The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Career Analyst Program (CAP) for new analysts seeks to increase their on-the-job effectiveness and ability to produce more accurate analysis. The program is located within the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, which CIA’s senior managers created in 2000 to increase the expertise of officers within its Directorate of Intelligence (DI). The school provides analyst and managerial training for the DI, as well as housing the Kent Center which acquires and disseminates information regarding analytic ‘best practices.’

According to an Agency press release, the CAP is CIA’s “first comprehensive training program for professional intelligence analysts,” and is a noticeable improvement on prior training efforts. The CAP provides new analysts with the knowledge and skills that enable them to be more effective in the production of finished intelligence, as well as in their overall job performance. It also provides them with the means to produce more accurate analysis by teaching them the causes of—and means to avoid—intelligence failure, and cognitive tools to assist them in structuring their analysis more along the lines of the scientific method.

Whether the CAP will lead to an improvement in the quality of the CIA’s analytic output will depend on whether analysts have the opportunity to apply their newly acquired expertise when back on the job after training. Ultimately, the institutional assessments of analytic production processes will determine whether analytic training programs allow the CIA to...

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improve its production of accurate, timely, and tailored intelligence that fits the needs of the Agency’s national security policymaking customers.

**IMPROVING THE CIA’S ANALYSES**

Just as every reform is intended to be a solution to a particular problem, the CIA’s leaders created the Kent School as a way to address the Agency’s analytic weaknesses. In May 1998, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George J. Tenet “gave a classified internal briefing on the CIA’s problems and what he intends to do about them,” according to an article in *US News and World Report.*³ In articulating his vision for the future of the CIA—a vision that became known as his ‘Strategic Direction’—Tenet emphasized the importance of changing past practices to improve the Agency’s contribution to national security policymaking. A year later, in 18 October 1999, he told an audience at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.:

[When] I launched a Strategic Direction plan for the CIA... I told our people that we had to take charge of our destiny. That we would do all within our power to maintain our edge and our vibrancy. That we had to streamline and realign ourselves and adopt business practices like the best in the private sector. That we would think big and think different. That we would work smarter and in new ways so that we would have the agility and the resiliency to do what the President—this President or a future President—wants and the American people expect.⁴

One week after this speech, the CIA failed to warn American policymakers of India’s intention to test nuclear weapons. This failure highlighted the Agency’s limitations and likely accelerated the implementation of reforms stemming from Tenet’s Strategic Direction plan.⁵ Post hoc analyses cited many factors which may have contributed to the failure, but notable was the DI’s “lack of critical thinking and analytic rigor,” causing it to fail to add together all indications of a possible nuclear test.⁶,⁷ According to *The Wall Street Journal*'s Carla Anne Robbins, Admiral David Jeremiah—who headed the official investigation into the failure—“recommended hiring more analysts, improving their training and increasing contact with outside experts to challenge conventional wisdom.”⁸ She also reported that DCI Tenet said he would “make it my highest priority to implement [Admiral Jeremiah’s recommendations] as quickly as possible.”⁹

Tenet subsequently commissioned a number of task forces to implement his Strategic Direction. The “Analytic Depth and Expertise Task Force,” made up of eight DI officers, was given free rein to investigate ways to “develop true world class experts” consistent with the Strategic Direction’s goals, according to Kent School program director Denis Stadther.¹⁰ The...
officers met several times a week through the latter half of 1998, brainstorming ideas to increase the expertise of junior, mid-level, and senior analysts. The task force ruled out a training course for mid-level officers because they believed that the broadening experience provided by rotational assignments, such as those overseas or to policymaking institutions, would provide greatest value to the Agency. The task force also ruled out training for senior analysts. It noted that the DI’s career paths provided greater advancement possibilities for senior analysts willing to switch to management, and as a result the more ambitious analysts became managers rather than continuing to use their knowledge in an analytic capacity. Therefore, the task force proposed the creation of a more desirable career track in which senior analysts could continue to use their expertise rather than shift into management. Finally, the task force concluded that junior officers would be best served with a training program intended to “build a common foundation upon which analytic expertise could be built.”

The task force submitted two recommendations to then-DDI John E. McLaughlin, who approved both, and subsequently attributed their implementation to DCI Tenet’s support and tenure that “lasted longer than the ‘task force phase,’” according to Vernon Loeb of the Washington Post. In 2000, the career track allowing “analysts to rise to very senior rank without branching out into management” took form as the Senior Analytic Service. Also that year, the improved new analyst program began operating through the newly created Sherman Kent school. The school was named for Kent, chairman of the CIA’s Board of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967, and considered “a leader in developing the profession of intelligence analysis.” At the dedication of the Kent School in May 2000, Tenet praised Kent as a “brilliant teacher to generations of analysts,” and expressed his wish that “this school…[will] always produce analysts of whom he would be proud.”

MECHANISM OF IMPROVEMENT

The Kent School was created to improve CIA’s analytic quality, in part by increasing the expertise of its analysts. At the opening ceremonies, Tenet stated that the Kent School “will prepare generations of men and women for the…profession of intelligence analysis in the 21st Century…[by teaching] the best of what we as an Agency have learned about the craft of analysis.” According to Martin Petersen, director of the CIA’s human resources department, the Kent School’s creation “sends a very, very powerful message about what you value, and the value here…is analytic expertise.” The Kent School improves the CIA’s analytic production by
providing analysts with knowledge that they otherwise would acquire haphazardly or not at all in on-the-job training.

