

Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War

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Information Peacekeeping is one of two neglected aspects of Information Operations, a new concept that up to this point has focused almost exclusively on Information Warfare, and avoided dealing with the substance of All-Source Intelligence, or the proactive possibilities of Information Peacekeeping. Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information and information technology so as to achieve national policy objectives. The three elements of Information Peacekeeping, in order of priority, are open source intelligence; information technology; and electronic security & counterintelligence. Information Peacekeeping is the strategic deterrent as well as the tactical force of first resort for the 21st Century. Virtual Intelligence, a supporting concept, is the foundation for informed policy-making, judicious acquisition management, effective contingency planning and execution, and timely public consensus-building. By its nature, Information Peacekeeping must rely almost exclusively on open sources and services available from the private sector; this requires the crafting of a new doctrine of national intelligence that places the critical classified contributions of the traditional national intelligence communities within the context of a larger global information community. Information Peacekeeping is the purest form of war, but most traditional warriors will be reluctant to accept its most fundamental premise: that intelligence is indeed a virtual substitute for violence, for capital, for labor, for time, and for space. Information Peacekeeping is in effect both a strategy for government operations and a national security strategy with global reach; consequently it has profound implications for how we train, equip, and organize our government and our military.

INTRODUCTION: Intelligence as Munition

Time and time again, the U.S. defense and intelligence communities rush to spend billions on technology, while routinely ignoring the challenges and the opportunities inherent in human collection, open-source collection, foreign area expertise and human all-source analysis.¹ We do it in mobility systems, in weapons systems, in command-and-control systems and in intelligence systems. Sadly, leaders in all corners of the Department of Defense (DoD), at all levels, continue to abdicate their responsibility for thinking at the strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels, and have surrendered their forces to the mindless flow of self-generated bits and bytes.²

This is not the place to repeat original thinking from earlier writings,³ but it is the place to emphasize the fact that a majority of the U.S. military leadership still does not "get it." The Revolution in Military Affairs is a joke. It is nothing more than lip service, substituting astronomically expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter guidance, nor any relevance to three of the four warrior classes, for outrageously expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter guidance and dated relevance to one of the four warrior classes. The three warrior classes we must confront in this new era are: the low-tech brutes

"INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: The Purest Form of War," in Douglas Dearth and Alan Campen, *CYBERWAR: Myths, Mysteries, and Realities* (AFCEA Press, June 1998).

(transnational criminals, narco-traffickers, terrorists); the low-tech seers (ideological, religious, and ethnic groups unable to accept conventional relations among nations); and high-tech seers (a combination of information terrorists or vandals, and practitioners of economic espionage).⁴ Most of our training, equipment, and operational doctrine are completely unsuited to meeting the threat from these three warrior classes. Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that our national “order of battle” must now fully integrate our government civilian agencies and our private sector information reserves, but we have no one in a leadership position who is willing or able to deal with this harsh and urgent reality.

The real revolution is being led by a few original thinkers who have yet to be heard on Capitol Hill and whose thoughts are a decade from influencing fruitful changes in how we train, equip, and organize our Nation for war. Alvin and Heidi Toffler were among the first to articulate the fact that information is a substitute for wealth and violence, for capital, labor, time, and space.⁵ Pilots and ship drivers may never forgive Martin Libicki for reframing their platforms as delivery vehicles for intelligence-driven operations.⁶ Winn Schwartau overcame his Hollywood and rock-and-roll past ultimately to inspire a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.⁷ Colonel James Clark blew past the nay-sayers, with support from a very wise Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to bring EAGLE VISION in as an operationally effective means of putting real-time commercial imagery into tactical service—something the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) refused to contemplate and still resist at every level.⁸

Information Peacekeeping,⁹ the subject of this chapter, is the purest form of war. It shapes the battlefield, it shapes the belligerents, and it shapes the bystanders in such a way as to defeat the enemy without battle—in such a way as to achieve U.S. policy objectives without confrontation and without bloodshed. Sun Tzu would approve.¹⁰

DEFINITION: A Strategic View of Information Operations

At the strategic level Information Operations must be seen as a triangle in which all-source intelligence, information warfare, and information peacekeeping are seamlessly integrated and inherent in all aspects of military and civilian operations. *Perhaps the most important aspect of information operations in the 21st Century is that it is not inherently military; instead, civilian practitioners must acquire a military understanding and military discipline in the practice of information operations, if they are to be effective.*

Information Operations tends to be viewed as a strategic form of Information Warfare, and this is a much-too-narrow view which deprives the policy-maker, acquisition manager, and commander of two-thirds of the “firepower” represented by a more accurate and well-rounded understanding of Information Operations.

All-Source Intelligence is the critical classified element of Information Operations which assures all parties being supported that they are receiving essential indications and warning intelligence, current intelligence, and estimative intelligence, to name just a few kinds of all-source intelligence.

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