requirements for intelligence and information sharing with U.S. law enforcement, foreign military, and non-governmental humanitarian organizations.
- **Processing and Dissemination.** Processing and dissemination management (and concepts) cannot be isolated from ADP and Intelligence Communications management. This is also true of production planning—advances in technology and the manner in which multi-media data can be handled have finally made “product” and “system” two sides of the same coin; our planning processes in these area must be integrated.
- **Intelligence Training.** We would welcome more emphasis on the development of advanced analysis methods and tools throughout the community, and development of a means of exporting these methods and tools to all intelligence analysts. We also need to do a better job of educating non-intelligence professionals regarding all aspects of intelligence, including how to ask for intelligence, how to collect it, and what are the capabilities and limitations of our existing and planned intelligence systems.

Now, lest one conclude that the U.S. Intelligence Community is to blame for its inability to adequately inform the policymaker, it is time to stress several factors which permit its deficiencies to persist:

1. The budget for intelligence operations is not subject to critical review in detail, obscuring virtually everything in its “base” budget and being limited to scrutiny by a few staff employees of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) or the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).
2. The majority of the budget for intelligence operations is managed by the Secretary of Defense rather than the Director of Central Intelligence, and is such a small amount in relation to the total Department of Defense budget as to merit very little oversight from the Secretary of Defense.
3. The budget is not subject to review by the various policy-level consumers in the Administration, to whom “intelligence” represents a “free good” which they may ignore, or consume, at their pleasure. A corollary of this point is that the policymaker is permitted to avoid investing in their own analysts (e.g. the Departments of Treasury and Commerce have mediocre to non-existent intelligence collection and analysis organizations).²⁴
4. No one in Washington is held accountable for ignoring intelligence, and in fact most intelligence is presented in a fashion which makes it not only easy to ignore, but essential: as a cumbersome compendium of classified research, often so compartmented that the executive assistants are not cleared to read it, but so difficult to gain access to (codeword signatures, special vaults) that the policymakers don’t bother to seek it out.
5. The needs of the policymaker, and the wont of the intelligence analysts, are worlds apart. Four contrasts between the two worlds are provided:²⁵
 - The analyst focuses on all-source INTERNATIONAL DATA while the policymaker focuses on DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES as the primary criteria for decision-making.

²⁴ Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has a Deputy Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs, this office does not serve as a focal point for information strategy, for integrating government-wide information collection plans, for ensuring that information funded from one government entity is made available to the rest of government (or the public), or for ensuring that classified intelligence expenditures are coordinated with and complement unclassified information expenditures by the government as a whole.

²⁵ These are taken from the presentation by Mr. Sumner Benson, former CIA analyst then working at the Pentagon, to the 1986 running of the CIA’s senior class on “Intelligence Successes and Failures”. Two other very detailed tables contrasting the needs of policymakers and the wont of analysts, both taken from the 1992 running of the Harvard Executive Program (Intelligence Policy), are provided in the author’s “A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligence Capabilities”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (Summer 1993). That article, incidentally, is the first public presentation of these specific highlights from the two courses. It is unfortunate that the lessons taught in the advanced classrooms of intelligence cannot be implemented in the hallways of bureaucracy, for the stakeholding managers do not share the vision or the zeal of the best of the intelligence instructors.

- The analyst focuses on (and is driven by community managers to) produce “PERFECT” products over a lengthier timeframe while the policymaker requires “GOOD ENOUGH” products immediately. *Analysts continually run the risk of having zero impact because their review process delays their product to the point that it is overtaken by events.*
 - The analyst is accustomed to INTEGRATING all-source information at the CODEWORD level, while most policymaker staffs, and especially those actually implementing operational decisions, have at best a SECRET clearance. “A secret paragraph is better than a codeword page”.
 - The analyst and community management focus on SUBSTANCE and ACCURACY while the policymaker focuses on POLITICS and PROCESS, an arena where disagreement can be viewed as insubordination. Even if new information is received, political considerations may weigh against policy revision.
6. Lastly, the sources of unclassified (and unanalyzed) information available to the policymaker drown out and reduce to almost nothing the impact of the narrow inputs from classified intelligence. Consider these competing influences on the policymaker, all flooding the policymaker with verbal and written information:²⁶
- Politicians (Executive Leadership, Legislative Leadership, Personal and Professional Staffs)
 - Government Officials (Department Heads, Assistant Secretaries, Program Managers, Message Traffic)
 - Foreign Officials and Organizations (Diplomats, Counterparts, Correspondence)
 - Private and Public Sector (Lobbyists, Executives, Citizen Groups, Pollsters, Individuals)
 - Independent Researchers (Think Tanks, Academics, Authors, Foundations, Laboratories)²⁷

²⁶ This material is also drawn from the (now discontinued) CIA course on “Intelligence Successes and Failures”. The founder of that course as well as the primary influence on the establishment of the Harvard course on Intelligence Policy, Dr. Jack Davis, was an inspiration to many analysts, and evidently a major irritant to many politically-inclined intelligence managers—for the final decade of his career he never entered the CIA Headquarters building at Langley, Virginia.

²⁷ While this might seem contradictory to the general theme of this paper, which stresses the utility of open sources of information to the policymaker, it is not. Most of those listed here are listed in their role as advocates of a particular point of view, whereas properly harnessed, the private sector can provide the policymaker with a rich range of objective and balanced unclassified intelligence.

- Media (CNN/C-SPAN, Newspapers, Wire Services, Radio/TV, Pool Reporters²⁸)
- Personal (Family, Intimates, Church, Clubs, Alumni)
- Intelligence Community (CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, NIMA, FBI, State INR, Service Intelligence organizations)

What does this all mean? It means that right now the U.S. Intelligence Community is unable to meet the most practical needs of the policymaker, at the same time that the policymaker is unable to define and manage their own needs in the context of their available funding for unclassified information procurement, and their prerogatives as intelligence consumers to dictate a new focus for national intelligence—one which stresses responsiveness to policymakers and the exploitation of open sources of information. Neither the U.S. Intelligence Community, nor the information management specialists serving the policymakers, nor the policymakers themselves, have focused on the basic fact that intelligence is an inherent responsibility of command, and it is the *policymaker* who must specify the timing, format, length, and level of classification of the intelligence products they wish to receive—to abdicate this responsibility is to persist in a condition of power without knowledge.