Its mission of increasing analyst expertise corresponds with the efforts of many other professions, and even other intelligence organizations, that train employees as part and parcel of organizational improvement programs. Training programs, in general, provide information specific to the needs of the institution, and different institutions within the governmental foreign policy process use training programs to bolster their unique informational needs. For example:

- The State Department’s Foreign Service Institute provides area and language studies helpful to outgoing State Department Foreign Service Officers and other government officials;
- The Department of Defense’s (DOD) command colleges—including the Army War College, Naval War College, and National Defense University among others—provide rising military officers with a more advanced conceptual and informational context within which to make command decisions;
- The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) specializes in providing short-course training to the DOD’s military intelligence analysts, according to Ken Olson, the chief of JMITC’s General Intelligence Training Branch. Its companion institution, the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), provides broader education consisting of degree and certificate programs in intelligence at the graduate and undergraduate level.17

Training is intended to increase expertise, which is “the skill of an expert,” and this skill is crucial to the production of accurate intelligence analysis.18 “In the lexicon of US intelligence professionals,” observes intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson, “analysis’ refers to the interpretation by experts of unevaluated (‘raw’) information collected by the intelligence community.”19 The more expert an analyst is, the more likely that he or she will produce a higher quality product. DCI Tenet described the importance of an analyst’s expertise at the Kent School’s dedication:

In our [DI] it is not enough just to make the right call. That takes luck. You have to make the right call for the right reasons. That takes expertise. It is expertise—built up through study and experience—that combines with relevance and rigor to produce something that is very important: insight. ... [O]ur analysts blend a scholar’s mastery of detail with a reporter’s sense of urgency and clarity. At its best, the result is insight. And it is insight that wins the confidence of our customers and makes them want to read our publications and listen to our briefings.20

The DI’s exploitation of analytic expertise in its production of finished intelligence entails the integration of a complex web of analytic specialties to produce multi-disciplinary analysis. Not hired by the CIA or even the DI, most analysts are hired by the individual DI offices, assigned to
“groups” which cover specific geographic areas, and then assigned a functional specialty—“discipline” or “occupation” in DI terminology—such as political, military, economic, leadership, or scientific, technical, and weapons intelligence. For the most part, CIA analysts possess a very small area of direct responsibility, defined by a combination of their regional area and discipline, work in country “teams” with analysts of other disciplines, and interact with other regional or disciplinary specialists as the need arises. Therefore, an analyst’s expertise can vary, depending on the relative possession of regional knowledge, disciplinary theory, and intelligence methods in general:

- **Regional expertise** is essentially area studies: a combination of the geography, history, sociology, and political structures of a specific geographic region. The DI’s regional offices, such as the Office of Near East, South Asia and Africa, are responsible for an analyst’s regional expertise and develop it by providing access to language training, regional familiarization through university courses, or in-house seminars.

- **Procedural expertise** is knowledge of “tradecraft”; the sometimes unique methods and processes required to produce intelligence analysis. The Kent School is the primary repository for tradecraft information and its training programs are the primary means of distribution to both analysts and managers.

- **Disciplinary expertise** is the theory and practice that underlies the individual analytic occupations. For example, political, military, economic, and leadership analysis are all built on beds of theory derived from the academic disciplines of political science, military science, economics, and political psychology, respectively. Disciplinary expertise can be acquired through previous academic coursework, on-the-job training, and through occupational “representatives” distributed throughout the offices as focal points for disciplinary resources.

The CIA’s small analytic niches create specialists, but their specialties must be reintegrated in order to provide high-level policymakers with a bigger picture that is more accurate and balanced than the limited perspective or knowledge of the niche analyst. This process of reintegration includes a procedure known as “coordination,” in DI parlance, which allows analysts of all kinds to weigh in with their niche expertise on pieces of finished intelligence before they are disseminated. According to CIA analyst Frank Watanabe: “We coordinate to ensure a corporate product and to bring the substantive expertise of others to bear.” accordingly, the bureaucratic norm is that an analyst will make every effort to coordinate a draft with other analysts in related regional or disciplinary accounts prior to submitting the draft to management for editing and dissemination. As a result, while the expertise of the primary drafter of the piece of intelligence analysis usually has primary influence on the accuracy of the final piece, the coordination process exerts a strong influence as well.
Inaccuracies in the analytic product can occur as a result of insufficient substantive and disciplinary expertise. Columbia University Professor Robert Jervis points out that “a grav(e) danger lies in not having sufficient expertise about an area of a problem to detect and interpret important trends and developments. To make up for such deficiency, analysts tend to impose on the information the concepts, models, and beliefs that they have derived elsewhere.” In addition, in 1991 former DCI Stansfield Turner noted that: “Another reason for many of the analytic shortcomings is that our analytical agencies do not have an adequate grasp of the cultures of many countries with which we must deal.” He goes on to suggest that analysts could use a “a better opportunity to attend academic institutions, participate in professional conferences, travel and live abroad, acquire language skills and thus become true experts in their areas.” Robert Jervis adds “adequate training” and “first-hand exposure to the country” as additional methods to increase expertise.

Expertise is not necessarily sufficient to produce accuracy or prevent failure, though. Jervis notes that: “experts will [not] necessarily get the right answers. Indeed, the parochialism of those who know all the facts about a particular country that they consider to be unique, but lack the conceptual tools for making sense of what they see, is well known.” In addition, “even if the organizational problems... and perceptual impediments to accurate perception were remedied or removed, we could not expect an enormous increase in our ability to predict events” because “the impediments to understanding our world are so great” that “intelligence will often reach incorrect conclusions.” Human cognitive limitations require analysts to simplify reality through the analytic process, but reality simplified is no longer reality. As a result, “even experts can be wrong because their expertise is based on rules which are at best blunt approximations of reality. In the end any analytic judgment will be an approximation of the real world and therefore subject to some amount of error,” and analytic inaccuracies—and sometimes intelligence failure—will be inevitable.

In sum, analyst expertise is an important component of analytic quality, but even if the Kent School’s analytic training were ideal it could never increase expertise to the point that perfection would be attainable. In addition, the CIA’s interdependent analytic structure implies that training can increase aggregate capabilities only through the cumulative effects of multiple kinds of targeted training. Even so, that these factors limit the Kent School’s potential to improve analyst quality does not preclude improvement on the margins. If training can improve analytic quality it does so by increasing the knowledge and skills at the analyst’s disposal.

The CIA’s intelligence analysts require an understanding of their role within the foreign policy process, tools that help them structure and
analyze complicated issues, a theoretical framework to approach an issue from a specific disciplinary perspective, such as political or economic analysis, and the presentational skills necessary for busy policymakers to incorporate into their decisionmaking processes. Yet, prior to the Kent School’s creation, new analysts were not receiving the information they needed to do their jobs effectively.

OVERCOMING PREVIOUS TRAINING DEFICIENCIES

The CIA’s central role in providing high-level policymakers with analysis of national security threats and opportunities might be expected to require stringent training for new analysts prior to conducting analysis and writing reports for senior policymakers. In fact, CIA analysts have been hired and assigned a desk at Agency headquarters without any analytic training whatsoever, with two or four weeks of analytic training coming six months or so later. For example, in 1996 the introduction to the CIA for new analysts consisted of just one week of pro forma briefings regarding security and other administrative issues, with nothing specific to analysis. Within weeks, and in some cases days, these newly hired analysts were producing finished intelligence—albeit limited and under the careful watch of more senior analysts—without any official training whatsoever in substance or methods.

