A Report of the Public Diplomacy Council

A CALL FOR ACTION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

January 2005
Public Diplomacy in Crisis

United States public diplomacy is in crisis. Buffeted by a decade of budget cuts, hampered by bureaucratic structures that marginalize it and call on its expertise too late in the policy process, public diplomacy as currently constituted is inadequate to perform the urgent national security tasks required of it—to inform, to understand and to influence world publics. America faces foreign hostility and misunderstandings that threaten to eclipse the positive legacy of U.S. leadership in World War II and the Cold War.

Effective public diplomacy is vital to a successful American foreign policy. In the war on terrorism, public diplomacy can play a critical role combating misinformation, enabling us to better understand our world, providing accurate information about the U.S. and helping people around the globe to understand this nation, our values and our policies.

The Public Diplomacy Council, a non-partisan group of professionals with extensive experience in public diplomacy, calls upon the Administration and Congress to revitalize public diplomacy efforts, to integrate them into all of our foreign policy deliberations, and to support them in contributing to the security and well being of the United States. In that spirit we put forth the following five Action Recommendations to the Administration and the Congress to effect a necessary transformation of public diplomacy for the 21st century:

Recommendations

1. Establish an agency within the Department of State and the National Security Council process, the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), to manage the U.S. government’s civilian information and exchanges functions and to coordinate all U.S. government public diplomacy efforts.

2. Increase public diplomacy overseas staffing by 300 percent over five years, through increased recruitment, contracts and recall appointments for necessary skills; expand language and cultural awareness training to ensure public diplomacy officers fluent in the local language at every overseas post; and increase program budgets for public diplomacy, including international broadcasting and exchange programs, four-fold over five years.

3. Provide the long-term resources necessary for global international broadcasting capability, including 24 hour per day English language world wide broadcasting, as well as a range of language service broadcasts, innovative broadcast and internet programs for youth, and interactive radio programming. Integrate international broadcasting more closely with other elements of strategic communication.
4. Establish by Presidential Directive an Interagency Committee on Public 
Diplomacy at the Cabinet Level to coordinate and direct the national public 
diplomacy strategy, with a permanent secretariat and associated working 
groups, co-chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for 
Communication and the Director of the new USAPD agency.

5. Create a public-private partnership “Foundation for the Global Future” to 
provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges 
conducted by civilian and military federal agencies. Encourage broad 
private sector participation in funding the Foundation.

Introduction

Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the 
national security of the United States through understanding, 
informing and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue 
between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.

If it is to remain a global leader, the United States must significantly strengthen 
its public diplomacy programs around the world and do so immediately. With a 
responsibility to wage war on international terrorism, to increase global stability, 
and to provide accurate information to counter those who distort the facts, the 
United States must both support existing public diplomacy programs and create 
new tools and structures that utilize new technologies. An expanded public 
diplomacy or strategic communication effort requires substantial additional 
resources; it also requires a new organizational structure and relationships. 
Information should have priority among policy makers as an essential element of 
national power along with its diplomatic, economic and military elements.

Public diplomacy embraces the core programs—exchanges, broadcasting and 
information activities, and cultural affairs—that reach international audiences 
and educate them about America. But more significant than its support of 
specific U.S. policies, a vibrant public diplomacy program can improve the global 
image of the United States. That improvement, in turn, gives governments, 
opinion leaders and democratic publics a positive perspective about the United 
States. Changes in their perceptions of the United States lead to corresponding 
changes in their attitudes towards the United States and towards U.S. policies. 
In short, effective U.S. public diplomacy over time can change behavior toward 
the United States.
This has already happened. During the Cold War, public diplomacy proved itself an effective instrument of American foreign policy. It efficiently disseminated information about the United States, countered Soviet propaganda and gave hope to people living behind the Iron Curtain. From the “kitchen debate” between Vice President Nixon and Premier Khrushchev on American values and productivity to Voice of America broadcasts that brought jazz music and current events into Soviet homes to traveling exhibits about American society and the more than 50,000 Soviet scholars, students, scientists, journalists, officials and musicians who visited the United States on government-sponsored exchange programs, these efforts to reach out to the citizenry of the Soviet Bloc cumulatively undermined the propaganda and credibility of their governments.

