



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE; SEPERATING THE  
INSURGENT FROM THE POPULATION**

by

Kevin Burke

December 2007

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

Douglas Borer  
Bob O'Connell

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2007	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Civil Reconnaissance; Separating the Insurgent From the Population		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Kevin Burke		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT Civil Information Management is one of the main tools in conducting effective counter insurgency operations, yet there is no definitive doctrine that explains how to collect, analyze, or warehouse Civil Information. This thesis provides a methodology for collecting civil information in a counter insurgency environment. The proposed methodology provides a foundation for the creation of standard operating procedures and tactics to enhance the US Military's capability to conduct Civil Reconnaissance and Counter Insurgency Warfare.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Human Terrain Team, Human Terrain, Civil Affairs, Geospatial, Temporal, Socio-cultural, open source, ASK, Asymmetric Software Kit, CIM, Civil Information Management		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 101	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited**

**CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE; SEPARATING THE INSURGENT FROM THE  
POPULATION**

Kevin P. Burke  
Major, United States Army  
B.S., North Georgia College, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2007**

Author: Kevin Burke

Approved by: Dr. Douglas Borer  
Thesis Advisor

Dr. Bob O'Connell  
Second Reader

Dr. Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ABSTRACT**

Civil information management is one of the main tools in conducting effective counter insurgency operations, yet there is no definitive doctrine that explains how to collect, analyze, or warehouse civil information. This thesis provides a methodology for collecting civil information in a counter insurgency environment. The proposed methodology provides a foundation for the creation of standard operating procedures and tactics to enhance the us military's capability to conduct civil reconnaissance and counter insurgency warfare.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	DEFINING CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE.....	3
	A. INTRODUCTION.....	3
	B. CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE .....	3
	C. WHAT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS NOT.....	4
	D. IF CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS DONE WRONG .....	5
	E. WHO CONDUCTS CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE .....	5
	1. Clash of Culture; An example from Afghanistan .....	6
	F. HUMAN TERRAIN .....	9
III.	WHY CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE.....	11
	A. INTRODUCTION.....	11
	B. THE ENEMY .....	12
	C. ON FRIENDSHIP .....	20
	1. The Phone Number- (When Opportunity Meets Preparation).....	20
	2. AL NUKHAYB (What Right Looks Like).....	22
IV.	HOW TO CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE .....	27
	A. INTRODUCTION.....	27
	B. PRE DEPLOYMENT PHASE.....	28
	C. DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE .....	31
	1. Introduction.....	31
	2. The Survey .....	33
	3. Operations After the Survey .....	38
	4. Non-Violent Direct Action .....	39
	5. Rapport Building Operations.....	41
	6. Drawing Operations- .....	44
	7. Emersion Operations .....	46
	8. Network Building Operations- .....	47
	D. POST DEPLOYMENT PHASE .....	48
V.	WHAT INFORMATION TO COLLECT .....	51
	A. INTRODUCTION.....	51
	B. GEOSPATIAL.....	51
	1. Introduction.....	51
	2. Geographic Information System .....	52
	3. Components of GIS .....	53
	4. GIS relevance to COIN.....	54
	C. RELATIONAL .....	56
	1. Introduction.....	56
	2. Utilizing SNA .....	57
	a. <i>Overt Networks</i> .....	59
	b. <i>Steps in Conducting Analysis</i> .....	62
	D. TEMPORAL .....	64

	E.	SUMMARY .....	65
	F.	CONCLUSION .....	65
VI.		THE HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE .....	67
VII.		CONCLUSION .....	79
	A.	SUMMARY .....	79
	B.	ISSUES THAT REMAIN.....	80
	1.	Internal.....	80
		a. <i>Development of SOP</i> .....	80
		b. <i>Warehouse the Data</i> .....	81
		c. <i>Training</i> .....	82
	2.	External .....	82
		a. <i>Keeping CR Out of the Intelligence Community</i> .....	82
		b. <i>Evolution of Software and Technology</i> .....	83
		c. <i>Unifying the Effort</i> .....	83
		d. <i>Educating the force</i> .....	84
		LIST OF REFERENCES.....	85
		INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	89

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Actual photograph of local boy who provided phone number and the numbers provided during the relief in place.....	22
Figure 2.	Ranger Company Commander interacting with locals during food distribution. ....	24

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

# I. INTRODUCTION

US Army Civil Affairs branch has been given the task by the Department of Defense to conduct Civil Information Management (CIM) as one of its primary tasks. CIM has been defined by the Civil Affairs community as the process of collecting, analyzing, and warehousing of civil information for others to access in order to enhance operational awareness and cultural understanding. The first step in CIM is collecting the information or conducting Civil Reconnaissance of the operational environment.

There is no definitive doctrine that explains how to collect, analyze or warehouse Civil Information. The anticipated result of this thesis is to provide the ground work for the development of a methodology for collecting civil information in Irregular Warfare, specifically, the counter insurgency fight. The center of gravity of both insurgents and counter-insurgents is the population. Insurgents need the population primarily to provide cover and concealment, while offering some level of active or passive assistance. Counter insurgent forces need the population to provide information that will essentially remove the insurgent's ability to hide, and use non combatants to gain support and facilitate operations. This assistance insurgents seek from the population ranges from providing recruits and assisting in operations, to turning a blind eye to activities and not reveling essential details to counter insurgents. In order to effectively remove the insurgent's ability to hide amongst the population we must first understand the population and the underlying motivations for their support of the insurgency.

The enemy is no longer conspicuous and observable through traditional methods and technologies, but can be discovered by observing locally relevant phenomena and social networks. Much of the information counter insurgent forces need is not gained through covert or technical means but can be discovered through regular and systematic interaction with the local population. Historically the military focus in counter insurgency warfare is to provide security to the population by seeking out insurgents through conventional tactics, which

has recently equated in Iraq and Afghanistan to conducting patrols and hoping for enemy contact. Some intelligence is derived from interrogations, informants and conventional intelligence gathering techniques, but creating operations to engage the local population and gain their long term trust and confidence have not been designed or conducted on par with direct action style operations.

The intent of conducting civil reconnaissance in the counter insurgent environment is; to collect civil information in order to engage the civilian population with precision; provide an overall enhanced understanding of the human terrain; impede the enemies ability to operate freely among the population and use it as cover and concealment for operations; reduce the risk of undesired secondary and tertiary effects of military operations; and capitalize on opportunities to gain the trust and confidence of the civilian population.

## **II. DEFINING CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Civil Reconnaissance (CR) is the process of gathering a broad spectrum of civil information about a specific population in support of military operations. Civil information encompasses relational, temporal, geospatial and behavioral information captured in a socio-cultural backdrop. It is information developed from data related to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be processed to increase situational awareness and understanding. The type of civil information that is needed in order to support military operations varies based on the environment and situation. Civil Reconnaissance can be conducted in all military operations related to Irregular Warfare (IW), Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).

In accurately defining the contextual and cultural population of the task force battle space, it became rapidly apparent that we needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics as well as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqi population.<sup>1</sup>

### **B. CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE**

Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.<sup>2</sup>

The civilian population has been correctly identified as the center of gravity in Irregular Warfare<sup>3</sup>; civil reconnaissance is the process of collecting information in order to understand the population and all the relative factors that

---

<sup>1</sup> Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis. *Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations*, *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1*. September 2007. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Gordon McCormick, "Guerilla Warfare" class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.

bear on conducting successful Irregular Warfare and Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) in selected areas. Insurgents are not easily found using conventional electronic sensors and are successfully evading detection by using the population as cover and concealment. Civil Reconnaissance begins to remove the enemies' ability to move freely in amongst the local population by unraveling the various aspects and systems he relies on to provide his secrecy. This is the essence of the "indirect approach", attacking the elements that support the enemy verses the enemy directly. Once US or Coalition Forces can find the enemy with precision, than the decision can be made to either capture or kill him.

### **C. WHAT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS NOT**

Civil Reconnaissance is not the covert collection of information by agents employed by US or Coalition forces but rather data obtained from open sources, primarily through interaction with the host nation population, review of open source information found in various mediums, and academic research. There is a great hazard in persons collecting civil information being perceived as covert intelligence assets. Every effort must be made by soldiers to avoid this perception. The strength of this information is that it is collected through interaction with the population. The manner in which the information is collected and how operators conduct themselves will have an effect on the level of involvement and accuracy of the information provide by non combatants. Many locations the US is involved in or has interest in going to are run by regimes that live and die on the level of spying they can perform on the population in order to rid itself of dissenters or potential enemies of the state. People who live in these types of oppressive conditions are leery of telling the truth, especially to Westerners, and may not provide any information at all out of fear of reprisal if it is discovered.



#### **D. IF CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE IS DONE WRONG**

Any misstep on behalf of US soldiers could spoil efforts over the long term and significantly inhibit soldiers in the future from working effectively with the population. Not all soldiers possess the natural ability to effectively interact with civilians. Our conventional forces are not trained in performing these complex interactions and many times portray themselves as intelligence personnel. Soldiers need a level of maturity coupled with training in effective techniques that are culturally specific and focus on highlighting adaptive thinking in order to interact with locals, and build the bridge to mutual trust by providing an open conduit for communication. Most, if not all, of the civilians cooperating with the US or Coalition are potentially taking their lives in their own hands. This all important aspect of civil interaction should never be lost by soldiers that interact with civilians. If the enemy witnesses the interaction the level of violence that could be brought to bear on the individual or his family will outweigh the value of the interaction with US forces.

#### **E. WHO CONDUCTS CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE**

Officers and NCOs who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of guerilla warfare.<sup>4</sup>

The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW.<sup>5</sup>

Although the doctrinal definition of Civil Reconnaissance found in the Civil Affairs Field Manual FM 3-05.40 dated 15 September, 2006<sup>6</sup> indicates “other

---

<sup>4</sup> Mao Tse-Tung. *On Guerilla Warfare*. London: Cassell, 1965. 33.

<sup>5</sup> Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1. September 2007. 1.

specialties and assets...can conduct CR...” persons who are not trained or ignorant of the complexities of CR could significantly inhibit the ability to collect the open source information from the population. Granted all soldiers are human sensors and gather information by communicating with and operating among civilians, the type of reconnaissance discussed in this thesis addresses the trained soldier who has a background in conducting effective dialogue that results in gaining information about an area that is pertinent to success in a counter insurgent environment. The most significant characteristic of civil information is that the data exists in the open source realm. None of the collection techniques utilized in Civil Reconnaissance are conducted covertly. One of the hazards in collecting CR is the potential of losing the assistance of the population that the information is being collected from due to inappropriate actions taken by the collector. This begs the question then who should conduct Civil Reconnaissance? Since the Civil Affairs branch has identified the management of Civil Information as one of its core tasks it is not a far leap to deduce that CA should be the organization responsible for creating the commanders Civil Situational Overlay as well as creating operations to support it. Infrastructure is currently being created to warehouse the vast amounts of detailed collected data within the 95<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Bde, Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell.

### **1. Clash of Culture; An example from Afghanistan**

The following is an anecdotal story that provides an example of the cultural friction points that exist when working by, with, and through a foreign

---

<sup>6</sup> “Civil Reconnaissance is defined as a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil Reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical level by the mnemonic ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events). Civil Reconnaissance can be conducted by CA forces or by other forces, as required. Examples of other specialties and assets that can conduct Civil Reconnaissance are engineers, medical, MP, and unmanned observation aircraft.” FM 3-05-40 CA Operations 15 September 2006.

national population. This example also provides a glimpse into the type of person that is needed to operate in this environment and the training that must take place in order to effectively work with foreign nationals. Not just anyone can do this kind of work, and there is a need for a set of inherent personality traits needed by operators in order to achieve the desired end state no matter the obstacle. A degree of moral flexibility and an understanding the political and strategic significance of handling delicate cultural issues are just a few of the characteristic needed in order to function in this environment.

During 2002 in Orgun-E a US Army medic was continually treating a young 15 year old Afghan soldier who complained of nausea and stomach cramps. After repeated treatments, the medic made an effort to further explore the cause of the young boys' ailments. What was revealed both angered the medic and placed a significant roadblock in working with the local Afghani security forces. It was discovered that the boy's main function in the unit was to provide oral sex to the unit commander every morning. This practice was culturally accepted among the locals for several reasons but primarily the sin of fornication with an unmarried woman was more culturally unacceptable than engaging in sex acts with small boys and other willing men. US forces informally inquired into this practice among the Afghani soldier working at the fire base and it was discovered that it was rather wide spread, in that, many of the older soldiers were using younger ones for both oral and anal sex, and that the practice was accepted and permeated the unit.

The medic who treated the boy initially reacted very viscerally and reached for his weapon in an effort to remedy the situation but was stopped by members of the unit and eventually was removed from the FOB. The US forces attempted to speak to the commander about his sexual use of this young boy and the effects of his actions were having on the relationship with US and Coalition forces. The commander indicated he understood the issue but, was never compelled to stop or change his behavior and the soldiers of his unit continued as well.

In the effort to work by, with, and through Afghan locals, the relationship with the Afghani security force was deemed more valuable than fighting over the cultural acceptance of homosexual rape of the young boys. US and Coalition soldiers were forced to not intervene, and except the fact the practice would continue. The extent the US forces got involved was to advise the young boys involved to eat bread before performing oral sex to help with the nausea. As a result of this incident the Afghani leadership no longer allowed the young Afghan boys to be seen by American medics, and the practice continues today. Incident of homosexual rape and bestiality among the Afghans has become an expected fact in working with the Afghan nationals and other predominately Islamic countries. The act is not isolated within their military, but is practiced among the rural Afghan nationals and witness by most who spend any significant amount of time living among them. Although Islam forbids homosexuality it has been assimilated to a lesser sin than adultery as it is interpreted by the men who engage in this practice.<sup>7</sup>

The Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) taught at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School (SWC) have adopted cutting edge technology to both train and evaluate CA soldiers in their ability to be comfortable and effective in the art of cross cultural communication and adaptive learning techniques. Active duty Civil Affairs Officers receive additional regional cultural training that align with the combatant commands that is found nowhere else in the military. This specialized training coupled with psychological reviews given during the CAQC provides a fertile environment to create the best possible soldiers to conduct Civil Reconnaissance.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Author notes, Afghanistan deployment 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Elbert Ross. "The Changing Face of Civil Affairs; Training Today to Meet Tomorrow's Challenges". *Special Warfare Magazine*, Ft. Bragg, NC, July 2006.

## F. HUMAN TERRAIN

Although the origin of the term is uncertain “Human Terrain” has been used by the military and academic community as short hand to refer to the totality of civil information. Human terrain” has been defined as, “the population and society in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society. Human terrain information is open-source derived, unclassified, referenced information. It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual.”<sup>9</sup>

The term is akin to the evaluation of the physical terrain conducted during the planning of military operations at all levels, captured best in the Army acronym OCOKA (Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain and Avenues of approach). Soldiers and leaders are beginning to understand that the civil depiction of the battlefield or the “Human Terrain” is as significant to Irregular Warfare as key terrain and avenues of approach is to conventional operations. How the area of operations is described through the civil perspective is the true battlefield in Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations.