This minimal formal training appears to have historical roots in the CIA. According to former DDI and current Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) John McLaughlin: “Dick Lehman, the creator of what we now call the President’s Daily Brief, once remarked that the basic analytic training he got back in 1949 came down to a single piece of advice from his boss: ‘Whatever you do, just remember one thing—the Soviet Union is up to no good!’ Simple, but that said it.” In addition, Mark Lowenthal, a former staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that CIA does not “do a lot of training. . . . They say, ‘Congratulations, you’re the Mali analyst, have a nice day.’” The training process usually relied upon the analyst’s prior formal education, combined with an initial period of sink-or-swim adaptation to the DI. The sink-or-swim analogy is used frequently inside the Agency to describe its junior analyst acculturation. In May 2001, the Kent School’s former dean, Frans Bax, likened previous DI training to being thrown into the deep end of a pool, and added that if the training or mentoring “missed,” the analyst “floundered.”

In 1996, the CIA improved its training for junior analysts with the creation of a month-long survey course for new analysts entitled “Fundamentals of DI Tradecraft” (FDIT). Some of FDIT’s content was based on a tradecraft course developed under the auspices of former DDI Douglas
J. MacEachin, and delivered to all analysts and managers. Nonetheless, although FDIT was intended only as a limited survey course, it received a fair amount of criticism internally in its first few runnings due to the slow pace and inconsistent quality of instruction. It also demonstrated that a mere month of training was too short to familiarize analysts with the range of information that they needed to know to do their jobs correctly. But these weaknesses became strengths, as the criticisms may have provided the Analytic Depth and Expertise task force with indicators that there was greater potential inherent in the new analyst training than was being actualized through FDIT. In the end, the task force was able to use the lessons derived from FDIT to inform the structure of the Kent School and the content of its new analyst training program.

One member of the Analytic Depth and Expertise task force had been intimately involved in FDIT’s development as a DI representative to the CIA’s Office of Training and Education (OTE), and he contributed the lessons he learned from this to the task force. After deciding to recommend training for junior analysts, the task force began to prepare the outlines of a proposal. Prior DI training programs run through OTE, located in CIA’s Directorate of Administration, had difficulty obtaining qualified instructors from the DI because of the prevalent belief that non-analytic assignments in OTE were not career-enhancing. In addition, OTE’s separate structure led to difficulties providing training tailored to the DI’s needs. To overcome these problems, the task force recommended that training be run through the DI so that it could be better integrated with the DI’s requirements. Also suggested was a school structure that would ensure continuity and a knowledge base for future training efforts. A final suggestion was that the school be headed by a Senior Intelligence Service officer with a presence on the DI’s corporate board in order to provide greater “bureaucratic weight and budgetary authority” for the school to meet its goals. Then-DDI McLaughlin implemented all the suggestions. As a result, the Kent School’s location within the DI and bureaucratic structure provide it with a solid base from which to deliver its informational product.

Although the CAP used lessons derived from FDIT, it was, according to Denis Stadther, “a clean-sheet exercise in developing new training that was founded in the belief that comprehensive training for new analysts must go beyond skills development to include history, mission, and values of the DI as well as orientation to specialized knowledge and skills like operations, intelligence collection, and counterintelligence issues.” Comprehensive training could not be shoehorned into a one-month course akin to FDIT, however, and the CAP’s length became a matter of some dispute. According to the school’s former dean, Frans Bax, DCI Tenet had “chided the DI for not taking training as seriously as the [CIA’s
Directorate of Operations or DO]”—which has a year-long program for trainees—and “instructed the DI to create a program as long as the DO’s.”39 As a result, the Analytic Depth and Expertise task force initially proposed a ten-month long training program. But this was opposed by the DI offices that were facing tight personnel resource constraints and reluctant to lose their new analysts for that long. To accommodate their concerns, the program was reduced from ten months to twenty-five weeks, and yet retained “all [its] training components” by providing analysts with fewer interim assignments to other components.40 The CAP’s curriculum undergoes constant revision derived from analyst and manager feedback in a search to make the program more effective. According to Denis Stadther, between 2000 and 2002, the CAP’s length was reduced to twenty-two weeks, as the curriculum was refined due to student feedback and a comprehensive review of the curriculum by the CAP faculty.

**CAP’S TRAINING CURRICULUM**41

By February 2002, the CAP had become a twenty-two-week program which “teaches newly hired analysts about the CIA’s and the DI’s history and values and develops the basic skills essential to an intelligence analyst’s successful career in the directorate.”42 The initial week entails an introduction to intelligence topics, including the history, mission, and values of the CIA, and a unit on the history and literature of intelligence that is taught by the history staff of the Agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence.43 The following few weeks introduce analysts to a variety of DI skills, including analytic thinking, writing and self-editing, briefing, data analysis techniques, and a teamwork exercise akin to an “outward bound” for analysts. Training in these kinds of basic skills is necessary, even for CIA analysts with advanced degrees, because intelligence analysis focuses on the informational needs of policymakers who ask different questions than those encountered in academia. Also, briefing skills are not emphasized in academia but are vital for the effective distribution of information within government. In addition, analysts are not accustomed to writing in the specialized writing style of the DI, which emphasizes bottom-line judgments at the beginning of the piece, while strategically using evidence to bolster the main conclusions. This training is reinforced throughout the CAP, as analysts write an intelligence paper in which they self-consciously apply lessons learned to a real-world analytic problem.44 The first five weeks of training culminate in a task force exercise that provides analysts with the opportunity to take the skills they have learned and practiced in a classroom setting and apply them in a more realistic one.

