
C⁴I

The New Linchpin

By Robert David Steele

From the Marines' perspective, one call should get it all—command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence support to deny the enemy of the same. Today, following the concept of aggregate usefulness, the Marine Corps should better equip, train, and organize, based on that premise.




U.S. NAVY (E. BAILEY)

Last October ten Marines, including six colonels, participated in an extraordinary wargame—"Technology Initiatives Wargame 1991"—sponsored by Vice Admiral J. G. Reynolds (Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) that focused exclusively on command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C⁴I) concepts, architectures, doctrine, and technologies. The centerpiece of the Navy's version (called Space and Electronic Warfare, or SEW) is Vice Admiral J. O. Tuttle's Copernicus concept.¹ During the war game, the Marines aggressively represented the Marine tactical automated command-and-control system (MTACCS) and expeditionary C⁴I requirements and capabilities.

"No-notice" combat operations in the next 20 years are going to move away from traditional engagements between forces and the present focus on key terrain. Ma-

neuver warfare has been part of the evolution. Now, concepts such as "relative advantage" are emerging, and highlighting a decline of ground troops as the automatic first choice in power projection. Instead, much of it may take the form of carefully targeted single-missile attacks against precisely defined deterrence objectives. Disruption, rather than destruction, will be the norm. C⁴I nodes, rather than troops or equipment, will be targets of choice. Warning shots, especially in the deterrence or preconflict stage, will consist of long-range precision weapons guided either by national imagery or by small units of special covert or clandestine forces with a "dial-a-weapon" capability. Or electromagnetic bursts may seek out specific band widths or communications and computer capabilities. Even in a broader conflict, C⁴I and C⁴I countermeasures will have the capability—and therefore the status—of a separate maneuver element.



year 1994-1999 Program Objective Memorandum cycle. This is necessary for several reasons, not the least of which is the requirement for full joint and coalition interoperability. It is also necessary to develop and integrate new and unanticipated capabilities with corresponding concepts, doctrine, training, and equipment. What we can and cannot do with C-I should influence how we train, equip, and organize in all other mission areas.

► Reorient existing forces and equipment to achieve a capability to deal with people and conditions, rather

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
According to a 1989 study, only 10 of 69 areas of interest have complete map coverage. A greater emphasis on integration and adaptation of different computer programs and databases—such as these mapping and vehicle identification models from the Marine Corps Intelligence Center—should begin closing that information gap.

Where does this leave the Marines, who field the world's finest forcible-entry, self-sustaining, combined-arms team? In no way does this reduce the requirement for an effective combined-arms capability. It simply places our potential for creating the greatest amount of violence in the smallest possible space in the context of a much broader world view—one that sees C-I and its countermeasures as both an alternative to combined-arms warfare and an integral part of it, when forces are finally committed.

A Four-Part Approach to Aggregate Usefulness

At a minimum, the following should be undertaken:

► Establish a new "focus of effort" on C-I in the fiscal



than enemies and combat. Recognize what intelligence analysis and common sense are telling us about the likelihood of employment in various stability and limited-objective missions, and recast our structure to provide for the necessarily more robust engineering, medical, military police, public affairs, and civic action capabilities within each division-wing team. Noncombatant operations have entirely different C-I requirements; we need to institutionalize our capabilities in these areas.

► Draw heavily on the Marine Corps Intelligence Center and its new-found ability to provide strategic generalizations about the military capabilities, operational geogra-