The “terrain” we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that ‘80% of AQ leadership have fled’ don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather drive them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Jacob Kipp, Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A COORDS for the 21st Century” *Military Review* September-October (2006) : 8.

<sup>10</sup> Dave Kilcullen, “Understanding Current Operations in Iraq” *Small Wars Journal* (URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/>) accessed 27 August, 2007.

Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> (Major General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, CJTF-76, Afghanistan, 2006) found in Jacob Kipp, Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, "The Human Terrain System: A COORDS for the 21st Century" Military Review September-October (2006) : 8.

### III. WHY CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

#### A. INTRODUCTION

The enemy stands on alighted stage; from the darkness around him, thousands of unseen eyes intently study his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out, he hits the air; his antagonists are insubstantial, as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight. Because of superior information, guerillas always engage under conditions of there own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain [physical and human], they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomfiture.<sup>12</sup>

Conducting civil reconnaissance provides the information needed in order to understand the human terrain in order to design effective counter insurgency operations. Information is what the population possess that is the deciding factor in who wins and who looses in unconventional warfare. The population keeps the secrets of the insurgent and provides the cover, concealment, and resources needed in order to remain alive and able to carry out operations against their enemy. Counter insurgent forces need the same information, who insurgents are, where they live and operate and how to best interdict their operations in order to destroy the organization. The people possess this knowledge and the real war is fighting over who will win the support of the population in order to gain the information superiority.

Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host-nation (HN) government. Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups. These requirements are the basis for collection and analytical efforts.<sup>13</sup>

Conducting Civil Reconnaissance provides information about the population used to begin to gain support and in creating effective operations to

---

<sup>12</sup> Mao, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> FM 3-24. *Counter Insurgency*. 16 June 2006. Section 3-2. p. 3-1.

defeat insurgents. Gaining cultural awareness and providing for the needs of the population will create the environment necessary to begin to gain the support of locals. Without the necessary information on the enemy, counter insurgent forces are operating blindly, often making more mistakes and further separating themselves from the population and their true goal of finding and fixing the enemy. The fight initially is to gain the support of the population in order to glean the necessary information and intelligence needed to find the enemy.

Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force.<sup>14</sup>

## **B. THE ENEMY**

Becoming in tune with the population will provide critical information about the enemy and the tactics he employs to gain support. "Guerilla leaders spend a great deal more time in organization, instruction, agitating, and propaganda work than they do fighting, for their most important job is to win over the people."<sup>15</sup> In understanding how the enemy fights the war, effective counter insurgency units can design operations to disrupt his efforts and begin to counter his moves. It could be argued, attacks by insurgence serve several functions; first, to distract from the true fight over gaining the support of the population, second elicit a more restrictive response from counter insurgent forces on a community that the attack came from, thus frustrating the non combatant population and motivating them into supporting the insurgency out of a sense of frustration and anger.<sup>16</sup>

Understanding how the enemy operates in a community will reveal critical details on how to defeat him. In order for the insurgent to gain support he must

---

<sup>14</sup> FM 3-24. *Counter Insurgency*. 16 June 2006. Section 3-2. p. 123.

<sup>15</sup> Mao, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Class notes Guerilla Warfare class, Dr Gordon McCormick, 2006.



have a mechanism of communicating with them. The Taliban's use of "Night Letters" is an example of a method used to communicate with a population.

One good example of Taliban information strategy is their use of "night letters." They have been pushing local farmers in several provinces (Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar) to grow poppy instead of regular crops, and using night-time threats and intimidation to punish those who don't and convince others to convert to poppy. This is not because they need more opium—God knows they already have enough—but because they're trying to detach the local people from the legal economy and the legally approved governance system of the provinces and districts, to weaken the hold of central and provincial government. Get the people doing something illegal, and they're less likely to feel able to support the government, and more willing to do other illegal things (e.g. join the insurgency)—this is a classic old Bolshevik tactic from the early cold war, by the way. They are specifically trying to send the message: "The government can neither help you nor hurt us. We can hurt you, or protect you—the choice is yours." They also use object lessons, making an example of people who don't cooperate—for example, dozens of provincial-level officials have been assassinated this year, again as an "armed propaganda" tool—not because they want one official less but because they want to send the message "We can reach out and touch you if you cross us." Classic armed information operations.<sup>17</sup>

In Vietnam the Communist Party members moved into villages at night to communicate with locals and spread propaganda as well as conduct operations against non supporters and dissenters. From just understanding the method the enemy uses to communicate with the population operations can be created to observe and learn about the enemy. Who conducts the communications, where it is done primarily, who might be working for the enemy in allowing safe haven <sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy; Can Social Scientists Redefine the War on Terror," *The New Yorker*, December 2006, [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa\\_fact2?currentPage=1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2?currentPage=1) accessed 16 November 2007.

<sup>18</sup> William Andrews, *The Village War* (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 30.

Gaining an appreciation of the population and learning the cultural dynamics and personalities will allow the enemy's vulnerabilities to be known. Tribal differences, old vendettas, personality conflicts and politics are all factors in the soup of culture that once understood could be exploited by counter insurgent forces to gain support. Most recently the Iraqi Sunni's resistance to al-Qaeda serves as a living example of the power in understanding the human terrain. The friction point with Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda stems from a cultural issue that runs deep in Islam. Members of AQ are trying to entrench support in Iraq via the clans, villages and towns by marrying into families of local leaders.<sup>19</sup> The cultural impact the act of marrying into families is significant. In cases where this has been done successfully the family essentially becomes a proxy member of AQ out of cultural obligation, for example should the AQ member be killed by Coalition forces it falls to the family to avenge his death, regardless of political beliefs. Once the relational bond has been established the male has a certain status and say that sways the locals and family members to accomplish AQ or anti western objectives.<sup>20</sup> In the majority of Islam, family is the cornerstone of the social system. Family is not a casual or spontaneous organization of people, but it is a divinely ordained institution. Family and marriage are regarded as noble and sacred; a social contract that confers mutual rights and obligations on the couple.<sup>21</sup> Iraqi culture does not allow marriages for convenience as do Muslims in tribal Afghanistan where members of AQ and the Taliban have found success in marrying into families. AQ has effectively fallen victim of their lack of cultural understanding of the Iraqi population. This serves as both a great example of an opportunity as well as a model of how bad things could go if untrained soldiers

---

19 Dave Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," Small Wars Journal Aug 29 2007 (online journal) accessed at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/>

20 Ibid., on-line article no page number.

21 Reading Islam (website)  
[http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article\\_C&cid=1176271732901&pagename=Zone-English-Discover\\_Islam%2FDIELayout](http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1176271732901&pagename=Zone-English-Discover_Islam%2FDIELayout) accessed 25 September 2007.

attempt to try a culturally significant operation or effort that fails that is equivalent to AQ's marriage plot. This information can be used in countless ways to exploit AQ and attack their credibility among the local population.

If insurrection is said to be an art, the main content of this art is to know how to give the struggle forms appropriate to the political situation at each stage.<sup>22</sup>

Understanding how the enemy is giving the struggle structure and form is critical in destroying it. "We must patiently explain..."persuade", "discuss" and "convince"- these words recur with monotonous regularity in many of the early Chinese essays on guerilla war."<sup>23</sup> Learning whatever the insurgents are promising, providing or doing to the population in exchange for support creates an opportunity. Many times insurgents begin to gain initial support by providing something the central government has failed to give.<sup>24</sup> Culturally specific issues come to light in examining this aspect that could provide the opportunity for success by counter insurgent forces if handled properly. An example of one of the most effective uses of culturally significant information used to persuade a population was the agrarian strategy of the Vietnamese Communists. The Vietnamese culture places a high premium on land as captured in this saying, "An ounce of earth is worth an ounce of gold". To the traditional Vietnamese that lived outside of the cities land means far more than just livelihood; it enabled families to venerate their ancestors by maintaining their tombs and assures descendants would be taken care of after their death. "Ownership of the land takes care of the past, present and future of the peasant."<sup>25</sup> The Communist gained significant support after announcing the plan to forcefully redistribute the land among the poor that worked it verses the owners. Since the country was

---

<sup>22</sup> (Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, p 76) in Andrews, *The Village War*

<sup>23</sup> Mao, 8.

<sup>24</sup> Class notes, *Guerilla Warfare*, Dr. Gordon McCormick 2006.

<sup>25</sup> William Bredo, *Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Viet Cong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict*, *Asian Survey*, 10, 8 (August 1970), 738.

owed by the rich 2%, this proposal had significant appeal to the poor, who were unable to afford their own plots and were forced to pay rent and work fields to just break even. Although this bit of propaganda wasn't presented initially during the Communist takeover because it would have alienated the wealthy and created opposition to the movement it was used selectively as the Communists progressed and had taken hold in the rural areas.<sup>26</sup>

The Taliban's establishment of an immediate rule of law that was based upon Islamic jurisprudence provided the cultural appeal, at least initially, to local Afghans. The country had no sense of government or security after the retreat of the Soviet Union, the Taliban seized upon this vacuum to gain initial support. This was also initially welcomed around the world, seen as the people of Afghanistan reacquiring ownership of their country. Issues surfaced in the extremely harsh interpretation of the Koran and application of conservative tribal code in a manner in which served to oppress all non Taliban (a.k.a. true believers of Islam) in Afghanistan. "The Taliban's refusal to compromise with the UN humanitarian agencies or foreign donor countries or to compromise in their principles in exchange for international recognition and their rejection of all Muslim ruling elites as corrupt, has inflamed the debate in the Muslim world and inspired a younger generation of Islamic militants."<sup>27</sup> This continues to be a major attraction to tribal populations that are so far separated from a Central government that the Taliban version of law and order is more reflective of that society than that of what is perceived by the Taliban as a non secular, Karzai led government.<sup>28</sup> Mao believed "Military action is a method used to obtain a political goal."<sup>29</sup>, what is the insurgents political objective? Analyzing actions taken to identify why they are conducting them will provide answers to many questions and help focus operations to target the enemy's true political objective.

---

<sup>26</sup> Andrews, 6.

<sup>27</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (United States: Yale University Press, 2001), 93.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>29</sup> Mao, 89.

In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to ensure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake. A trained and discipline guerilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a homemade bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and political alert fighting man.<sup>30</sup>

Ideology provides motivation to insurgence and serves as the life blood of the fight. Making soldiers intimately aware of the politics behind their actions and why their sacrifice is important on the largest scale possible makes the insurgent motivated and can provide him answers in how to behave and contribute to the strategic plan at the tactical level. Not only is the ideology of why they fight important but how they fight as well. Evidence of this exists in Mao creation of the Eight Points of Attention that were used to govern the actions of insurgents when working with the population.<sup>31</sup>

### **8 Points for Attention**

- Speak politely.
- Pay fairly for what you buy.
- Return everything you borrow.
- Pay for anything you damage.
- Do not hit or swear at people.
- Do not damage crops.
- Do not take liberties with women.
- Do not ill treat captives.

It is also “the story” used to recruit support from the population. Identifying the specific rhetoric used and the context it is placed in will help to determine much about the enemy, why he fights, what his goals are and how far he is willing to go in accomplishing his objective. Fighting the ideology in a UW environment is as important as killing the enemy. “Historical experience suggests

---

<sup>30</sup> Mao, 8.

<sup>31</sup> Mao., 92.

that there is very little hope of destroying a...guerilla movement after it has...acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.”<sup>32</sup> Ideology is the foundation of the enemies argument used to persuade the population to support its cause, effective use of Civil Reconnaissance will quickly identify the ideology used and allow the maximum amount of time to develop counters to it and attack its credibility. Ideology will differ throughout an area of operations based on what the local population deems important. The enemy will adapt his rhetoric and propaganda to achieve his desired affects based upon what will work in the community. This is a point of weakness and can be used to discredit the insurgent.

In the case of Islamic militants, the added dimension of religious obligation and jurisprudence for their actions provides a base of belief in “the cause” that has been cultivated even before fighting began. Understanding the ideology is one of the most significant aspects of the civil reconnaissance effort, and until it is expressed by individuals of the population having been indoctrinated in it, it will not be fully known. Making an assumption as to the ideology being used will only hazard clumsy guesses that will lead to problems in developing ways to counter it.

Understanding the human terrain will allow tactical and operational planners to be creative in generating operations to win civil support as well as targeting the enemy. Each sector, region, village or town may need a fundamentally similar strategy that is different in the tactical actions required in order to achieve a desired end state. One of the biggest lessons learned in fighting in a COIN environment is the need for decentralized planning and the empowerment of lower-level leaders to develop and execute operations against a very nimble adversary.<sup>33</sup> Conducting an effective assessment of the human terrain both before and immediately after entering into an area of

---

<sup>32</sup> Mao, 27.

<sup>33</sup> Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon; A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review* May-June (2006): 13-32.

operations will ensure the best possible understanding of the pertinent civil information needed to make effective decisions and create appropriate operations.

Che Guevara's attempt at creating an insurgency in Bolivia was symbolic of the effects of not conducting civil reconnaissance in a UW environment. The most significant mistake made by Che was the assumption that the population he believed would help facilitate an insurrection (Indians of the southeast) could be motivated to fight. In fact, Che selected a portion of the population that was as leery of foreigners as they were of the central government. "The President of Bolivia once told a visiting general from the United States that his greatest political problem was to persuade his countrymen that such a nation as Bolivia existed with a capital called La Paz. Nowhere did national identity have less impact than among the Indians of the southeast."<sup>34</sup> Additional evidence of Che's lack of any Civil Reconnaissance is demonstrated in his own diary when he notes the targeted population does not speak Spanish but a language of local derivation.<sup>35</sup> Had he done the most basic of research into the targeted population he would have discovered the need to learn another language or at least to obtain supportive translators in order to conduct operations against a central government. Evidence exists in the Bolivian government record that they feared an insurgent effort beginning in the mining population of the country. In making this educated assessment, the government increase troop strength and were waiting for Che's attempt at influencing a revolutionary ripe population. Had Che figured out that the governments understanding of the civil domain had allowed it to prepare operations that would have resulted in the destruction of his force with little to no effort, he might have thought twice about civil reconnaissance.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Henry Ryan, "The Fall of Che Guevara" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 42.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 43.

## **C. ON FRIENDSHIP**

Civil reconnaissance provides feedback from the targeted community on the effectiveness of both combat and non-combat operations as well as pitfalls to avoid. The correct metric to measure success will vary location from location. Keeping a finger of the pulse of the targeted community will allow counter insurgency forces to assess their performance and make corrections to better achieve the desired effects.

Providing the opportunity for locals to interact with counter insurgent forces is the goal of all counter insurgent operations. Many times locals might be willing to provide information intentionally or unintentionally. During the course of conducting effective Civil Reconnaissance information may come to light that may or may not be solicited or targeted. The following is an example of the unlimited possibilities that can result from just being amongst the local population with soldiers trained in conducting passive Civil Reconnaissance.