After five weeks in the classroom the CAP students go on a four-week interim assignment that helps them understand how the DI relates to other
components of the CIA, the intelligence community, and the policymaking agencies they serve. The analysts—in consultation with their managers—identify positions within the bureaucracy that are related to their assignment, and provide working knowledge of units that each analyst will either work with or rely upon throughout his or her career.\textsuperscript{45} In particular, seeing how intelligence analysis is viewed and used in other components of the policymaking bureaucracy can help new analysts understand their role and perform it better, according to Denis Stadther. These interim assignments can entail a stint at a military command—such as the Pacific Command headquartered at Pearl Harbor—which provides the analyst with insight into working with a military customer. These assignments can have other benefits as well. In early 2001, DDCI McLaughlin spoke enthusiastically of the insight that a new analyst can acquire from visiting Pearl Harbor and seeing first-hand the reason the CIA was created, and how he or she fits into a fifty-year tradition of working to prevent similar destruction.\textsuperscript{46}

After this four-week interim assignment, the analysts return to the classroom for four more weeks of training in more advanced topics, such as writing and editing longer papers and topical modules that address issues such as denial and deception, and indicators and warning.\textsuperscript{47} According to Stadther, these are special kinds of analysis that require application of more advanced and sophisticated analytic tradecraft techniques. The analysts also broaden their knowledge of other positions within the intelligence community by visiting other intelligence agencies and participating in an “ops familiarization course” which provides a brief exposure to the intense training that a DO case officer receives.\textsuperscript{48} The analysts are also provided with greater information on tradecraft topics—consisting of concepts, techniques, and methodologies—that form the core of the intelligence analysts’ specialized skill set, which they can use to rigorously and self-consciously analyze raw intelligence data. This skill set includes adapting the study of intelligence issues to the needs of the user, presenting complicated issues in simple terms stripped of long-winded assumptions, qualifications, and background, and addressing issues related to controversial foreign policies and policy goals without taking a policy position.\textsuperscript{49} Specifically, the CAP uses Sherman Kent’s “Principles for Intelligence Analysis” as guidelines for its students to follow as they learn the craft of analysis.\textsuperscript{50} These guidelines—listed here in full in the Appendix—emphasize the importance of intellectual rigor, the conscious effort to avoid analytical biases, a willingness to consider other judgments, and the systemic use of outside experts as a check on in-house blinders, as well as the importance of candidly admitting analytic shortcomings and learning from mistakes.
The CAP also teaches other tradecraft skills, such as alternative analysis techniques including, but not limited to, scenario building and competitive “A/B Team” approaches that entail periodic checks on analysis by external experts. In addition, the CAP assigns Richards Heuer’s writings to provide analysts with tips and techniques for overcoming flaws and limitations in the human thinking process. The CAP also uses analytic failure as a teaching tool for what not to do. Since much of the intelligence analysis tradecraft has been derived from intelligence failure, “the lessons of ... high-profile CIA screw-ups form the core of the Kent School curriculum,” according to reporter Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times. Drogin quotes the school’s dean as saying, “We spend a lot of time in this course studying mistakes.”

The analysts then go for a second four-week interim assignment, and come back for a final four-week classroom session that deals with more advanced topics. For example, a session on politicization and professional ethics teaches analysts “how to walk the fine line that separates effective intelligence support for policymakers from prescribing policy,” according to Stadther. Another session, entitled “Writing for the President,” is taught by senior DI editors, provides insight and lessons learned in writing for the CIA’s most senior and demanding policymakers. The CAP also provides new analysts with a “roundtable on customer relations” in which experienced analysts provide their hard-earned lessons in dealing with Congress, the public, and the press, and a “secrets of success panel” providing tips of what does and does not work from analysts with a few years of experience.

Once again, the classroom session ends with a task force exercise. This time it entails a two-day terrorist crisis simulation that takes place outside the classroom, and requires total immersion to handle the fifteen-hour days. The CAP instructors, using this as an opportunity to present analysts with situations they might see later in their careers, spike the simulation with dilemmas to force the analysts to improvise and apply the skills they learned throughout the course. As reporter Bob Drogin notes, it is “deliberately designed to be intensive and stressful.” Finally, at the end of the program, the CAP provides written evaluations of the students to their home offices, documenting their skills, abilities, and performance during trainings. In sum, the CAP’s twenty-two weeks provide analysts with information unique to the realm of intelligence analysis, as well as “greater opportunity for individual growth in understanding of the profession, and hopefully a greater self-conscious rigor in the use of analytical tools.”

In addition to more rigorous content, the CAP utilizes interactive teaching methods to maximize analyst learning and acquisition of expertise.
The training is intended to improve analyst performance. According to Kent School Dean Dan Wagner, rather than risk student disengagement from abstract lecture courses, the programs use varied and active teaching methods which are “very important” to provide multiple pathways for students to apply their unique learning styles. In addition, the CAP also employs the case study method to make the lessons more fungible to real-world situations. Former CIA instructor Thomas Shreeve has noted that “cases fit best in those parts of the CIA curriculum in which the teaching objectives included helping students learn how to analyze complex, ambiguous dilemmas and make decisions about how to resolve them.”

In sum, the CAP provides analysts with knowledge that they could not acquire elsewhere, and improves on prior efforts in this area. If these lessons are absorbed and subsequently applied, analytic quality may improve. But training effectiveness and the growth of analyst expertise will depend on several variables, including student motivation, peer group influence, and teaching methods. The CAP’s use of interactive teaching methods is aimed at maximizing learning, and provides an assessment to the analyst’s home office similar to and with the incentives of a report card. Some of that knowledge will fall by the wayside, however, as analysts discard the lessons that are not relevant to their specific accounts. Other lessons, such as the promulgation of Sherman Kent’s principles to new analysts, are more goals than standards, and may be modified by inevitable workplace pressures. For example, professional practices and promotional concerns may mitigate against the universal application of “candid admission of shortcomings.” Nonetheless, the CAP’s emphasis on practices such as coordination, cooperation, and admission of one’s own analytic limitations provides the impetus to change the sometimes hidebound internal DI culture. As its former dean, Frans Bax, noted in 2001, the Kent School is “trying to embed the concept of career-long learning within the culture of the DI.” By disseminating tradecraft and techniques widely throughout the DI, individual analyst expertise will increase. But concluding that this increased expertise may or will cause improvement to the DI’s analytic quality has yet to be justified.

INCREASING ANALYST EFFECTIVENESS

The CAP appears to be an upgrading of the CIA’s past efforts to provide analysts with job-relevant expertise, although measuring this improvement from outside the institution is impossible. Hypothetically, evaluating the CAP’s impact is possible through a simple pretest-posttest control group research design. For example, to establish the efficacy of the school in increasing new analyst expertise a test could be administered both before and after training to measure any increases in analyst
knowledge. A control group composed of new analysts who remain on the job instead of receiving training could be tested as well, and any changes in analyst knowledge between the two groups would be attributable to the training alone.