Part III: The Perils and Promise of Information Technology

Information technology up to this point has been a resource drain, and ultimately reduced the ability of government to hire and retain world-class experts. Information technology has imposed on the policymaker financial, productivity, secrecy, and opportunity costs. The “iron curtains” between classified information technology systems, policymaker information technology systems, and private sector information technology systems have created a wasteful and counter-productive archipelago of information, which the policymaker needs but cannot access electronically. Billions of dollars are being wasted through a lack of coordination and standardization, and a lack of focus on requirements analysis, human productivity, and the need for easy access to multiple remote multi-lingual and multi-media databases. Information technology continues to offer extraordinary promise, but only if the policymaker begins to manage the technology rather than abdicate technology procurement decisions to technologists far removed from the core competencies of the policy environment.

Information technology, in relation to “content”, appears to have swamped the end-user with three waves, each of which has left the end-user less productive and less informed than they were before having information technology imposed on them.

²⁸ At the time, 1986, the Internet was just emerging into the public eye. Today one would add the Internet to the list of “media” which comprise the “sea” of information where the policymaker must tread water to breathe.

- The “first wave”, when electronic publishing and electronic storage of data first became possible, brought with it two major negatives:
 - Because computer memory was so limited, the end-user was turned into a “virtual slave” to the computer, and obliged to master all manner of arcane commands with which to feed the “c prompt”; and
 - Because librarians were focused on hard copy, and technologists were focused on processing generic bytes, the computer industry developed without any strategy for data classification and data archiving.
- The “second wave”, when increasingly sophisticated word processing and database management programs became available, also brought with it two major negatives:
 - Because the programs were so sophisticated, end-users were required to either spend a significant amount of time in training, or to forego most of the features offered by the programs; and
 - Because the programs kept changing and managers kept allowing the technologists to specify ever-more sophisticated programs for use, the end-user ended up losing access to much of their legacy data, and spending a great deal of time re-entering data to satisfy the changing formats and features of the new programs.
- Now comes the “third wave”, in which the Internet is touted by the most optimistic as well as the least principled (two different classes of advocate) as the be-all and end-all for meeting the information needs of the policymaker, with, again, two major negatives:
 - Because the Internet is such an interesting environment, and new programs do indeed have a lot of power, analysts are disappearing into the void, either hopelessly lost or hopelessly addicted to wandering in cyberspace; and
 - Because the Internet does offer a superficial amount of information on virtually any topic, albeit with no real source authentication or validation, it has become the “classic comics” of knowledge, and too many policymakers and their analysts are accepting the Internet as the first *and* last stop in their quest for information.

As one reflects on the \$300 billion dollars (roughly) that the U.S. Intelligence Community has spent primarily on information technology, and the \$3 trillion (roughly) that the rest of the U.S. Government has spent on information technology (including weapons and mobility systems information technology), four “costs” emerge which must

be considered by policymakers as they plan future investments in information technology:

- **Financial costs.** The ugly fact of the 1980's and 1990's is that information technology usually provides a *negative* return on investment in both government and corporate applications, largely because of the dramatic negative impact on employee productivity, and because of the lack of standardization across organizational lines which interferes with data sharing and also wastes resources through the development of multiple variations of complex systems responding to different managers with the same functional requirements.²⁹
- **Productivity costs.** The productivity costs of badly managed information technology acquisitions are two: the loss of employee productivity due to constantly changing applications; and the loss of organizational productivity due to an absence of attention to external sources of information.³⁰

²⁹ In addition to the author's personal experience while serving in three of the four Directorates of the Central Intelligence Agency, on various inter-agency committees, and in personally planning and executing the budget for a new national intelligence production facility, the enormous knowledge of Mr. Paul Strassmann, former Director of Defense Information and former Chief Information Officer of the Xerox Corporation, has been helpful in understanding this fact of life. Mr. Strassmann, in addition to documenting a potential savings of \$22 billion over seven years (roughly \$3 billion per year, or the same amount identified by OMB as line-item cuts for 1997) through straight-forward improvements in U.S. government information technology "housekeeping", has carried on an in-depth look at Fortune 500 investments in information technology in recent years, and found that their own investments in information technology are randomly associated with productivity and the generation of "knowledge capital™" (Mr. Strassmann's term). Among other studies, the author completed a second graduate thesis on the topic of *Strategic and Tactical Information Management for National Security* (MPA Thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1987), and spent two years studying advanced information technology applications for national security—during that time, the CIA library informed the author that he was responsible for one quarter of all requested copies of articles for the entire organization. Among the many books influencing the author during this period, two deserve mention: Harlan Cleveland, *The Knowledge Executive: Leadership in an Information Society* (E.P. Dutton, 1985); and Robert Carkhuff, *THE EXEMPLAR: The Exemplary Performer in the Age of Productivity* (Human Resource Development Press, 1984).

³⁰ It has been the author's experience that both government and corporate managers tend to abdicate control over their information technology planning to their Chief Information Officers (CIO), who tend to be technologists rather than subject-matter or "core competency" experts. The result should not be surprising: investments are driven by the availability of hardware and software rather than the added value of functionality derived from information technology. The appeal by one senior manager from the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom is typical—Captain Patrick Tyrrell, RN OBE LLB, then on detached assignment from his position as deputy to the Assistant Chief of Staff for C3I, remarked in Brussels, at the Information Warfare Conference in May 1996, that managers must "take back control" from the technologists and refocus information technology investments on the functional needs of their key personnel. For another example, see the U.S. Army's grand plan for multi-media communications in the 21st century, in which they program vast funds for creating a state of the art communications and computing system which can generate and transmit huge amounts of multi-media information—unfortunately, they programmed no funds at all for discovering and digitizing the 80% of the information, including mapping information, which they need to conduct operations, nor did they program any funds for communicating this information to allies, coalition partners, and civilian authorities whose level of information technology lags theirs by a decade or two. The author provided an invited review of the Army's plan to the National Research Council as "Data Mining: Don't Buy or Build Your Shovel Until You Know What You Are Digging Into", 25 October 1994. Interestingly, the most advanced providers of information technology

- **Secrecy costs.** Between classifying our vulnerabilities and classifying our data, we have left ourselves vulnerable to electronic attack of our financial, communications, power, and transportation infrastructures in the private sector, at the same time that we have deprived most end-users of critical information.³¹ There is also “virtual secrecy”, a pervasive compartmentation and concealment of information from the public and indeed from the policymakers, which results from poor information management practices as well as bureaucratic regulations that block access to unclassified information.
- **Opportunity costs.** Between spending billions of technical collection and related security systems, and policies which ensured the technical isolation of analysts dealing predominantly with classified information and analysts dealing predominantly with unclassified information, we have essentially created a dysfunctional technological architecture—we have created a “virtual” iron curtain between sectors (government, business, media, academy); a “virtual” bamboo curtain between institutions within sectors (Oxford, Harvard, Stanford, George Mason, University of Southern Florida); and a “virtual” plastic curtain between individuals who cannot readily share word processing or graphics files. This dysfunctional technological architecture is preventing policymakers from identifying opportunities for conflict avoidance in time to be effective, and at a far lower cost in terms of political and economic resources than will be required later to resolve the conflict once begun.

