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## Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations

The use of intelligence as a support tool in conducting international peace operations has received considerably more attention among practitioners in recent years. In contrast to the banning of the term "intelligence" by the United Nations in earlier peacekeeping missions, and the UN's refusal to acknowledge the usefulness of intelligence gathering and analysis, modern peace operations have increasingly included intelligence assets to support the mission. Although some political sensitivities remain—for example, the use of the title "military information" as opposed to "military intelligence" for the intelligence assets provided to the UN—constraints on the use of intelligence structures and personnel for direct mission support, either by the UN or by other coalitions involved in peace operations, seem to be diminishing.

This change has been particularly noticeable in "complex emergencies," such as those in East Timor, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo. The key feature in each instance has been international intervention in intrastate conflicts. These missions have involved significantly more complicated environments than have traditional peacekeeping operations. The key difference between them has been the attempt to coordinate the political, diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to resolving an area's internal crisis. The military's key role is as a stabilization force to restore

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or create conditions for internal security, thereby permitting a stable environment for success for the other, nonmilitary initiatives. These complex environments have required differences in the intelligence structure and missions for the military operations designed to stabilize the security environment.

Assessing the intelligence system designed to support these stability operations includes mission-specific intelligence functions; strengths and potential weaknesses of major intelligence disciplines; the intelligence architecture designed to support stability operations; and the issues involved in making these elements work in practice. Somalia, the Balkans, and Haiti provide good examples for study. The focus here is on the United States intelligence system, since the U.S. provided the major intelligence systems and structures for these particular interventions, with considerably more open reporting by U.S. sources of challenges faced by the intelligence systems in these missions. But many of the issues raised by U.S. sources are likely to be similar to those faced by other countries.

#### INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Many specific requirements for standard military intelligence (MI) missions in supporting peace enforcement or stability operations are the same as those for conventional military operations.<sup>1</sup> In fact, many standard intelligence structures and procedures can be easily adapted to the operational environment for stability missions. Military intelligence officers involved therein have noted that collection management and intelligence preparation of the battlefield follow procedures similar to those of normal military operations; Army doctrinal publications also emphasize the same procedures.<sup>2</sup> But a very significant difference in the intelligence requirements between conventional military operations and stability missions is the relative merging of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence requirements in stability missions. This mixing of different levels of intelligence requirements results from two principal causes.

The first is the missions' very complex environment. They involve concurrent military, diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, and economic programs. Though they are only one component of the overall international effort, the military forces are involved in one way or another in supporting most of the nonmilitary initiatives. These requirements result in the expansion of the intelligence issues that military intelligence analysts must cover. As noted in the 1994 U.S. Army publication *FM 100-23*, "Success for the intelligence officer... often focuses on what were formerly considered *nonmilitary topics*, such as politics, economics, and demographics. The intelligence officer must consider political objectives that drive military decision making at every level."<sup>3</sup> Another U.S. Joint