In October 2001, the Kent School’s director implemented a version of this alternative design by hiring an outside contractor to interview CAP alumni and their managers to assess the effect of training on their job performance.63 CAP program director Denis Stadther provided an overview of its conclusions. According to Stadther, all interviewees considered the CAP to have been beneficial. In particular, line managers noted that new analysts who went through the program appeared to possess greater confidence and maturity in applying their skills on the job. In addition, CAP analysts created lasting ties with their classmates, and the use of these contacts increased their ability to work the system in such job-related tasks as obtaining information from a counterpart agency, coordinating with experts elsewhere within the government, and finding a fellow analyst within the CIA who covers a particular issue. Managers appreciated the analysts’ greater institutional expertise because it meant that they required less intense mentoring to perform well on the job. Stadther also noted that, contrary to the belief of early CAP students that their promotion prospects might be adversely affected by being pulled off the job for five months of training, anecdotal evidence suggests that their promotion rates have been as good as or better than those who did not attend the CAP. Stadther states that a good performance by analysts in the CAP appears to translate well into good job performance.

But he also emphasized that not all CAP student feedback was positive, and that this led to adjustments in the curriculum. For example, when analysts had difficulty relating to a theoretical unit intended to improve interpersonal skills, the CAP’s program manager refocused it on the practical application of those skills. Nonetheless, even though feedback indicates that some aspects of the CAP’s curriculum require modification, in the aggregate the CAP improves a new analyst’s individual effectiveness, and this may improve the DI’s effectiveness on the margins.

Training also provides other benefits to analyst effectiveness that Stadther did not mention was part of the study. For example, CAP promotes a better fit between analyst and assignment by encouraging analysts to pursue transfers to units where their skills or interests may be more effectively applied.64 The CIA’s placement policies are cumbersome due to the six-month or greater lag between the time a vacancy opens up and a qualified person can be hired because of the background checks and other matters necessary to obtain security clearances. This lengthy process can lead to initial assignments that are a misfit for an analyst’s knowledge and
abilities. In 2001, Frans Bax noted that the CAP “provides the opportunity for officers to find a better fit for themselves,” and that “there is an infinite range of career possibilities and if an analyst sees something better they should go for it.” He added that, in the one year the CAP had been in operation, a number of analysts had switched offices and even directorates, and that this was an intentional attempt to break out of the apprenticeship model that had formerly formed the core human resource approach for the DI. Therefore, the CAP provides CIA with the opportunity to shift personnel in a way that allows for interest and skill mixes to be applied more effectively towards institutional goals.

In sum, the CAP provides analysts with a greater knowledge of the institution and its practices that can make their job performance more effective, and even side benefits like providing the opportunity to refine placement policies with transfers can improve institutional performance on the margins. But neither addresses the core reason the Kent School was created: to improve the CIA’s analytic quality.

TOWARD IMPROVING ACCURACY

More fundamental to the mission of intelligence analysis than bureaucratic savvy or presentational ability, however, is the accuracy of the finished intelligence product. According to the CIA’s Website, its mission includes “providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security.” Directly measuring the CAP’s impact on analytic quality is impossible from outside the institution, due to the fact that intelligence analysis is inherently classified. In addition, so far as I know, neither the CIA in general nor the school in particular measures the accuracy of the analytic product because accuracy in intelligence analysis is a very difficult concept to operationalize.

Since intelligence analysis can influence what American national security policymakers decide to do, and what they do has the potential to prompt or preclude actions of other international actors, a hit-or-miss yardstick would not effectively capture the quality of the analysis. For example, if the CIA predicts that a terrorist bombing is imminent and policymakers implement security procedures based on CIA warnings, and the terrorists are deterred due to the increased security measures, then the intelligence prediction may well be considered inaccurate even though it helped prevent the bombing. This causal dynamic exists for all intelligence issues—including political, economic, and scientific—due to the nature of the intelligence mission. Therefore, post-hoc assessment of intelligence accuracy may not provide a true sense of the quality of the analysis. Instead, both the Kent School’s and the CIA’s evaluations focus on the
soundness of the analytic process because it is implicitly a modified version of the scientific method.

Analytic Processes Familiar

The CIA analyst uses a version of the scientific method to create intelligence analysis. The traditional term “intelligence cycle” describes how an analyst integrates information collected by numerous entities and disseminates this information to policymakers. As former DCI William Colby noted, “At the center of the intelligence machine lies the analyst, and he is the fellow to whom all the information goes so that he can review it and think about it and determine what it means.”69 While the “intelligence cycle” presents this process in sequential terms, more accurately the analyst is engaged in never-ending conversations with collectors and policymakers over the status of international events and their implications for United States policy. In converting raw intelligence data into finished analysis, analysts interpret the international environment through an information processing methodology approximating the scientific method.70 As intelligence author Washington Platt noted in 1957: “The so-called ‘scientific method’ means different things to different people, but the basic features are much the same. These features are: collection of data, formation of hypotheses, testing the hypotheses, and so arriving at conclusions based on the foregoing which can be used as reliable sources of prediction.”71

An analyst builds an operating hypothesis upon constructs found in a particular country’s history, culture, regional dynamics, governmental workings, or whatever aspect may be relevant to determine how that country’s leaders might respond to foreign challenges. The Kent School bolsters this knowledge with both procedural and disciplinary expertise to provide a methodological and theoretical base for the production of intelligence analysis. For example, academia develops theories to explain outcomes in the realms of economics, politics, psychology, and international relations, and these theories form the basis for any good intelligence analysis. The analyst’s reigning conceptual framework is grounded in disciplinary theory modified by knowledge of regional or country-specific substance. Analysts simultaneously—and for the most part instinctively—use inductive reasoning to find patterns amidst the flood of data, and use deductive reasoning to provide meaning and context for the patterns they find. Incoming bits of intelligence data are filtered through this framework, and those that fit are imbued with meaning and context, while those that do not fit are set aside as potential modifiers of the concepts. As a result, intelligence analysis, when done accurately, is a model of social scientific inductive and deductive reasoning in action.
Yet, despite the similarities to social science research, intelligence analysis is more complex. Two methodologists note that intelligence analysis has difficulties—including externally imposed time constraints which necessitate analysis prior to acquisition of sufficient information, an inability to control the variables under study, an unknown data quality due to imperfections in the collection process and the possibility of deception, an emphasis on prediction, and a focus on utility—that, combined, make intelligence analysis more difficult than social scientific research in an academic setting. 72

Also, like many specialties in the study of international relations, intelligence analysts cannot test their hypotheses or replicate outcomes in the real world, and instead must allow the progression of events to falsify them. In addition, international relations writ large has a minimal empirical base relative to other fields such as medicine or physics, meaning that the etiology of certain kinds of activities, such as war or revolution, cannot be aggregated into anything other than a very general and uncertain theory. Unlike academics, though, the intelligence analyst does not create theory, but must interpret facts that are themselves subject to distortion and deception, at times under tight deadlines. 73 This means that high levels of uncertainty are implicit in most analytic judgments.

