

APPLYING THE "NEW PARADIGM": HOW TO AVOID STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN THE FUTURE

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This article focuses on three concerns of mine which are central to ensuring that the restructuring effort is meaningful. First, what "sins" of strategic intelligence persist in the face of restructuring? Second, how must the nature of the individual intelligence analyst, their working conditions, and their relationship to policy-makers change if we are to avoid strategic intelligence failures in the future? And third, how must we relate defense intelligence restructuring to a broader national effort to establish a truly national knowledge management and information technology strategy, a strategy to empower our enterprises and schools while enabling our government to make informed policy decisions in all areas?

Here are the major sins we are committing today:

(1) Excessive collection of technical intelligence (including much too much emphasis on repetitive collection against higher priorities instead of baseline collection against lower, e.g. Third World, priorities);

(2) Cursory attention to both open source collection, and the need for a

modest and redirected expansion of our clandestine human intelligence collection capability;

(3) Severe shortcomings in control over intelligence resources - those responsible for billions of dollars in each year's budget have no capability to evaluate relative returns on investment across programs or elements of the intelligence cycle, and no adequate mechanisms for ensuring government-owned capabilities are shared and not duplicated.

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(4) Mindset inertia. We still have very senior bureaucrats and appointees insisting that we maintain our traditional priorities against the Soviet

Union and major economic powers. To be clear on this problem:

(a) It will continue to be difficult for our policy-makers and senior intelligence managers to focus on the need for changed priorities because our intelligence and foreign affairs communities are at least two generations away from fully understanding the Third World and dimensions of change outside the political-military and transnational economic environment. We do not have an adequate methodology for studying the preconditions and precipitants of revolutionary change (including ideocultural, techno-demographic, and natural-geographic change), and no indications and warning (I&W) capability suited to this challenge.

(b) Our entire intelligence structure, our designs and methods, do not lend themselves to being restructured and reconstituted. It is as if, after decades of learning how to build Cadillacs, our very fine Cadillac, accustomed to traveling the same super-highway back and forth, must suddenly be taken apart and put back together as an off-road vehicle able to deal with the treacherous terrain and back roads of the Third World. It is