

COMMENTARY

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Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still in Denial

Dr. Jennifer E. Sims's article, "Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details," (*IJIC*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 195–217) is quite wonderful in all respects save one: it deals only with secret government-to-government intelligence liaison, and makes no reference at all to the many non-secret, nongovernmental, and non-intelligence liaison and information sharing arrangements that have been under development for the past eighteen years, and are just now about to explode into global reality. Bottom-up collective public intelligence is here to stay, and the new standard, defined by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, is Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information Sharing (M4IS). As I note in on the inside flap of my latest book,¹ "Sharing, not secrecy, is the operative principle." While now obvious to the rest of the world, it is necessary to add here that the sharing of non-secrets among nongovernmental organizations is the defining aspect of M4IS, and governments, while they may be the catalysts for such arrangements, are largely the beneficiaries, not the benefactors, of M4IS.

In as much as my own article on "Peacekeeping Intelligence," based on a presentation I made in Sweden in December 2004, subsequently appeared in *IJIC* (Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter 2006–2007), I will say no more about the seven tribes, or the other rather obvious fact that open source information in 185 languages, including 12 still-relevant variations of Arabic, now comprises 80 percent or more of what the government needs to collect, process, and analyze. Despite this, the U.S. not only spends less than one-tenth of one

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percent of its total secret intelligence budget on open sources *but also* the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS)—to whom the Intelligence Community has pledged its complete support—is not a Program Manager, has no real authority, and lacks any staff other than (at least awareness) two people on rotation. This is simply not serious management, one reason why the Department of Defense is completely justified in going its own way.

I agree wholeheartedly with my friend Dr. Sims on the matter of information and intelligence metrics,² one reason why Team OSS includes Thomas J. Buckholtz, author of *Information Proficiency: Your Key to the Information Age*. Tom has led the knowledge-management, computing, and telecommunications practice for the 4,000,000-person Executive Branch of the United States federal government. He also led a program that catalyzed \$100,000,000 in recurring annual benefits for a \$6 billion corporation—in other words, metrics can help enhance one's Return on Investment (RoI).³ However, and I say this as one who supported Martin Hurwitz, then Director of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) when he tried to do this in 1990–1992, there are two major flaws in all prior and current approaches to metrics for intelligence: flaw#1 is that they are not tied to policy outcomes, and flaw#2 is that no one—and especially the high-end defense technical collection agencies—is held accountable for failing to show a reasonable return on investment in the larger context of our total intelligence analysis needs.

Continuing Reluctance

My observation on connecting intelligence to budgets and interagency behavior, that is to say, rational unified national security programs in touch with reality, will no doubt inspire sighs of exacerbation from all those who remain in denial and continue to believe there should be a wall between intelligence and policy. These are the same people who have refused—with the exception of Joe Markowitz and Gordon Oehler—to take open sources of information and lower-tier instability threats seriously from 1988—when Commandant of the Marine Corps Al Gray made this an issue in his seminal article, “Intelligence Challenges of the 1990's,” as published in the *American Intelligence Journal* (Winter 1988–1989)⁴—to this very moment.

The Importance of History

History is the context for intelligence and policy metrics. This is about ends, ways, and means—about sustainable outcomes that must be guided by intelligence, but can be achieved only through wise policy.⁵ The Intelligence