

CHAPTER 9

THREATS, STRATEGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY

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While suffering substantial reductions in manpower, and failing to modernize the conventional force, the American military claims to be ready so as to support the political claims of its current master in the White House. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The American military is not ready, either for two simultaneous theater conflicts, or for a range of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In fact, we have real culture shock within our military, where a serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be heard to say "Real men don't do OOTW" at the same time that units are stretched to the breaking point while they do exactly that: OOTW in every clime and place. The other elements of our national power—the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and justice elements of our government—are also not ready to make their contribution to national security in the 21st century.

We require a comprehensive evaluation of the threat, a reconstitution of our national security strategy, and a deliberate but prompt investment in training, equipping, and organizing the forces needed to protect our nation in the 21st century. The "2+" strategy of structuring the force to address two major theater war (MTW) scenarios at once is driving our military into severe degradation. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not a substitute for strategy and it is bankrupting our military by diverting what disposable funds we have toward an overly technical "system of systems" that is neither financially nor militarily

sound. At the same time, RMA is creating an enormous interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—between our forces and those of allied nations, and between our commanders and the 98 percent of the relevant information they need that is in the private sector and not accessible by our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.

This review, after evaluating the real-world threat, outlines a change in our national security strategy from 2+ to 1+iii—we need *four* forces after next, not one—and an increase in national security spending on the order of \$40 billion a year for traditional military capabilities and \$10 billion a year for nonmilitary capabilities in direct support of our long-term national security strategy. Regardless of funding, however, we need to restructure the force.

Arriving at the Bottom Line Figure.

Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, said in the 1990s, with perfect clarity:

I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line defense number. I don't know of any logical way to arrive at such a figure without analyzing the threat; without determining what changes in our strategy should be made in light of the changes in the threat; and then determining what force structure and weapons programs we need to carry out this revised strategy.

This review follows Senator Nunn's cogent tasking by first discussing the threat, then recommending a strategy appropriate to the threat, and finally proposing specific force structure modifications as are necessary to execute the new national security strategy, a strategy I call the "1+iii" (One Plus Triple I) Strategy. This new strategy will reinforce our conventional military; substantially enhance our expeditionary, constabulary, and special operations forces; create a bold new program to achieve force protection through global intelligence coverage that inspires economic and cultural investments; and assure home front security

through a much expanded and better integrated combination of electronic security and economic counterintelligence that extends the concept of national security down to the state and local level through revolutionary new uses of our National Guard and Reserve forces.

Analyzing the Threat.

The “threat” to the United States in the 21st century must be evaluated in the larger context of a world where conflict is the norm, where major ethnic fault lines cut across all major continents, where transnational criminals and local warlords are amassing fortunes through trade in women, diamonds, food, and medicine; and where water—our most precious resource—is approaching a “tipping point” of nonrenewability.

Let us begin with conflict. Each day, today, we have on-going 26 severe low-intensity conflicts that killed over 300,000 people in 1999 alone, and cumulatively, have killed roughly 8 million over time. There are 78 less severe low-intensity conflicts, and over 178 violent political conflicts internal to specific nation-states. India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, China, Russia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, all populous countries, are engaged in between 6 and 32 conflicts each!

Conflict trends are troubling. Severe low-intensity conflicts (defined as conflicts with over 1000 casualties per year), have leveled off. However, lesser low-intensity conflicts are increasing steadily in number each year, while violent political conflict, often ethnically-based, has leaped toward geometric increases year by year. Figure 1 shows the actual number of conflicts per year from 1995 to 2000.

In addition, relying on the aggregate data collected and analyzed by centers of excellence such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), we see that our world, today, endures 29 complex emergencies as