### **1. The Phone Number- (When Opportunity Meets Preparation)**

During a relief in place in Afghanistan, two Civil Affairs Teams Alpha (CAT-A) 523 and 522 while in support of the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment were conducting area familiarization rides to orient the new team to the terrain and meet key local civilians. During one of the stops in a village in Northern Afghanistan a child approached the Civil Affairs team members while they were waiting outside the house of the local Imam. The young boy appeared from a building very close by with a pen and paper wanting the soldiers to write anything in English. In the course of the engagement with the child the CA soldier noticed a series of numbers on one of the pages of the notebook. The numbers seemed familiar for some reason but time was short and the patrol was moving on so the CA soldier took a digital picture of the page to analyze the numbers later. He also had the wherewithal to photograph the father of the young child and the house form where the child came from before departing the village. Once the CA soldier returned to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and had time to review his picture



of the numbers in more detail, he discovered it was a phone number as it would appear on a satellite phone. After a further analysis on the part of the team it was determined the country code was of the US and area code was of California. The CA soldier immediately brought this to the attention of his Team Leader and the number was sent to the CA planning cell at the Task Force. The planning cell enlisted the assistance of the FBI representative assigned to the unit for follow up and a possible lead. Within a short time the FBI identified the number as a safe house under surveillance in Sacramento that had been previously suspected of organizing a local cell of al-Qaeda. The number was the needed probable cause to affect a warrant for the search of the house. The search resulted in the arrest of the entire cell and further evidence to identify other cells operating in the Western USA. This US based cell was taken down as a result of open source information gathered by an aware soldier in the right place at the right time. As a result of the discovery future operations were designed to monitor the village and the individuals in possession of the satellite phone and phone number. The village was targeted by eavesdropping assets that helped shape further operation in the area. The individuals were not immediately taken into custody but kept under watch for a period of time, resulting in the identification of other collaborators and further exposure of the Taliban insurgents operating in the area.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Author's notes during Afghanistan 2004.



Figure 1. Actual photograph of local boy who provided phone number and the numbers provided during the relief in place.

## 2. AL NUKHAYB (What Right Looks Like)

During the initial advance into Iraq it was decided by SOCOM that the town of al-Nukhayb in the Anbar Province would be one of the first targets of the Coalition. The town was selected due to the presence of anti aircraft artillery pieces and dug in fighting positions around the entire town. It was decided 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment would be selected to seize the town and destroy any Iraqi military or Saddam loyalists present.

After the town had been seized, Rangers of C Company, 2nd Battalion of the 75th Regiment secured the area and the Civil Affairs Team Alpha (CAT-A) 51 went about establishing who was the local leadership of the town and opened a dialogue that resulted in significant amounts of information and intelligence. During the course of the clearing of the buildings in the town the Rangers discovered a huge ammunition cache that was estimated at approximately three tons of anti aircraft and small arms bullets and RPG rounds. It was determined that the building holding the cache was to be destroyed in an effort to prevent the ammunition from being employed against follow on US forces. The CAT-A discovered during the course of conversation with local elders that the building was the town hospital and had been seized by the Iraqi military after Desert

Storm. With this information the CAT-A further assessed the building and discovered it also served as a quasi detention facility. Rooms in the hospital had been altered to function as prison cells and torture rooms with hooks protruding from the walls and ceiling and closets converted to spaces not big enough to stand in, but with no way of sitting either. In addition to the ammunition an extensive amount of chemical protective gear was also discovered. Gas masks, filters and suits designed to protect soldiers from chemical attack filled what was once a doctor's office. The hospital still contained the records of the town's people and could be used as a hospital once again if the ammunition and military equipment was cleared. The CAT-A Team Leader advised the Ranger Company commander of the effects destroying the hospital could have on the Coalition's efforts, and the support that the story could provide to the enemy. The decision was quickly made not to blow up the building but to utilize soldiers and civilians to remove the explosives, ammunition and chemical gear to another location for destruction. Rangers provided security while other soldiers shed body armor, holstered weapons and began the arduous task of emptying the hospital of its deadly contents. This act by US forces demonstrated the true intent of the Coalition to the locals of al Nukhayb and significantly changed the tide of information that flowed in. Immediately following the return of the hospital to the town, the Civil Affairs team was inundated with information. Locals began producing; identification cards of Saddam Fedayeen that had fled after the invasion began, passports, certificates of graduation from Fedayeen training camps and descriptions of military forces and commanders that frequented the area.

Before departing the area Rangers assisted the CAT-A in distributing what was left of a pallet of water and food to the locals in an effort to solidify trust and build a solid rapport for follow on forces. During the distribution the Imam approached the CAT-A Team Leader and indicated there was a foreigner amongst the crowd that nobody recognized and might be trouble. The individual was removed from the crowd by the CA team and questioned with the Imam

present. The man was from Baghdad and was looking for his brother who was an Iraqi soldier stationed in the town but had left once the invasion started. The Imam decided to provide shelter to the individual until time was appropriate for him to leave after being questioned by US forces.<sup>38</sup>



Figure 2. Ranger Company Commander interacting with locals during food distribution.

Had the CA Team not conducted effective civil reconnaissance; the Coalition would have missed critical information, been responsible for blowing up a hospital, and possibly created more insurgents and insurgent supporters. The fight for establishing rapport and population support would have been halted before it had a chance to begin.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Author's notes Iraq deployment.

<sup>39</sup> Author's notes Iraq deployment.

The essence of the indirect approach in Counter Insurgency is addressing the elements who support the enemy verses the enemy directly. By focusing on the civil aspect of the battlefield we remove the enemy's ability to use the population as cover and concealment, thus making him easier to capture or kill.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **IV. HOW TO CONDUCT CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The following is a suggested methodology of how to conduct Civil Reconnaissance. Never has the adage, “train for certainty, but educate for uncertainty” been more applicable than in understanding how to conduct Civil Reconnaissance. What this chapter does not offer is a cookie cutter template for conducting Civil Reconnaissance solution, but instead provides a suggested manner of thinking. This methodology could be used as a foundation for the development of a battle drill or standard operating procedures. In order for the military to become better at this critical effort there exists a need to create a more systematic approach to conducting this task. The process of effectively conducting this type of reconnaissance requires a type of personality, a high level of patience, ability to communicate cross culturally and going beyond one’s individual cultural bias in order to gain information and correctly interpret others.

The proposed methodology is broken down into three phases; pre deployment, deployment and post deployment. Each phase has particular tasks and focus but all contribute to painting the best picture possible of the human terrain. Additionally throughout the process, a level of attention must be paid to the use of technology to assist in conducting analysis and storing information. Presently, the Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK) is currently being used by the Special Operations Community to help catalog and analyze data in order to better understand the human terrain. In the future, this technology will advance and hopefully become more user friendly and helpful in analysis. Before deployment, the methodology centers on researching the targeted area or areas using as many different sources as possible in order to gain as firm an understanding as feasible before leaving the continental United States. Actions conducted during deployment are the real focus and substance of this thesis. Creating operations in order to deliberately discover information and gain a

detailed understanding of the human terrain requires lots of effort, patience and well thought out and executed missions. Finally, after deployment focuses on properly storing and passing on the information gleaned during the deployment.

Objectively understanding a culture is difficult enough: trying to understand it to the point it can be analyzed and interpreted to support military operations is a huge undertaking. The military faces an even larger obstacle in that the enemy we are facing more often than not is of the very population we are trying to learn about. It is the enemy's back yard, he knows the people, customs and is part of the culture, he has the advantage of time and information in preparing for our arrival. All of this must be taken into consideration at the onset and never forgotten throughout the process.

## **B. PRE DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

The pre deployment phase is about conducting research and being prepared before leaving the continental United States. The goal is to be ready before the need arises by getting in tune with the state of play in the AOR, and becoming as culturally savvy as possible before the notice to deploy. Once the unit is notified of the mission, there will not be enough time to adequately gain the needed cultural and situational awareness to be effective once the unit arrives in country. Being able to provide some level of analysis of the human terrain to commanders in order to conduct effective counter insurgency operations is what active duty Civil Affairs is expected to do at a minimum.

The topics most significant in pre-deployment research encompasses both civil and cultural information as well as gaining an understanding of what is planned and programmed for the target area from other agencies in the US government. These plans are essential in understanding United States foreign policy plans for the target country and provides a framework at the macro level that will come to play significantly at the micro level when considering potential operations. With the military's attempt at strengthening Security Stability



Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) a firm grasp of the plans and budgeting allocations of efforts in the targeted area is essential in order to prevent overlap or duplication of efforts by all organizations involved.

The Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) has the overall responsibility for maintaining a finger on the pulse of their individual area of responsibility and is where research efforts should begin. With the creation of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) 7500 (OPLAN for the Global War on Terrorism) each individual GCC has developed plans that are nested in 7500. In conjunction with the military OPLANs the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also have similar documents in the form of Country Plans that outline the US government's strategy in the region and individual countries.

Once the GCC, DoS and USAID have been queried the next significant piece of information is the supported Joint Task Force (JTF) OPLAN. This document will provide another level of analysis and instruction on how the task force plans to defeat the enemy and nest plans in accordance with DoS, USAID and the GCC.

After the macro level of analysis has been done, and a firm understanding of the US governments articulated plans is achieved , teams should research what is available from the special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS)<sup>40</sup> and final after action reports from units that have deployed previously to the targeted area. Most of this information will be found in the Secret [formerly Secure] Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) and requires access to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) intranet. Once all available reports have been collected and read speaking directly to the units that are in the area of operation and researching what has been done by the unit being replaced is the next step. This phase will take the

---

<sup>40</sup> SODAR is a collection of out detailed out briefs that are required from within the SOF community immediately following deployments. The effort has had sporadic support since its inception and is very much driven by the command climate of the units that submit information to this system.

most time and effort since it requires reading whatever data has been collected and is available as far back as possible. The sources for this information are the teams in country as well as the Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell at the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. With the use of the Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK) all the available data should be available at the CIM cell in order to help teams maintain a high level of continuity and provide the history and cultural background for the specific AOR. If time is limited in mission preparation, it should be spent on this level of analysis and research. If the devil is in the details, these are the best details available until the unit arrives in the AOR.

Once the macro and micro level of analysis has been begun physical preparations become critical in quickly deploying and becoming effective as fast as possible with minimal loss of information or history. In using the ASK system there are steps that are critical to take in order to prepare the software for immediate usage before leaving the continental United States. The level of detail required to be efficient in utilizing the ASK is an entire thesis in and of itself. The SOF community should spend the time and effort in creating pre-mission checklists for the ASK in order to assist teams in preparing as efficiently as possible. It is sufficient to say downloading all available information into the ASK system and ensuring the needed maps, satellite imagery and software version are uploaded and operational is as critical as zeroing your weapon at the range before going to war in the counter insurgency fight.

Civil Affairs planners and teams leaders should attempt to conduct a Pre Deployment Site Survey (PDSS)<sup>41</sup> before the incoming unit arrives in country. The PDSS provides a very small glimpse into the area of operations in order to help the incoming unit better prepare for the deployment. Any time spent understanding the geospatial, relational or temporal information is critical but there is also a need to gain a deeper appreciation for the nuisances,

---

<sup>41</sup> PDSS is an operation conducted by a small element of the deploying unit. This element is usually made up of key personnel that travels independent of the main body and conducts an on the ground survey of the location, the mission, and make initial coordination necessary for relief in place operations.

personalities and “sub rosa” issues when working in cross cultural environments. The rotation of units in a counter insurgent environment is the point of most weakness. Constantly rebuilding relationships that in some countries and cultures don’t come easy cost time we don’t have lots of. The enemy benefits at points where counter insurgent forces have to start over and regain the collective knowledge discovered from all the previous rotations. Without the knowledge base and an effective method of transferring the details the US will fight the war starting over at every rotation.

Pre-Deployment Operations continue even after arriving in country. Once the team arrives at their respective geographic locations the actual relief in place (RIP) is the next critical event. Just as important as collecting the data on the local population is the ability to seamlessly transition it between units and individuals. If everything has been collected, cataloged, and documented perfectly it is all for nothing if it cannot be effectively passed on. Systemically Soldiers at the tactical level have failed at conducting truly effective counter insurgency style RIP operations. With the widespread use of the ASK the problem of information continuity will get better over time. In addition to the raw digits of data comes the meeting and transitioning of contacts in the community. Civil Affairs is all about the development of relationships in the local population, and if the contacts or sources cannot be transferred to follow on forces then we will; be open to manipulation by local nationals, ineffective in fighting the COIN fight and have wasted the time of soldiers that have collected the data and built the relationships with the population previously.

## **C. DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

### **1. Introduction**

The main effort in separating insurgents from the population is designing operations that create opportunities for meaningful interaction with local

civilians.<sup>42</sup> Planning operations to further enhance the operational understanding of the cultural and local information is the conceptual equivalent of “draining the pond”. The goal of Civil Reconnaissance is to gain as much information as possible about the population in order to decrease the information advantage of the enemy. By closing the information gap insurgents begin to run out of cover and concealment. If one civilian or just interacting with civilians provides a piece of information that leads to better understanding the civil environment then the operation has proven successful. These planned interactions need to be well orchestrated and given the same level of planning, support and seriousness that conducting a direct action mission or movement to contact requires.

There are a number of significant secondary objectives that can be accomplished while interacting with the local population. Any time soldiers communicate verbally or non verbally with locals they are representing the US and the Coalition. Every action and movement will be interpreted and placed into the collective memory of all who witness it. Soldier interaction is one of the best counter propaganda efforts the US can conduct. Mao recognized this significant aspect in working with the local population and made soldiers behavior when working with locals a priority. Mao wrote rules that addressed actions with civilians much like our rules of engagement.<sup>43</sup> Anytime soldiers interact and move around a community they become passive collectors of information and the data is of some value in adding to depict the Human Terrain.

---

<sup>42</sup> Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: OEF-Philippines and indirect approach,” *Military Review* Nov 1, 2006. In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created the triangle insurgent/COIN model. He later created the Diamond Model to capture the interaction with external international actors. See Gordon H. McCormick, “A ‘Pocket Guide’ to Internal War,” Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming. Leg 1 of the Diamond model encapsulates the need for engaging the local population in order to gain situational awareness and information.

<sup>43</sup> see reference 30 for the rules dictated by Mao.

## 2. The Survey

The first step in trying to understand the human terrain is to conduct an assessment of the population. This assessment is designed to be the first layer of information about the population in the geographic area. The initial assessment should have started as part of the predeployment preparation. The use of surveys and assessment tools is not new to insurgency style warfare. Successful insurgents utilize the same method of conducting initial surveys to assess how to approach a community. Examining what previous insurgent efforts have done and surveys they utilized provides an idea of things counter insurgent need to consider as well.