In summary, today information technology is part of the problem, not part of the solution. However, the fault does not lie with the technologists, but rather with the managers who have abdicated their responsibility for the direction of technology and its proper applications in support of core competencies.³²

systems engineering tend to be very good at enhancing legacy systems and automating access to legacy data already owned by the corporation, and totally—totally—oblivious to the need for developing creative technical solutions for access to the full range of open sources and services available outside the corporation and most often in the form of either hard-copy publications, or unpublished knowledge from key experts which must be elicited and either used up in the moment of decision, or converted into an internal record.

³¹ The report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, under the leadership of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), was released on 4 March 1997. The author testified to this Commission several times, including once in a personal session with Senator Moynihan at the Senator’s request. The author’s extensive written comments on the costs of secrecy are available in “TESTIMONY to the President’s Inter-Agency Commission on National Security Information”, Department of Justice, 9 June 1993.

³² In 1991 Admiral Jerry Tuttle, USN, the “Rickover” of the information age, sponsored Technology Initiatives Game 1991 at the Naval War College. A number of flag officers and senior field grade officers participated. The two most dramatic conclusions reported to the Chief of Naval Operations:

- Technology is not the showstopper—management is where we must change the way we do business.
- Architecturally we must define a completely new paradigm of what information we need, how we handle it, and how it is delivered to the user; this new paradigm must include an information architecture (vice a system/command architecture) approach, must extend to

- **At the strategic level**, we must manage information as the core value—what Paul Strassmann calls “knowledge capital™”, and use information technology to reach across national, organizational, and disciplinary boundaries.³³
- **At the operational level**, we must radically alter how we manage both security and procurement, as both are now hobbling information technology by placing barriers in the way of connectivity and state of the art capabilities, while we simultaneously avoid investing in advanced electronic security programming.
- **At the tactical level**, we must dramatically realign dollars from the collection of classified information, to the discovery, discrimination, distillation, and dissemination of unclassified information.
- **At the technical level**, we must accept that our classified base of analyst workstations is a given and stop trying to create a duplicate architecture of unclassified machines which the analysts and policymakers will never use—instead we must rely on private sector Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) to serve as the “air gaps” for introducing unclassified information into the classified system. At the same time, we must invest in our global Embassies (of all nations) and their related corporate offices, and establish a Global Information Management (GIM) concept of operations.³⁴

Returning to the field of imagery and global geospatial data to illustrate the perils of badly managed information technology, one can observe:

- Billions have been spent to collect repetitive snap-shots of (then) Soviet missile silo doors, at the same time that the mapping satellite constellation was cancelled and the Defense Mapping Agency was forced to create an enormously cumbersome processing system to digest synoptic and relatively microscopic classified images. The system is also poorly suited to integrating commercial imagery sources that have now far outpaced national assets in terms of diversity of utility and breadth of availability.

include commercial and coalition capabilities, and must integrate Geographic Position System (GPS) data.

A copy of the Marine Corps trip report, USMC AC/S C4I Ltr C4I2R dtd 3 Jan 92, is available from the author to U.S. government personnel faxing on official letterhead to (703) 242-1711.

³³ These four points comprise the essence of the author’s invited presentation to the Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Steering Group conference in 1996.

³⁴ The practical and intellectual contributions of Paul Strassmann, and his prolific documentation of the critical role of information technology in the context of management (“information technology makes bad management worse”), make him the *virtual* Chief Information Officer of the United States. His insights into information pay-off, the business value of computers, the politics of information management, and the economics of information are essential to devising and implementing any national-level improvements. The author has extended Mr. Strassmann’s original concept, Corporate Information Management (CIM), to the global context—one time data entry, global access.

- SPOT Image Corporation has most of the earth already in its archives, generally 100% cloud-free, and less than three years old....yet the U.S. Intelligence Community refuses to realign funds to meet the stated need³⁵ of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for \$250 million dollars a year to buy commercial imagery; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense has refused an even more modest request from NIMA for \$25 million a year; the Director of Central Intelligence continues to refuse to create a separate funding line for the procurement of commercial imagery; and NIMA compounds this problem by refusing to acknowledge the EARTHMAP Report and the needs of the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and other key elements of the government concerned with peace and prosperity.
- In the absence of a means for integrating *existing* commercial global geospatial data into a global multi-media database, automated data fusion between distinct sources and disciplines remains an impossibility. *Global geospatial data at the 1:50,000 resolution level is literally the foundation for information sharing and integration and automated value-added processing and—ergo—the foundation for virtual intelligence, virtual diplomacy, and information peacekeeping.*

Now what of the promise of information technology? One can focus on two areas: generic functional requirements for individual workstations; and generic organizational methods for routine, reliable, and responsive access to global data and expertise—neither exist today.

The single most helpful contribution to the productivity of all those supporting policymakers across national and organizational boundaries would be the stabilization of their individual workstations and their means of accessing multi-lingual and multi-media data. At a minimum, organizations must put a stop to the practice of duplicative and counter-productive investments in varying kinds of “all source fusion workstations” which ultimately divide rather than unite data and people.³⁶

³⁵ NIMA today spends around \$3 million on the procurement of SPOT image data. To its credit, it appears to be overcoming historical and technical biases against buying commercial imagery, and has appointed a commercial advocate. The figure of \$250 million a year, originally estimated by the author, was publicly acknowledged as on the mark by Mr. Doug Smith, Deputy Director of Corporate Affairs for NIMA, following his prepared remarks to the Fifth International Conference on “Global Security & Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions”, 16 September 1996.