As a result of the high levels of uncertainty, intelligence analysis rarely has certainty or proof and, for the most part, conclusions are tentative. In what has become a cliché, “evidence collected by intelligence agencies is often ambiguous and can lead to differing conclusions.” 74 In addition, Israeli scholars Yitzhak Katz and Ygal Vardi cite an experiment demonstrating that the same data can lead to differing conclusions, depending on the conceptual structures applied. 75 The result of such ambiguity is an environment of conflict and debate over the interpretation and implications of intelligence data. Loch K. Johnson says that within the institutional context “analysis is usually a messy affair, with incomplete information and often heated debates over what the available facts may really mean about the intentions of secretive adversaries in distant capitals. ... Uncertainty, ambiguity, debate, and partial answers to tangled questions will remain an existential condition of the analytical process.” 76

Given this complex information environment, not knowing or negligence in applying social science techniques can lead to analytic inaccuracies. As Robert Jervis observed in 1986: “Good intelligence demands three interrelated conditions. Analysts should present alternatives and competing explanations for a given event, develop the evidence for each of the alternatives, and present their arguments as fully as is necessary to do justice to the subject matter. This is not to imply, of course, that if these conditions are met the resulting analyses will always be excellent but only that their omission will substantially reduce the probability that the
product will be of high quality." At its most extreme outcome, analytic inaccuracies due to failure to apply tradecraft can lead to intelligence failures. As intelligence scholar Robert Folker notes, "the root cause of many critical intelligence failures has been analytical failure." Katz and Vardi also argue that, although Israeli intelligence possessed "data pointing to the probability of war," it was surprised by the 1973 Yom Kippur War because it "was incorrectly interpreted." In addition, Georgetown Professor Walter Laqueur notes that sources of analytic failure include "bias...[which is] an unwillingness...to accept evidence contrary to their preconceived notions,... ignorance, lack of political sophistication and judgment, [l]ack of training and experience, lack of imagination, and the assumption that other people behave more or less as we do," which is known in intelligence parlance as 'mirror-imaging.' In sum, failure to apply appropriate social science standards of rigor and procedure can lead to analytic inaccuracy. If so, then accuracy can be improved on the margins by providing analysts with greater knowledge of fact, theory, or procedure, and the application of methodologies to simplify and structure their analysis.

Kent School: Improving CIA's Analytic Procedure

The Kent School's CAP provides analysts with improved methodological knowledge and analytical tools that should provide a more rigorous basis for their analysis. This greater rigor, approximating social science methods should increase the chance that the analytic product will be more accurate than it otherwise would have been without training. Just as increases in the quality of research methodology allow a researcher to more effectively operationalize and measure the constructs of interests, better training in methodology would hypothetically provide an intelligence analyst with a better foundation from which to produce more accurate analysis. Therefore, if the theory holds, then the Kent School will provide analysts with the capability to produce more accurate analysis, so long as its programs provide information that enables a more effective application of the scientific method.

Many possible methodological tools can be used to organize and simplify the process of intelligence analysis. As Washington Platt noted in 1957: "In intelligence production as yet we find little study of methods as such. Yet a systematic study of methods in any given field by an open-minded expert in that field nearly always leads to worthwhile improvement." For example, one JMIC publication—a distillation of a student's Masters thesis—demonstrates that "analysts who apply a structured method (specifically) hypothesis testing...to an intelligence problem, outperform those who rely on...the intuitive approach." Just as social science is
structured upon a foundation of hypothesis falsification and revision which requires that hypotheses be compared for accuracy and relevance, intelligence analysts self-consciously compare hypotheses in a process termed “competitive analysis.” This technique can be applied in particular circumstances—e.g., when an issue of particular importance is imbued with partisan implications—to get at underlying assumptions that might be biasing the analysis in one direction or the other.\textsuperscript{83} Some have even advocated the structural incorporation of this method through an institutionalized “Devil’s Advocate” position or “Team B” exercises. According to Richards Heuer, other tools that help analysts structure the most appropriate approach to a particular intelligence problem include “outlines, tables, diagrams, trees, and matrices, with many sub-species of each. For example, trees include decision trees and fault trees. Diagrams include causal diagrams, influence diagrams, flow charts, and cognitive maps. … [In addition, a matrix can be used] to array evidence for and against competing hypotheses to explain what is happening now or estimate what may happen in the future.”\textsuperscript{84} Finally, R.V. Jones—the “father of modern scientific and technical intelligence”—suggests that analysts apply Occam’s Razor—or “the simplest hypothesis that is consistent with the information”—as a way to simplify the analysis of contradictory or insufficient information.\textsuperscript{85}

The analytic tradecraft standards and techniques taught in the CAP were developed in the 1990s. According to former CIA officer Jack Davis, former DDI Douglas MacEachin articulated “corporate tradecraft standards for analysts . . . aimed . . . at ensuring that sufficient attention would be paid to cognitive challenges in assessing complex issues.”\textsuperscript{86} Davis added:

MacEachin advocated an approach to structured argumentation called “linchpin analysis,” to which he contributed muscular terms designed to overcome many CIA professionals’ distaste for academic nomenclature. The standard academic term “key variables” became drivers. “Hypotheses” concerning drivers became linchpins—assumptions underlying the argument—and these had to be explicitly spelled out. … MacEachin thus worked to put in place systematic and transparent standards for determining whether analysts had met their responsibilities for critical thinking.\textsuperscript{87}