In the Dang Lao Dong's (Communist Vietnamese) approach to the conduct of civil reconnaissance in the rural areas of Vietnam, they initially categorized the area of operations into three types: the liberated areas, temporarily liberated areas and contested areas.<sup>44</sup> Liberated areas were defined as "areas firmly under the control of the Communist party at all times, save for brief incursions by Government troops from outside".<sup>45</sup> Temporarily liberated areas were defined as "...villages in which the presence of government force denied the Party full control". "The contested areas where those in which the government had its strongest forces, and exercised strong control of the population".<sup>46</sup> Once the cadre had divided the geographic areas up they systematically moved into the liberated areas or easily governed space and began operations to slowly take control of the contested areas. The Party coined this method "tu the vot can cau" (line casting position), this term provided an image of a fisherman, who by remaining in one spot cast his line out to catch fish close to him.<sup>47</sup> The first task once the areas had been coded using the Party's

---

<sup>44</sup> Andrews, 43.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>47</sup> Andrews, 45.

method was to send in trained cadre to conduct surveys of the targeted villages. These cadre covertly moved into these targeted towns and began assessing the strengths and weakness of the population as well as identifying potential weak points where influence, blackmail and infighting could be exploited in order to gain control of the population. Captured documents detailed some of the information Communists survey teams were interested in.

1. Geographical position, terrain, population; is it situated near communication lines, plantations, military bases, etc.?
2. Enemy situation [Presence of Government]: administrative committee, police militia, spies, etc. Schemes and activities of the above-mentioned organization: activities of upper level men coming to the village: (cadres coming to carry out communism denouncing tasks, collecting taxes, carry out community development...etc.); internal discord; attitude in executing [Government] orders.
3. Masses situation: Classes, social strata, circles, religious habits and costumes, cultural standards...
4. [Strength of Party members] : thought , morale, revolutionary ability.

Points two and three were most strongly emphasized by village cadre when conducting their version of civil reconnaissance. Other documents later revealed the cadre tailored versions of this survey based upon different cultural environments. The one constant used in all surveys was the detailed analysis of the class structure of the villages in which the targeted population lived and worked. Additional information that the covert assessment teams examined were potential recruits. Persons who had family problems, were indebt, or in trouble with the law or were seen as potential recruits or sympathizers.

The surveys were developed from Mao Tse-Tung article, "How to Differentiate Classes in Rural Areas".<sup>48</sup> Mao broke down the population in the following categories; landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and the worker. The Dang Lao Dong adapted these categories and modified

---

<sup>48</sup> Mao Tse-Tung. "How to Differentiate Classes in the Rural Areas," <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/date-index.htm> see date for October 1933 accessed October 2007.

them to make the survey more culturally relevant to their country and the targeted village. An example of the cultural alterations the Dang Lao Dong Party made from Mao's version is the change from worker to landless peasant category. This was a critical yet seemingly insignificant change but better reflected the target audience of the Dang Lao Dong's efforts. The Party considered the landless peasant as their main source of support when the time came to overthrow the upper ruling class in power. In later years the assessment conducted by the "conventional Western military" were discovered to have been very similar to the assessments made by the Dang Lao Dong. In examining the surveys the Dang Lao Dong conducted patterns emerged, and a methodology could be examined as to how the Party planned operations based on the survey information. Some of the key factors in assessing the targeted villages were how far away they were from lines of communications, and military bases. More isolated locations were selected first. Analyzing the enemy presence in the targeted areas was extremely important. Other things considered were; movement patterns, strength levels, and reaction times of the government's quick reaction force if fighting broke out.

Measures have been used fairly recently in Iraq and Afghanistan that are similar in concept and execution. LTC Baker's article *Decisive Weapon* details how he conducted assessments based upon criteria of areas in order to begin to plan his approach towards gaining the populations assistance in defeating insurgents in his AOR.

Once we appreciated the dynamics of the demographics in our AO, we found that we could easily fit Iraqi citizens into three broad categories: those who would never accept the Coalition's presence in Iraq (religious fundamentalists, insurgents, terrorists); those who readily accepted the Coalition's presence in Iraq (typically secular, Western-educated pragmatists); and the vast majority of Iraqis, who

were undecided. We referred to this last category as the silent majority and focused much of our information operations on influencing this group.<sup>49</sup>

One of the first steps upon arriving into the AOR is developing a culturally relevant survey instrument that will begin to help dissect the population. This is a topic that requires much additional research and examination. US military assets, expatriates, academics and anthropologist should be employed to help develop culturally effective surveys to understand the people of a selected AOR. Pre deployment research provides a vast amount of information but getting the understand of the ever changing dynamics of life at the micro level requires being there and talking to locals. Subject matter expertise is required to conduct the surveys as well as creating them. With the advent of the Human Terrain Teams (HTT) the military is contracting a cadre of academics, cultural experts and sociologists to help in crafting products and assist in soliciting the population for the information. More will be discussed later on concerning the role of the Human Terrain Teams in the conduct of Civil Reconnaissance.

The survey should be designed to extract relevant details that will provide commanders a level of understanding of who is in the area and what the present status and impressions are of specific aspects of the society. Surveys should be created individually based upon the region and targeted population. There are models used inside the military such as PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information) MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Information, Finance, and Economic Elements), DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) and DIMEPC (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Paramilitary, Civic) that focus forces on information deemed relevant to counter insurgency warfare. There is also a layer of information that may seem meaningless at first but when placed with other data takes on significant relevance. Data such as the primary means of employment in the area, who are the richest civilians, who are the poorest, of

---

<sup>49</sup> Baker,. "Decisive Weapon," 15.



which religious affiliation are the population, etc... Once this background information is compiled it can help to confirm or deny other more significant data or can be used to help establish the community baseline from which anomalies can be seen. An example of this type of information might be the sudden unexplained rise in the number of cattle among poorer ethnically isolated members of a community that coincides with an increase on the use of IEDs in an area that previously never used them before. Unexplained changes in a community's baseline can provide a starting point in tracking down insurgent influence and or sources of auxiliary support.

Figuring out how the surveys should be conducted is as important as the data collected. Gathering data should be done in a less formal manner than in the west, and done by locals and US military who have been trained if possible. Selecting the right people to conduct the survey is crucial. Open note taking might be discouraged in most cases. US forces should be familiar with the content of the survey to the point the information can be extracted during the course of casual conversation verses a formal interview. The best case scenario is working with a proficient translator or trained surrogate to help initiate conversation and allow the narrative of the local population to play out. Asking open ended questions that allow the individuals to explain answers verses simple yes and no is the ideal. The use of digital tape recording is a method of not only recording what's being said for future reference and continuity but will allow translators to be more specific in translating the details after the meeting, subjects that would be inappropriate to bring up during the meeting. The cultural impact of all actions conducted in front of civilians needs to be considered before hand as much as possible. How they interpret what is said and done is the most important aspect of any exchanges. The collection of the proper data will take time and enormous effort. The time being taken should be seen as gathering data to help refine the civil operating picture or another opportunity to passively collect information while conducting the survey and providing locals with a positive impression of US forces.

### **3. Operations After the Survey**

The first type of operation that should be considered after surveys are completed is a population control effort that entails creating identification cards for all residence in the battle space<sup>50</sup>. There is a huge need for much further study and research into the best practices of creating a national identification card system and a central database similar to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). A great effort should be applied to quickly accounting for everyone who lives and works within a units geographic responsibility. Through the use of biometrics, finger prints, and retinal scans, individuals cannot use culturally excepted aliases or false names to evade capture. This is a very delicate operation and will have to be completed over a period of time. Ideally the host nation government must be in support of this effort and most of the work to collect the data should be done by the national or local government with US technology in support. The cards must be of the national government symbology and be perceived as being done on their initiative. In doing this the United States can regain the technological advantage that has been lost to the enemy in its use of the internet and creation of IEDs. Government support for enforcing the possession of identification cards will make significant strides in forcing the insurgent further undercover or out of an area completely. Either way, the insurgents' ability to conduct operations will be immediately effected.

If at the local level this cannot be accomplished using the establish government, an analysis should be done to examine the possibility of conducting such an operation by assets in place and with whatever resources are available. The ideal end state for this operation is to be able to connect the host nations to a central data warehouse that can be accessed by anyone with clearance in the country, in order to verify the identification and meta data of every individual in possession of a card.

---

<sup>50</sup> Class notes Guerilla Warfare 2006.

#### **4. Non-Violent Direct Action**

After entering into the area of operations the imperative becomes learning as much as possible about the people and activities: this effort encompasses the direct involvement of Soldiers with civilians in order to develop rapport and facilitate the passing of information. The operations must be designed in such a way as to give the perception that the populations involvement is voluntary and not forced through the threat of violence thus the term, non violent direct action. US forces we get into the communities and military planners create missions with the specific intent of learning and absorbing as much as possible about the community and its people. These types of operations should be conducted with information gathering assets in concert such as ASOT (Advanced Special Operations Teams) and eavesdropping capabilities in order to get the maximum benefit out of the effort. If the presence of military in the community has any effect at all it will provide cause for insurgents and insurgent sympathizers to potentially communicate with each other and provide us with more information for better analysis of who is who in the AOR. The COMINT (Communication Intelligence) potential is huge if done as a part of the operation and is positioned outside of the view or knowledge of locals and insurgents.

The primary concern during these types of interactions is to provide a level of security to civilians who are interacting with soldiers. Understanding that the insurgent can find out who talked to soldiers and what was said, especially if he is among the civilians that are interacting with counter insurgent forces is imperative. When creating opportunities to talk attention needs to be paid to the ability of others to hear what is being said and who can witness the interaction. Controlling for the audience and venue in which interactions take place is critical in creating the right environment for civilians to pass information to soldiers.

The overall purpose for the mission should not be lost by focusing on the method being utilized to interact with locals. In short, the mission is not the distribution of humanitarian aide; it is an opportunity to communicate with the local population. Presently many soldier become confused as to what is being

done and why when it comes to Civil Affairs operations. Not understanding the purpose of operations that involve the interaction of civilians with military causes problems, and could be counter productive to long term mission success. As recognized by Mao when he created his Eight Points of Attention, every soldier's behavior is extremely important on missions of this nature. All eight of his point go to the heart of how soldiers should interact with every civilian they come in contact with.<sup>51</sup> If a soldier standing guard during a rapport building operation mistreats children, becomes angry, or appears unapproachable it may have an effect on the population that stops the flow of information and makes the operation appear hypocritical. If a unit is trying to build good will and soldiers end up barking at kids or throwing rocks at animals because they are bored, it serves to hamper efforts. Soldier's behavior during these types of operations is extremely important and should be understood at the lowest level. Information may be given to any soldier at any time from anyone in the community. All members of the mission need to be intimately read in on what is going on and what is happening, everyone is a sensor on these missions.

The following operations are suggested methods to structure activities that lend to the collection of civil information. These are not doctrinal but based on the examination of a few operational and tactical level designs that have worked for units in the past. This is not an all-inclusive list but only a starting point to gain momentum for further designs. Creativity in designing, planning and executing these type of operations is more important than creating a template that can be repeated by other forces else where. Every territory and its people are different.

---

<sup>51</sup> Mao's Eight Points of Attention; speak politely, pay fairly for what you buy, return everything you borrow, pay for anything you damage, do not hit or swear at people, do not damage crops, do not take liberties with women, do not ill treat captives.

## 5. Rapport Building Operations

It is imperative to earn the trust and confidence of the indigenous population in your AO. They might never “like” you, but...you can earn their respect.<sup>52</sup>

Rapport building is the essential element in creating an environment for locals to begin to provide meaningful civil information. Captain Lawrence put it best, “Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest.”<sup>53</sup> To obtain this level of rapport is difficult and takes time, their version of time not the Western concept of it. These types of operations will be conducted more often than other Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) or Civil Military Operation (CMO). Without a feeling of trust or the building of rapport locals will not feel comfortable interacting with soldiers and foreigners and information flow will be limited or non-existent. Rapport building operations need to be culturally specific and well thought out and designed. In the counter insurgency game rapport takes a long time to build but can be lost with little effort, cultural mistakes, making promises that cannot be kept and being impatient are just a few of the culprits in losing rapport. Factors that work against building rapport are; lack of cultural understanding, time of deployment rotations, bad first impressions by others and expectation management. An entire thesis could be devoted to this very important topic but in the interest of brevity only a few issues will be addressed.

Lack of cultural understanding is an ongoing battle that must be focused on throughout a Civil Affairs Soldiers time on active duty. Never feel comfortable enough in a foreign culture that focus is lost and assumptions are made. Soldiers get lazy and inadvertently cross a line setting back efforts. Get to know the

---

<sup>52</sup> Baker, 21.

<sup>53</sup> Lawrence, “Twenty Seven Articles” (Britain 1917) accessed on 16 November 2007 <http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/revolt/warfare4.html>

culture especially the taboos and stay away from them. The generic rules of cultural engagement do not speak of sex, politics or religion, seem to work when there is little to no base of knowledge.

We constantly strove to earn the trust and confidence of the Iraqis in our area by consistently being truthful with them and following through on our word.<sup>54</sup>

There is nothing that can be done to change the length of deployments, that is something beyond the tactical and strategic span of control. A significant factor that arises from transition during deployments is how to transition local points of contact to the unit conducting the relief in place. This process needs to be thought through and planned for as much as possible. Losing data and institutional knowledge that was collected during a rotation can be limited with using the ASK software but personal ties that take time to grow are what suffers the most. Understanding that the inhabitants of the country are not required to adapt or change but the soldiers trying to obtain their support and assistance are.

Fixing problems that were caused by others takes time and a consistent demonstration of performance. American soldiers have difficulty in judging the amount of time that is needed by foreign nationals to feel comfortable in speaking to members of other cultures, and often times become frustrated and demanding attitudes which can potentially ruin the US ability to gain information. Soldiers who are not trained in cross cultural communication and attempt to enter into a relationship without spending the time and effort needed to build rapport could affect all efforts after their rotation. Depending on the civilians and their level of comfort, building the needed level of rapport could take significant portions of time but is necessary due to the protracted nature of insurgency.

The expectation of US forces and their capabilities is a factor when interacting with local nationals. "If you Americans are capable of putting a man on the moon, why can't you get the electricity to come on..."<sup>55</sup> is a prevalent feeling

---

<sup>54</sup> Baker, 24.

<sup>55</sup> Baker, 19.

in most third world countries. Getting control of expectations starts from the very first interaction with local nationals. Never allow the expectation to get ahead of capabilities,

...we were met with enormously unrealistic expectations that we had to manage and were simply unable to gratify in a timely manner. Such expectations grew out of Coalition pronouncements before Soldiers arrived that extolled how much better off the average Iraqi citizen's life was going to be when Saddam and his regime were gone. The concept of 'better' proved to be a terrible cultural misperception on our part...<sup>56</sup>

All operations have the potential to build rapport as well as destroy it. Some examples of operations designed to specifically build rapport are centered on the needs and cultural sensitivities of the local population.