Why is Public Diplomacy Important Today?

A robust public diplomacy program can be an effective weapon in the war against terrorism. Favorability ratings of the United States have fallen dramatically since 9/11 in many countries around the world. In the Middle East for example they are now in the single digits but America’s prestige and credibility have seriously declined almost everywhere. Such low numbers may be a short-term reaction to specific U.S. policies and actions, or a more general response to Western values as represented by the United States. Whatever the cause, our low standing is exacerbated by distorted, negative reporting and the lack of a coherent response. The United States is in a war not only of guns but also of ideas in the Middle East and around the world. Public diplomacy programs that offer balanced information, and foster increased understanding of the United States, are a proven weapon in that war.

The number of democracies around the world has increased dramatically. But democratic governments are guided by the attitudes and behaviors of their electorates: a nation whose voters are constantly fed misinformation regarding U.S. policies will not ally itself with the United States. In the past, traditional diplomacy tried to influence other nations’ policies by engaging their leadership. As democracy spreads, that approach is not enough. Today, the voters influence policy. To persuade the leaders of other nations and their parliaments to support U.S. policies we must persuade their publics. Even in those remaining non-democratic and authoritarian societies with state-controlled media, public diplomacy programs have proven to be effective in affecting public perceptions. Today, even rulers in non-democratic states must take public opinion into account.

If public diplomacy is the best means to do this, it should also be clear that public diplomacy is no silver bullet. It will not change foreign audiences’ perceptions of the United States overnight. It is a long-term effort that requires years to influence others’ views. But resourceful public diplomacy communicates skillfully and powerfully. Over time, with multiple opportunities for contact, it brings
balanced, accurate information to foreign audiences with honesty, reliability, and conviction. Over time, increased understanding grows and behavior changes.

Long-term exchange programs expose international participants to long-standing values that are held by Americans. They understand that they and we share the common values of spirituality, family, economic opportunity, justice, equality and freedom.

Not all policies can be made appealing. A sophisticated public diplomacy program has to take that reality into account. It must focus on explaining the rationale behind such policies, recognizing that they may not be supported by a foreign public and directing its programs to combat misinformation about them even while recognizing that they may not be welcomed in some societies.

Public diplomacy programs must target mass audiences as well as elites, and must do it in a sophisticated manner. Reaching out to mass audiences is critical in a world where democracy is flourishing. But we must reach out as well to young educated elites, the future leaders of society, by providing them with more nuanced information.

If we take the path of avoidance and do not engage with foreign audiences in a thoughtful, mature, intelligent, respectful manner then we necessarily cede the ground to those who rely on distortion and misinformation. By remaining silent, we allow an information vacuum to be filled by those who hate the United States.

What Can Public Diplomacy Do?

Public diplomacy has been an effective foreign policy tool in the past. As we look to the future, an enhanced, robust, effective public diplomacy program must rely on a combination of traditional and new tools.

Public diplomacy has an arsenal of programs that work well, but they lack the direction, resources and scale necessary for the current situation. Two-way exchange programs, one of the most effective means by which the U.S. can foster long-term changes in perception, attitude and behavior, is an existing approach that must be supported at much higher levels and with a long-range perspective. The International Visitors Program, Fulbright Academic Programs and other exchanges, especially youth exchanges like the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program in the former Soviet Union that have a proven record of effectiveness must be expanded and enhanced.

Programs that were successful in the past should be reexamined and the best of them reestablished, reinvigorated or expanded. For example, media placement or direct projection of videos on American life and institutions can give foreign
audiences another, more balanced perspective on a society that they otherwise might see only through mass market films depicting a violent and decadent America. American Corners, the innovative smaller information centers headed by foreign nationals, provide print, internet, audio and video information about the United States. These programs are an extension of efforts to reach out to mass audiences by placing information in the community, where the people are.

Broadcast programs, like the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), and, more recently, Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV, have had significant impact. The latter two stations have succeeded in attracting substantial audiences in the Arab world with their programs of music and light features. However, an effective public diplomacy broadcasting effort must also include programs of real substance directed to elites and democratic reformers just as RFE and RL did earlier. This means more serious coverage of events in the targeted region, cross-reporting, and in-depth discussion programs and features. As the means and media of influence change, so too must our public diplomacy programs and initiatives.

Public diplomacy professionals must develop new programs to take advantage of new technologies. Broadcasting should be made more interactive, engaging audiences rather than simply talking at them. The ubiquity of cell phones and wireless technology in much of the world suggests that programs should increase use of that technology to provide information. The Internet is still largely an untapped resource for innovative public diplomacy.

Finally, there is no substitute for reliance on public diplomats posted overseas and their expertise. These professionals are ultimately the best strategic communication tools. They have a vast amount of information and knowledge at their disposal; most importantly they are the most interactive tool available. Public diplomacy professionals in U.S. embassies and consulates can aggressively provide information as well as respond immediately to the concerns of their local audiences. As a fundamental prerequisite, equipped with language and regional expertise, they can engage in dialogue in real time. And by listening to the concerns of both leaders and average citizens they are able to provide insight into how policies are being received, what popular concerns in their countries are, and feed that information back to decision makers in Washington.

**Why Is Public Diplomacy Not Working?**

Given the need for public diplomacy today and its track record, why is public diplomacy not as effective as it was and as it needs to be?
---Public Diplomacy efforts lack direction and understanding in the State Department’s bureaucratic culture that clashes with that of public diplomacy.

Until 1999 public diplomacy programs resided within an independent agency, the United States Information Agency (USIA). In 1999 the USIA was absorbed into the State Department for purposes of administrative streamlining. The unintended result, however, has been to weaken strategic communication as an effective, cohesive foreign policy tool. There are many reasons for this, including limited understanding by the State Department of public diplomacy’s program needs and utility, and a significant difference in methods of operation between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy.

In the post 9/11 world, it has become all too evident that the diminished, fragmented and under resourced public diplomacy in the State Department was just not adequate to the task. Some minor adjustments and new (or new once again) programs were created under the new Under Secretary, but they proved to be much too little and far too late. There is near universal agreement that public diplomacy is broken and something must be done and done quickly to fix it. A number of thoughtful solutions have been proposed to solve the “PD problem” in recent years, including those put forward by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Congressionally-mandated Djerejian Report, the Heritage Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the USIA Alumni Association. Each of the studies notes, or at least implies, that there are chronic and systemic problems within the Department of State that must be addressed in any renewal of American public diplomacy. The most serious of these problems are:

- Misunderstanding of the nature of public diplomacy vis-à-vis public affairs;
- No true integration within the State Department;
- No central authority over public diplomacy operations;
- Insufficient funding for public diplomacy programs.

Recent efforts by the State Department to enhance the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs in response to Congressional pressures by creating a new office to serve as a “focal point” for management and personnel issues and a “clearinghouse” for issues, however well intentioned, miss the point. Without direct control of public diplomacy personnel and financial resources, an Under Secretary will continue to be held responsible for yet have no real authority over public diplomacy—a prescription for failure. A new structure, one that more accurately reflects the nation’s requirements for effective public diplomacy in the 21st Century must be built.

---Public diplomacy programs do not have sufficient financial and personnel resources.
At its height during the Cold War twenty years ago, the public diplomacy programs of the United States had budgets of just about $1 billion. Today, U.S. Government public diplomacy programs are, in real dollars, a fraction of that amount. Funding for exchange programs, including the flagship Fulbright and International Visitor Programs have remained stagnant since the end of the Cold War that is a reduction of more than 40 percent in real dollars. Support for libraries, cultural programs and similar efforts was cut drastically or in some cases eliminated entirely. In addition, the number of public diplomacy Foreign Service Officers overseas was also drastically reduced, often from a staff of ten to twenty or more diplomats serving in a critical mission to one or two officers. Effective public diplomacy cannot be done on the cheap.

---The absence of 24/7 VOA broadcasting in the world's dominant language deprives most of the world's listeners of a reliable and authoritative source of information about the US. And, in an effort to reach broader audiences, U.S. broadcasting is investing resources in youth programming at the expense of substantive programs for current elites and decision makers.

Perhaps the time has come to merge all U.S international broadcasting into a single adequately funded, comprehensive, full service, multimedia global broadcaster that maintains the principles laid down in the VOA Charter as well as its journalistic code. Such an entity would reduce waste, overlap and competition among the many current U.S. government-funded broadcasters. It would provide better allocation of resources in programming and transmission and would provide credible information and programming based on our culture, our political ideals and our policies. At a minimum, U.S. international broadcasting should have the funds necessary to be heard in English 24/7 around the world.

There has been an over emphasis on youth-oriented, music and entertainment programs directed to key regions such as the Middle East. Young people as the future decision makers of the world are important audiences and must be addressed but there is an urgent need for an expansion of substantive news and feature programming to the region. Today, because of an overall lack of funding, there is an either/or choice between youth programming or substantive programs for elites. The emphatic choice of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is youth but young people cannot be the only audience for targeted U.S international broadcasting. Our international broadcasting must address elites and current decision-makers; it must reach out to a broader demographic including women and young people. In some parts of the world, such as Africa, it must serve also as a credible source of local as well as regional and international news. The administration and the Congress should take a hard look at how U.S. international broadcasting is managed to serve broad U.S. public diplomacy goals and the American taxpayer. Our international broadcasting should be integrated more closely with other public diplomacy tools.
---Public Diplomacy is not integrated into Cabinet level decision-making.

Public diplomacy has not been at the table with other elements of the U.S. Government during deliberations of policy initiatives and their implications for many years. Even when it was present, the participation was uneven, inconsistent and often reactive rather than integrated from the outset. For example, the Clinton administration’s PDD 68 set up a senior working level interagency process but it was convened only rarely during its existence. Currently, information sharing and coordination on public diplomacy exist only at the working level through a so-called “fusion” group meeting. A new presidential directive on public diplomacy and a global communication strategy is needed to provide authoritative guidance. The President should clearly and unmistakably direct and require that public diplomacy play a key role in the foreign policy decision making process.

---Essential and proven educational and citizen exchange programs that build mutual understanding over the long-term suffer from shifting levels of funding from year to year and from reliance on annual appropriations.

There is striking unanimity among public diplomacy professionals, Members of Congress, and the Executive Branch that long-term exchange programs are truly essential to building and sustaining an accurate, positive view of the United States and its goals in the world. Shifting budgetary winds, however, have made it hard to keep funding and interest levels at the steady high point that all agree is necessary. Whenever a region captures the public’s attention, whether it was the former Soviet Union in the 1990s or the Arab and Islamic worlds today, scarce funds for exchanges are diverted from the rest of the world to build up worthy but hastily created exchanges for the favored region at the expense of areas of future crisis. Removing this key component of the nation’s public diplomacy from the year-to-year vagaries of the budget cycle would lead to the reliability and predictability that a multi-generational program really requires.

How Do We Improve Public Diplomacy?

To return public diplomacy to its place as a crucial tool of U.S. foreign policy, to take advantage of its strengths in the war on terror, and to utilize it effectively in the effort to better explain the United States and its policies to the world, we call for the following:

1. Establish an agency within the Department of State and the National Security Council process, the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD),
to manage the U.S. government’s civilian informational and exchanges functions, to coordinate all U.S. government public diplomacy efforts. The Agency Director would be equivalent in rank to the Deputy Secretary of State and report to the President through the Secretary of State.

This approach would move significantly beyond the 1999 reorganization, which fragmented and undermined U.S. public diplomacy management. Public diplomacy would have central direction over its budget and personnel resources and a renewed sense of commitment. As an agency of the State Department analogous to USAID or the FBI in the Justice Department, the agency would have sufficient distance from the Department’s bureaucracy yet, under direction of the Secretary of State, would be “in on the take offs as well as the crash landings” from the beginnings of policy formulation through to its implementation.

Most importantly, the agency would be free of the incompatible State Department culture that has been ineffective, slow and reactive in addressing the challenge of spreading anti-Americanism around the globe. State and USAID now share a unified Strategic Plan and the agencies’ goals are closely coordinated at all levels of the bureaucracy. A similar process should be adopted to ensure that policy direction from the Department of State is integrated into the public diplomacy carried out by the separate agency and that input from the new agency is integral to the formulation of that policy from its earliest stages. This level of integration must ensure that there is a flow in both directions as every State Department diplomat, every USG official and every deployed member of the uniformed military abroad, must be, in part, a public diplomat in order that American values and policies—and the relationship of values to policies—is clearly understood.

While it would be most efficient if the agency also included international broadcasting elements, it is unlikely that a single public diplomacy agency including broadcasting could be re-created at present. While we encourage closer integration of international broadcasting with other elements of public diplomacy, the proposed structure does not include international broadcasting as a component of the new agency.

The new agency—with the working title of the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy or USAPD—would include the current State Department Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and International Information Programs (IIP), all public diplomacy elements within the Regional & Functional Bureaus, the Office of Research (INR/R) and portions of the Bureau of Public Affairs that migrated to State from the USIA in 1999. Other components of the new agency would be drawn from various support offices and bureaus of the Department of State that gained staff from the 1999 merger as well. Like the Political-Military Bureau of the State Department, elements of the new agency would benefit in terms of consistent and continuing coordination from regular and significant levels of
exchanges of personnel with the uniformed military and with other agencies, particularly in the areas of public affairs and civil affairs.

The goal would be a Washington level of Full Time Employees roughly equivalent to the pre-1999 USIA minus its broadcasting bureau—approximately 1500 Foreign Service and Civil Service employees. The largest component of the new Agency, however, would be stationed overseas and be comprised of approximately 1800 Foreign Service Officers and Specialists and 7000 Foreign National Employees. The U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy would be “field-driven” not “Washington-driven” in its approach to its Mission in that field offices would not merely receive instructions from Washington headquarters to carry out specific programs but rather provide input into Washington decision making and be able to choose those programs most effective under local conditions. All programs would be subject to rigorous and continuous measurement and evaluation.
2. Increase public diplomacy overseas staffing by 300 percent over five years, through increased recruitment, contracts and recall appointments for necessary skills; expanded language and cultural awareness training to ensure public diplomacy officers fluent in the local language at every overseas post; increase program budgets for public diplomacy, including international broadcasting and exchange programs, four-fold over five years.

Funding for public diplomacy must increase dramatically. A four-fold increase in funding, for a three-fold increase in overseas personnel, significant expansion of existing programs, “smart security” installations designed for interaction with the public and development of new creative programs, is essential.

For too long American policy makers and critics have bemoaned the woeful state of American public diplomacy but were unwilling or unable to provide adequate funding for this vital component of American national security. If America is serious about public diplomacy, it must devote serious money to make public diplomacy an effective instrument of national policy. This means nearly a quadrupling of the financial commitment to almost 4 billion dollars (but with most exchanges programs funded through the Foundation’s public-private partnership) and a three-fold increase in the number of field personnel, American and Foreign National staff in our overseas operations. Specifically, this means:

---More than one billion dollars (funded largely through the permanent off-budget trust fund-see recommendation number five) for educational, cultural and professional exchange programs. These programs, currently carried out mainly by the State Department’s ECA Bureau, elements of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development, are proven to be the most effective means to create generational changes in perceptions and attitudes about the United States. They must be made a permanent long-range instrument of national policy immune from the year-to-year budgetary ebbs and flows of interest in promoting mutual understanding.

---One billion dollars for international broadcasting in order to fund traditional language service broadcasts, 24/7 English language broadcasts worldwide, Worldnet TV service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio-TV Marti and innovative new radio and TV services like Radio Sawa, and Al-Hurra TV targeted to specific regions and young audiences

---More than one and one half billion dollars for information dissemination, USAPD salaries and expenses, support and field operations so that the best means of persuasion and understanding—face-to-face contact and conversations-- can again be a major part of our public diplomacy effort. We need to increase the number of language and cultural awareness qualified public diplomacy professionals three-fold in order to have critical mass and meaningful direct contact with a significant portion of our worldwide audience. We need
secure yet accessible ("smart security") American Corners, American Libraries and Cultural Centers in world capitals and provincial cities. Then, in the words of Edward R. Murrow, we can better bridge that most important part of the communication chain—"the last three feet."

3. Provide the long-term resources necessary for global international broadcasting capability, including 24 hour per day English language worldwide broadcasting, as well as a range of language service broadcasts, innovative broadcast and internet programs for youth, and interactive radio programming. Integrate international broadcasting more closely with other elements of strategic communication.

American international broadcasting programs must be supported at a level that is worthy of the world’s leading nation. At present the VOA is the world’s 12th leading international radio broadcaster; this is insufficient given our position in the world and our policy requirements. (See recommendation number two for estimated cost for international broadcasting worthy of a global power.)

The current BBG structure and priorities should be examined critically and thoroughly with a view to ensuring that this organization is more closely attuned to foreign policy while reflecting the diversity and richness of American society and maintaining its journalistic independence. International broadcasting and the other forms of public diplomacy would benefit greatly by closer integration within an overall global communications strategy.

4. Establish by Presidential Directive an Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy at the Cabinet Level to integrate advice on international opinion and to coordinate and direct the national public diplomacy strategy with a permanent secretariat and associated working groups co-chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and the Director of the new USAPD agency. The Presidential Directive should spell out the relationships, authorities and responsibilities of all relevant agencies and initiate an interagency national public diplomacy strategy.

Public diplomacy considerations must be incorporated from the outset into all aspects of our foreign policy deliberations. Public diplomacy professionals should sit at the table with other senior decision makers when considering policy initiatives and their implications. For instance, we should bring public diplomacy concerns in at the beginning when developing policy related to failed and failing states, in economic, trade and environmental policy, weapons of mass destruction and national security, as well as in the many other policy deliberations which require international support.
The President should issue a directive to all federal executive branch agencies designating the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy (IACPD) as the principal point of contact and the policy coordination mechanism for all issues of public diplomacy and global communication. The directive should require that all agencies with international responsibilities shall incorporate public diplomacy into agency goals and plans; and all USG representatives abroad should include strategic communication into their responsibilities, coordinating their efforts with the public diplomacy officer in charge and the U.S. Ambassador in each Mission. Public Diplomacy should be highlighted in the National Security Strategy of the United States as an important element of national security.

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (IACPD)
5. Create a public-private sector partnership “Foundation for the Global Future” to provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by federal civilian and military agencies.

A Foundation for the Future

A permanent endowed trust fund dedicated to U.S. Educational and Cultural Exchanges and Mutual Understanding between the people of the United States and the peoples of other nations should be created. No new government funds for programs would be required. Government funding for programs would consist entirely of re-programmed funds from existing budgets. The private sector, philanthropies and individual citizens would be encouraged to contribute as well through tax deductions.

For six decades, exchanges programs have proven to be the most effective public diplomacy programs and may be among the most successful and effective government sponsored programs in history. The more than 200,000 International Visitors and quarter million Fulbright alumni are among America’s closest supporters abroad. It is time to acknowledge this effectiveness over time and ensure that America’s most effective means of public diplomacy is immune from the annual budget cycle. These inter-generational programs that affect attitudes and behaviors over the long term should be given the funds and mechanism to be effective over a long term.

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**One time funding sources:**

- U.S. Department of State budget $1.0 Billion
- U.S. Foreign Assistance budget (USAID) $4.0 Billion
- U.S. Department of Defense budget $9.0 Billion

**U.S. Government funding** $14.0 Billion

**Other funding sources:**

- U.S. Philanthropic Organizations
- U.S. Corporations
- U.S. Academic Institutions
- U.S. Private Citizens

**Non-USG funding** $ 6.0 Billion (goal)

**Total funding** $20.0 Billion (goal)
The public-private endowment would be invested in a combination of U.S. corporate stocks and bonds and U.S. Government securities. The funds would be managed by a non-partisan Board that would determine the mix of investments, the fund management and the amount to be transferred to the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Exchanges within a new public diplomacy agency, the U.S Agency for Public Diplomacy (see recommendation number one) on an annual basis. The Board would have no authority over the actual disbursement of the funds for programs. No endowment funds could be used for other than USAPD Bureau of Cultural and Educational Exchanges programs, Department of Education Fulbright-Hays programs, Department of Defense exchange programs (for example, International Military Education and Training [IMET] and Expanded-IMET programs, foreign officer enrollment in service schools, The National Security Education Program) and U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) scholarship programs for study in the United States.

The allotment of funds for these programs would be determined by the Director of the USAPD in consultation with the members of the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy. All other USAPD costs, (i.e. information dissemination, administrative support, salaries and expenses and field operations) would continue to be funded through the 150 Account subject to Congressional review and approval. USAID development programs and support would continue to be funded through direct appropriations under the Foreign Assistance Act from Foreign Operations funds.

Such a major commitment of resources, even if reprogrammed from other uses rather than from new funds, requires a thoughtful bipartisan national consensus. The goal is one that all Americans would support but the scale of the challenge and the methodology may inhibit its realization. We must try, however, to break through the current constraints on long-term, two-way exchanges imposed by the budget cycle and involve, to a greater extent than ever before, the energies, capabilities and generosity of the American private sector to join with government in this enterprise. In the final analysis, only mutual understanding built through sustained and long-term two-way exchanges of people and ideas can eliminate the ignorance, mistrust and apprehension that make the world of today such a dangerous place.

The five recommendations proposed in this paper, if carried out by the United States over the next five years, could do much to ensure the peace, prosperity and progress of the world and the security and influence of the United States in that world.
The Public Diplomacy Council (PDC) is a non-profit organization committed to the academic study, professional practice, and responsible advocacy of public diplomacy.

PDC members believe that understanding and influencing foreign publics, and dialogue between Americans and the citizens of other countries, are vital to the national interest and the conduct of 21st century diplomacy.

The Public Diplomacy Council was founded in 1988 as the Public Diplomacy Foundation. Dedicated to fostering greater public recognition of public diplomacy in the conduct of foreign affairs, the Foundation evolved to serve also as a resource and advocate for the teaching, training, and development of public diplomacy as an academic discipline.

In 2001, the Foundation joined with The George Washington University's School of Media and Public Affairs and Elliott School of International Affairs to establish The Public Diplomacy Institute.

The Foundation changed its name to the Public Diplomacy Council in 2002 and became a membership organization with an elected board of directors. The Council maintains close ties with the USIA Alumni Association whose president is an ex-officio member of the Council’s board of directors.

Objectives

The Public Diplomacy Council is committed to fostering awareness of the public, social, educational, and cultural dimensions of world affairs. In recent years the Council and the Public Diplomacy Institute have become a primary source of information on the academic study of public diplomacy and on legislative and executive branch efforts to strengthen its use as an essential element of statecraft.

Assumptions

- Publics and their opinions matter increasingly in a globalizing world.
- U.S. statecraft should rely on careful analysis of the public dimension of issues.
- Informed judgments about global trends depend on an understanding of social and cultural dynamics and public opinion here and abroad.
- Civil society, the arts and educational communities are crucial intermediaries with counterparts in other nations.
- Public Diplomacy budgets, training, and recruitment currently do not reflect the growing importance of public diplomacy.
- 21st Century diplomacy will rely increasingly on mastery of modern telecommunications, yet the growth in mass communication creates a more urgent need for interpersonal communication.

Purposes

- Increase understanding of the public dimension of world affairs and of public diplomacy as an essential instrument of statecraft.
- Encourage teaching, research, and writing about public diplomacy.
- Develop and promote high standards in the professional practice of public diplomacy.
- Encourage cooperative relations between the U.S. Government and civil society, communications, arts, and educational and cultural institutions.
- Foster dialogue between the government and non-governmental sector about the changing role of publics in a globalizing world and the impact on publics of new communications technologies.
- Build the bases for understanding public diplomacy and public perceptions by supporting the preservation of archival materials.

Funding

The Public Diplomacy Council has no government connection and receives no financial support from any government source. It seeks support from foundation grants and corporate gifts.

The Council is a 501(c) (3) organization that relies on the dues, contributions, and volunteer work of its members. Donations to the Council are tax deductible.

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Note: These recommendations do not represent a unanimous view of all 50 members of the Public Diplomacy Council. Several members support other approaches and solutions to the challenges that confront American public diplomacy. The report does represent a consensus among Council members on the urgency of giving greater saliency to public diplomacy and of the need to provide adequate resources in order for it to be effective. Members’ alternative views are posted on the council website: www.pdi.gwu.edu.