MacEachin then formalized the promulgation of methodologies to all DI analysts. In 1996 and 1997, “nearly all DI managers and analysts attended” a new course based on the standards entitled “Tradecraft 2000.”\textsuperscript{88} In addition, in 1997 Jack Davis authored “a series of notes on analytical tradecraft” that encapsulated the lessons from the new course.\textsuperscript{89} According to the CIA Website—where portions of these notes can be found—the notes “elaborate on some of the skills and methods used by DI intelligence
analysts’ and have “become a standard reference within CIA for practitioners and teachers of intelligence analysis.” These methodologies have become, in essence, analytic doctrine, and through them CIA analysts have become familiarized with social science methodologies, if with a modified vocabulary. In 2001, the CIA Website noted that: “Invariably, analysts work on the basis of incomplete and conflicting information. DI analysts are taught to clearly articulate what is known (the facts), how it is known (the sources), what drives the judgements (linchpin assumptions), the impact if these drivers change (alternative outcomes), and what remains unknown.” The analytic standards were subsequently incorporated into the existing training courses for analysts, and maintain their place in the Kent School’s curriculum today.

In sum, the Kent School’s CAP provides analysts with the expertise necessary to produce more accurate analysis. This conclusion, however, is insufficient to address whether the school’s CAP actually improves the quality of the CIA’s analytic output.

**BUREAUCRATIC PROCESSES CAN STIFLE POTENTIAL**

Hypothetically, the CAP could improve an analyst’s analytic accuracy, but its potential could be stifled if the DI’s business practices prevent application of the hard-earned expertise. Intelligence analysis takes place within a specific organizational context, and an organization’s processes can promote or impede the application of lessons learned in training, and affect the ultimate accuracy of the intelligence product.

For example, the length of finished intelligence product emphasized by the DI can impact expertise acquisition. The DI produces many types of finished intelligence—some reportorial, some analytical, some estimative—largely as a result of its attempt to meet policymakers’ varying needs for information. The reportorial products—known as current intelligence—tend to be shorter but more targeted to policymakers’ needs, while the more estimative and analytic products can be longer and potentially less relevant for policymakers due to the time of production and length of product. Over time, the DI tends to emphasize the benefits of one product length over another. In the 1980s, the DI emphasized the production of longer pieces for the knowledge that they create, but after arguments surfaced that these longer papers were of decreased utility for policymakers, the DI promptly reversed course in the mid-1990s and limited “most DI analytical papers . . . to 3 to 7 pages, including graphics and illustrations.” Presumably, this was done to increase the relevance of DI products for policymakers.

But, while the production of a single piece of current intelligence has limited effect on expertise because it draws on the knowledge and tools
that an analyst has developed through training and prior analysis, expertise acquisition and application problems become endemic if the institution emphasizes current intelligence over longer products. If the analyst does not have time to think, learn, or integrate new information with old to create new understandings, knowledge of facts and events may increase, but the ability to accurately interpret these events decreases, as the analyst does not have the opportunity to reinforce knowledge through the more in-depth research and drafting processes. The reliance on brevity also deprives analysts of the opportunity to apply "best practices," including the structured tradecraft methodologies and benefits arising from disciplinary theory. By 1997, DI management was making efforts to address the decreased expertise levels resulting from excessive current intelligence production.\textsuperscript{94} In the end, the Kent School's effectiveness in improving analytic accuracy may depend in part on whether the CIA provides its analysts with assignments that allow them to utilize the expertise acquired in training, while still providing relevant current analysis.

The length of time that the DI encourages an analyst to spend on an account can also impact an analyst's expertise, and by extension, accuracy. In 2001, former CIA Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz argued that CIA's analysts have "tended to be 18-month wonders who hopscotch from subject to subject without developing any broad, long-term expertise in any one area," and as a result "are ill-equipped to grapple with the information that arrives on their desks."\textsuperscript{95} An analyst cannot apply sophisticated methodological tools to intelligence data until he or she becomes knowledgeable about the specific regional area or discipline of the account. Frequent changes will prevent an analyst from achieving the potential inherent in the analytic tools that the Kent School provides new analysts. Therefore, for the Kent School to improve analytic accuracy through the application of increased expertise, "analysts should be expected to make a career of their functional or geographic specialty so that the daily flows of information are added to an already solid base of knowledge," as Hitz suggests.

In sum, the DI must adapt its practices to provide analysts with the greatest opportunity to apply the expertise they have acquired both on-the-job and in training if the potential inherent in the Kent School's programs to improve the DI's analytic accuracy is to be fully realized. Yet, despite the importance of institutional context in determining the CIA's analytic quality, few have studied the interplay between analyst and institution. As Robert Jervis has concluded, "perhaps the intelligence community has paid too [little attention]... to how the community's internal structure and norms might be altered to enable intelligence to be worth listening to."\textsuperscript{96} Further studies of analytic structures and processes must be done to determine which reforms would have the greatest
Improvement on analytic quality, and perhaps their implementation will take CIA a step closer to creating “intelligence worth listening to.”

IMPROVING TO MEET FUTURE CHALLENGES

In 1988, Loch Johnson said “probably the most important problem faced by any intelligence agency [is] how to improve the quality of its product.” The Kent School is part of the CIA’s effort to do this. The school has apparently achieved its goal of increasing analytic expertise by improving the Agency’s training for new analysts. This training improves the analysts’—and consequently the DI’s—effectiveness, and should provide each analyst with a greater ability to produce more accurate intelligence analysis. But, even if increases in analyst expertise due to training can be documented, the analyst may not have the time, inclination, or opportunity to apply recently acquired expertise in the production of finished intelligence analysis. Analytic training may be a necessary component for improvement in analytic accuracy writ large, but is not sufficient in and of itself. Therefore, complementary modifications may have to be implemented to the DI’s business practices if the desired outcome—increased analytic accuracy—is to occur. As such, the Kent School is a step in the right direction, but further assessments are required to determine which changes in business practices or organizational structure might magnify possible improvements.

More broadly, other issues have implications for American intelligence. The tragic events of September 2001 have highlighted the limitations of institutionalized intelligence, including the problems inherent in intelligence analysis, and present policymakers with the opportunity to redefine the intelligence community of the next decades. This time, according to an intelligence expert advising President George W. Bush on ways to improve the workings of the intelligence community, “We are trying to treat the intelligence community more like a corporation that should have goals and a way to measure success or failure against those goals.”