There is a direct correlation between our credibility and our ability to demonstrably improve the quality of life, physical security, and stability in a society.<sup>57</sup>

Infantry and Special Forces handle the physical security Civil Affairs tackles the quality of life and stability aspect of rapport building. Many times these aspects intermesh and are by no means exclusive, but identifying who is responsible for what helps make the load manageable. Examples of effective quality of life type operations that proved successful in Afghanistan were the distribution of wood and charcoal bricks to rural families during the winter. Food is often a welcome aspect but keeping people warm in the winter and cool in the summer goes a long way to demonstrate concern for the health and welfare of a target audience. MEDCAPS (Medical Civil Action Program), VETCAPs (Veterinarian Civil Action Program) and DENTACPs (Dental Civil Action Program) are all examples of rapport building type operations.

---

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.,19.

We came to realize that any chance of success with information operations was specifically tied to immediate, visible actions to improve the average Iraqi's quality of life.<sup>58</sup>

## **6. Drawing Operations-**

Drawing operations are operations conducted with the goal of drawing large numbers locals to interact with US forces. These operations may take on different forms but have the same desired end state, create an opportunity for local nationals to interact with soldiers. Creating an environment during these operations that allow for privacy in order for local nationals to pass along information proves valuable. There are several reasons to conduct these operations.

Drawing and interacting with a large numbers of people hinders the insurgents ability to identify who passed information to US forces. Counter insurgency forces can create an environment to meet with individuals and interact with them on a short term basis to pass information or plan a more lengthy interaction at another time. Many times this type of information can be exchanged while distributing humanitarian assistance, during the conduct of a medical examination, or in the course of treating their livestock. These opportunities must be designed to allow time away from the eyes of a community in order to provide the best possible security to the individual and his or her family.

An example of drawing operations was conducted successfully by Civil Affairs teams in Orgun-E Afghanistan and continues today. Upon initially arriving into Orgun-E a destroyed and neglected warehouse was identified as a location to store and distribute incoming humanitarian assistance (HA) items (food, blankets, radios, etc...). It was during the distributions of HA that the locals had their pictures taken, asked a few questions and given information within just few moments of being alone with soldiers in the warehouse. The mission was

---

<sup>58</sup> Baker, 19.



designed to incorporate other coalition forces in order to provide an eavesdropping net and security on the warehouse prior to announcing a specific date and time of the distribution operation. Announcing the date and time would hopefully draw out any insurgents from the community before hand to attempt to attack the warehouse or plant improvised explosives to detonate during the operation in order to kill civilians seen interacting with US military. Additionally with the eavesdropping net established over the town communications regarding any activities related to the distribution could be monitored in order to identify insurgents and gain an understanding of who the insurgents are and the size and location of their network. Occasionally the efforts paid off and plans were discovered before hand and insurgents were caught conducting a reconnaissance of the warehouse in preparation for attacks.

During the course of the distribution locals that arrived at the warehouse and were told they would be receiving the supplies individually and they would need to enter into the warehouse in order to help pack the items. It was during these brief moments behind the walls of the warehouse that the individual was photographed, biometrics were taken and casual conversation was struck that resulted in a more detailed understanding of the human terrain. Individuals effectively answered a survey of questions developed before hand during the course of conversation while loading supplies on pack animals or gathering the items in bundles to carry. The information was gathered away from the site an hearing of others who were waiting in line and conducted in a manner that was more reflective of a conversation than a formal questioning. These short but effective conversations resulted in a large portion of the community providing a significant amount of detail to the civil terrain and began the interaction with specific locals and the building of rapport and trust. Some information on insurgents is always provided, whether the information results in the identification of a particular insurgent or observations of things happening in the community it all adds clarity to the understanding of the operational environment.

There are other tactical benefits for conducting Drawing Operations, specifically, preventing civilian interference during the course of combat or intelligence collecting operations. Drawing a large crowd away from the area of an attack could potential help prevent the loss of civilian life and collateral damage. Announcing these types of activities to the civilian population provides a kind of honey pot for insurgents to communicate to each other about or possibly makes plans to attack or threaten locals before hand, doing this puts the enemy into a reaction mode verses planning operations against US forces. If intelligence collection assets are in position prior to operations a net can be established to help intercept communications and help identify insurgents that might be interested in information on US forces. Lastly, these operations are another opportunity to build rapport and help demonstrate the best face of the counter insurgent forces.

## **7. Emersion Operations**

Emersion operations are designed to get soldiers into the villages and towns for a period of time in order to observe and gain situational awareness. Emersion will provide a limited opportunity to interact with local nationals and observe daily life. In the course of living among a target population relationships can be created and others fostered to help strengthen ties among supporters. Sharing the hazards of living amongst a targeted population boosts the confidence of locals as well as demonstrates unity. The best situation possible is a unit or individuals to be invited to remain overnight or for a few days by a local leader in of the area. In being invited several hurdles will be bypassed and a local face will be put to an invitation verse an uninvited bunch of soldiers moving in to hopefully draw a fight. Spending an extended amount of time among the local population provides an enormous information gathering opportunity. The more intelligence assets that can help in collecting information during the emersion the better the time spent.

## **8. Network Building Operations**

Network building operations are designed to create counter insurgency networks from among civil organizations in the population. The end state of this effort is to create small groups who are motivated to fight against insurgents within their own neighborhoods. By building small networked groups, based upon preexisting civil and social organizations, to help collect information or report suspicious activities counter insurgency forces increase their information and security networks from within the population. There are several techniques to accomplishing this task,

The groups might not directly seek out or report on insurgents but provide information that can further enhance the civil terrain or identify insurgent support networks. An example of this type of operation might be; bringing together the local business owners in an area and creating an environment where they understand how insurgent activities or an insurgent victory could effect their interests and livelihoods. Any civic organization in a community might be helpful in this effort; farmers, women's groups, youth groups or informal social groups. Helping to support local governance by bringing together people of a like interest creates a web of networks and civil organizations that counter insurgent efforts and strengthen communities.

Opportunities to be apart of meetings of local leadership or security forces is a high value effort. Bringing other members of the community to witness what goes on during the meetings is another potential opportunity to spread counter insurgent fervor and create networks. If leaders and elders are seen working with US forces while representing their constituency it allows for word of mouth to do rapport building from within a society. Asking the local leaders to bring in a different member of their community every meeting to observe adds another dimension to the proceedings and allows for social networks among citizens to begin. Additionally it provides another opportunity to interact with a section of the population in another venue.

#### **D. POST DEPLOYMENT PHASE**

Post deployment operations center primarily on Civil Information Management (CIM)<sup>59</sup> which will be discussed at length in another chapter. This phase begins as units begin to prepare for relief in place operations. This phase involves the updating, cataloging and warehousing of civil information in order to pass it on to the follow on unit. More vital than the data is the passing along of contacts and area familiarization. This portion of most deployments is the area of most vulnerability to counter insurgency forces. The relationships that have taken months to establish and foster are now coming to an end and must be transitioned to replacements as nearly intact as possible. The complexities of working in a cross cultural environment, by, with, and through the local population, makes the cycle of changing counter insurgent forces problematic at best.

The focus of this effort initially should be in communicating with the arriving unit and specifically with the Civil Affairs counterpart handling the Civil Common Operating Picture in order to provide as much information as possible before deployment. The temporal, relational and geospatial information is the bulk of the data but the personalities, complexities and nuisances need to be portrayed as much as possible as well. One of the big difficulties in conducting the RIP is the rotating units don't know each other and have no opportunities to gain an understanding of the ability or level of knowledge or experiences of the incoming team. Part of the Pre Mission activities of the incoming unit is to gain familiarity with the operational environment during the Pre-Deployment Site

---

<sup>59</sup> Civil Information Management (CIM) is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other USG/DoD agencies, and international organizations and NGOs to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both the raw and analyzed civil information to military and non-military partners throughout the area of operations.

Survey (PDSS). As discussed in the Pre Deployment Preparation section of this chapter any opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of the environment is critical.

Once the unit arrives to conduct the RIP all operations in the community are forced to a temporary halt if conditions have not been set to make for a smooth transition. As discussed in previous chapters, surveys are the best method to get to understand a community. A suggestion for RIP operations is the consideration of conducting joint surveys of the population with the members of the incoming and outgoing unit as part of the RIP. This would provide for several things; updating information and keeping a finger on the pulse of the population, provide a vehicle to familiarize the incoming unit with the population, and demonstrate to the community the determination to outlast insurgents. Conducting a door to door survey in some areas especially urban environments might be impossible especially in the short window available during RIP operations but activities that could achieve the same end state might be able to be created in its place.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **V. WHAT INFORMATION TO COLLECT**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The focus of civil reconnaissance efforts should center on collecting geospatial, relational and temporal information. Integrating data collection and analysis across these layers puts counter insurgent forces in a better position to understand the operational environment and see the rich tapestry of the human terrain. The methodology begins with the examination of the geospatial dimensions of an area of responsibility with the goal of understanding the physical environment in as much detail as possible. The second step is the layering of socio-cultural dimension or relational data to the physical terrain to indicate where people are, and what relationships exist. The final layer is the temporal dimension, which will depict the evolution of relationships in a specific geographic area and offer clues as to how they will continue to evolve in the future.

### **B. GEOSPATIAL**

Knowledge of the terrain and population provides commanders with an understanding of how to select the time and location for future operations, as well as the tactics to be employed.<sup>60</sup>

#### **1. Introduction**

Gaining spatial awareness of an area of operations helps focus counter insurgent forces, and quickly identify the relevance of activities and civil information. Geospatial information is data that can be superimposed onto maps to visually depict information that has a geographic relevance. The primary means of collecting, analyzing and depicting geospatial information is the Geographic Information System (GIS). Merging civil information with geospatial information provides a visual representation of the human terrain. In combining

---

<sup>60</sup> Brian Reed, "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency," *Parameters* Summer (2007): 28.

these pieces of data more information becomes apparent about the population and insurgents. Understanding the physical environment helps to close the information gap that exists between insurgents and counter insurgents.

The term “geospatial intelligence” means- “ the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.”<sup>61</sup>

## **2. Geographic Information System**

GIS is many things; a science, a tool, and software application all in one. The science of GIS is the understanding of the earth surface and all the aspects of mapping it. This portion of GIS is very technical and precise. Geography, Cartography, Remote Sensing, Surveying, Geodesy, Statistics, Computer Science and Mathematics all contribute aspects to the creation of the software that result in highly accurate and detailed geospatial representations. The quality of the information extracted from the use of GIS relates to the quality of the information provided and from the analyst’s ability to visually depict the data. If the base maps or satellite images used are flawed or improperly displayed the value of the information is lessened. GIS functioning as a tool strives to merge mapping and database management to produce more than just a two dimensional map, but a model rich in information. GIS’s role as a software is the point the science meets the functionality of the tool, and the information provided can be manipulated and graphically represented in order to conduct spatial analysis.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> Geospatial Intelligence Basic Doctrine, National Geospatial Intelligence Office, Publication 1-0, September 2006.

<sup>62</sup> Dr. Arlene Guest, “Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems” class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.



### 3. Components of GIS

The GIS is the integration of five components; people, data, procedures, hardware, and software. All components must be present and functioning in order for GIS to operate effectively.<sup>63</sup> The higher the quality of the individual components the more utility GIS can be to the counter insurgent fight.

The people component of GIS are the collectors of the raw data and the analyst that input and manipulate the information. GIS is not user friendly, it is quirky and is constantly being updated, so remaining proficient in all of its many functionalities is a task in and of itself. If the very perishable skill of operating GIS is not exercised with regularity the value of the tool is diminished. GIS conferences are conducted virtually everywhere in the world by the company that created the software Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) to help keep operators current on developments with the software. ESRI works closely with the Special Operations community and strives to make the software relevant to the counter insurgent fight and modern day battlefield. Of all the components of GIS the operators are the most important since they take time to make and become proficient in the use of the software.

The type and quality of the data inputted into the software will determine the quality of the output. There are essentially three types of geographic data; spatial data (where something is), attribute data (what something is), and time (when something was something or somewhere).<sup>64</sup> Some of the sources of data are paper maps, GPS input, digital data and satellite information. In addition to geospatial related data. Databases and spreadsheets can be incorporated to maximize data input and analysis capacity. Pictures and videos can also be linked to data on maps to provide a multi media presentation of data. The more detailed information input to the system the higher the quality of the model that

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., "Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems" various class notes.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., "Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems" various class notes.

can be produced. Raw data placed into the proper format will allow for the maximum utility of the software. When dealing with mapping and map making precision is the key to success.

When using the software to visually represent data against a base map a high level of attention to procedure is required. The software is extremely rigid in the procedure for uploading data and strives to ensure the necessary metrics are applied to maintain accuracy. After understanding the science that applies to the data and map making, understanding procedures is the primary focus of GIS operators.

The software can't exist without the proper hardware. Present day off the shelf computers possess the needed hardware, memory and speed to perform all the functions of the GIS software. The best utilization of the GIS is if it used on a network of other computers collecting similar information. In tracking and fighting insurgents networking GIS capabilities is essential. The enemy often times is not constrained to the geographic boundaries counter insurgent forces recognize and understands that part of his strength is to operate in several areas simultaneously. If we don't understand the terrain of our own AOR as well as the units adjacent to our own we stand a great chance of allowing the enemy free reign. Understanding the complete picture of the civil terrain will help in making the activities of the insurgent more apparent.

#### **4. GIS Relevance to COIN**

GIS software provides for several key functions; capture, store, query, analyze, and displays information. Through these functions information can be manipulated to gain better insight into the population and further understanding of the civil domain. One of the advantages of being able to use spatial and attribute data together is the ability to code large amounts of information very quickly in order to visually depict an area. Entire neighborhoods and populated areas can be surveyed and the data collected can be attributed to locations quickly. This speed and accuracy of understanding the physical environment is essential in defeating the insurgents information advantage. As features are

created on a map, data tables exist to further enhance the information about the feature. An example is collecting the location of residences and business (special data) inside an area of operations and then linking information about the location (attribute data) to provide details on who occupies the location, pictures of the individuals, background data and so on. Entire target packages and historical record can be created using GIS.

Once the special and attribute data are properly entered into the software queries of the data can be done to create different overlays that can be placed against a base map to understand the population. Features can be identified based upon attributes and information can be gleaned to layering the information on top of each other to identify trends and correlations. An example is plotting IED explosions and layering the locations of residence to see who was the closest house to the blast sight. This provides counter insurgent forces with a place to start investigating to see if they saw when the IED was emplaced, heard insurgent operating in the area, etc. Additionally the geographic component can help identify likely positions from which a remotely controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIED) could have been detonated given the strength of the frequency and the type of detonating device used. In developing the details, operations can be crafted to help to understand the template for IED set up and detonation that could be used throughout the theater.

The primary purpose of using GIS as it relates to civil information in the COIN environment is to help organize data and visually depict it quickly over a network to reduce the information gap the enemy has over counter insurgency forces. Having the ability to analyze both special and attribute data simultaneously provides a strong tool for analysts to gain situation awareness quickly.

