

# GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES IN THE 1990'S

by General Alfred M. Gray  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

"The Corps must be 'fighting smart' if it is to meet the combined challenge of an austere fiscal environment and an increasingly lethal expeditionary environment."

- A. M. Gray, CMC



*General Gray, who served a tour as an intelligence officer, understands the value and uses of intelligence. General Gray is an articulate proponent of intelligence in the JCS forum. He has been kind enough to provide us with his views on global intelligence issues from his perspective as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. General Gray states how he is posturing the Marine Corps and what requirements he envisions for intelligence in the era of "revolutionary war."*

*General Gray is an Honorary Life Member of NMIA.*

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff observe the dramatic changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the increasingly volatile and lethal Third World on the other, it is immediately apparent that the 1990's will be a period of global and sweeping challenge to both intelligence professionals and the policy-makers and tactical commanders they support. When we add to this equation the severely constrained fiscal environment, forcing all of us to do more and more with less and less, these challenges verge on being overwhelming.

Our ability to gauge events and their implications in Eastern Europe; our ability to estimate and forecast Third World change in all dimensions (socio-economic and ideo-cultural as well as the more traditional political-military); our ability to develop indications and warnings of emerging threats in the Third World; our ability to provide intelligence for counternarcotics and counter-terrorist programs; and our ability to protect national security secrets through both offensive and defensive counterintelligence; these will define and guide the national strat-

egy, national defense posture, and national military force structure and systems acquisition in the 1990's.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs will require the absolute best intelligence available if they are to make prudent decisions about fiscal, system, and operational matters. To the extent that intelligence fails or proves inadequate, our national defense programs suffer, both through the expenditure of millions of dollars on inappropriate capabilities, and through a lack of readiness to deal with unanticipated or underestimated threats. We need to strike a better balance between our capabilities and actual requirements. We simply cannot afford to equip and train for the wrong war.

The U.S. Marine Corps, as the nation's "force of choice" for expeditionary operations, must be extremely concerned and vocal about global intelligence challenges in the 1990's. The Marine Corps is also a microcosm of the Department of Defense as a whole. A Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is self-contained and sup-

ported, must be able to work with all other Services and civilian agencies overseas, in all operational plans worldwide, and must have constant near-real-time access to national, theater, and in-country intelligence. Our Corps is particularly well-suited to respond to these challenges, but to be most effective, we must obtain more balanced intelligence coverage of the Third World.

Since WWII there have been over 200 situations requiring the use of U.S. forces; roughly 85% required employment of the Marines, and virtually all were in the Third World. Prior to WWII and the establishment of a bipolar world, there is an even richer history of Marine Corps employment in expeditionary and constabulary operations throughout the Third World.

---

***...we must obtain more balanced intelligence coverage of the Third World...***

---

As nuclear/conventional threats stabilize, a multipolar world is forming, characterized by shared global concerns as well as competing interest in regions containing powerful Third World nations. This environment offers both opportunity and challenge for policy-makers concerned with the protection of U.S. interests.

The east-west factor will not be the central focus of our contingency planning in the 1990's. This represents a fundamental challenge to the intelligence community, because the emerging threats in the Third World require a distinctly different approach to intelligence than does the relatively static threat posed by the nuclear and conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

In recognition of this challenge, we are doing what we can to improve tailored intelligence for Marine Corps' need at both the strategic and tactical levels.

— At Headquarter Marine Corps, we have combined our Intelligence Division and C<sup>4</sup> Divisions to form the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence and Interoperability (C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup>) Department under a Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff. This department will ensure execution of my C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup> plans and policies which are best exemplified by recent guidance to Marine Corps general officers: "If you can't manage information and data, you can't command."

— At Quantico, we are creating and bringing up to speed a service-level intelligence center within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. I have tasked that activity with becoming, as quickly as possible, a model all-source fusion center. With assistance from the

General Defense Intelligence Program, we expect this modest initiative to become a lead site for "state of the shelf" intelligence analysis tools, and serve as a catalyst for combat development activities involving force structuring, doctrine, equipment requirements, and the training and education of our warriors. The Intelligence Center will also serve as a gateway to the various reservoirs of both classified and open source knowledge about the world wherein our MAGTF's are most likely to be employed.

— In the Fleet Marine forces we have formed the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups (SRIG). This internal initiative brings together under one commander the resources necessary to meet the operational and tactical commander's needs, and significantly facilitates the integration of command & control, communication, computing, and intelligence resources at the tactical level.

Our understanding of the difference between the conventional and the emerging threat is illustrated below:

**Conventional Threat**

- Governmental
- Conventional/Nuclear
- Static Orders of Battle
- Linear
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Known Doctrine
- Strategic Warning
- Known Intelligence Assets

**Emerging Threat**

- Non-Governmental
- Non-Conventional
- Dynamic or Random
- Non-linear
- No constraints (ROE)
- Unknown doctrine
- No established I&W net
- Unlimited 5th column

This radical difference between conventional threats and emerging threats poses a strategic challenge that must be met with a strategic response. A fundamental element of our success in developing a strategic response will be our ability to agree on a broader continuum of civilian and military programs requiring in-depth sustained intelligence support. In dealing with "low intensity conflict" it is imperative that the importance of intelligence to all activities, including overt civilian and military programs, be validated, and resources applied accordingly.