³⁶ While serving as a founding member of the Advanced Processing and Analysis Steering Group of the Intelligence Research and Development Council (U.S.), the author observed that virtually every “black” compartmented program appeared to be allocating around \$10 million a year to building its own “all source fusion workstation”. Since the data domains were compartmented, the procurement system was essentially funding between 10 to 20 different programs, at a cost of \$100-200 million a year, intended to build 10-20 different versions of the same generic workstation.

<p>Data entry</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selective text and image extraction • Hard copy scanning including color • Audio transcription/translation 	<p>Data routing and records management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automated clustering of related information • Automated gisting • Automated weighting of documents for review • Automated routing, filing, and purging
<p>Data retrieval</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very large unstructured multi-media database search • Automated access to and querying of distributed databases • Menu-driven multiple database/multi-level security access programs • Natural language query conversion to all legacy search systems • Automated flagging of data changes • Retrieval of like images despite angle of look and shades of gray differences • Understanding of numeric variations and equivalents 	<p>Database construction and management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free form database construction • Automated database maintenance and updating • Automated verification and cleansing of data • Automated text extraction • Automated tagging of data elements with level of classification and source • Fully integrated text and images • Automated and ad hoc hot links easily applied • Automated records management • Individual entry protocols for voice and video
<p>Data collection and exploitation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desktop publishing • Graphics and briefing aids • Global electronic mail • Graphical visualization of trends and linkages • Menu of modeling and simulation programs • Automated statistical analysis • Expert pre-screening of indicators and warning • Automated flagging of "hot" words and changes in content over time • Digital map overlays and grid coordinate input • Tailored no-notice map productions to the 1:50,000 level • Automated overlay maintenance 	<p>Knowledge base construction and management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Menu driven access to previous queries • Automated repeat queries • Menu driven flagging of key words, profile extensions • Gradual automated and user-assisted development of key links and concepts
<p>"Intelligence" collection management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automated collection asset inventory and status • Automated matching of assets and requirements • Automated "tasker" • Automated tracking of satisfaction/tickler • "Alternative collection strategies" generation • Raw/finished collection evaluation toolkit 	<p>Administrative and security management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Classified documents control/bar coding • Electronic "marking" of classification by word • Automated sanitization to any level • Automated comparison of like/unlike reports • Quick search OOB and terminology library • Automation of all forms and reports • Automated name traces on refugees and prisoners for any location • Automated access/query audit trail • Automated virus detection & eradication • Smart in-boxes (prioritizing and screening) • Instant retrieval of any order, manual, handbook, or other official document • Instant retrieval of any contingency plan to which the individual is a party

Figure 5: Generic "All-Source Fusion" Workstation Requirements

Above have been a few illustrative examples of generic requirements, which should be part of joint government-corporate efforts to establish an international information technology standard, which contributes to individual productivity:³⁷ The technologists will be quick to say “we can do that”, but there are two realities that continue to escape them:

- Human productivity and human nature cannot afford to learn a different application for each function and task. These are basic functions and tasks, which must be integrated and intuitive.
- Crazy things happen when multi-media and multi-lingual data is needed which can only be obtained from multiple remote sources. No technology should be considered acceptable until it has been fully tested against the real-world data sources and real-world data processing needs of the end-user.

It is essential, therefore, that *policymakers* present a united front, across organizational and even national boundaries, with respect to the generic functional requirements for the single most important tool in the arsenal of the diplomat: the electronic information machine.

Now with respect to external access, and the creation of an architecture through which policymakers can obtain open source intelligence from the private sector, the following two illustrations outline the core ideas for the “information merchant bank” which has been established by the author in prototype.³⁸




Figure 5: Concept for Providing Four Levels of Open Source Information Service

³⁷ The requirements were developed by the author while serving as Project Manager for “Project GEORGE (Smiley)” on the Artificial Intelligence Staff, Office of Information Technology, Central Intelligence Agency.

³⁸ This model for service delivery has been developed by Mr. Jan Herring, a founding member of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), and a man widely recognized as one of the founding fathers of the profession of “business intelligence”. After a full career with the U.S. Intelligence Community as an analyst, retiring in 1983 from his position as the National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology, he was invited by the Chief Executive Officer of Motorola to establish the first major business intelligence unit in the United States, and went on to do the same for Ford, General Dynamics, Phillips Petroleum, NutraSweet, Southwestern Bell, and Monsanto

Early Bird (Periodic Awareness Service). The lowest level of service is the daily *Early Bird* which builds on a quality process such as that offered by Individual, Inc., and provides to each individual policymaker (or supporting staff employee) a one page digest of highly focused current news—each entry comes with a route to obtaining the full text document.

Help Desk (Online Search & Retrieval). The next level of service, the Help Desk, provides rapid response search and retrieval services which can access the Internet, all major commercial online services including international and foreign language online services as well as international electronic databases that are not necessarily “online” but can be exploited remotely, and hard-copy references including general literature such as is available in a major library.³⁹

Primary Research (Experts on Demand). At the third level, even more expertise can be brought to bear on a policymaker’s problem by systematically identifying and then contracting with individual experts who can bring to bear decades of experience and immediate access to all manner of electronic and hard copy sources (as well as their own network of experts and assistants). The economic benefits of out-sourcing decision support to such experts cannot be understated—this essentially allows the policymaker to harness expertise that has been maintained at someone else’s expense, and that has proven itself in the marketplace through peer citation and public success. Oxford Analytica, which uses the Dons of Oxford University as a *de facto* “Intelligence Council”, is the only organization of its kind, and an integral part of any comprehensive effort to take advantage of the knowledge available in the private sector.

Strategic Forecasting (Including Technology Forecasting). Finally, at the fourth level, strategic studies and forecasts, including forecasts of scientific and technical trends and opportunities, can be obtained by using the capabilities of the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI). This unique organization is the sole source in the world of both citation analysis data, which covers all significant peer-reviewed journals in the world (i.e. it is international and multi-lingual) as well as essential technology for mapping specific disciplines and identifying key individuals and centers of expertise. In

³⁹ In the early 1990’s the Central Intelligence Agency created a list of all public journals to which its analysts had access through their library or through subscription, and then established the accessibility of these journals via electronic means. They found that roughly one-fifth were available through LEXIS-NEXIS, one-fifth through DIALOG, one-fifth through other online services or other electronic databases, and two-fifths were not online. Most customers for information services do not realize that most information brokers rely largely on either LEXIS-NEXIS or DIALOG, not both in tandem, and have limited access to the larger range of international online sources, while having almost no access at all to a complete collection of hard-copy references. At the same time, very few customers for information services understand that the best value in searching comes from employing a searcher who has *both* access to a full range of international sources, *and* subject-matter expertise—otherwise, the customer pays for the searcher’s learning curve and false trails. The *Burwell World Directory of Information Brokers* is an essential reference for those doing their own “general contracting”, as it provides both a subject-matter index to information brokers, and (at the author’s suggestion in 1994), an index to brokers speaking a foreign language and familiar with specific foreign databases.

combination with a wide range of other open sources, systems, and services, relatively low-cost strategic forecasts can be developed.⁴⁰

Any organization can establish its own clearinghouse for gaining access to external expertise and knowledge. It may not be as effective as using a “virtual” intelligence center provided by a global leader in open source exploitation, but it will assuredly improve—significantly improve—day to day decision support and hence contribute to the effectiveness of the organization.