With this tool and its vast ability to manipulate data comes the difficulty in standardizing the processes and encompassing all the various scenarios possible. Since this aspect of civil information is very important great attention to establishing as coherent as possible a format is required and a procedural

checklist is needed to standardize data collection, input, and representation. With the transition of units the one constant needs is knowledge of the area. Creating a SOP or Codebook that details how to enter the data and what the standard should be is the next step. The difficulty initially will be in creating a format and SOP broad enough to capture as much of the process as possible. Immediately after the SOP is written changes based upon utilization or developments in the technology will begin to take place. How the force will train on this software, maintain proficiency and keep up with changes will be a daunting task. If a priority is not placed on using this type data will continue to exist in unconnected plains and formats never to be linked to anything relevant or actionable. Forces will continue to be victim of the enemy's informational advantage.

### **C. RELATIONAL**

No longer can analysts use just an organizational chart to describe an enemy's configuration. Today it is much more difficult for a commander to differentiate the enemy from members of the general populace. The commander can no longer expect to face a single, consistent leader running a subordinate organization exhibiting a coherent pattern of activity.<sup>65</sup>

#### **1. Introduction**

The purpose of conducting social network analysis (SNA) of the civil environment is to understand the people and networks within a population. Gaining an awareness of the networks in an operating environment using SNA will produce significant amounts of information of both the population and the enemy. Understanding the relationship the insurgent has with the local population provides planners the sort of information needed in order to make effective plans. Once there is an understanding of who is who and how they relate, or the presence of a baseline, anomalies begin to become more visible. The presence of hidden or dark networks will begin to emerge.

---

<sup>65</sup> Reed, 19.

The modern insurgency is characterized by non-state actors, linked by pre-existing ties (religion, family, or tribe) that are adapted to support insurgent warfare.<sup>66</sup> Understanding these ties and what their strengths and weaknesses are is the first step in destroying an insurgent network.

In the Global War on Terrorism, one of the greatest challenges facing the United States is the opposition of a fully mobilized, traditionally networked, tribalized enemy. This opposition is reflected in an insurgency that possesses an unassailable base immune from direct attack. This unassailable base is itself the social network, merging and diverging as the situation dictates.<sup>67</sup>

## **2. Utilizing SNA**

The primary purpose of SNA in COIN is to visualize the relationship between actors and uncover whatever structure exists. This probative analysis of the enemies networks based upon civil information not only removes the insurgents cover and concealment but also erodes the information advantage of the cultural and civil information that he uses to defeat US forces. Analysis of the civil environment should start with an effort to understand the ties that exist independent of the conflict. Preexisting ties are the conduit for persons of like interests and experience to organize into groups that share a common ideology or goals. Understanding who belongs to preexisting networks provides counterinsurgent forces an excellent place to begin to look for other insurgents or supporters. Tribal societies already have affiliated social, economic, and military networks easily adaptable to war fighting. The methods by which insurgents are exploiting tribal networks does not represent an evolved form of insurgency, but rather, it is an expression of inherent cultural and social customs.<sup>68</sup> Kinship ties, be they of blood or brotherhood, are a fundamental aspect of many terrorist, criminal, and gang organizations.<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> Reed,. 24.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid,. 29.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid,. 26.

<sup>69</sup> Reed,. 24.

Enemy information could be better understood and have more depth if layered against civil information in order to help identify preexisting ties. Understanding these ties will aide in discovering information about whom else might be involved in activities or might aide insurgents. Most efforts to hunt insurgents center on analysis of enemy information and networks These are pieces to a larger tapestry and could be better understood if placed into context. SNA provides a social and relational context to better understand, effect, and even predict, who might be insurgents from within preexisting relationships and networks.

Once the networks have been visually depicted, next comes examining the factors that influence the relationships between individuals and gaining an understanding of the nature and strength of the ties. Understanding why relationships exist between actors and how actors interact, counter insurgency forces are afforded a window into the inner workings of the network.<sup>70</sup> Understanding the links of a network are as important as understanding the characteristics of the individuals in the network. While pre-existing ties are the foundation, it is a common interest...that serves as the catalysts for creating a collective identity that allows a group to embrace collective action.”<sup>71</sup> For example, news about Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network reveal their dependence on personal relationships formed over the years with “Afghan Arabs” from Egypt and elsewhere who were committed to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism against the United States.<sup>72</sup> The common interest of Islamic jihad superseded preexisting relationships that helped to network fighters together from different parts of the word but once a member of the network it provided qualification for membership into other jihadists insurgencies.

Once the network has been analyzed, strategies can be developed to affect the network. The end result of effective SNA is knowledge based upon

---

<sup>70</sup> Reed,. 24.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid,. 24.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid,. 26.

information and intelligence that provides for the development of a plan of attack. We can now begin to see the enemy. Having conducted an effective SNA of the enemy using civil information US forces will be in a better position to utilize our superior direct action capability to interdict at our choosing verses whenever the enemy attacks.

Attacking these networks can be extremely difficult. Defeating a networked enemy requires a capability that possesses an array of linked resources necessary to sustain it. Conventional military thinking and strategies do not always permit such a response.<sup>73</sup>

SNA is not something easily trained and is a perishable skill that is more characteristic of tracking weather patterns than that of describing a static display. This method of peeling back layers to get at the heart of networks is time consuming and often counter intuitive,<sup>74</sup> but in modeling these networks effective methods of how to take them apart become more apparent. Civil information provides the base line from which other analysis can begin to take place. If we don't understand who is who and how they relate then we are not getting the full picture.

**a. Overt Networks**

SNA of overt networks in a population will reveal much about the enemy that the billion dollar satellites are incapable of. Face to face contact with civilians on a large scale has an effect on the enemy. With more interaction comes more information, and with more information the less room insurgents have to hide. Understanding whom in a community has influence, legitimate leadership, and control is similar to identifying key terrain in preparation for battle. Who controls those pieces of key terrain will dominate a battle space. Those who are in favor and have influence over the key individuals in an area stand a better chance at swaying public opinion and influencing perception. In understanding

---

<sup>73</sup> Reed,. 19.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid,. 19.

this critical concept soldiers and analysts can begin to predict who the enemy will target for influence operations. Efforts can be made to observe these people or actively engage them before the enemy in order to deprive them of that persons influence. It can also translate into the manifestation of operations that target watching those selected individuals residence and workplace to see who comes and goes, when and with what frequency. The desire to control these types of individuals will draw the enemy to these key people thus making him vulnerable.

SNA will help identify networks and individuals that are susceptible to being influenced or recruited by insurgent forces. The communist Vietnamese would identify popular youth as possible sources for recruitment when surveying a village for Communist take over, with the understanding that if certain individuals were recruited others would follow more easily.<sup>75</sup> Survey teams also identified those that were in trouble with the law and had reason to take issue with the current established government as potential recruits.<sup>76</sup> Using SNA to Identify theses sorts of individuals before insurgent recruitment efforts are applied could be extremely helpful in stopping the flow of new members.

Effective SNA will reveal the means the enemy communicates with the population. In the course of conducting Civil Reconnaissance how the civilian population has come to understand the enemy will become apparent. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's preferred method of communication is the "Night Letter" in Vietnam communist infiltrated villages at night and conducted visits of targeted locals to influence and intimidate. The tactics the enemy uses to communicate is a vulnerability and critical information.

In understanding the overt networks of a population, methods the insurgent uses to resource himself become apparent. A practical example of this can be found in Afghanistan. Due to the countries extreme isolation and terrain there is only one gas station in some places for miles, and in order to get out of

---

<sup>75</sup> Andrews,. 30.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid,. 30



town people must stop there when either coming or going. This fact makes the gas station network critical. Understanding who works there what they see and gaining an understanding for their loyalties could be significant in creating a “choke point” for the enemy. Observing who comes and goes at this location could yield significant information to counter insurgent forces and further hinder insurgent’s ability to operate in the open.

Understanding the major issues locals have with the established government can lead to the heading off of insurgent propaganda and ideology. Issues that are very apparent to locals and people of the region may not be to counter insurgent forces. These complaints and issues are the fuel which insurgent will use to mobilize and influence disgruntled citizens into supporting their effort. Understanding how the enemy puts form to the struggle and his ideology is critical in defeating it.

The military presently utilizes several different software packages to help conduct a limited version of SNA. Software such as Analyst Notebook were a great starting point but in order to get the fullest benefit from the information and the ability to manipulate it to the fullest extent, upgrades and training are desperately needed. SNA needs to be a part of training beyond the walls of the intelligence community. Insurgencies are fought at the lowest level with thinking and innovative leadership. Relying on a distant headquarters to conduct analysis of a population and be able to understand the complexities and nuances of its people is foolish. This is an opportunity for the Civil Affairs community to fill a gap in capabilities that the military is suffering from. Training on SNA packages that can integrate with the SOF community is the ideal. Software is only the tool for organizing and analyzing data, the strength of the analysis is only as good as the information that is gathered. The focus of the SNA effort should be placed on effective gathering techniques and coming up with creative solutions to bypass cultural and political obstacles to get at ground truth information.

***b. Steps in Conducting Analysis***

Before and during the coding of information a codebook of clear definitions needs to be established. This codebook is essential for several reasons; prevent confusion in terms, assist in the longevity of the data to other analyst, help others interpret the data outside of the creators and their organization. Presently the military utilizes several different SNA software packages with no synchronization or continuity of how data is entered, what it means or its significance. This drop off in the life of the data equates to fighting the first rotation into country every time a new unit comes in. The military has built a very limited and unstructured method of conducting relief in place missions that has hindered the forward progress of counter insurgency forces. The presence of a codebook is the first step in rectifying the situation. The document is ever evolving as new information is presented or new networks discovered. Codebooks are the key to unlock the value of conducting SNA.

(1) Describe the context of the network- Deciding on the scope or level of the analysis with as much detail as possible is the first step in preparing to conduct SNA. In the COIN environment at the operational and tactical level, analysis of the civil environment will start with understanding who is in a selected geographic location. This area could be as large as cities or as small as a few houses or small village. Once the area has been surveyed more specific layers like business networks or religious networks, whatever is deem appropriate can be examined more closely based upon the situation. What is important is defining the scope of the analysis before beginning or designing operations to collect the data. Ultimately the strength of SNA in COIN operations is the ability to map as many different networks as possible and then merge the models to examine the characteristics of the network.

(2) Translation of data into a matrix- Translating the data collected into a matrix is the point information begins to be dissected. Creating a one or two mode matrix or a simple relational matrix needs to be determined before sifting through the information to find relationships begins. Without going

into the specifics about how to construct matrix for analysis the decision on how to organize the model and what to visualize is important; getting it wrong will cost time and effort.

(3) Depict the network visually- Once the data has been loaded, the networks can be visually depicted. Selecting the different variations or types of methods of depicting a network will only enhance the information and provide different perspectives.

(4) Apply matrices to the network- Once the various networks have been created the true value of SNA can be understood, by merging different models together to identify key nodes and relationships. As networks are merged together to reveal characteristics and trends the enemy's cover and concealment begins to disappear.

(5) Analysis of the network- Applying the academic analysis to the network will bring to the surface details that visual inspection don't necessarily make apparent. Understanding the academic measures that could be applied to a network requires a more than casual understanding of SNA. Entire fields of education are dedicated to understanding the terms and methods of looking at the data, and speaks to why a SNA trained soldier is necessary to get the best out of the data. Using SNA software allows analysts to move the model around and get at different perspectives. Picking out key nodes and where cut off points exists are easy to see.

(6) Develop strategy- Once the models have been analyzed and different models placed together different methods of attacking a network can be analyzed. In most SNA software the ability to remove nodes and links to nodes is available and will provide a model of how networks will restructure in wake of the removal of one or several nodes. This is the goal of SNA is to provide planners with suggestions and methods to destroying insurgent networks.

Social Network Analysis is only a tool and has inherent faults. Quantitative analysis of any data possesses inherent problems. The models

created are only as good as the information provided. The uncertainty of the scope of a network is always a concern. As with any study of human relationships and social sciences, dealing with the unpredictability of human beings causes much apprehension in placing lots of confidence in the data once it is presented. The more a result of SNA is counter intuitive the more resistance will be encountered. Even with the many flaws of SNA it still remains the process that strives to reveal the relationships that insurgents use to conduct operations.<sup>77</sup>

#### **D. TEMPORAL**

The temporal aspect of civil information is extremely critical to understanding the significance of events in the context of time. Upon first observation, this may seem the most insignificant aspect used to understand the civil environment, but in most cases it permeates the relevance of all other aspects of analysis. Using the temporal aspect to help ultimately predict occurrences or examine when conditions are right for events to happen is just one of the goals of temporal analysis. Although seemingly insignificant by itself when layered against relational and geospatial data understanding when an event occurred is an essential element in determining when it may happen again. In breaking into the enemy's decision cycle we can begin to examine his routines and breakdown the times when conditions are ripe for his success and move to interdict them. Examples of the relevance of time can be seen in the rise in attacks during the time of Ramadan in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ramadan is also a major cultural event for all Muslims throughout the world and will be recognized by all those working with Muslims as a time when fasting and minimal physical action is taken. Another example is the harvesting season is for poppy plants in Afghanistan. Harvest will draw Taliban merchants from their hiding place in order

---

<sup>77</sup> The concepts presented in the how to conduct SNA portion were taken from class notes and presentations made by Dr. Nancy Roberts in her Dark Networks class given at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.

to obtain the plants for refinement into heroine which finances a large portion of Taliban and AQ activities in the country. Knowing when is as relevant as knowing the who, where and why. Both GIS and most Network analysis software such as Analyst Notebook have temporal components to aide and keep track of events along a time continuum.

## **E. SUMMARY**

In having provided an overview of the three aspects of civil information the question of what is to be collected becomes more clear. Under geospatial information items to be collected are spatial data, attribute data and time. Understanding where something is, what something is and when it was something or somewhere provide a strong level of analysis. Under relational or socio-cultural data critical pieces of information to focus on are; the people and the relationships they share with each other. Understanding the individual and why they behave the way they do as well as the relationships they have creates a baseline that begins to reveal anomalies. These anomalies are persons or people who are operating outside of the norm and deserve further attention to explain their behavior. This is the essence of identifying who are the insurgents within the population. Understand the relationships and the networks will begin to be understood. The temporal aspect of civil information is as simple as it is powerful. Understanding when something took place is a significant factor in understanding why it happened and what conditions caused it to happen. Once this data is collected analysis will reveal conditions under which it could happen again. Knowing this level of detail provides a certain capacity to predict, that could prevent future surprise.

## **F. CONCLUSION**

If used effectively these level of analysis should provide a detailed picture of the human terrain and indicators for the allocation ISR and civil reconnaissance resources. Gathering this information takes a significant amount of time and patience. Large amounts of the information are not static but change,

and keeping aware of the changes is just as daunting as gathering the initial data. Training on effectively utilizing any one component of analysis takes dedication and a regimen of repeat usage. Preparing before deployment is critical to being able to make the most from these analytical tools and corresponding software.