Increased analytic quality, achieved through the Kent School’s Career Analyst Program helps CIA reach that goal. Yet, in the broader context of national security policymaking, improving the accuracy of the CIA’s analytic output on the margins may not necessarily lead to improved policymaking. Intelligence analysis is only one of many information streams that the policymaker listens to, and may not be the most important. In addition, a policymaker’s decisions will be affected by policy agendas, tradeoffs, and other cognitive limitations that create “bounded” rationality. Therefore, if the researcher’s primary concern is more effective national security policymaking, then it may be more useful in this limited-resource environment to assess how intelligence production can be
modified to better fit policymaker needs. In the end, the utility of intelligence analysis may be just as important a criterion of analytic quality as is accuracy.99

Nevertheless, understanding the options available to improve policymaking is crucial, and improving the CIA’s analytic accuracy is one of those options. As Robert Jervis has said, “We will never be able to do as well as we would like, but this does not mean that we cannot do better than we are doing now.”100

The Kent School’s Career Analyst Program is a step in the right direction, but more steps may be necessary in order to produce a measurable improvement in the CIA’s analytic quality.

APPENDIX

Sherman Kent’s Principles for Intelligence Analysis. The Career Analyst Program (CAP) Teaches These Principles:

1. Intellectual Rigor
   Judgments are supported by facts or credible reporting.
   All sources are reviewed and evaluated for consistency, credibility.
   Uncertainties or gaps in information are made explicit.

2. Conscious Effort to Avoid Analytical Biases
   State working assumptions and conclusions drawn from them explicitly.
   Subject assumptions and conclusions to structured challenge: what developments would indicate they would be wrong.
   If uncertainties or the stakes of being wrong are high, identify alternative outcomes and what it would take for each to occur.

3. Willingness to Consider Other Judgments
   Recognize the limits to your own expertise and avoid treating your account as yours alone.
   Seek out expertise that will complement your own as a product is being prepared. Strong differences of view should be made explicit.

   Seek out and allow time for formal coordination of your product.
   Represent and defend all Agency and DI views.
   Make it clear when you express individual views; do so only when asked.

5. Precision of Language
   Provide your most unique or new insight or fact quickly.
   Use active voice and short sentences; avoid excessive detail; minimize the use of technical terms. Follow DI writing guidelines.
   Shorter is always better.

6. Systematic Use of Outside Experts as a Check on In-House Blinders
Seek out new external studies and experts relevant to your account and discipline on a continuing basis. 
Keep up with news media treatment of your account and consider whether their perspective offers unique insight. 
On key issues, indicate where outsiders agree or disagree with your judgments.

7. Candid Admission of Shortcomings and Learning from Mistakes
Recognize that intelligence analysis will sometimes be wrong because it must focus on the tough questions or uncertainties. 
Review periodically past judgments or interpretations; what made them right or wrong; how could they have been better. 
Alert the policymaker if you determine that a previous line of analysis was wrong. Explain why and what it means.

8. Attentiveness To and Focus On Policymaker Concerns
Deliver intelligence that is focused on and timed to the policymaker’s current agenda. 
Make clear the implications of your analysis for U.S. policy. 
Provide “actionable” intelligence that can help the policymaker handle a threat, make a decision, or achieve an objective.

9. Never Pursue a Policy Agenda
Personal policy preferences must not shape the information presented or the conclusions of intelligence analysis. 
Politely but clearly deflect policymaker requests for recommendations on policy. 
Intelligence helps the policymaker by reducing the range of uncertainty and risk, and by identifying opportunities for action. It does not make the choice for him.

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6 For a good presentation of the specific indicators, see Tim Weiner, “U.S. Intelligence Under Fire in Wake of India’s Nuclear Test,” op. cit.


9 Ibid.

10 Denis Stadther was a member of this task force and provided all the information on the Kent School’s creation during an interview on 14 May 2001, except where otherwise indicated.


12 CIA Website, “Tenet Lauds Appointment of McLaughlin as Acting DDCI.” Also see: CIA Website, “John E. McLaughlin: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.” http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/mclaughlin.html


15 CIA Website, “Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet at the Dedication of the Sherman Kent School, 4 May 2000.”


17 Ken Olson, Personal Interview, 16 May 2001; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Website, “About the JMIC.” http://www.dia.mil/Jmic/about.html

18 Merriam-Webster Website: http://www.m-w.com


20 CIA Website, “Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet at the Dedication of the Sherman Kent School, 4 May 2000.”


Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?”, p. 33.

Ibid, pp. 31–32.

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Author’s personal experience, circa 1996.


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Sherman Kent’s “Principles for Intelligence Analysis” acquired from informational materials provided by Kent School officers, 14 May 2001. See Appendix for the full text of the document.

Frans Bax, presentation at AFIO Luncheon.

The ‘A/B Team’ approach stems from 1976 when former DCI George H. W. Bush commissioned a team of outside experts to review the same information that had led to a controversial National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet military spending. This outside ‘B Team’ based its analysis on more pessimistic assumptions of Soviet intentions, interpreted intelligence of Soviet military spending accordingly, and came to a judgment more skeptical than the IC’s that was consistent with reigning conservative views. See Robert C. Reich, “Re-examining the Team A–Team B Exercise,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1989, pp. 387–388. See also Kevin P. Stack, “A Negative View of Competitive Analysis,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 1997–1998, pp. 456–464.

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Bob Drogin, “School for New Brand of Spooks.”

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61 Frans Bax, presentation at AFIO Luncheon.


63 Denis Stadther, personal interview, 26 February 2002.

64 Frans Bax, personal interview, 14 May 2001.

65 Frans Bax, presentation at AFIO Luncheon.

66 Ibid.


68 For more on the limitations of using accuracy to measure intelligence, see the strategic surprise and intelligence estimation literature. Of particular note, see Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 171–180.


70 For more information on the processes of intelligence analysis, see Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: Estimation and Prediction (Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press Inc., 1996); Research: Design and Methods, (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, September 2000); David Schum, Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).


73 Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 29.


77 Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 33.

78 Robert D. Folker, “Intelligence in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods,” Joint Military Intelligence College Occasional Paper Number Seven, Washington, DC, January 2000, p. 3.


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96 Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 41.
99 In fact, in 2001 the Kent School’s former dean noted his preference for a utility measure over an accuracy one. Frans Bax, personal interview, 14 May 2001.
100 Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 30.