Below are an illustration of a basic internal clearinghouse, and a brief description of its core functions.




Figure 6: Generic Concept for Open Source Intelligence Support Cell

The above “cell” is scalable, but the key idea is to avoid at all costs the creation of a centralized unit with increasing numbers of employees which attempts to actually do the research and develop the intelligence itself. Instead, the focus for *each* of the specialists must be on “knowing who knows”⁴¹

The Internet specialist keeps track of external Internet experts who are also subject-matter experts, for instance in regional, scientific, or military domains, and who can be called upon to carry out specific searches of the Internet. This specialist also monitors the development of new Internet technologies.

⁴⁰ It is unfortunate that most organizations turn to very large accounting, legal, or market research firms, and pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for huge compendiums of *information*, when they would be much better served by using a clearinghouse—the information merchant bank—to focus very carefully on their most important questions, and then obtain “just enough just in time” *intelligence*, generally for a fraction of what they would pay for the more comprehensive but less useful compilations of assorted facts and figures.

⁴¹ This excellent phrase is one that the author credits to Dr. Stevan Dedijer. Dr. Dedijer, a member of the original Office of Strategic Services, is considered by many in Europe and elsewhere to be the intellectual father of the concept of business intelligence. He spent many years in Sweden as a professor at the University of Lund, and is now in retirement in Croatia (his birthplace) where he is writing his memoirs and occasionally lecturing on intelligence matters to the Croatian military and police.

The commercial online specialist must understand in strategic terms the relative utility and price value of the various commercial online offerings, and focuses on retaining the appropriate information broker or brokers, each with the necessary expertise at particular online services, as well as a complementary knowledge of the language and /or foreign databases as well as the subject matter area.

The primary research specialist is expert at using a combination of citation analysis, association and other directories, and direct calling to rapidly get answers to questions which cannot be addressed through accessing published information, but rather require either access to “gray literature” that is legally available but only if you know where to go for it, or to a human expert who can construct the answer in real time by drawing on their historical knowledge and access to various sources, including human sources.

The external services specialist (some might wish to distinguish between an external systems specialist and an external services specialist) is a master of the marketplace and follows all of the niche providers who offer narrowly focused technologies (e.g. search & retrieval technologies, visualization technologies) or services. Below are some of the standard niche services that are common to the private sector:

Open Source Examples	Open System Examples	Open Service Examples
Current Awareness	Internet Search Tools	Commercial Online Search & Retrieval
Current Contents	Data Entry Tools	Foreign Language Media Monitoring
Subject-Matter Clearinghouses (Univers.)	Database Construction and Management Tools	Human Document Abstracting and Indexing
Conference Proceedings and Papers	Data Retrieval, Routing, and Records Management	Document Translation
Direct Access to Commercial Online	Automated Document Abstracting and Indexing	Gray Literature Discovery and Retrieval
Contextual Awareness/ Cultural Orientation	Automated Document Translation	Experts on Demand
Document Acquisition	Knowledge-Base Construction & Mgmt.	Primary Research (Telephone Surveys)
Subject-Matter Commercial Databases	Data Mining and Visualization Tools	Private Investigation and Direct Debriefings
Risk Assessment Reports	Desktop Publishing Tools	Market Research
Expert and Association Directories	Multi-Media Communications Tools	Strategic Literature and Technology Forecasting
Photographic Archives	Digital Imagery Processing	Hard-Copy Global Map and Chart Procurement
Digital Data Archives	Electronic Security and Administration Tools	Commercial Imagery and Map Production

Figure 7: Standard Niche Capabilities Offered Within the Private Sector

“Market research” and “studies & analysis” are generic categories where in many cases the customer cannot rely on the provider. In general, providers of such services who have major investments in permanent personnel will *not* take the trouble to systematically identify world-class experts or fully survey external online and hard copy sources. It is an unfortunate reality that such organizations are constantly seeking to assign existing employees, whether or not they are fully qualified to address the specific inquiry, and to avoid paying for direct support from niche providers such as those who specialize in specific languages, citation analysis, patent records search, etcetera.

Information technology continues to offer the policymaker significant opportunities for acquiring and managing knowledge with which to avoid conflicts and resolve conflicts, as well as to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual peaceful advantage, but it will not be part of the solution until the policymaker recognizes that in the age of information, the management of information technology is an inherent function of command, and not something which can be delegated to technologists.

It is also critical that the policymaker focus on content and access to external expertise and multi-lingual data as well as value-added services, and not on internal information handling systems which tend to require more effort to “feed” than they return in value-added.

In the age of information, the cost of communications and computers (hardware and software) has already declined dramatically. Now the cost of content is leveling off and is about to begin declining. The major added value in the next two decades—and information technology has an important but not an exclusive role to play in delivering this added value—will come from:

- **Discovery.** Policymakers have power and they should spend their time reflecting and deciding when they are not in negotiation and in face to face communication with their counterparts. It is for the “virtual intelligence community” to meet the policymakers needs for discovering as much of the raw information as is necessary to meet the policymakers needs for “just enough just in time” intelligence.
- **Discrimination.** A major value-added function is that of discriminating between valid and invalid information, through a constant process of source validation, generally a labor-intensive process requiring genuine human expertise as well as new developments in automated understanding. A cost element can also be provided here, by giving the customer the benefits of superior knowledge in selecting sources of equal content but lower prices.⁴²
- **Distillation.** This is the essence of “intelligence” in that it combines research judgements which first discover and discriminate, and then it adds expert

⁴² There are a number of major media providers, which can be accessed through the Internet for free, or through commercial online services for a fee. This is but one example.

subject matter knowledge to distill the broader effort into “just enough” intelligence—intelligence being information which is tailored to the needs of the policymaker and tightly focused on helping the policymaker with a specific decision at a specific time and place.