## **VI. THE HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE**

Many of the principal challenges we face in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) stem from just such initial institutional disregard for the necessity to understand the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight.<sup>78</sup>

Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are professional academics from various social science backgrounds that deploy into theaters of operation and provide cultural insight and subject matter expertise to commanders and staffs. The Human Terrain Team could play a significant role in helping plan Civil Reconnaissance operations, and making sense of Civil Information. The five man teams are lead by a military officer and have an anthropologist and subject matter experts of the region serving as advisors. The strength of the team lies in its members' expertise. The military realizes the gap present in cultural knowledge as well as its effects in the counter insurgency fight. In an effort to shorten this gap, the military has solicited the academic community for subject matter experts to provide their knowledge to the war fighter in order to help make culturally relevant plans and avoid mistakes.

The Human Terrain initiative was started in 2003 with after action reviews coming in from conventional units detailing the lack of cultural understanding and how they suffered from not understanding the significance of cultural intelligence in getting buy in from the local community. The Pentagon initially solicited Dr Montgomery McFate, a Yale-educated cultural anthropologist working for the Navy, who advocated using social science to improve military operations and

---

<sup>78</sup> Jacob Kipp, Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, "The Human Terrain System: A COORDS for the 21st Century" *Military Review* September-October (2006) : 8-15.

strategy<sup>79</sup>. Her efforts in creating data bases and collecting open source information to provide to commanders were so successful and the demand from the field was so great the Pentagon brought on COL (R) Steve Fondacaro, a retired Special Operations officer to help Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) organize and hire the needed professionals to get academics to units as far forward as possible<sup>80</sup>.

These teams have reach back capability to a network of other academics, researchers and social scientists throughout the US who can help support and analyze civil information. One of these institutions is the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Selected cultural expertise lies in the National Security Affairs Department with renowned academics such as Dr. Thomas Johnson<sup>81</sup> and Dr. Vali Nasr<sup>82</sup>. Also available to the HTT and military forces is the Defense Analysis Department and its Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab<sup>83</sup>. The lab fuses together geospatial, relational and temporal information in order to better understand the human terrain and gain a deeper understanding of the operational environment. The lab will provide interested students and faculty a place to collect, organize and analyze data in order to observe trends and ultimately anticipate actions in the field based upon a level of understanding of the human terrain and relevant cultural information. The

---

<sup>79</sup> David Rohde, "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones," New York Times, 5 October 2007 [newspaper on line]; available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?ei=5124&en=a13ee15e97920f0f&ex=1349323200&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&pagewanted=all>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2007.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>81</sup> Thomas Johnson, Center for Contemporary Conflict [website] available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/johnson.asp> accessed 1 October 2007.

<sup>82</sup> Vali Naser, Center for Contemporary Conflict [website] available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/nasr.asp> accessed 1 October 2007.

<sup>83</sup> Established by Douglas Borer, Nancy Roberts, Kristen Tsois and Brian Sweeney in 2007, to help evaluate software that analyzes geographic, relational and temporal aspects of selected areas of operation. The lab also serves a resource for students to conduct research and analysis over a period of time with all the latest software made available in one location.



Defense Analysis department specializes in all the forms of Irregular Warfare and SOLIC related issues. With this level of expertise at the fingertips of the military the chances at doing things better significantly improve.

Human Terrain Teams were created to provide commanders with subject matter experts, as far forward in the battlefield as possible, in order to provide culturally significant information in order make better tactical and operational decisions. The teams presently reside at the Brigade or Regimental level. The home of the Human Terrain effort is located in the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) of the Combined Arms Center located in Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO falls underneath the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)<sup>84</sup>. FMSO actively recruits from the academic community and world at large for persons with the proper background and credentials who are willing to go forward into a war zone and provide cultural insight to units and soldiers. The effort has received national level attention and support. In September 2006, Defense Secretary Gates authorized a \$40 million expansion of the program, which will assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades scheduled to rotate into Iraq and Afghanistan. Since early September, five new teams have been deployed in the Baghdad area, bringing the total to six<sup>85</sup>. Presently the Department of the Secretary of Defense has hired a staff to help ensure the program receives the required funding.

Conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like building a house without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure.<sup>86</sup>

This effort is critical to reducing the learning curve for counter insurgent forces and quickly makes sense out of the operational environment. Since the

---

<sup>84</sup> Jacob Kipp et al. 9.

<sup>85</sup> David Rohde, 2.

<sup>86</sup> Jacob Kipp et al. 8.

insurgent is usually from the country or region he is operating in he possess cultural understanding of the people and issues that host nation civilians deem important. The insurgent's strength lies in his ability to use cultural information to support his cause and demonize counter insurgency efforts. Many times the insurgents play upon the problems and injustices, whether real or perceived, of the local population in order to garner support and gather the people, guns and money necessary to fight counter insurgent forces.

The communist Vietnamese campaign for control of the villages in rural areas in the south provides an example of the very effective use of culture to manipulate all classes of society into supporting the insurgents. The communist party in its initial efforts to gain support, suppressed talk of Marxists class struggle and maintained a "wise and flexible attitude" with the bourgeoisie' in order to attain maximum support. The communist could not afford to loose the support of the upper-class and thus spoke of "democratic rights" in order to gain their buy in.<sup>87</sup> The plan was later revealed by Truong Chinh, in his book, *Primer for Revolt*

First, it must be an anti imperialist revolution aimed at over throwing the imperialist domination, and second, it must be an agrarian revolution so as to confiscate the lands of the feudal landlords and distribute them to the peasants. The second stage in North Vietnam began after the French left and in 1956 resulted in the virtual elimination of the bourgeoisie through a "land reform" program planned and executed by Truong Chinh. In what one western observer called an "indescribable butchery", more than

100,000 persons were executed or imprisoned. The Communist party broke their struggle down into two parts the struggle against the imperialist (French, United States) and secondly against farmers and feudal landlords. Understanding this key piece of cultural information about the form of the struggle and the methods utilize to persuade the population to aide the Communist could have provided an understanding of how better to fight the war.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt: The Communist Take-over in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 13.

<sup>88</sup> William Andrews, *The Village War* (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 30.

For too long the insurgent have been able to utilize American cultural ignorance to feed their propaganda in order to strengthen their argument and recruit followers. Violations of cultural taboos provide the enemy with “evidence” of the true intentions of the US and Coalition and their desire to enslave and subjugate the country. When in all reality the soldier did not know the taboo existed and thought he was doing a good thing by holding the elderly Afghan woman’s hand while she side stepped an unexploded rocket launched by the Taliban. Seemingly small infractions such as the handling of Afghani women by male US soldiers, is a cultural violation that requires an act of revenge in order to set the balance straight. Such acts on the part of a culturally ignorant soldier could have life and death consequences. Having subject matter expertise on the ground with the troops will help soldiers avoid making mistakes that are counter productive to their efforts. Ideally, the team’s presence will increase the ability of military planners and leaders to focus operations that are culturally appropriate in order to attain population support, identify insurgents, and degrade their ability to conduct effective operations. The ability to conduct operations with as much precision as possible, will minimize collateral damage prevent the senseless death of innocent civilians and affect the enemy’s ability to further perpetuate insurgent propaganda and recruiting.

The Human Terrain Team could have significant impact on the ability to guide and plan Civil Reconnaissance operations, and help make sense of Civil Information. Although currently no doctrine exists to depict the relationship of the HTT to the military, the logical location for the HTT to insert itself is with the Brigade Civil Affairs Planner. If the CA planner could incorporate the HTT into a cell that works together, the combined knowledge and capabilities could be extremely powerful. Using this CA/HTT cell, information can be gathered in order to accurately depict the human terrain, then operations could be developed to target the insurgents’ efforts at controlling or influencing the population. Without an HTT the task of analyzing the civil terrain falls to the Civil Affairs planner who is more soldier than cultural anthropologist. The information a Civil Affairs soldier

could provide to a commander in reality will be a best guess based on what appears in front of him and what cultural understanding he may or may not have. Essentially, CA soldier can function as collectors of Civil Information but have a limited ability to analyze it based on their education and training; having the HTT present would remove that obstacle, and help commands better understand the information and the people. Bottom line, The HTTs could provide cultural expertise to a military that has very little.

There exists a strong opposition to the Human Terrain initiative and the use of anthropology to support warfare. The issue has boiled to a point now that concerned Anthropologist have created a pledge that is circulating to not assist in the HTT effort or with the military.

The eleven originators of the Pledge are deeply concerned that the 'war on terror' threatens to militarize anthropology in a way that undermines the integrity of the discipline and returns anthropology to its sad roots as a tool of colonial occupation, oppression, and violence<sup>89</sup>.

### **Pledge of Non-participation in Counter-insurgency**

We, the undersigned, believe that anthropologists should not engage in research and other activities that contribute to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or in related theaters in the "war on terror." Furthermore, we believe that anthropologists should refrain from directly assisting the US military in combat, be it through torture, interrogation, or tactical advice.

US military and intelligence agencies and military contractors have identified "cultural knowledge," "ethnographic intelligence," and "human terrain mapping" as essential to US-led military intervention in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. Consequently, these agencies have mounted a drive to recruit professional anthropologists as employees and consultants. While often presented by its proponents as work that builds a more secure world, protects US soldiers on the battlefield, or promotes

---

<sup>89</sup> Network of Concerned Anthropologist, Frequently Asked Questions section [website] available from <http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/faq> last accessed 2 October 2007.

cross-cultural understanding, at base it contributes instead to a brutal war of occupation which has entailed massive casualties.

By so doing, such work breaches relations of openness and trust with the people anthropologists work with around the world and, directly or indirectly, enables the occupation of one country by another. In addition, much of this work is covert. Anthropological support for such an enterprise is at odds with the humane ideals of our discipline as well as professional standards.

We are not all necessarily opposed to other forms of anthropological consulting for the state, or for the military, especially when such cooperation contributes to generally accepted humanitarian objectives. A variety of views exist among us, and the ethical issues are complex. Some feel that anthropologists can effectively brief diplomats or work with peacekeeping forces without compromising professional values.

However, work that is covert, work that breaches relations of openness and trust with studied populations, and work that enables the occupation of one country by another violates professional standards. Consequently, we pledge not to undertake research or other activities in support of counter-insurgency work in Iraq or in related theaters in the “war on terror,” and we appeal to colleagues everywhere to make the same commitment<sup>90</sup>.

The chief complaint from the anthropological sciences is that Anthropological studies should not be used to enable the occupation of one country by another or breach the trust of the studied population. Favorite platforms for dissent stem from the use of anthropologists during previous conflicts that served as spies and played key roles in espionage. The favorite example used by the anthropologist in opposition is reference to the COORDs program, which they connect to the Phoenix Project and the assassination of identified insurgents.

---

<sup>90</sup> Network of Concerned Anthropologist, Frequently Asked Questions section [website] available from <http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/faq> last accessed 2 October 2007.

If anthropologists on HTS teams interview Afghans or Iraqis about the intimate details of their lives, what is to prevent combat teams from using the same data to one day "neutralize" suspected insurgents? What would impede the transfer of data collected by social scientists to commanders planning offensive military campaigns? Where is the line that separates the professional anthropologist from the counter-insurgency technician?<sup>91</sup>

The opposing anthropologists have no problems working for the military or government agencies in efforts to assist with reconstruction effort but not in offensive operations. While apparently altruistic the argument lacks understanding of insurgency warfare and demonstrates the short sidedness of professionals who have never lived or worked in such a conflict environment. Better information means less violence and death especially to civilians.

Initial reports from the field are the Human Terrain Team are having a significant impact on the success of units down range. "In interviews, American officers lavishly praised the anthropology program, saying that the scientists' advice has proved to be "brilliant," helping them see the situation from an Afghan perspective and allowing them to cut back on combat operations. The aim, they say, is to improve the performance of local government officials, persuade tribesmen to join the police, ease poverty and protect villagers from the Taliban and criminals. Afghans and Western civilian officials, too, praised the anthropologists and the new American military approach..."<sup>92</sup> While the success of the teams lacks theater wide metrics to determine success, the anecdotal examples of success coming from the locations the teams are currently in are extremely compelling.

There remains lots of work to be done in making the information from the teams forward and the reach back cells available to others. This data and

---

<sup>91</sup> Roberto Gonzales and David Price, "Pledging to Boycott the War on Terror, When Anthropologist Become Counter Insurgence," Counter Punch, 28 September 2007 [journal online]; Available from <http://www.counterpunch.org/gonzalez09272007.html>; Internet; accessed 22 October 2007.

<sup>92</sup> David Rohde, 2.

analysis could be used extensively for wide spread theater and regional level situational awareness. Making it available to a broader audience could create the environment for official collaborative based research from other areas. Currently the Human Terrain System is in the early stages of developing software kits similar to the Asymmetric Software Kit in that they incorporate off the shelf software in various fields placed together in a suite package to interact with each other. The software is designed specifically for the social scientist. The HTTs will be outfitted with laptops complete with software to help in accumulating survey results, track information coming into the teams from other units using various software devices and versions in order to conduct some trend analysis and pattern social networks.

This initiative has tremendous potential and the political emphasis to support the effort by getting the right people into place. Hazards exist though in the haste involved in creating the teams and getting them into place as fast. The original design of the team was never proofed as it was intended in Afghanistan before its implementation, so some of the bugs have not surfaced yet. Additionally what role or precedence will this effort take after the current threats in Iraq and Afghanistan subside? What will the changes in politics power mean for the level of support? There will remain a need to prepare and train for the next cultural conflict and this require sustaining the HTTs effort over the long run. Making the teams a part of the military package and planning is one of the long term challenges Steve Fondacaro and Dr. McFate face.

Additionally there is a major overarching problem on the horizon that has significant impact for the HTT effort and the future of Civil Information. Currently the entire Human Terrain effort remains out of the intelligence community and in the open source run by the FMSO. If the program should become a part of the intelligence community the stove pipe will wrap itself around the data and seal it off in the regions of JWICS and classification walls that will inhibit its ability to move freely between units. Moreover, civilians will need higher level background and security checks that will inhibit the timeliness and potentially the pool of

candidates to draw from. One of the biggest strengths of the program is that the information exists in the open sources and not behind veils of secrecy. Presently the data and communications reside in the SIPR realm but mainly as a result of the fact that communications coming out of the theater are required to remain in those pipes, but the data itself is not classified. Other organizations stand to gain from the data collected and in sharing it. Other units stand to gain from accessing the information in order to begin to understand of the culture issues in their future areas of responsibility. Making cultural information a part of the intelligence community will further bog down a very overburdened system in intelligence and serve to limit the ability to gain the best academics available in the shortest amount of time to react to an enemy, who has no barriers or restraints and changes his strategy on the fly. Even in the face of some uncertainties and potential problems in the future the benefit the teams provide currently far outweigh the potential problems that might surface with the management and bureaucracy later. The ability to walk into a country and immediately have a cultural understanding from persons who are from the area or dedicated their lives to studying and understanding the region would drastically reduce the learning curve for American soldiers and allies. Getting such academics to the strategic level might prevent the short sightedness as demonstrated by the surprise of the Shia verses Sunni fight after the fall of Saddam's regime. Cultural understanding is the essence of fighting counter insurgency warfare, the quicker American leadership understands that and continues with efforts like the Human Terrain Teams the sooner we can end insurgents ability to cause problems.