- **Dissemination.** Often the timing, length, and even the format of the delivered product can be decisive in determining whether the intelligence contained in the document (or oral presentation, or video, or electronic mail, or whatever) is received by the intended policymaker, absorbed, and compelling enough to support action. There is far more to dissemination than simple delivery.⁴³

The above is not intended to make a case for the use of open sources from the private sector to the exclusion of either unclassified information or classified information from government sources. Indeed, the ideal situation emerges when both the policymaker and the intelligence community use open sources to the fullest extent possible, but with intelligence methods applied to produce open source intelligence, *then* task the classified systems for such information as is truly critical, and finally utilize open sources to protect classified findings but inform those who require information support but to whom classified information cannot be disclosed.

Part IV: Strategic Information Management for Global Peacekeeping

The private sector offers the policymaker an extraordinary range of world-class expertise at very low cost, and with the ability to create new knowledge on demand. In most cases having to do with Third World conflicts, traditionally very low priorities for classified intelligence capabilities, the private sector is the essential source for expertise needed by the policymaker. At the same time, the policymaker can acquire a new appreciation for information as a “munition” or a means by which to alter the balance of power in a conflict through an alteration of the balance of information. A new theory is presented, the theory of “information peacekeeping”, whose elements are (unclassified) intelligence, information technology (“tools for truth”), and electronic home defense. The article concludes that the private sector can be harnessed by the policymaker in a non-intrusive way, but that a national information strategy is required if the policymaker is to be effective in fully integrating and exploiting classified and unclassified government information as well as private sector information. Given a national information strategy, the policy maker can create a “virtual intelligence community” and utilize “information peacekeeping” as a means for the conduct of virtual diplomacy.

⁴³ In a most engaging way, (then) National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci told a group of mid-level CIA analysts in the 1980's that the ideal intelligence briefing for President Ronald Reagan would be “a five minute video, five minutes before his meeting”. This remains a superb statement of the requirement, and one which the intelligence community has yet to acknowledge or address.

In this final part of the article we examine three elements which, taken together, can help avoid and resolve conflicts while significantly increasing the productivity and effectiveness of those practicing “virtual diplomacy”:

- Distributed Expertise in the Private Sector—The Information Continuum
- Information Peacekeeping and “Tools for Truth”
- Information Strategy as the Enabler of Virtual Diplomacy

Distributed Expertise in the Private Sector—The Information Continuum. The following illustrates the “information continuum” which exists today, the vast majority of it in the private sector:




Figure 8: The Information Continuum

In contemplating this continuum⁴⁴, the policymaker should consider the following key findings:

- The expertise contained within each of the sectors is created and maintained at someone else’s expense.
- The expertise which is maintained in these other sectors is constantly subject to the test of market forces, and tends to be more current with respect to both sources and methods than the government’s archives and analysts.
- The cost of this expertise, when the policymaker is able to surmount security and procurement obstacles, is on the order of \$10,000 for a world-class report

⁴⁴ Although the author first developed an open source exploitation strategy in 1989 when he discovered the data vacuum within the classified world while standing up the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, it was not until 1993 and 1994, after first running several international symposia to bring together leading experts such as Jay Keyworth, Robert Kahn, Howard Rheingold, John Perry Barlow, and many others, that the author ventured to publish two formal papers in this area. The first, written under contract to a representative of a European government, “ACCESS: Theory and Practice of Intelligence in the Age of Information” (26 October 1993), is the first comprehensive attempt to examine why national governments must radically alter their investment strategies to better integrate unclassified government information with private sector information, reserving the classified investment for “the hard stuff”. The second, “ACCESS: The Theory and Practice of Competitor Intelligence”, was developed as a keynote presentation to the Association for Global Strategic Information, meeting in Heidelberg, and was subsequently published in the *Journal of AGSI* (July 1994).

which is concise and actionable and delivered overnight, inclusive of the cost of identifying and validating the best choice of expert.

- Such published information as is available to the policymaker through either online retrieval or hardcopy document retrieval represents less than 20% and more often less than 10% of what is actually known by the individual experts.
- The most significant deficiency in national intelligence today as it pertains to providing the policymaker with just enough, just in time “intelligence”, is the lack of direct access to the expertise available in the private sector.

There are many examples of worthy private sector sources and capabilities, which can be harnessed to meet the needs of the policy maker, but for the sake of this article, a practical case study pertinent to conflict resolution, will be reported.⁴⁵

On the afternoon of 3 August 1995, a Thursday, the author was testifying to the Commission on Intelligence regarding the importance of dramatically improving government access to open sources. At the end of the day, at 1700, the author was invited to execute a benchmark exercise in which the U.S. Intelligence Community and the author would simultaneously seek to provide the Commission with information about the chosen target, Burundi.⁴⁶

By 1000 the morning of 7 August 1995, a Monday, the following was delivered to the Commission offices via overnight mail:

⁴⁵ Since 1992 the author has developed and managed five international conferences with contributions from over thirty countries and a cumulative attendance of close to 4,000 self-selected government and private sector experts in exploiting publicly available information. The bulk of the knowledge developed for these conferences is available free at <<http://www.oss.net>>, together with—at the same location, copies of the monthly 30-40 page newsletter on open sources, systems, and services which is published monthly. (Only issues less than a year old require password access and subscription.)

⁴⁶ The exercise is described in vague terms on page 88 of *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community). What the report does not mention is that the comparison was so shockingly graphic that the staff initially decided to avoid the issue of open sources entirely, calling the exercise “unstructured and invalid”. Correspondence with the Chairman was evidently successful, as a three person sub-panel of Members was created, and the report ultimately contained a number of very significant comments on the critical importance of improving access to open sources of information. Perhaps even more significant than its findings on the critical nature of open sources for the U.S. Intelligence Community, was the Commission’s conclusion that intelligence questions which could be answered predominantly by open sources, should be answered by the consumers themselves—by the home organizations of the policymakers needing the intelligence. This is an important recommendation which validates much of this article’s thrust, because the reality is that most policymakers do not have, today, a staff or a fund with which to define their requirement, manage the collection, and then apply the value-added techniques of intelligence analysis necessary to convert open source information into open source intelligence. Policymakers can no longer excuse their ignorance by claiming reliance on secrets that do not materialize—they *must* take responsibility for collecting and producing open source information.

- **From Oxford Analytica**, a series of two-page executive reports drafted for their global clients at the Chief Executive Officer level, outlining the political and economic ramifications of the Burundi situation;
- **From Jane's Information Group**, a map of Burundi showing the tribal areas of influence; a one page order of battle for each tribe; and a volume of one-paragraph summaries with citations for all articles about Burundi published in the past couple of years in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *International Defense Review*, and *Jane's Defense Weekly*.
- **From LEXIS-NEXIS**, a listing of the top journalists in the world whose by-line reporting on Burundi suggested their intimate familiarity with the situation;
- **From the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI)** in Philadelphia, a listing of the top academics in the world publishing on the Burundi situation, together with contact information;
- **From East View Publications in Minneapolis**, a listing of all immediately available "Soviet" military topographic maps for Burundi, at the 1:100,000 level.
- **From SPOT Image Corporation (USA)**, it was determined that SPOT could provide digital imagery for 100% of Burundi, cloud-free and less than three years old, at a ten meter resolution adequate for creating military maps with contour lines at the 1:50,000 level as well as precision-munitions guidance packages and nape of the earth interactive aviation and ground mission rehearsal simulation packages.

The above effort has received wide recognition among those who are responsible for oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and was described by one very senior Hill staff manager as "John Henry against the steel hammer—only John Henry won." In fact, it is very important to stress again and again that open sources are *not* a substitute for spies and satellites (the author has been the first and worked with the second), but rather that both common sense and fiscal realities suggest that it is imperative that the policymaker be able to exploit open sources to the fullest in their public diplomacy, military acquisition, and economic competitiveness roles, while relying on classified intelligence—classified intelligence presented in the *context* of open sources—for those unique insights and details which cannot be obtained through other means, and which in fact are demonstrably so precious as to warrant the risk and cost of espionage.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ In the author's experience, and as generally acknowledged by most senior policymakers with intimate knowledge of the classified world, roughly 80% to 90% of our government's secrecy is derived from a desire to protect bureaucratic interests rather than true national security. True secrets—and the risky expensive means to collect them—could be reduced with a positive net contribution to the political, the military, and the economic health of the Nation. Cf. Rodney B. McDaniel (then) Executive Secretary, National Security Council and former Senior Director, (White House) Crisis Management Center, in

Information Peacekeeping and “Tools for Truth”. As policymakers contemplate the advantages of virtual diplomacy and the potential of information technology, they may wish to absorb the implications of a new theory of information peacekeeping, and the value of “tools for truth”.

Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information and information technology in order to modify the balance of power between specific individuals and groups so as to achieve one’s policy objectives. The three elements of information peacekeeping, in order of priority, are intelligence (providing useful actionable information); information technology (providing “tools for truth” which afford the recipient access to international information and the ability to communicate with others); and electronic home defense, a strictly defensive aspect of information warfare.⁴⁸

Information peacekeeping is *not*:

- the application of information technology in support of conventional military peacekeeping operations, or in support of coalition humanitarian assistance operations;
- the development and execution of traditional psychological operations which focus on manipulating perceptions and imposing strategic deceptions;
- covert action media operations, covert agent of influence operations, or covert action paramilitary operations; nor
- clandestine human intelligence.

Information peacekeeping “gray areas” exist.

- Information peacekeeping may require the clandestine delivery of classified or open source intelligence, or the covert delivery of “tools for truth” (cellular phones, fax machines, personal computers and software for accessing and contributing to the Internet).

Thomas P. Coakley (ed.), *C31: Issues of Command and Control* (National Defense University, 1991), page 68: “Everybody who’s a real practitioner, and I’m sure you’re not all naïve in this regard, realizes that there are two uses to which security classification is put: the legitimate desire to protect secrets, and protection of bureaucratic turf. As a practitioner of the real world, it’s about 90 bureaucratic turf; 10 legitimate secrets as far as I’m concerned.”

⁴⁸ The author originally surfaced the concept of information peacekeeping while talking with former colleague Mr. James Roberts, the SES Director of Intelligence and DoD principal action officer for psychological operations in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Conversing with him undoubtedly helped germinate this idea. This was in 1994. In 1996 the author prepared a *pro bono* paper and presented it to a working group sponsored by the same Assistant Secretary. A copy of this rough paper with various illustrations is available by post mail.

- Information peacekeeping may require the covert delivery of assistance in electronic home defense, or selective information warfare operations (either overt or covert) in order to “level the playing field” between emerging democratic and popular nodes, and their oppressive opponents.

On balance, information peacekeeping is by its nature most powerful and most effective when it relies exclusively on open sources of intelligence and on overt action, and when it is therefore incontestably legal and ethical under all applicable rules of law including host country and non-Western cultural and religious rules of law.

Some general principles of information peacekeeping, which build on the information provided in the first three sections of this article:

- Policy options have to start “here” at home, during violent “peace”, and now.
- Information peacekeeping is the ultimate global presence.
- Information peacekeeping is the *first* policy option—both to ensure that the policymaker has a full knowledge of the situation, and to impact constructively on those we seek to influence.
- We need to develop an information peacekeeping “order of battle” with related tables of organization and equipment—much of this can be “virtual” and rely on private sector providers of information and information technology who are mobilized “just in time”.
- Information peacekeeping is the operational dimension of a broader approach to national intelligence.
- The nature of global security and the ease of movement of transnational criminal and other rogue elements requires the inseparable integration of law enforcement, military, and civilian agencies as well as all elements of national intelligence into a larger global information architecture.
- Information is the ultimate *countervailing force* against the emerging threats, and the most cost-effective means of devising diplomatic and other responses intended to avoid or resolve conflicts.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ No major paper about information can neglect to mention Alvin and Heidi Toffler, and their decades of significant research, writing, and speaking. In particular, their recent books documenting their thesis that knowledge is a substitute—a countervailing force to—violence, wealth, capital, and labor (the author would add time and space as well) merit careful consideration by all policymakers. See specifically Alvin Toffler, *PowerShift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century* (Bantam, 1990), and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Little Brown, 1993). In conducting research for *War and Anti-War*, they planned a chapter on knowledge strategy and discovered that neither the Administration nor Congress had any inkling of this necessary element of national power—but in talking to the author about it, decided to substitute a chapter on “The Future of the Spy” built around four pages describing the open source revolution.

initiatives worthy of a great nation, but they are seriously flawed in that they do not address issues of content and especially of how the policymaker can use the NII and GII to nurture distributed centers of expertise and fully integrate, in real time, the classified intelligence available from selected elements of the government, unclassified government information, and the often more accurate, comprehensive, and lower-cost information available from the private sector.

- **Content.** The private sector will not open itself to control or regulation by the intelligence community, nor will it cooperate with any initiative, which seeks to impose government oversight upon private sector expertise and data. It will, however, welcome government subsidization of the marginal cost of providing increased public access to its expertise, in the same fashion that the National Science Foundation (NSF) nurtures selected scientific & technical initiatives. A National Knowledge Foundation (NKF), funded with just \$1 billion a year by which to nurture distributed centers of subject-matter expertise which permit increased public access to their knowledge, could yield enormous productivity gains in both the private and public sectors. International agreements to implement a Global Information Management (GIM) burden-sharing agreement could radically reduce the cost of information for Third World and other policymakers, and begin the process of creating an "information commons"⁵³ which can support virtual diplomacy.⁵⁴
- **Coordination.** There is an urgent need for voluntary coordination in the arena of standards, of content acquisition and development, and of resource management. Billions of dollars a year are being wasted in the United States alone, simply for lack of coordination across industrial sectors and organizations.

⁵³ The concept of the "information commons" is original to Lee Felsenstein of the Interval Research Corporation, at <lec@interval.com> or (415) 354-0857.

⁵⁴ As the author developed most of these ideas in 1990-1995, there were a number of very valuable opportunities to present them for critical review to concerned citizens and organizations. The staffs and those participating in the conferences sponsored by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Civic Networking, the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center were extraordinarily candid and helpful to an old spy trying to learn new tricks, and their observations have been fully integrated into this and many other articles. The author's initial venture into applying his professional intelligence experience on behalf of the public instead of an elite group of policymakers was inspired by Howard Rheingold, then author of *Tools for Thought: The History and Future of Mind-Expanding Technology* (Simon & Schuster, 1985) and also editor of *The Whole Earth Review*. In agreeing to speak at the first OSS conference in 1992, he required of the author an article in return, which became "E3i: Ethics, Ecology, Evolution, and Intelligence", (WER, Fall 1992) an early reconceptualization of the role of national intelligence which today is gaining acceptance but which at the time was described by a senior CIA official as "confirming [the author's] place on the lunatic fringe". John Perry Barlow also spoke at the first OSS conference, and announced the defeat of the secrecy paradigm by the openness paradigm in compelling terms. Subsequently many other distinguished speakers at these conferences, including Robert Kahn, Jay Keyworth, Vint Cerf, Stuart Brand, and Kevin Kelly (author of *Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization*, Addison-Wesley, 1994), have provided the author with the richest possible mix of intellectual influences, nurturing the rough ideas in this article.

- **Communications and Computing Security.** The vulnerabilities of our financial, communications, power, and transportation infrastructures, all with very heavy computational aspects which are easily attacked by both physical and electronic means, are just now emerging into the public eye, despite a decade of effort by spirited citizen-leaders such as Winn Schwartau.⁵⁵ The intelligence community continues to classify the electronic threat as well as the economic espionage threat, and Congress continues to ignore the need for legislation defining “due diligence” in the electronic arena.⁵⁶

There are many other comments that could be made in conclusion, but at this point, if the four parts of the article have been successful, a simple summary should suffice:

- We need to know about our world in terms and by means that impact on our day-to-day decision making;
- The classified intelligence community as it stands today is not able to meet the needs of the policy makers for real-world intelligence that is timely, accurate, and deep in understanding;
- Neither the intelligence community nor the policymaker have adequate access to the wealth of information available in the private sector;
- A national information strategy can resolve these deficiencies and make the contributions of the intelligence community much more important in the context of unclassified information properly analyzed, and it can also empower the policymaker by making possible the execution of a new form of global power, information peacekeeping.

The really good news is that in comparison with the funding of military systems, contingency operations, disaster relief, and many others aspects of government, a national information strategy—and the resulting ability to create a virtual intelligence community and to conduct information peacekeeping operations—is available today at a fraction of the cost of any alternative program. One billion dollars per year for a National Knowledge Foundation, and no cost at all for a change in approach to information

⁵⁵ Winn Schwartau’s first major book was a novel, *Terminal Compromise* (1990), because his lawyers were afraid of liability issues in the then unknown world of electronic attack. His 1994 book on *INFORMATION WARFARE: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway*, has become the classic work, and done more than any other single work to heighten international awareness of our general vulnerability to electronic attack by individuals, corporations, and states. The author co-sponsors two information warfare conferences with Mr. Schwartau, one in Brussels each May, and one in Washington, D.C. each September.

⁵⁶ A major government organization intercepted each piece of hardware and software reaching its loading dock over a one-year period, and subjected every item to intensive testing. Five hundred distinct computer hardware and software viruses were found during this one-year period, in items coming directly from the factory—shrink-wrapped. It is not safe today to work and play in cyberspace, and a major reason is that no one has defined “due diligence” and the industry is therefore not criminally liable—nor are managers of intellectual property being held liable by stockholders for failing to protect that property from electronic theft.

management—this is easily affordable in the context of \$3 billion per year in savings from improvements in the management of unclassified information technology, and \$10 billion per year in savings from refocusing classified information technology toward “the hard stuff”.⁵⁷ We *can* create a Smart Nation able to practice “information peacekeeping”.

“To worry about war or anti-war in the future without rethinking intelligence and seeing how it fits into the concept of knowledge strategy is an exercise in futility. The restructuring and reconceptualization of intelligence—and military intelligence as part of it—is a step toward the formulation of knowledge strategies needed either to fight or forestall the wars of tomorrow.”

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *WAR AND ANTI-WAR: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Little Brown, 1993), page 164

⁵⁷ In 1994 (then) Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey agreed with the Commission on Intelligence that the U.S. Intelligence Community could safely plan to reduce its annual budget from \$30 billion a year to \$20 billion a year. This was announced publicly by Dr. Loch Johnson during his keynote speech to the Fourth International Symposium on “Global Security and Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions”, 1994. OSS Inc. has published via U.S. Newswire, and has available, an unclassified budget proposal which identifies \$10 billion a year in savings goals for the U.S. Intelligence Community.