If the anthropological experts don't contribute, the military will find other sources to get the information. As Anna Simons, an anthropologist who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, points out:

If anthropologists want to put their heads in the sand and not assist, then who will the military, the CIA, and other agencies turn to for information? They'll turn to people who will give them the kind of information that should make anthropologists want to rip their hair



out because the information won't be nearly as directly connected to what's going on in the local landscape.<sup>93</sup>

Without professional expertise and academics to put into context information found in the open source soldiers will do their own version of cultural analysis and develop methods of dealing with cultures they think will work. This trial and error approach to dealing with culture is the sort of thing that will allow an insurgency to point out the American's mistakes and use the propaganda to further their agenda and boost recruiting efforts.

An example of this is the Abu Ghraib scandal. Without cultural advisors the soldiers and leadership involved in interrogation techniques were left with finding out facts on their own in an effort to turn insurgents into informants. The interrogators used the book *The Arab Mind* by Raphael Patai which was a study of "Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, a cultural anthropologist. The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression.<sup>94</sup> "The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of the women . . . and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world," Patai wrote. Homosexual activity, "or any indication of homosexual leanings, as with all other expressions of sexuality, is never given any publicity. These are private affairs and remain in private."<sup>95</sup> The Patai book, an academic told me, was "the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior." In their discussions, he said, two themes emerged—"one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation."<sup>96</sup> The government consultant said that there may have been a

---

<sup>93</sup> Renee Montagne, "Interview: Anna Simons and Catherine Lutz on the involvement of anthropologists in war," National Public Radio's Morning Edition, 14 August 2002.

<sup>94</sup> Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002)

<sup>95</sup> Raphael Patai in Seymour M. Hersh, "The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib," *The New Yorker*, 24 May 2004; Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Scribner's 1973).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

serious goal, in the beginning, behind the sexual humiliation and the posed photographs. It was thought that some prisoners would do anything—including spying on their associates—to avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and friends. The government consultant said, “I was told that the purpose of the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could insert back in the population.” The idea was that they would be motivated by fear of exposure, and gather information about pending insurgency action, the consultant said. If so, it wasn’t effective; the insurgency continued to grow.<sup>97</sup>

These are the types of uses of the information that if not put into context will backfire. “Using sexual humiliation to blackmail Iraqi men into becoming informants could never have worked as a strategy, since it only destroys honor, and for Iraqis, lost honor requires its restoration through the appeasement of blood. This concept is well developed in Iraqi culture, and there is even a specific Arabic word for it: al-sharaf, upholding one's manly honor. The alleged use of Patai's book as the basis of the psychological torment at Abu Ghraib, devoid of any understanding of the broader context of Iraqi culture, demonstrates the folly of using decontextualized culture as the basis of policy.”<sup>98</sup> More of this will happen in the course of the present insurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan unless professional step forward and help make sense out of the information that is out there.

---

<sup>97</sup> Seymour M. Hersh, “The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib,” *The New Yorker*, 24 May 2004.

<sup>98</sup> Montgomery McFate, “Anthropology and Counter Insurgency, The Strange Story of There Curious Relationship,” *Military Review* March-April (2005): 24-38.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

### **A. SUMMARY**

The primary means of conducting Civil Reconnaissance is through the creation of operations that facilitate interaction with the local population in order to collect data that will provide more fidelity to the understanding of the civil environment, thus lessening the information gap the enemy has over counter insurgent forces. Some of the secondary effects of conducting these types of operations are that they; help defeat enemy propaganda of counter insurgent forces, support the counter insurgent story through action, build rapport and hopefully persuade non combatants with no alliance to support counter insurgent forces verses the insurgency.

Although extremely important to the conduct of effective COIN, untrained Soldiers should avoid conducting active Civil Reconnaissance due to the extremely sensitive nature of cross cultural communications and the potential for a bad interaction with civilians. At risk is the time lost in rebuilding or reestablishing rapport or credibility with a local population that developed a bad first impression as a result of ignorance, lack of training or experience by US forces. Civil Affairs Soldiers are primarily trained in all aspects of CIM and specifically Civil Reconnaissance. The CA planners and staff should be the primary generators of missions and suggestions for the command in what kind of operations, where to conduct them and the desired end state that will ultimately lead to enhancing understanding of the operational environment and the human terrain. CA planners should be responsible for identifying the gaps in civil information and designing operations to close these gaps as quickly as possible.

The primary types of information gathered while conducting Civil Reconnaissance center on geospatial, relational or socio-cultural, and temporal data. When these three aspects of civil information are combined, they provide a rich and detailed understanding of the human terrain and serve as guides in the

creation of operations that will enhance rapport and help increase the support of the local population. The conduct of Civil Reconnaissance does not begin once the Civil Affairs assets arrive at the respective area of operations but before the deployment begins and ends with the effective transfer of data and points of contact to follow on forces during relief in place operations. Over time and with the changes detailed in the 2006 QDR the active duty Civil Affairs will grow in strength and numbers facilitating the return of Soldiers to their respective areas of responsibility. Doing this will enable CA Soldiers to focus more directly in developing a deeper level of cultural understanding in order to remain ready in the pursuit of the radical militant Islamic insurgency as it spreads around the world.

## **B. ISSUES THAT REMAIN**

### **1. Internal**

#### ***a. Development of SOP***

(1) Collection. The US Army active duty Civil Affairs community needs to quickly establish how to conduct Civil Reconnaissance and begin experimenting with effective SOPs in order to become proficient in conducting this very complex task. This is a very large undertaking in that the specific method of collecting civil information will vary from culture to culture and the best method of gaining the confidence of the population will very rarely, if ever be the same. Providing broad methodologies for teams and individuals to adopt might be the best solution as all variations cannot possibly be captured in a document.

(2) Use of the ASK. . The method utilized to collect and enter the data into the ASK differs from team to team as there is no standard SOP as to how to execute any of the tasks related to data entry. For instance how are individual photographs entered into the ASK, what is required to accompany the photo; name, date, 10 digit grid coordinate in using the military

grid reference system, is it placed on the picture or somewhere else, if so how...etc. This is just a small example of the need to create a living SOP that will have to be adhered to in order to facilitate effect cataloging and trend analysis.

**b. Warehouse the Data**

(1) Where to physically store the data. Presently the 95<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Brigade, Civil Information Cell serves as the collector of the information that comes from the deployed Civil Affairs Teams scattered throughout the world. What is utilized to store the data is a Share Point server maintained by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). This server can only be accessed by DoD personnel that have access to the ASOC intranet with specific access to the Share Point site. Although the data is stored it is put on the server with no established SOP which makes retrieval difficult and inefficient. Once an SOP has been established a baseline can be created to begin cataloging the data using something along the lines of key word searches, RSS feeds or updates on interested subjects similar to Google searches.

(2) How to make information available to other organizations . With the experience of units in Iraq and Afghanistan the understanding of value of civil information and the need to keep it as current as possible is catching on. Defeating an insurgent network requires a networked organization. The civil information collected by CA teams forward should be made available if the knowledge is going to be of any significance. An organizations ability to access the collected data found on the USASOC Share Point site is restricted to; persons with access SIPR access, availability to the USASOC net, and then permission to access data from the site itself. Presently no other organization outside of USASOC has access to the data and no plans are currently on the table for discussion on how to reduce some of the barriers to this data. Ultimately, the info will have to exist in the classified and unclassified arena. If DoD is serious about the value of human terrain and cultural information

it must be made available to both military and civilian organizations in order to create a cinergy of effort to collect and update data as units, organizations and individuals pass through areas of interest.

**c. Training**

(1) Individuals. No time is dedicated in the Civil Affairs training pipeline to educate CA Soldiers on the specifics of conducting this Civil Reconnaissance at the tactical, operational or strategic level. Currently the task is more intuitive than institutional. Individual CA Soldiers are developing ways to accomplish this task depending on their environment and situation. The ASK software is trained during the Regional Studies course but at this point it is more reminiscent of learning to paint by numbers sort of education, essentially familiarizing CA soldiers with the capabilities of the software. The problem begins when the teams are given the kit with no SOP or requirements and told to execute essentially, move from paint by numbers to giving them a professional set of oil paints and a canvas and told to reproduce the frescos on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.

(2) Planners. There is no organized education of CA planners once individuals leave a tactical team to enable them to plan, organize or resource tactical CA teams to conduct Civil reconnaissance. If a CA planner does not understand COIN in detail, or the value of Civil Reconnaissance, he or she will be ineffective and prevent the supported unit from understanding or gaining any relevant headway in defeating the enemy.

**2. External**

**a. Keeping CR Out of the Intelligence Community**

Civil Reconnaissance belongs to the open source community specifically to Civil Affairs as it is the only force dedicated to this task specifically in the DoD and has the training pipeline established to support this all important task. If an over burdened Intelligence community should take over the function of

collecting, analyzing and warehousing civil information it will be instantly made unavailable to the civilian organizations that may serve to help keep the information fresh through the establishment of a reciprocal collaborative environment. Intelligence staff Officers should remain connected to the CA planner and be aware of the operations of the tactical teams in order to deconflict operations, use civil information to confirm or support enemy intelligence on the enemy and help enhance the common operating picture (COP) using civil information.

***b. Evolution of Software and Technology***

As software is developed and allows soldiers to become more efficient at collecting and analyzing data it should be vetted and replace old technology quickly. One of the benefits of Civil Affairs proponentcy remaining in SOCOM is the environment for utilizing off the shelf technology is more conducive than anywhere else in the DoD. We must utilize every advantage over the enemy, bureaucracy and procedure hinder the quick access to better tools to do the job. Networking civil data to make it as available as possible to counter insurgent forces; this is the desired end state. The individual soldier inputs data collected during the course of conducting a survey or after an interview with local national, that is instantly made available to the community at large.

***c. Unifying the Effort***

With the other service getting more involved in Civil Affairs the need to quickly unify efforts in all aspects of CIM and Civil Reconnaissance is a must. The US Army used to hold a monopoly on this data, its collection, and analysis but the times is quickly coming that this will no longer be the case. If specific parameters are not established before other services deploy and begin conducting these types of operations there exists a great potential for problems, duplication of effort and lack of knowledge sharing.

**d. *Educating the force***

Counter insurgency warfare has been historically avoided since Vietnam, many of the lessons learned during that time have been lost and we are suffering from it now. Civil Reconnaissance and CIM are not new to the military but are forgotten skill. There exists a strong need to reeducate the force on the value of civil information and how it should be made the main effort in a COIN environment not a secondary aspect on the Brigade support staff. Leaders from the Division to the squad need an education in CIM and Civil Reconnaissance in order to realign how COIN is fought.



## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Andrews, William The Village War. University of Missouri Press, Missouri, 1973.
- Baker, LTC Ralph “The Decisive Weapon; A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” Military Review May-June (2006).
- Bredo, William. “Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Viet Cong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict,” Asian Survey, August 1970.
- Center for Contemporary Conflict website  
(<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/johnson.asp>)  
(<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/nasr.asp>) Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, accessed October 1, 2007.
- Chiarelli, Peter W. and Michaelis, Patrick R. “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review July-August (2005).
- Giap, Vo Nguyen. People’s War, People’s Army. University Press of the Pacific, June 2001.
- Gonzales, Roberto and Price, David “Pledging to Boycott the War on Terror, When Anthropologist Become Counter Insurgency,” Counter Punch, 28 September 2007  
(URL:<http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/faq>), accessed October 2, 2007.
- Guest, Arlene. “Fundamental of Geospatial Information and Services”, class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2007.
- Kilcullen, Dave. “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt”, Small Wars Journal, (URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/>) accessed August 29, 2007.
- Kipp, Jacob, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A COORDS for the 21st Century” Military Review September-October (2006).

- Lawrence, T.E. "Twenty-Seven Articles," in Robert D. Ramsey III, ed., Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, Occasional Paper 19, Combat Institute Studies Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d. (URL: <http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/revolt/warfare4.html>), accessed November 16, 2007.
- McCormick, Gordon. "Guerilla Warfare," class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2006.
- McFate, Montgomery, "Anthropology and Counter Insurgency, The Strange Story of There Curious Relationship," Military Review March-April 2005.
- Montagne, Renee "Interview: Anna Simons and Catherine Lutz on the involvement of anthropologists in war," National Public Radio's Morning Edition, August 14, 2002.
- National Geospatial Intelligence Office, Publication 1-0: Geospatial Intelligence Basic Doctrine. Washington, DC: September 2006.
- Packer, George. "Knowing the Enemy; Can Social Scientists Redefine the War on Terror," The New Yorker, December 2006.
- Patai Raphael, The Arab Mind, (New York, Hatherleigh Press: 2002).
- Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. Yale University Press, United States: 2001.
- Reading Islam. Readingislam.com  
(URL:[http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article\\_C&cid=1176271732901&pagename=Zone-English-Discover\\_Islam%2FDIELayout](http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1176271732901&pagename=Zone-English-Discover_Islam%2FDIELayout))  
accessed September 25, 2007.
- Reed, Brian. "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency," Parameters Summer 2007.
- Roberts, Nancy. "Dark Networks," class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2007.
- Rohde, David. "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones," New York Times,(URL:<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.htm?ei=5124&en=a13ee15e97920f0f&ex=1349323200&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&pagewanted=all>) accessed October 6, 2007.
- Ross, MAJ Elbert. "The Changing Face of Civil Affairs; Training Today to Meet Tomorrows Challenges". Special Warfare Magazine, Ft. Bragg, NC, July 2006.

- Ryan, Henry. The Fall of Che Guevara. Oxford University Press, New York: 1998.
- Seymour M. Hersh, "The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib", The New Yorker, May 24, 2004; (URL:[http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa\\_fact2?currentPage=1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2?currentPage=1) accessed 16 Nov 07) accessed October 15, 2007.
- Truong, Chinh. Primer for Revolt: The Communist Take-over in Vietnam Praeger Publishing , New York, 1966.
- Tse-Tung. Mao. How to Differentiate Classes in the Rural Areas, (URL: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/date-index.html>), accessed October 16, 2007.
- Tse-Tung. Mao. On Guerilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965.
- U.S. Army. Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: December 15, 2006.
- U.S. Army. Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept Version 1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: September 2007.
- Wilson, "Gregory. Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: OEF-Philippines and indirect approach." Military Review, November-December 2006.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, VA
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA
3. COL Ferdinand Irizarry  
Ft. Bragg, NC
4. LTC James Wolff  
National Defense University
5. SOCOM J-7  
MacDill AFB, FL
6. James Anderson  
Hurlburt AFB, FL
7. ASD/SOLIC  
Washington, D.C.
8. HQ USSOCOM  
Ft. Bragg, NC
9. Jennifer Duncan  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA