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Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam

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ABSTRACT

Our “war on terrorism” is a narrowly focused effort to roust out and round up a “network” of criminal gangs and to punish states that harbor them. But these gangs should more properly be identified as military subcultures. Moreover they are not only interlinked through informal relationships with each other but also interwoven into a much larger movement—an insurgency within Islam. This insurgency cannot be seen simply as a “radical” Islamist movement. It draws heavily on Saudi Wahhabist support, but many other Islamist groups share the greater cause. And the cause also shares wide, if passive, support among ordinary Muslims.

The greater goals of the insurgency are the defense of Islam under attack and its renewal after generations of corruption. The struggle, therefore, requires support. Military subcultures like Al Qaeda are understood to be fighters and not ultimately leaders, so their severe agenda is not necessarily anticipated as the practical outcome of the struggle. Furthermore, the insurgency is supported broadly because it has full authority under Islamic law and tradition. Indeed, the movement’s power can only be understood within Islam’s mystical, all-encompassing cultural context.

The historical implications are straightforward. If the insurgency represents a period of renewal, then it presages political-religious revolution according to the sanctions and expectations of Islam, especially for Arabic-speaking societies. But the U.S. response in the form of its war on terrorism refuses to confront this.

This report, therefore, has three parts. The first is a deconstruction of America’s strategic language so that we can think in terms of an insurgency within Islamic civilization instead of groups of “terrorists” that are culturally marginal to that civilization.

The second part analyzes the insurgency. Here, however, analysis will not take the form of a traditional “intelligence” snapshot: toting up militant groups, listing their financial backers, etc. That has already been done many times. The “intel” approach creates, in effect, a material manifest of the insurgency. Intelligence analysis focuses on people, tools, and patterns of activity. It encourages us to view terrorism in isolation from its larger context. Instead, this report will explore the cultural context of the insurgency by showing how the ethos of terrorist subcultures relates to and works within the larger orbit of Islamic civilization.

The third part suggests a range of U.S. responses, once we have deconstructed our strategic language and revised our understanding of the enemy.

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CONTENTS

Preface	1
What Is “Terrorism?”	2
Definitions	2
Continuum of Conflict.	2
How Insurgencies Win.	4
Summary.	6
A Cultural Anatomy of Terrorism	7
The Terrorist’s Symbolic Framework.	7
The Symbolic Framework in Islamic Civilization.	10
Inter-/Intracultural Variation	13
Openness to Adaptation	15
Historical Expectations and Support.	18
Weaknesses and Strengths.	20
Responses to Terrorism	21
Dagnet (Incarceration).	23
Fort Apache (Decimation)	24
Apocalypse Soon (Annihilation)	24
We Come in Peace (Occupation)	25
Siren Song (Co-optation)	25
Sealed Train (Legitimization)	26
Summary Judgements	27
Civilizational Counter-Insurgency?	28
References and Notes	29

PREFACE

Winning in war requires one thing above all: *know the enemy*. It is the argument of this report that we do not know the enemy—and perhaps even that we do not wish to.

America is engaged in its second “war on terrorism.” The first ended with the defeat of the United States on September 11, 2001. That war was waged the way a major metropolitan police department fights crime. Although it considers crime prevention important, most law enforcement energy goes to tracking down criminals and “bringing them to justice.” Likewise, crime is understood as an ineradicable condition. The unstated mission of law enforcement is therefore not to eliminate crime but to ensure order.

The U.S. Government defined its first war on terrorism along these lines. Because terrorists were simple criminals, the level of threat they posed was described within familiar criminal parameters. Thus even a large terrorist group or “network” was by definition limited in the scale of operations it could conduct and the level of damage it might inflict. So an occasional strike on Americans was reckoned simply as a global overhead cost.

The error of this assessment was made clear on September 11. We had defined the war we wanted to fight and had prosecuted it as we wished, without regard either to the nature or intentions of our enemy. Then our enemy forced us to redefine the conflict.

What we decided to do was to widen our definition of the enemy and pursue a broader campaign. We have officially called it a real “war” as well, comparing the new struggle to the great wars of our nation’s past. We ditched the mealy bureaucratic-speak of the “war on drugs” or the former “war on terrorism.”

But we chose not to *declare* war. On the face of it this made sense. “Just who do we *declare* war on anyway?” some asked, while others made the perfectly reasonable point that declaring war on “nonstate actors” would actually give them legal recognition and effectively legitimize their political standing. We still want to treat them as simple criminals.

Yet there was another reason for not declaring war. The terrorist network is a ring of military subcultures that represents a much larger political movement within Islam, one that is nothing less than a civilization-wide insurgency against the established regimes of Sunni Islam. The “terrorists” are merely the fighters in this *jihad*. Millions of sympathizers and supporters play active, even critical roles in the movement. While most perhaps are passive, they are nonetheless loyal adherents.

If the United States were to suggest that it is waging war against militant Islam—even if officially labeled as “radical” or “extremist”—Islam as a whole might well interpret this as a declaration of war against all

Muslims. This at least is the fear: a political fear expressed so publicly and so often through official pieties like “Islam is a peaceful religion” that it threatens to become self-fulfilling.

No matter the rhetoric, the second war on terrorism is in this way as arbitrarily constrained as the first. This time we will take action against all formal fighting nodes and select elements of logistical support within the terror network. But we will not take on the movement itself. We will leave the insurgency’s source of authority—its religious leadership—to the old-line regimes we call our Mid-East Allies. Let them undertake the delicate tasks of repression and feigned embrace. They will endeavor both to put the movement down and to caress it with savage earnestness, for they fear the insurgency even more than we do. We cannot, however, talk about this part of the war.

So political needs have forced the United States to publicly limit the scope of the war. *Can we defeat an enemy that we are afraid to name?* By making this a war on terrorism the United States has created for itself a new and significant strategic vulnerability; and it weakens us in three ways.

The obvious vulnerability is political. By defining the war as less than it is, the Government instantly creates a set of diminished expectations: a low bar to victory. Thus we might “win” this war on the initial battlefields—as we have drawn them—only to have our subsequent policy shaped by a misplaced assessment of what “victory” has actually achieved. The things that were not done *because we could not bring ourselves to speak their name* could then come back to haunt us.

A more insidious vulnerability is in the mind. It may be that even though the Government talks about terrorism it is in fact deliberately pursuing a broader strategy against militant Islam. If we cannot say this publicly, then in what “safe” venue may it be said privately? If it cannot be said privately, then how shall it be properly communicated? And if it cannot be communicated, then how will it inform our strategy?

Finally, using changeling words (e.g., terrorism) for what we really mean to say subtly and inevitably corrodes our ability to see things as they really are. This is all the more true when anxiety encourages us to push feared truths away. Changeling words thus play a role in comforting the user. The challenges we face seem less daunting, the uncertainties more manageable, and a favorable outcome all the more certain. So talking terrorism is more than expedient political correctness: the more we use the word the more we actually come to believe that there truly is something called terrorism, and that this is what the conflict is really about.

The purpose of this report is to suggest a contrary path of mind—to come to know our enemies as they know themselves. To achieve this we must disengage from the reassuring opiate of our own language. Yes, the

words we use surely convey meaning, but not always truth. So the first part of this report is a necessary deconstruction of terrorism. It seeks to replace a bad word with a more accurate and useful term: “insurgency.” The second part describes our enemy in cultural terms, an anatomy of mind and spirit using concepts from anthropology and sociology. This anatomy seeks insights that may change not only how we understand the enemy, but ourselves. The third part will show how cultural insights can suggest alternative strategies against the enemy.

WHAT IS “TERRORISM?”

Definitions

Terrorism is an expression of conflict, much like a battle in a war. But war is a legalized conflict in which both parties recognize each other’s political legitimacy, so negotiation is war’s central process. In contrast, terrorism operates within a political construct in which one or both parties refuse to recognize the other’s legitimacy. In fact one goal of a legitimate political entity fighting a political movement seeking legitimacy is to disallow negotiation. “Terrorism” and “terrorist” are thus significant legal instruments. Successfully labeling a group, a movement, or even a state as terrorist denies it political legitimacy. It can then be dealt with as a merely criminal organization. One doesn’t negotiate with criminals; one simply brings them to justice.

We know from History that criminalizing an authentic political movement has often failed. Terrorist conflicts end up being just as much about negotiation as any legal war. Many terrorist entities have been awarded political legitimacy, often after a long conflict, and often by the very parties that sought to destroy them. Of course once legitimated, the moniker “terrorist” is politely withdrawn. When did we first start using the “terror” word, and was it always used to deny legitimacy to an enemy?

“Terrorism” was first used in 1795, during the so-called “Reign of Terror,” when British commentators labeled the legitimate government of France as “terrorist” (from the French, *terroriste*).¹ The objective here was to de-legitimate the French Republic by describing its behavior as uncivilized and therefore no better than criminal. Of course most of the old-line monarchies in Europe were already at war with France and had failed to overthrow the new republic in battle. So wags like Edmund Burke were hard at work looking for other ways to strip the *Sans-Culottes* of legitimacy. This is not to say that Robespierre was a model political leader, but simply to show how the word terrorism was first used as it is still used, to place an enemy “beyond the pale.”

But making terrorism stick is not easy, beginning with its very definition. No one has defined exactly what

constitutes terrorism, but most people seem to know it when they see it. Today’s most common official attribute is “the deliberate killing of noncombatants.” True to this rule, outraged members of “the civilized world” branded Germany’s Zeppelin raids on London as acts of terror when they were initiated in 1915. Yet by the outbreak of the next European war in 1939, attacks on civilian targets were expected by all. They were just another, more modern frisson in the terrible routine of war. The Allies went so far as to actually stage an incendiary raid on Tokyo in March 1945 that had as an explicit objective the highest possible noncombatant toll.² About 135,000 noncombatants died that night. Did that make it an act of terrorism? Our current definition would seem to say yes, though most of us would strongly protest its use in this instance. Yet many believe bombing attacks that encourage civilian casualties are war crimes.³ Is not a war crime the equivalent of terrorism? They are both, after all, “criminal” acts.

Responding to this definitional difficulty are those who say that only “nonstate actors” can practice terrorism. But for decades the U.S. Government has called the violent acts of select states “terrorist,” and even officially coined and used the term “state-sponsored terrorism.”

So the difficulties grow. We all know that terrorists like to attack civilian targets. If we could agree, as some would have us do, that attacks on purely military targets, like the Stern Gang bombing of the King David Hotel, are by definition *not* terrorist acts, then why is the attack on the USS *Cole* not labeled as such? The answer is obvious: if we had called the attack on the *Cole* a military strike, it would have meant we were at war with Al Qaeda; this, in turn, would have meant that they possessed some measure of political legitimacy. Thus there was no declaration of war after 9-11. A declaration of war is a *de jure*—“of the law”—recognition that one’s enemy possesses political legitimacy.

Terrorism is a gray-area term. Its usage immediately acknowledges that terrorist activity is in its essential nature political, not simply criminal, but also that it is *illegitimate* political activity. Therefore the acknowledged relationship between “legitimate” political actor and “terrorist” is a relationship between what is established and what is insurgent. In this sense, then, terrorism encompasses all violent political activity that is outside the framework of legally violent conflict, i.e., what we call “war.”

Continuum of Conflict

If we examine terrorism as political insurgency, then cataloging it is straightforward, even easy. There are five categories of political insurgency. Listed in order of increasing severity they also conveniently form a “continuum of conflict,” with “legal” war sandwiched in, close to, but significantly not at the top.

The symbolic act

Violent political action by a single person or “conspiracy” of persons is inherently limited, but can nonetheless be very effective. If it is political in nature it transcends the “personal statement” and is directed at a wider constituency. That constituency may be a movement that has not yet gelled or a movement/subculture that has hitherto operated only in peaceful and permitted political realms. The act is symbolic because its goal is to convey a powerful political message, which through its very drama seeks to inspire a great collective recognition such as, “Workers of the world, unite!”

Ergo the Lincoln conspiracy, the Haymarket bombing, the assassination of Alexander II, and even the Murrah Office bombing all sought to galvanize a wider political constituency which, in the minds of the attackers, was ready to be ignited by recognition. Thus the persistent power of the bomb and its fuse in the symbolism of attack.

Motivational ambiguity of course enshrouds the symbolic act. For an attack by a few to count as an insurgency it must not simply exhibit political motivation; its enactment must be socially and culturally interwoven into a larger movement, whether or not that movement has embraced or eschewed violent action. So Lee Harvey Oswald and Sirhan Sirhan count as criminal assassins, whereas John Wilkes Booth and Timothy McVeigh count as symbolic insurgents. Booth and his ring hoped to reawaken rebellion; McVeigh hoped to ignite the anti-Government emotions of the Militia movement.

An enterprise seeking legitimacy

Criminal enterprises, if big enough or socially longstanding, rate almost as tribes in their own right, and certainly as full subcultures within society. Just look at the Mafia, which learned to survive in America through the (often-stretched) framework of legal accommodation. Not so in Italy. Recent Mafia terrorism in Sicily arguably represents a defensive political insurgency, as the Italian government is seeking, after generations of grudging acceptance, to bring them to heel.

Criminal subcultures go to “war” as “terrorists,” taking on a state establishment for one reason only: legitimization. “State,” they say, “leave us alone.” This was true for Cilician pirates in the last century of the Roman republic as much as for Morgan’s pirate enterprise in 17th century Jamaica. And it has been true of Colombian drug cartels that have sought legitimacy through violent, subversive political activity.

However, these subcultures are corrosive to the authority of both the state and the larger civilization, so their violent political activity only tends to buy them time—time to adapt and accommodate or to let conditions change, perhaps in their favor. And doing favors for an establishment can bring the boon of legitimacy.

Morgan achieved this by becoming English governor of Jamaica, as did Jean Lafitte by providing aid to Jackson’s army at the battle of New Orleans. But then the grant of recognition became essentially an act of social co-optation and elevation: as members of the establishment they killed their former selves.

Civil insurgency

Tribes are by definition culturally homogeneous, but states are not. We like to think of nation-states as culturally homogeneous, since the word “nation” means “tribe.” But just tell that to a Basque or Scot or *Québécois*. Tribal insurgency happens all the time. But a state that has defined a *Basquo* as “Spanish” is hardly about to legitimate his national aspirations. Hence the violent political activity, hence the charge, “terrorist.”

There are also classical revolutionaries within a nation who would overthrow the established order and replace it with one of their own. Marx and his progeny saw this as class warfare, and certainly the French Revolution, pitting *bourgeoisie* vs. *ancien régime*, fits this frame. It can also be caste vs. caste, tribe vs. tribe (e.g., Tutsi and Hutu), or people from very different culture areas (e.g., Indians and Polynesians on Fiji). It can be a minor movement that uses violence opportunistically to advance itself politically, like the Nazis in embryo. This swathe of people and places shows political violence—so often labeled as terrorism—as so much a part of politics that it is almost impossible to disentangle and objectify it as something inherently apart. It is America’s almost unique good fortune that terrorism has not been a normal part of our politics ... *for at least a generation!*

War by other means

Weak states that wish to fight strong states cannot afford to declare war if they are to survive. They can, however, use surrogates and external clients to undermine the confidence and damage the reputation of an enemy. The enemy is essentially undamaged, but the flamboyance and audacity of these indirect attacks increase the weaker state’s own reputation. The real goal of this “war by other means” is therefore the advancement of a state within its own community hierarchy. Elizabeth’s England did just this. Drake and Hawkins were liberally supported to conduct private war and mayhem against the Hapsburg superpower: “singeing the Don’s beard.” England’s reputation as a leader in the Protestant cause shot up. In latter days, Quaddafi pursued a terror campaign against the United States, hoping to advance Libya’s leadership *bona fides* in the “Arab world.”

Sometimes a great power will resort to war by other means if it has limited objectives that can better be gained through terrorism than the disproportionate

instrument of legal war. Around 1800, France and other European powers chafed at rising American economic competition, especially in the Mediterranean. There were simply too many U.S. merchant vessels snatching away too much of the valuable carrying trade. But France, at war with most of Europe, was in no mood to strategically overextend itself by taking on another enemy. Plus France desperately needed American wheat, so it could hardly confront us directly. Instead it signed on “terror” surrogates in the form of North African “Barbary” states to prey upon U.S. shipping and hold Americans hostage.

["Legal" war

Think of a Movietone News clip of a president addressing Congress in black and white, of ringing words: "... was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan..."]

Civilizational insurgency

Was the Haymarket bombing intended to help spark a Socialist revolution in America? Maybe, but the bombers saw themselves as part of a much bigger movement. Socialism was a worldwide revolution, a worker's revolution. Pulling back a bit from their language we can see an insurgency within the industrial world whose boundaries in the 1870s and 1880s basically demarcated Western Civilization. An insurgency that emerges across an entire civilization and engages systematically in political violence is hardly a stranger to us. Communism between the 1920s and 1950s was an "international" movement (although cynically manipulated by Stalin), which often resorted to political violence outside of war. We know of other such insurgencies. The Protestant Reformation was an even more dangerous example than Communism—far more dangerous to the Hapsburg world empire and the Roman Catholic Church, that is.

Thus as we deconstruct "terrorism," we only find in its place violent political insurgency. The practical question then becomes, *How should we prosecute the current "war against terrorism" if what we are really dealing with is an insurgency?* Thinking in terms of fighting insurgency rather than terrorism encourages us to consider the problem in the broadest terms. What is the dynamic path of insurgencies? How do they achieve their goals? What is the calculation of victory and defeat in political struggle outside of classic wars?

How Insurgencies Win

Understanding terrorism as insurgency, or violent political activity, requires that we understand its political utility. When we call an insurgency "terrorist" we become actual participants in regime strategy by helping define what is *loyal* society. The establishment

strategy is to keep the insurgent movement from gaining its cherished goal, i.e., legitimacy. But if at all possible it must also endeavor to destroy the movement entirely by stripping it of authority as well. The problem for the legitimate regime is that the insurgency already has some measure of political authority ... *or it could be dealt with as purely criminal activity.* In other words, its very existence challenges the political authority and continuing legitimacy of the establishment.

This creates an interesting dynamic. While the established and legitimate must have as their goal the destruction of the insurgent movement, the insurgency needs only to survive to deny the established authority its goal. An establishment that cannot put down a direct challenge to its authority—a challenge possibly supported by many regime subjects—is increasingly discredited. Insurgencies thus can play a waiting game, because the longer they survive the more their authority grows, and the weaker the strategic position of the establishment becomes. A sense of historical shift is introduced into people's minds, and authority can actually begin to flow away from the regime and toward the insurgency. This is why astute insurgencies can lose every battle and still win the war, because time is on their side. We can illustrate this dynamic with six examples of insurgencies that won; i.e., six variations on the waiting game.

Just survive

These are insurgencies where a distinct culture and people within an imperial framework seek autonomy or independence, two words that equate to legitimacy. Where shall we begin? With the Swiss Confederation in the 13th century, or perhaps the Greek revolt of the later 18th century, or the Moros of the later 19th century? Ottomans called Greeks terrorists, and Americans called Moros terrorists. We could list more modern terrorist peoples: the Basques, the Chechens, the Timorese, the Kurds, and yes, the Moros, still fighting after all these years. Some will win and some will not.

Often the only way to ensure that insurgent people lose is to absolutely and utterly destroy them. That worked for the Romans. They thought they had put down the Jews in 70, but then they rose again three generations later in the *Bar Kochba* rebellion. This time the Romans not only slaughtered the Jews wholesale, they scattered them to the ends of the earth. But almost two thousand years later, guess what? They were back (and still being called "terrorists," but this time by another empire). Remember, the longer you survive the stronger you become.

Rob "them" of legitimacy

Turn the tables on the legitimate "power." Hurt the ruling establishment by making them do things that undermine their own precious legitimacy. The best

example is France in Algeria, 1954–1961. The French attempted a Roman-like solution and failed. Confronted with unspeakable mutilations of their own and countless bombings of *pied noir* civilians, the French Army stalked the FLN and broke their terror network through savage torture of prisoners. The French were becoming like their enemy. The government was sacrificing civilization to win the war.

Even today, an old general's memoirs have caused a scandal in France and Algeria alike. He defends without remorse what he did: "There was a threat of terrorism on the population. All I did was take defensive measures."⁴ He was an intel officer then, and elbow deep in torture and summary executions. So his small acts prefigured the secular government of Algeria today—the FLN's descendant—which in fighting its own Islamic terrorists has slaughtered over 50,000 people.

These were inner insurgency strategies, where "inner" means within the fabric of a legitimate state or empire. The next four variations target civilizational insurgency, and with good reason: that is the terrorism we face today.

Protestant Europe: superpower help

Martin Luther unleashed the greatest insurgency ever within Western Civilization. It began within the Roman Catholic Church and was dealt with initially as heresy, the Church's equivalent of criminal activity. But German princes were soon won over, and thus a terrorist network was born. It was not called terrorist; rather, what it was called was politically equivalent.⁵ Just because legitimate princes supported the insurgency didn't raise it to the level of legal acknowledgment. To the contrary, the Church now went after wayward princes to strip them of their very regalia. Naturally the efforts of the counter-Reformation didn't do much countering. It all built to a head in war, but not a nicely legal, modern war. Protestant princes were treated within the gray area of contemporary terrorism, between political legitimacy and mere criminality.

The grand dramaturgy was of course the Thirty Years War, but the war itself would have had no historical resolution without a singular development. Within the Roman world there were two great powers: the Hapsburg duo of Austria and Spain, and France. France, however, had been chafing against Hapsburg dominance. Richelieu preferred Protestant victory to Hapsburg high-handedness, so he threw the full weight of what would soon be the next superpower behind a heretical cause. Result: legitimacy for the spawn of Luther and two centuries of elusive European preeminence for France.

American Socialism: negotiation and co-optation

The Civil War was over, and for Northern workers trade unionism was not enough. They inhabited a brutal industrial-urban landscape, and so sought a vision that

would not only free them from its brutality but bring a better life. Socialism emerged in the 1870s as an answer that became a strategy. Violent political action was sanctioned in part because most political institutions were in the clasp of the Capitalist class and in part because it was felt that Socialism could not be realized until the robber barons fell. Thus Socialism began with a bang: in 1877, during a general strike, the Philadelphia railroad yards were burned to the ground. The militia turned their guns on the crowd and then the Pinkertons were unleashed.⁶

This was not to be the way, however. An uncommon and yet typically American solution emerged over the next generation. Both insurgents and establishment entered into a sort of intracivilizational negotiation. Socialists gave up their vision of a people's utopia, and the Capitalist elite gave up their monopoly on politics. Socialists put their faith in unions and created an enterprise whose muscle came to equal both boardroom and blue blood. The insurgency and the establishment both won and lost, yet they crafted in the process an enduring political symbiosis.

Soviet Communism: environments shift

The bomb-throwing Russian Socialists, in contrast to the bomb-throwing American (à la Haymarket) Socialists, actually got their way. How? They had a much weaker proletarian base and faced a real aristocracy, which had its very own Cossacks at saber beck and call. The Czar's agents kept anarchists manacled and at bay. Sure, the insurgents might pick off a Czar now and then, but that only spurred the Cheka dragnet. So again, how did they ever win? War. Not their war, but a general European war that leeched the life-blood out of the Third Rome's *ancien régime*. Both Czar and Liberal opposition had invested their entire political authority in the war effort, and now Russia was beaten and prostrate. The political environment was so massively altered that a minor fringe movement could move assertively to the center.

Two cases of "subversion"

Cultural subversion seems more like seduction than attack. For how could a "terrorist" movement—the very vision of the enemy, the "other"—take over an establishment, as the definition goes, "from within?" Clearly this suggests a process of change and accommodation, of pariahs embracing and even becoming like the elite society that has so feared them.

But insurgencies that win through subversion are often terrorist. These movements have the insight to adapt rather than resist. They see how to accommodate without compromising their vision. There are two examples of insurgent-turned-establishment: the early Christian Church and the Nazi Party. Both are well known

to us, though perhaps not quite as well as we might believe.

Early Christians were terrorists? Wasn't the violence all done to them, as martyrs? An explanation is in order. Rome had an official state religion, but it also accepted a medley of cults, all of which prospered happily under the imperial umbrella. The Romans welcomed this world of diversity and toleration as long as everyone accepted the civic centrality of the official pantheon. This meant not simply living within the framework of Roman law, but of Roman religious values. All the Romans asked was a simple acknowledgment of Imperial Divinity. This act in itself constituted a symbolic expression of political submission to the larger framework of Roman values. Once this was done, everyone could get along.

The Christians were *not* tolerant of other religions, however. Accepting a civic-religious niche within the Roman pantheon would constitute the utter corruption of their faith. Christians stubbornly refused political-cultural submission, making them subversives to be hunted down. The Romans treated the Christians with utmost political severity—as terrorists. If they had had the word “terrorism” they would almost certainly have applied it to the Christian insurgency.⁷

The Roman establishment was correct in its judgment that Christianity was a profound threat to Greco-Roman civilization. Christianity was an insurgency because it had no interest in losing itself in the larger fabric of the “pagan” Roman civic framework. Its interest was in overthrowing that framework. The Roman State's interest and energy in eradicating the insurgent cult suggest that they saw the Church as their greatest domestic threat.

The case of early Christianity raises an important truth about terrorism. Violence is not necessarily required for an establishment or regime to call an insurgency terrorist. The denial of political legitimacy rather than any arbitrary expression of violence thus establishes a condition of terrorism. “Terrorism” is an emotionally charged state of mind in which a ruling authority is seized by fear, perhaps not of its own impending historical defeat, but certainly a fear of *the stranger* who is not only alien but obdurately outside the claim of its own authority. The Christians were terrorists because that is how the Romans saw them.

Terrorist insurgencies are about threatening change, and the insurgents cannot rest until they have met their goal. Often this means that they must change too, to the point where they are no longer seen as terrorists. Christianity's progress shows this: political subversion only worked through political and cultural accommodation. By the time the Christians finally and confidently won over the Roman establishment they hadn't been terrorists for a long, long time.⁸

The Christian case suggests that the path of subversion can take both many generations and many

accommodations before it succeeds. There is, however, a meteoric example from recent times. Many have argued that Nazism represented a new religion in the making and that Christianity's overthrow was one of its ultimate goals. Certainly Hitler sought to create a new “civilization.” At the beginning, the Nazis themselves were truly terrorist insurgents: their goal in the *Putsch* was the violent overthrow of the Weimar state. But just a few years later the Nazis emerged as a legitimate, if still violent, political party. Then their popularity began to wane in the early 1930s. The only way for Hitler to gain power was through political subversion, which entailed major accommodations to the establishment. And as Hitler's relationship with the *ancien régime* deepened, he at last had to purge his own original supporters in a surprise midnight massacre.

Hitler could buy into the Wilhelmine elite because he was able to repackage his cult so it no longer seemed to threaten the old order.⁹ He gained political legitimacy without ever abandoning violence. This example shows how critical the relationship is between terrorist insurgent and ruling establishment. Their ongoing and evolving relationship is central to conflict resolution. Think of it as an almost existential negotiation.

Characterizing conflict between “terrorists” and “rightful government” as cultural negotiation means going outside these words' very frameworks of meaning. It may be almost impossible to think about early Christians as terrorists. Only if we go outside what we are given as meaning can we see a bigger picture. For example, what we think about the political behavior of early Christians is less important than what the Roman elite thought. It is always the threatened establishment that gets to name the insurgency as terrorist because it is the regime that is afraid. It is the regime's choice to strip a political movement of legitimacy.

Christianity and Nazism were religious movements that began as cults (*again, Christianity in Roman eyes!*) determined to create new and universal civilizations. Likewise we typecast the insurgency in Islam as an extremist fringe movement not so unlike a cult. But here it is the insurgency that claims Islamic legitimacy and calls the ruling regimes apostate, *murtad*.

Summary

What is important about civilizational insurgency is that it is about religion—at stake is the authority to legally define the existential. So what do we gain by stepping out of the meanings that so encumber the word terrorism?

- We can connect a set of violent human actions to a larger political movement, to its anticipated story, and to its ultimate vision. And political movements have cultural objectives that can go beyond national borders.

- We recognize that the establishment’s use of the word terrorism is a barometer of the progress of deep negotiation between insurgent and establishment. The end of terrorism’s official use is the moment of insurgent victory.
- We understand that the course and outcome of that negotiation is inflected by culture: the more the warring parties share, the greater the possibility of a resolution through accommodation.
- We can see how alien insurgents can shift their political agendas and tactics to insinuate themselves into the elite order, to the point where they become part of the elite. We can see others who succeed by so steadfastly refusing to assimilate that it is easier to set them free than to rule them.
- We can see that terrorism at last is not a phenomenology of violence, but an expression of changing relationships within culture and society. We need to understand the nature, momentum, and possible outcome of that change.

The next part of this report presents a “cultural anatomy” of the relationships within a “terrorist conflict.” It will offer a cultural analysis of nonclassical war, using the current war on terrorism as a case study.

A CULTURAL ANATOMY OF TERRORISM

Our war on terrorism is directed at political subcultures within Islamic civilization that we officially label as terrorist groups. The larger truth is that these groups represent a broader insurgency within Sunni Islam. This is a true civilizational insurgency in the sense that it is a conflict over the civic-religious basis of all Muslim societies, indeed, all Muslims: the community that is the *Ummah* (the people) itself.

Islam encompasses several distinct “culture areas,”¹⁰ but binds them together through a single civic-religious framework and a vision of Muslim unity: the *Ummah*. Thus the Islamist insurgency today calls for universal change within Islam. Even movements that seem to operate only within national societies nonetheless believe their own struggle to be intrinsically part of a greater story. And the insurgency’s mosaic of movements interacts across Islam. They see themselves as “brotherhoods” that work together as a single Muslim fraternity.

We call this the “terrorist network,” as though it were a cartel of criminal gangs. In fact, we know that it is supported across Islam by many millions of Muslims. This popular support, passive as it may seem, is the political basis for the very existence of the terror network. These terrorist groups do not see themselves as criminal or even simply as “political” in the way we think of politics as a separate, “professional” sphere. They see themselves in a context almost beyond

our imagination. What they think about themselves matters much more than what we think about them. Calling them terrorists satisfies our own needs but it does nothing to advance our understanding of them.

We need to understand them because they have authority and they represent change. We need to know how much authority they have among the *Ummah*, and even more importantly, whether that authority has the momentum of change. This means we must not only see the terrorists as they see themselves, but also as other Muslims see them. What is the relationship between Islamist militant and Muslim societies?

Traditional intelligence analysis would confine itself to the material evidence of insurgency: size, organization, capabilities, resources, and activities. But this approach tells us nothing about either the insurgency’s true standing or its historical dynamic. This report takes a different approach. It looks for standing and dynamic by placing the insurgency within its larger cultural context, tries to reveal the “cultural resonance” between terrorist subcultures and Islamic civilization, and approaches this resonance through four cultural themes.¹¹ These themes are introduced briefly here:

- **Symbolic framework or “web of significance.”**¹² This is the way we define our reality: who we are (our identity), where we are (the nature of Nature), how we are (rules for living), when we are (our place in time and History), and why we are (the meaning of our existence, and thus our intended mission).
- **Inter-/intracultural variation.** How similar and how different are related groups of people? People define themselves within concentric cultural orbits: they are at the same time members of a subculture, a national or tribal society, a culture area, and a civilization. This leads to significant variations in identity, belief, behavior, and belonging.
- **Openness to adaptation.** Adaptation is central to cultural survival. Why are some societies more open to change than others? What does it mean when a subculture is more (or less) adaptive than its parent society? And why do dynamically open cultures and civilizations close up across historical time?
- **Historical expectations and support.** People and their ruling elite together share a certain sense of moving through time. They sense their “river of culture,” i.e., a collective narrative that carries strong historical expectations. Ruling authority often comes from fulfilling those expectations or promising their imminent realization. Political support is ultimately rooted here.

The Terrorist’s Symbolic Framework

Al Qaeda and the Taliban are true subcultures and though different they share a common symbolic framework. Their intense motivation is a reflection of their

symbology's passionate and all-encompassing nature. A Western journalist recently scoffed at a Pakistani *'ulama* whose *madrassa* (school) had only Quranic books. "What is your favorite novel?" she asked mockingly. He replied, "The Quran is the best novel." But he was serious.¹³

Teller of the ultimate and even the only story, Muhammad is the shaper of their symbolic framework. For the warriors of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Muhammad offers the supreme mytho-poetic framework for their lives. Islam of course is greater than this framework, but Al Qaeda and the Taliban mold their identity around a legitimated but limited conception of Islam. Their web of significance is built around four elements:

- The heroic journey and the mythic figure
- The rhythm of History captured as epic struggle—and story
- The commanding charge of renewal
- History revealed and enjoined through mystic literary form

These themes are important elements in Islam, and the architecture of Islamic civilization legitimates each of them. But there are other charges and expectations within Islam which, had they been incorporated into Al Qaeda and Taliban reality, might have moderated their vision. These issues will be treated later.

The heroic journey and the mythic figure

Muhammad himself came out of the desert as a holy man with a message for all Arabs, who were then a squabbling, fractious, corrupted group of tribes used as pawns by outsiders. He united the Arabs and raised them to greatness around a compelling vision. The vision that united them was severe, apocalyptic, and pure: the fear of God driven by a constant "intimate anxiety" of the Last Judgement of Allah.¹⁴

Joseph Campbell would have called this the heroic journey of Muhammad. And like heroic journeys in all societies (as chronicled in Campbell's *Hero With a Thousand Faces*)¹⁵ the odyssey ends in a reunification with the Father—in this case, Allah. For those aspiring heroes who have tried to follow Muhammad's journey, this becomes as well a reunification with the Prophet.

How many have followed in his steps! They come out of the desert, pure and severe, warrior-ascetics, to renew a corrupted *Ummah*. For example, go to the Saudi Embassy web site and there you will find a loving rendition of the heroic journey of the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz.¹⁶ Through the centuries, so the story goes, the Saudis uphold "the purity of Islam" and "restore the pure teachings of Islam." And so the pure young man, Abdul Aziz, goes "deep into the desert" with his warriors where they not only manage to make a decisive strategic maneuver but spend a month in

fasting and prayer. Thus cleansed, Aziz and his band sweep into Riyadh, overthrowing cruel Turkish rulers and their Arab collaborators. Clearly a Saudi government looking like long-ago Arab *compradors* desperately needs to clothe itself in an upright ancestor and draw on the authority of his journey.

But Usama bin Laden, Saudi citizen, intended to usurp whatever residue of authority still clung to the Saudis from another century by creating a new journey of his own. He would be the new prodigal, renewing a degenerate Arabia. And his message was the same one of corruption in the very heart of Islam: a subverted kingdom run by foreign consultants and foreign servants, and occupied this time not by decadent outsider Turks but even worse, decadent unbelievers—the American military.

Look at how he presented himself. Not so unlike Abdul Aziz, bin Laden grew up as a pampered aristocrat. He sought purification in the high mountains of Afghanistan, where he lived as an ascetic—for all his wealth—in the thrall of a journey to Allah to renew a corrupted *Ummah*. His support across Islam flows from his reassertion of the heroic persona and its shared intimacy within the Muslim imagination. Thus the never-ending story unfolds again.

The rhythm of History captured as epic struggle—and story

That this story should have been so passionately and so often replayed is not surprising. What is surprising is how we dismiss its claim and forget as well the *leitmotif* of an *Ummah* that has lost its way. The great Arab conquests created the prospect of a truly universal people. In its young days the *Khilafat* (Caliphate) came close to creating a universal Islamic Empire. But then it splintered and grew soft and pleasure loving. There is a rhythm here, and like the romance of the heroic journey it is a conviction within the collective imagination. It is not so much a historical truth as it is deeply held belief about the nature of things.

When the *Ummah* lost its way, great leaders would sweep out of the wilderness. There was Ibn Tumart leading Berber and Tuareg zealots out of the bleak Sahara. There were the *Mahdi* storming out of the desert Sudan to overthrow Gordon and his *Raj* at Khartoum. There was Babur too, brand-ancestor of Pakistan, sweeping down from Afghan mountains. Then came the pious Mamluk Baybars, last scourge of the Crusaders, and of course the chivalrous Saladin, whose *jihad* wrested Jerusalem from infidel Frank.

The infamous video of the two shaykhs dining in their Tora Bora bunker made this lineage and its authority absolutely explicit. At one point, the one identified only as "Shaykh" turns to Usama bin Laden and praises him yet again:

And the day will come when the symbols of Islam will rise up and it will be similar to the early days ... of Al-Ansar. Finally said, if it is the same, like the old days, such as Abu Bakr and Othman and Ali...¹⁷

The drama of renewal is rooted in the collective imagination as much as the heroic journey is in the individual imagination. The emergence of a big movement and a heroic leader, as is happening now, creates the anticipation of an imminent renewal of the *Ummah*.

The commanding charge of renewal

Renewal in Islam is thus civilizational rather than simply theological: by seeking to purify the *Ummah*, its goals are as much political as religious. But there is a hidden element as well. Islam's original irruption came very close to establishing a universal *Ummah* through an apocalyptic event: the dual destruction of both Greco-Roman and Persian civilizations. Almost, but not quite. *Jihad* today not only hearkens back to the original struggle but also reasserts its freshness and force.

Thus ancient authority on *jihad* has modern force. For example, the 13th century Mamluk scholar Ibn Taymiyyah has reached out through the centuries to mold Islamist thinking about *jihad* today. Hillenbrand explains why "Ibn Taymiyya's ideas have been embraced enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements":

For him, *jihad*, both spiritual and physical, is a force within Islam that can create a society dedicated to God's service ... [but] whilst stressing the prototypical religious importance of the Prophet's career for those who wish to wage *jihad*. Ibn Taymiyya is sufficiently a man of his own age to draw parallels between Muhammad's time and contemporary events. Ibn Taymiyya sees the Muslim world assailed by external enemies of all kinds and the only solution is to fight *jihad* so that 'the whole of religion may belong to God.'¹⁸

There are several important insights here. First, like the mid-13th century, these are times of danger and crisis for Islam. The danger is not simply from enemies without—in the *Dar al'Harb*—but enemies within—in the *Dar al'Islam* itself. Second, *jihad* is the path to renewal in Islam, but that renewal requires both armed struggle and spiritual struggle. Third, no one is exempt from the struggle, because Islam is threatened at its very heart. Finally, this collective *jihad* is in itself a form of celebration, creating a current of collective piety that in effect moves History forward.

In this sense Islamist renewal attempts to re-create the spiritual experience of the original struggle to achieve a universal *Ummah*. This is why the Shaykh so emphasized the lineal continuity between original *jihad* and today: "In these days, in our times ... will be the greatest *jihad* in the History of Islam."¹⁹ Thus by plunging into the great river, one both joins the current and

propels it onward to its prefigured historical finish: the *Ummah* of all humankind.

History revealed and enjoined through mystic literary form

At the end of their videotaped dinner, Usama bin Laden concluded with verse he **recited**:

Our homes are flooded with blood
Where the tyrant wanders free
And from the battlefield are fled
The horses and the bright fire of swords
Yet over weeping voices now
We hear the roiling rhythms of drums
They are storming his forts and
They cry: 'Our raids will not cease
Until our lands are free...'²⁰

Arabic Islam found its voice in verse. Moreover that voice took heroic form as epic poetry, like the *epos* of Homer himself. This was not simply a choice in communication, however. The form is not merely a conveyance of meaning. It is a symbolic exaltation of that which is conveyed: meaning is expressed through form as much as content. Hence language itself becomes a path to higher understanding as much as the information it bears.

We in the West have done much the same, save in the opposite direction. We inhabit a world of *Logos*, ruled by rational thought, in which reason seeks to encompass the world by measurement, and where thought strives through quantification to satisfy that yearning. Thus our sacred language—that of *analysis*—is determined to imitate the precision of quantification and to eschew emotion.

But the sacred language of our enemy is mystical heroic poetry. Its cultural objectives are in polar opposition to our own. Corbin describes the essential interpretive principle or hermeneutic of Islam: "Recite the Quran as if it had been revealed to you alone."²¹ The Arabs and Persians created *Hikayat*—a "mystical epic genre"—to join "real" History—and one's own actions within it—to a metaphysically prefigured History promised by Muhammad. And like the Quran form, language and the act of recitation become essential elements of the joining.

Corbin's studies of traditional Arab and Sufist philosophies of History suggest that the *Hikayat* "designates above all a History that is a mimesis as well as a repetition and re-creation ... poem, song and myth at the same time. Indeed, the *Hikayat* is a recited story, but one in which the narrator is also a mime—an actor in the real and active sense of the word."²²

In this sense, then, the recitation of *Hikayat* joins one to the River of Islam. Thus there is no "past" as we understand it, and no future. It is all one. The *Hikayat* of Usama bin Laden joins all other heroic action as part of the greater story. We are told that the struggle, the *jihad*,

continues until the Last Judgement, so that there is no final earthly triumph of human spirit and of human arms. And because the whole story is a single unified narrative—“ahistorical or even anti-historical”—in which all join and all experience, and where time and space are folded into one, the specific outcomes of “real” History are less important than the actions of believers.²³

This creates an unusual possibility from the perspective of Western strategy. Al Qaeda as *Hikayat* has already triumphed because it has joined with the River of Islam. We see this in the dinner conversation between the two Shaykhs, where the focus was not on future action but on the transcendental achievement of September 11. The acts of that day are thus not simply a gesture of martyrdom but a reassertion of *jihad*. No defeat can overturn this achievement.

Hence Usama bin Laden’s recitation at the end. He is telling us that he has joined with all those who came before and those yet to come. As his dinner companion assures him, it is “like the old days” of *Al Ansar*, which means “The Brothers of Muhammad.”²⁴

Another ritual of joining is revelation. Because revelation is the central moment of spiritual recognition for Islam, the experience of revelation is not only enshrined in theology, it is eagerly sought as an intimate personal experience. In the *Mythos* of Islam, revelation always awaits. For did not the Archangel Gabriel come to Muhammad in the beginning? As Hourani explains:

...dreams and visions open a door to a world other than the senses. They might bring messages from God, they might disclose a hidden dimension of a person’s own soul; they might come from jinns or devils. ... Ibn Khaldun indeed regarded the interpretation of dreams as one of the religious sciences...²⁵

Dreams offer an everyday path whereby Muslims may experience mystical revelation in the manner of the Prophet. So interwoven in life are the mystical workings of dreams that their discussion may seem like normal conversation. Again, from the dinner videotape:

Usama bin Laden: “He told me a year ago: ‘I saw in a dream, we were playing a soccer game against the Americans. When our team showed up in the field, there were all pilots!’ He didn’t know anything about the operations until he heard it on the radio. He said the game went on and we defeated them. That was a good omen for us.”

Shaykh: “May Allah be blessed!”

Usama bin Laden: “Abd Rahman al-Ghamri said he saw a vision, before the operation, a plane crashed into a tall building. He knew nothing about it.”

Shaykh: “May Allah be blessed!”²⁶

They are thus surrounded by and strive to extend a highly idealized mytho-poetic framework, one that has been burnished and embellished. It incorporates a literary-historical *œuvre* to rival any civilization, and their

joining it suggests that they too now occupy a place of honor in it.

What does the symbolic framework of these two warrior subcultures tell us?

- They believe not only in the rightness of their cause but also in its pre-figured outcome.
- They are inspired in their commitment by an all-encompassing religious *Mythos*.
- They use the literary forms of this *Mythos* to reinforce kinship and conviction.
- They embrace hardship, adversity, and sacrifice as personal fulfillment.
- The act of struggle itself is a triumph, joining them to God and to the River of Islam, so there can be no defeat as we know it for them.

The Symbolic Framework in Islamic Civilization

It was suggested earlier that the fighter “web of significance” is a legitimated but limited conception of Islam. It has been often argued that “radical Islam” is illegitimate under Islamic law. But while Al Qaeda and the Taliban represent extreme interpretations of particular aspects of *Shari’a*, what is important is how their major message resonates. Whether Islamist sects like Wahhabi, Salafi, Ikhwani, and Deobandi or specific militant subcultures like the Taliban, their continuing appeal tells us that the resonance is strong indeed. Evidently either extreme interpretation is less important to supporters than the bigger vision, or Islam itself has a place for what we call “extreme.”

Insurgent resonance within Islam

The major message of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is essentially Ibn Taymiyyah’s message brought forward seven centuries with all its passion intact. How could this be? We tend to seek authority for our thought in something we call “modernity.” Modernity is understood as “what is best is newest,” but underlying this postulation are existential foundations. These tell us that knowledge is progressive and in a constant state of revision, so that our current understanding of truth is what most closely approaches “absolute truth.”

Thought within Islam, in contrast, more closely resembles thought in Antiquity. A thousand years after its codification, Greco-Roman civilization still focused on the interpretation of received truth. Knowledge existed in a world where truth was already absolute; even though it might be embellished, its main body was meant to be embraced and inhabited.

Islam too is a received civilization—knowledge from the Greco-Roman and Persian worlds, and absolute truth from Muhammad, from God. Through fourteen centuries there has been no major reconsideration of Islam’s basic religious tenets. Unlike Christianity or Buddhism,

Islam is fiat received through a single man and brooks no real revision, i.e., ancient pronouncements still have original force. It is as though the words of Gregory or Clement still ruled our thought. And here Muhammad's unyielding focus on God's Last Judgement has instilled within all Muslims a necessary militancy. Thus repeated U.S. Government protestations—"Islam is a peaceful religion"—are dangerously misleading. Even if we see the civic energy of Islam in peaceful pursuit, militant action lies at its very heart.

This is why Al Qaeda and the Taliban were able to assert authority within Islam. They occupy an unbroken lineage in their interpretation of *jihad*. If "modern" scholars might question their reliance on, say, Ibn Taymiyyah, they have no authority to throw it out either. The "dead hand of the past"²⁷ thus retains authority in doctrine, as is strongly suggested in this passage from Hillenbrand:

A detailed exposition of *jihad* is given by the Ottoman Hanafite legist Ebu's Su'ud (d.1574). His views show the conservative nature of the Islamic legal tradition and how little the theory of *jihad* changed over the centuries. Indeed there is very little difference in content and structure between Islamic law books composed in the tenth century and those composed in the nineteenth. According to Ebu's Su'ud *jihad* is incumbent not on every individual but on the Muslim community as a whole. Fighting should be continual and should last until the end of time. It follows therefore that peace with the infidel is an impossibility, although a Muslim ruler or commander may make a temporary truce if it is to the benefit of the Muslim community to do so. Such a truce is not, however, legally binding.²⁸

Hillenbrand is saying many things here. First is the implication that Islamic law, especially in terms of *jihad*, has not really evolved over the centuries. Second is the centrality of perpetual struggle. It is a condition of the religion. Third, its existential rules for living—the heart of Islam's ethos—do not apply to relations with the infidel. This is not the radical ideology of Islamists. This is the nature of Islam.

Nonetheless there are subtle points of departure between Usama bin Laden and a larger Islam over the concept of *jihad*. Remember that the heroic journeys of Muhammad and the early *Khalifas* created the prospect of a universal people. But the resistance of the Roman Empire dashed this prospect, so the failure of the great first *jihad* to achieve a universal *Ummah* created a problem for Islam. So much of Islamic identity was bound up in "the struggle" that some scholars believe that the idea of *jihad* was deliberately developed as an attempt "to keep alive the momentum lost ... and as an attempt to 'spiritualize' a deferred apocalyptic event."²⁹ In other words the practice of *jihad* gained popular authority over time as an expression of piety, even if Islamic law said, "*jihad* was lawful only if led by a legitimate Muslim ruler." This is why Saladin, perhaps today's most celebrated (because he fought

Crusaders!) historical exemplar of *jihad*, went first to the titular *Khalifa* for legitimacy:

Each step on Saladin's path toward the goal of recapturing Jerusalem was ratified retrospectively by the Sunni caliph in Baghdad. This was a 'legal fiction', yet Saladin punctiliously asked for the caliph's 'diploma of investiture' after each new conquest.³⁰

Today of course there is no *Amir al-Mu'minin* (leader of the Believers, or a *Khalifa* accepted by a consensus of Islamic scholars). Usama bin Laden has made much of the Ottoman abolition of the *Khilafat* in 1923. Now where does Saladin go for ratification? Asked rhetorically, this is the basis for Al Qaeda's self-assertion. What is the basis for militant action in the absence of an overarching, if symbolic, spiritual and political authority?

Establishment-owned Muslims use this argument—rather speciously—to deny the legal validity of contemporary *jihad*.³¹ But its legality is too enshrined in the very lineaments of Islam to dismiss on a technicality. Also, by historical implication, is not the very absence of a legitimating *Amir al-Mu'minin* evidence of spiritual waywardness among the regimes of the *Ummah*, and of their manipulation by the infidel?

Indeed by drawing its hermeneutic of *jihad* from Ibn Taymiyyah, "radical" Islam presents in some ways the least radical legal construction of the struggle. As Hillenbrand describes his views,

Jihad now went deeper and had much wider implications. For him jihad is defensive—to purge the Sunni world both of the infidel presence and of Muslim heresy ... He is not an advocate into the 'House of War' (Dar al-harb) but he argues that Muslims should strive to put their own house in order first. Thus he favours the moral rearmament of the Muslims within their own lands and strong resistance to any external intervention.³²

Most Muslims might well laud these goals, just as most might well point, if not to repression in Arab states then at least to the raw symbolism of infidel transgression today, especially in the reincarnate "Crusader kingdom" of Israel.³³

But it goes further than this. Because Islam "embraces all of life," there is as Lewis reminds us no distinction between religion and politics. This means furthermore that any Islamist insurgency against an established regime of Muslims has legitimacy only if it is theologically correct. Thus just as *jihad* is sanctioned against the "infidel" on theological grounds, so the overthrow of Muslim governments is sanctioned if they are untrue to Islam—which is to say heretics, apostates, *murtad*. Heresy in Islam is political in nature.³⁴

This is the righteous charge of the insurgency against the secular Sunni states: Egypt, Syria, and Algeria especially. What they have done is not merely admit the infidel invader but actually overturned Islam, returning their societies to the almost unimaginable times before

Muhammad, where barbarism and savagery ruled: the *jahiliyya*. Lewis describes this further:

For the militant opposition movements the governments of those countries ... though they call themselves Muslim do not deserve that name in any true sense of the word. By abandoning the law of God, the *Shari'a*, and replacing it with imported foreign laws and customs, they ceased to be Muslims. ... Such rulers and those who carry out their orders are therefore infidels and as such are not entitled to the obedience of the believers. ... Far from obeying such rulers, it is the duty of the true Muslim to disobey and indeed remove them, in order to bring about a restoration of the true Islam through the enforcement of Holy Law.³⁵

Even this conservative scholar of Islam confesses, "...this doctrine of Islamic revolution has proved extraordinarily powerful."³⁶

Insurgent dissonances within Islam

Some Islamist approaches, like those of Al Qaeda and Taliban ideology, might seem archaic or even unacceptable to most Muslims. Ibn Taymiyyah here has done a disservice to today's Islamist cause. Again, Hillenbrand explains:

His implacable diatribes against all kinds of innovations in Islam—against mystical practices, philosophy, theology, and veneration of tombs—are all motivated by his desire that the True Religion should not resemble in any way the practices of non-Muslims.³⁷

Ibn Taymiyyah's interpretation of *jihad* in effect has created a historical precedent for approaching non-Muslim innovation solely in terms of its potential theological impact on Islam. Thus some Islamists today judge Western technology on theological grounds as potentially corrupting, like the Taliban's rejection of TV. Muhammad and original Islam, in contrast, welcomed innovations of all kinds, whole-heartedly adopting what worked.

There are other divergences in symbolic framework between fighting subcultures—Al Qaeda and Taliban—and more open original traditions within Islam's web of significance. Wolf, exploring 7th century Islam's "Cultural Revolution," shows how at the point of origin Islam's success was rooted in the encouragement of cosmopolitan life and religious toleration. These are not particular interpretations of Islam; these are two essential things ignored by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. One concerns Islam's social locus. As Wolf says, Islam's creators, "Mohammed, Abu Bekr, and Omar all owed their wealth to trade. Torrey has pointed out the abundance of commercial-theological terms in the Quran."³⁸ Muhammad sought a future society that was commercial and urban. Islam was intended to be a cosmopolitan faith operating at the highest levels of civilization. This vision implies a sophisticated web of institutions that go beyond the simple virtues espoused by Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The vision is persistent within Islamic civilization. As Charles Frazee writes of Turkish Muslims eight centuries later:

Ethnic Turks and Christians who were converts preferred to make their homes in the larger Balkan towns because a full Muslim life could only be lived in an urban setting. It was in cities that the Ottomans located their administration, courts, and *medresses* and built their mosques or refitted Christian churches for Islamic worship.³⁹

Another deep tradition is Islam's tolerance. The Quran says, "let there be no compulsion in religion." Wolf goes on to assert, quoting from Buhl and Lammen, that toleration was essential to the political success of the original Islamic state:

If these non-Muslims paid taxes, as did the Christians of Aila, the Jews of Adruh, Garba, and Makna, and the Jewish and Christian communities of southern Arabia, their security was guaranteed. They became 'people [living] under contractually guaranteed protection.' Such relationships had previously been phrased in terms of kin or ritual kin relationships between patrons and clients, as in the case of the protective relation in existence between the Jewish communities of Medina and Khaibar and their Bedouin patrons. Under Islam, this type of relation was transferred to the level of the state.⁴⁰

In other words Wolf shows that Muhammad's success lay in translating a kinship-rooted society into a more complex society where the state could create kinship-like loyalty through civic institutions. This civilizational transition was necessary before Islam could ever be a universal state. Muhammad lived in a primitive cultural environment that cried out to be transformed. His mission was to create a social organization based on the civic models of Rome and Persia. So religious tolerance and a society focused on urban life were intrinsic Islamic goals.

But fighting subcultures in a time of crisis and calamity may not be able to find such equanimity within them. Hillenbrand reminds us of the Mamluks, where

... their aloofness from the indigenous population [*á la* Al Qaeda Arabs in Afghanistan] and their narrowly focused military education predisposed them to a much harsher approach to non-Muslims. The massive crisis brought to the Islamic world by the Mongols ... can only have sharpened these attitudes.⁴¹

But Hillenbrand goes on to say that

A true interpretation of *jihad*, however, should have gone hand in hand with the honouring of the covenant (*dhimma*) with the 'People of the Book' within their lands. This long-cherished principle seems to have been threatened in the Mamluk period, even though it was enshrined in Islamic law.⁴²

So it seems today. Does insurgent intolerance in fact alienate ordinary Muslims? If the insurgency ignores true Islamic tradition, then this is important. Ignoring what is cosmopolitan and tolerant within Islam—within Muhammad himself—may truly push ordinary Muslims

away. But then the insurgency's passionate audience knows full well that these are times of crisis for Islam. In a time too of declining Islamic scholarship, many now care nothing for such nuances. Their interest is not in the cosmopolitan Muhammad or his tolerant embrace of the unbeliever.

To a wider Muslim audience the fighters who join the *jihad* are special and must be supported. As Hourani reminds us, it is understood that *jihad* is "not an individual obligation of all Muslims, but an obligation on the community to provide a sufficient number of fighters."⁴³ Today's fighters also evoke a romantic-nostalgic longing among Muslims, as Ibn Khaldun described the Mamluks of Egypt as embodying:

... the firm resolve of true believers and yet with nomadic virtues unsullied by debased nature, unadulterated with the filth of pleasure, undefiled by the ways of civilized living, and with their ardour unbroken by the profusion of luxury.⁴⁴

How does Islam and its civilization view the insurgent fighters?

- Their status in the Islamic imagination as warrior poets and ascetic men of God is revered; if archaic to many, it is still heroic to many.
- Their heroic journey places them close to the spirit of Muhammad.
- Their quest to renew Islam and defend against an infidel invader gives them high authority within Islam.
- Some have differences with the insurgency but accept the fighter's role in *jihad*.
- There is more sympathy for the insurgency than for the established regimes.
- There is no greater task at this time for Islam and its *Ummah*.

Inter-/Intracultural Variation

How can a working movement be created out of such a variegated swathe of cultures? Islam is vast; it is said to be a fifth of all humanity. But it is also a cultural mosaic: Muslims are defined as much by culture area as the brotherhood of the *Ummah*. Islam has seven major culture areas, which are defined according to language phylum, related traditions, and patterns of culture:

The Arab-Semitic. Includes the kingdoms of the Arabian peninsula, Arabia Felix (Yemen) Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria (and Lebanon), and Palestine (Jordan and Israel)

The Shia-Persian. Includes Iran and Farsi-speaking Central Asia, and over a third of Iraq, as well as Shia minorities in Lebanon and Arabia

The Turkic. Includes Turkey and Turkic peoples in Central Asia

The Nilotic. Includes Egypt, the Sudan, and areas extending into parts of the horn of Africa

The Magreb. Includes Arab- and Berber-speaking peoples of the Sahara, and also Black Islamic tribes of West Africa like the Hausa

The Indo-Afghan. Includes the descendants of Mughals in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

The Malay. Archipelagic Islam from Malaysia to Indonesia to the Philippines

Yet are not all Muslims brothers? Militants talk often and proudly about their bond of fraternity, but does hortatory kinship translate into real practice? Cultural variation can help us understand three questions:

- What makes for kinship between militant groups from different cultures?
- Do intercultural hierarchies and other differences create difficulties?
- Is there a tension or balance between Islamic loyalty and tribal/national identity?

Al Qaeda and the Taliban represent subcultures from just two of Islam's culture areas, the Arab-Semitic and the Indo-Afghan. But as we look at the cultural spaces that both share, and others where they diverge, we can at least begin to suggest how cultural variation affects their ability to work together.

Kinship across Islam: The Ghazi tradition

One of the triumphs of Muhammad's vision was to translate blood kinship into a civic-religious kinship. This inheritance of "artificial" kinship relations remains an Islamic tradition. Arguably its most romantic and effective form is the ascetic band of warrior poets, the Ghazi, waging *jihad* forever along the frontiers of the *Dar al'Harb*. As described by Inalcik,

A ghazi can emerge to create a subordinate band of mounted warriors and comrades constantly occupied with raiding the lands of the 'infidel.' The distinction and the dominant position of the war leader in the clan was further enhanced by the 'coming under his flag' of ever increasing numbers of gharibs (rootless wanderers of various origins). These were always warmly welcomed by the leader and became 'his people,' his clients, personally attached to him ...⁴⁵

Are not Al Qaeda and the Taliban similar war bands, little tribes created *de novo*, roping in the rootless, the disaffected, and the dispossessed? In the following, Inalcik is describing a process sweeping through Western Anatolian Turks in the 14th century, but it is strikingly contemporary too:

The process entailed dissolution of tribal kinship ties, with the exception of those of the leader's family, who kept and consolidated their privileges within the peculiar pattern of agnate kinship. The Holy War ideology as much as the success of the actual raids reinforced ties within the band to produce a cohesive social group centered around the leader. Consequently, dervishes embodying the ghaza ideology and bringing to the leader's authority the spiritual sanction of Islam were ever present within frontier society.⁴⁶

Think of Afghanistan as a “frontier” society, on the frontiers described by *jihad*. Both Al Qaeda and the Taliban lived as latter-day Ghazi societies. Al Qaeda “brothers” especially defined their kinship around a shared relationship to the leader. We can even see the “agnate kinship” patterns Inalcik refers to in the kinship through marriage created when Usama bin Laden married Mullah Muhammad Umar’s daughter.

How does this artificial “clan” pattern differ from the *bucellarii* tradition of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages—of war leaders gathering a band of trusted retainers around them? The big difference is the bond of spiritual zeal, often reinforced through mystic rituals and of course heroic poetry. These are not barbarian *gefolgschaft* but true brotherhoods that re-create the first band that gathered around the Prophet: *Al Ansar*.⁴⁷

The passionate persistence of the Ghazi tradition suggests that Muhammad’s social innovations, as Wolf identifies, continue to create effective and fervently loyal little warrior societies. This implies that the realization of an effective insurgent network across culture remains a real possibility.

Family matters: Does real kinship divide?

If the Ghazi vision unites Muslim men through “warrior families,” does “real” family (i.e., blood relation), serve to divide them? Anthropologists look for family and kinship influence on complex thought and behavior. Social rules learned at very deep and basic levels of human relationships—like those of the family—guide “higher” ideas and actions.

Here are some questions an ethnographer would ask:

- What is the nature of the female role? Of the male role? What are the divisions of labor?
- How are partners chosen? What patterns of marriage prevail? Divorce? Remarriage?
- How is the care and socialization of children handled? Infanticide? Abandonment? What happens to orphans?
- What patterns of kinship prevail? What obligations do they impose?
- What is the descent system, and what large grouping results: kindred, clan, lineage, phratry, and moiety?
- How do these patterns figure in marriage, family, and residence? What are the boundaries of endogamy?
- How do these patterns figure in maintaining social order and structure?⁴⁸

In some ways new kinship models introduced in early Arab Islam also shaped family relationships to encourage a more egalitarian society. Discouraging an aristocratic model of political leadership subordinated blood kinship to civic kinship. Changing the rules of blood kinship itself did this, and by their personal authority and example the *Khalifas* made these changes universal. They

affected key aspects of the traditional kinship definition as well, especially descent and endogamy.

In the 7th century the Umayyad *Khilafat* had established an “aristocratic principle of descent.” *Khalifa* candidates needed to be sons of “free and noble mothers.” The ‘Abbasid revolution, however, changed all that. Great *Khalifas* like Harun al’Raschid were the sons of “slave girls of uncertain origin.”⁴⁹

This created two precedents for kinship in Islam as a whole. First, only men now mattered when reckoning descent. And second, blue blood meant nothing to career advancement. Both of these developments decreed that the social status of one’s origins no longer mattered. This new kinship code in effect discouraged the formation of leadership clans as a dominating factor in politics. This rule-set for the rulers quickly set a universal tone for all of society:

During the first half-century of ‘Abbasid rule, noble birth and tribal prestige ceased to be the main titles to positions of power and profit, and the Arab tribes gradually withdrew into insignificance. Instead, the favor of the Caliph was now the passport to success, and more and more it was given to men of humble and even of foreign origin.⁵⁰

Thus the legacy of an open and egalitarian basis for kinship suggests that even in family matters Islam has tried to encourage civic unity across culture lines.

If, however, it seems tempting to assume that as fellow Muslims Al Qaeda and the Taliban are twins in ethos, think again. Western Europe and the United States also seem like cultural twins. But listen to what de Tocqueville had to say about differences between European and American women. He was actually a bit intimidated by American women: they were the equal of men in education, fully as worldly, and in defending their virtue they did so with “a masculine strength of understanding and manly energy.” Not so their softer Euro-sisters. He concluded:

If I were asked ... to what singular prosperity and growing strength of [the American] people ought mainly to be attributed, I should reply: to the superiority of their women.⁵¹

Considering the contrasting origins of Arab and Afghan, of Bedouin and Mountain people, we should expect to find some similar differences, which are important in a militant movement spanning so many cultures.

Hierarchy and its difficulties

One division may lie in the bond between identity and “place.” Nomads (Arabs) understand place in very different ways than Mountain people (Afghans). For example, Arabs might feel comfortable roaming the harsh deserts of Afghanistan, far from their own *Arabia Deserta*, while Afghans stay passionately close to their own family mountain, where each peak has its independent chief.

But if physical roots contrast, there is an environmental character to both cultures that they once shared: both Arabia and Afghanistan were once “lands in-between.” Afghanistan stood astride ancient trade routes between the worlds of India, China, and Persia. For its part, Arabia abutted paths between Mesopotamia and Egypt, and then Roman and Persian empires. Both adapted to being in-between, and both were acutely aware of their significant marginality. This was significance on two levels: the sense of being “lesser” and “outside” civilization, and also the sense of being the essential guides, guards, and caravanserai of intercivizational exchange. They learned to be receptive and flexible.

Even though Arabs created Islam and took it to the ends of the known world, within a few decades the people of Arabia were culturally marginalized. Arabic was spoken everywhere, but moving the *Khilafat* to Damascus—at the crossroads of the Greco-Roman world—and then to Baghdad—the heart of Persian civilization—left Arabians again at the margins. New *Khalifas* in Cairo or even Constantinople continued to treat Arabia as little more than a sacred backwater.

In this century, the Saudis have made Arabia the center of the Muslim universe for the first time in fourteen centuries. Several historical developments promoted this metamorphosis. The first was the Arab revolt in the desert and the British Imperial nod to Wahhabism and the Saud family. This was followed by secular Turks terminating the residue of *Khilafat* in the modern world. Then secular Arab nationalism collapsed in the *Cannae* of 1967. Then the oil crisis of 1973 made of Saudi Arabia a new *Khilafat* of money. And finally, centuries-long evolution of the *Hajj* has made Arabia the populist center of Islam, guardian of the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. Arabians are now again at the center and exhibit all the lofty and arrogant mien of those whose social ranking permits the recognition only of inferiors. Theirs is conservatism so glacial that change itself has been dismissed.

In contrast, Afghans resemble more the Naxarar hereditary family lordships of 8th and 9th century Armenia. In those days Armenia was also a land between, and its attitudes and social structure showed how well Armenia adapted to strategic fragility. As Whittow tells us:

The values of Naxarar houses [were] aristocratic, warlike, independent, proud of their sworn loyalty to a lord but always willing to betray an outsider for the greater good of the family...[They] had no tendency as such toward national unity, rather they were engaged in a constant competition for land and regional dominance.⁵²

Does this—after so many months of breathless Fox News and CNN videophones in Afghanistan—sound familiar?

What does cultural variation tell us?

- Islam has the cultural tools to create effective warrior kinship societies.
- These societies furthermore can extend subcultural kinship across culture areas.
- This suggests that, with charismatic leadership in the *mahdi* mold, the entire network of militant subcultures could potentially be unified.
- This dream continues to be hobbled by arrogance issues within the Arab culture area, and between Arabs and other Islamic cultures.

Openness to Adaptation

What is “openness to adaptation?” Is it flexibility or is it creativity?

We know that Al Qaeda has been both flexible and creative. For men who followed the strictest human rule-set, they had no difficulty blending into the superficial mainstream of American life. They understood our culture well enough to use all its tools to further their own ends. In addition, their consciousness was still in another symbolic framework—another reality—so they could also stand back and see possibilities for those tools that no American would have considered.

How creative can a subculture be? Can it introduce new precepts or even a new creed to its parent culture? Is subculture creativity limited, at the existential or ideological level, if the larger culture disallows innovation? These questions are especially germane to the Islamic insurgency, indeed to any change movement within Islam.

Who is most adaptive within Islam?

Muhammad created Islam as a complete “recipe for life” and not simply “religion.” As an anthropologist might say, Islam can be seen as the most complete example we have of cultural integration, where new cultural patterns cross all aspects of life and come together at the same time. Muhammad created a singularly successful blueprint for Arab culture,⁵³ and made of a marginal culture a new civilization—one with universal pretensions at that. But he also became over fourteen centuries a sort of heavenly “dead hand of past achievement.” If the received word of Muhammad is the only word of God, then how to adapt his 7th century word to new conditions?

Islamic civilization has tried to find a way to adapt to a changing human environment. The way is called *ijtihad*. According to Vikør, “one of the crucial topics for discussion in the theory of Islamic Law is the right to *ijtihad*, loosely translated as ‘interpretation’, or more correctly, ‘working with the sources of dogma’.” Vikør shows how *ijtihad* developed within Sunni Islam in the 18th and 19th centuries as an authentically Muslim response to change. But from the sub-text of a 1995 presentation it becomes clear that *ijtihad* remains a controversial and far from accepted approach to cultural adaptation:

The importance that *ijtihad* has ... stems from the possibility it may give to steer a new course for Islam and Islamic Law. It is a course that stays within the boundary of Islamic tradition, but at the same time avoids the blindness of simply imitating earlier scholars without consideration of the changing conditions of society. In other words both for modernists and Islamists *ijtihad* is a prerequisite for the survival of Islam in a modern world. ... But general opinion both among Muslim historians of Law and Western scholars has been that the right to use an independent judgement on the sources of dogma was cut off in Sunni Islam sometime in the tenth century, or perhaps two centuries later. This is 'the closing of the door to *ijtihad*'.⁵⁴

The barriers to *ijtihad* still rule thought and action in Sunni Islam, but not so Iran. Why? Continuous if conservative reinterpretation is, after all, a Shi'ia tenet of faith. But perhaps at a deep level Iran can still claim the prerogative of its own antecedent civilization. However steeped in Islam, Persians retain a self-assurance that harkens back to the Sassanian Empire. Iranians know well how Persian civilization co-opted Arabic civilization under the 'Abassids. There is a sense of inner majesty that gives them permission to change.

Another society open to change is Pakistan, although its receptivity is different from Iran's. Here the broader influence of India comes into play. Pakistan is what anthropologists might call a "marginal" culture, caught between India and Islam, and seduced by Britain. Its fluency for change is in its unassuaged identity. Zia's embrace of Islamism emerged from this search for Pakistani identity.

There is a culture area within Islam that stands out for its flexibility, adaptiveness, and responsiveness: the Turkic. Why? In the 14th century the Ottoman tribe looks a bit like Plains Indian cultures discovering the horse. "Cultural crystallization"⁵⁵ for the Ottomans came at that moment when a Ghazi culture confronted Byzantine civic culture, imperial administration, and legal institutions. The transformation that occurred within a couple of generations created a *mélange* that had the vitality of the Ghazi ethos and the administrative sophistication of the Byzantine state.⁵⁶

When the Turks took Constantinople in 1453 they leased serious political authority to the Greeks. The Patriarch became a Byzantine emperor of internal Christian affairs, and Greeks came to run the Turkish navy and the Ottoman diplomatic service. Trusted Greeks were even given Rumania to rule as autonomous fiefdoms. This ability of the Turks to co-opt their major cultural challenger in Europe as privileged junior partner showed a shrewd ability to adapt without threatening their own identity. Much later the Turks seamlessly transitioned from *Khilafat* to European-style nation-state under Atatürk. How could they pull all this off?

Like the early Arabs the Turks as nomads owned inherent cultural flexibility. The Turks like the Arabs entered the orbit of high civilization and found it

expedient to accommodate its magnificent institutional overhead. But unlike the Arabs the Turks did not bring with them their own new idea—the trance-like verse of the Quran, which laid claim as equal to Torah and Bible. The Turks simply bought into a finished world. They donned civilization like a greatcoat, and it fit. Arguably they could keep a studied detachment while picking and choosing what they liked.⁵⁷ They were pragmatists unencumbered by a civilizational agenda. Their agenda was themselves: their own expansion and triumph. So they remain today on the cusp of the European Union.

Arabs, in contrast, carry heavy civilizational baggage. Among all culture areas within Islam, Arabs represent those societies least open to adaptation. Perhaps this aversion is a consequence of recurrent arrogance, as suggested previously. There are, however, other impediments that block an openness to change.

"The dead hand of the past"

Arab Islam has not escaped its resonance to Greco-Roman civilization. In Antiquity only the educated man could ascend into the elite. But what did it mean to be truly educated? Not fluency in Latin or even Greek, rather a command of the whole body of the civilization, and a sure voice in stainless Attic Greek. Who could afford this course for their life, which even with the best rhetors might take twenty years to achieve?⁵⁸

Like the Greco-Roman world of late Antiquity, the Arab world celebrates the full inhabitation of its civilization. This means true mastery of Arabic, one of the most demanding of tongues. Just to approach the fullness of this world requires study as rigorous as any course in Antiquity. No wonder elite Arabs shy away from science. It is not simply because science is an alien and infidel art. Their social goals require a course in civilization that brooks no time for other knowledge. This helps explain why two-thirds of all Ph.D.s awarded in Arabia are in Islamic studies.⁵⁹ It also helps explain the continuing lock of a religious elite on those societies' very identity.

For Arab elites, with cultural achievement comes only a limited calling: to teach, to preach, and to judge. Only those with Islamic authority may be considered true members of the elite. Like Greco-Roman civilization, they preside over a complete—and completed—civilization. Greco-Roman nostalgia for a "Golden Age" and Islamic romancing of its early days both suggest a backward-looking vantage. Also like Greco-Roman civilization, Islam has not overcome its cultural crystallization, occurring shortly after origination (Hourani places it in the latter half of the 7th century⁶⁰). Sunni religious leadership, which includes the leadership of the insurgency, has no path to significant innovation. Even revolution itself is defined as a return to the purity of first principles.

Within their niche, however, the militant subcultures of today's *jihad* are free from this confining orbit. Muhammad gave special dispensation to those defending Islam. They can move creatively outside the strict orbit of rules and laws he laid down for the normal believer in normal times. There is no doubt that within the realm of *jihad*—culturally, in the zone of struggle—the insurgency with its Ghazi approach was remarkably creative and risk-taking, leaping outside old boundaries of thought.

So we witnessed on 9-11.

Does the short, calamitous rule of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan suggest that militant adaptiveness ends at the far shore of the struggle? For example, as soon as they took power in Afghanistan they shifted gears like automatons, decreeing the most rigid and dogmatic orthodoxy over all of life. In victory they seemed imprisoned in their niche role—as fighters whose limited programming is adaptive only for *jihad*.

This may be overstatement. Other insurgent subcultures are more sophisticated and flexible, but most importantly, Al Qaeda and the Taliban are *fighter-subcultures*. Their role is essentially military, and their creativity is thus naturally confined to the operational achievement of change, i.e., the process of toppling the *murtad* (apostate) regimes and casting out occupying infidel armies. The examples of Islamist regimes in Afghanistan and the Sudan, which were already dysfunctional backwater states before Islamists took over, may not be good guides to what might happen in Egypt or Saudi Arabia if Islamic revolutions succeeded there.

As already suggested, the religious elite of the *'ulama* will lead the Sunni revolution. The victory of Islamic renewal will bring a return to unyielding law but not permission for cultural reformation. Reform and renewal within Islam are two very different things, because for Islam there has yet been no real Reformation.

Adaptive in adversity?

If the fighting subcultures have shown such flexibility and creativity, what will they do now? Their recent battlefield defeat gives them an opportunity to show how adaptive they are in adversity.

Operational adaptation: Survival is essential to ultimate victory. The United States made it clear that both Al Qaeda and the Taliban would not survive. But this is the record to date: they have escaped. Now they must evade the dragnet and eventually regroup.

Escape:

- The Taliban survived, not just as atomized individuals, but also as a collective consciousness able to anticipate their reawakening. It is reported that there are already 7000 in the new Afghan army,

many concentrated in Khandahar, and that perhaps as many, for now, have gone home.⁶¹

- Al Qaeda in Afghanistan also survived. They survived as refugees through two friendly escape routes: (1) an easy crossing into Pakistan, where supporters could usher them to the sea, and (2) via a special alliance between Al Qaeda and Iran that opened up a route West through Herat into Iran.
- Furthermore, to escape the American dragnet, Al Qaeda has developed creative new ways to communicate. As they learn how the United States snoops on them, as Rumsfeld said, “They get more sophisticated and more sophisticated.”⁶²

Evade:

- *Go to ground.* This means burrowing into the dense urban fabric of today's Arab world, dispersing so that only individuals will be hooked, even with the most intense law enforcement sweep.
- *Find sanctuary.* This is undoubted. America's “coalition partners” are harboring them, as well as untouchable adversaries like Iran.

Regroup:

- *Just wait.* While the United States, for example, expends its energies on Iraq, militant subcultures can regroup in friendly and protected terrain like Saudi Arabia or Iran. The FBI has speculated publicly that Al Qaeda military capability worldwide has been degraded only by about 30%.⁶³
- *Things open up.* Even now the United States may have leverage but scant control in Afghanistan. Reports in late January already describe thousands of Taliban fighters regrouping in the mountains around Khandahar.⁶⁴

Strategic adaptation: The insurgency must move forward and not simply survive. If militant groups are no more than fighting companies, foot soldiers in the struggle, they must still survive and even strike back to keep alive the insurgency's future.

- *Work on Muslim expectations.* The challenge for the insurgency is to make the electric uplift of 9-11 a permanent conviction among Muslims that historical change is imminent, and do this despite an appearance of battlefield defeat. The apparent survival of Usama bin Laden and many Al Qaeda fighters means that this objective is not impossible.
- *Make another successful “big” attack.* If America can again be attacked, the dynamic of the war can be shifted in the insurgency's favor. But the attack at a minimum must equal the dramatic impact of 9-11. The Bush administration has won the confidence of Americans in part because it has created the impression that adroit law enforcement has forestalled further planned “terrorist” attacks,

while overwhelming military attacks on Al Qaeda totally disrupted its ability to strike back. Americans are highly satisfied by U.S. military achievements, but another big attack now, wholly unexpected by Americans, could force the administration to undertake a riskier and more extreme military strategy against militant Islam in order to satisfy outrage at home.

- *Make a series of dispiriting smaller attacks.* Fragility in a key economic sector like the airline industry makes it vulnerable to smaller attacks that would have a political and emotional impact out of all proportion to actual incident damage. The unconventional “shoe bomber” approach took advantage of a security soft spot and could have led to a calamitous chain of air attacks.
- *Use America’s military strength against it.* Then there would be enormous opportunity to turn American military intervention in the region into strategic advantage for the insurgency. The more active and intrusive U.S. military forces are in Islam the easier it is for the insurgency to make a truly compelling case for *jihad*, increase popular support, and put pressure on skittish Arab regimes.

Openness to adaptation, at least for the fighting subcultures, has not yet truly been tested. With its infidel enemy condescendingly unconcerned, Al Qaeda was able to plan and execute with ease. Now things are different. We have seen highly creative operational methods, and so far it has partly survived military counterattacks that surely exceeded its expectations.

What Al Qaeda has not shown yet is an ability to turn apparently successful American efforts into actual strategic benefit for itself. The United States will be operating in the region for years, giving America ample opportunity to overreach itself and miscalculate, especially if it feels too strongly the rush of triumphal success.

Here America’s persistent disregard of Islam’s symbolic framework could become the insurgency’s greatest strength.

Historical Expectations and Support

How do we regard the relationship between insurgency and its base of popular support? Defining related parties in Islam is difficult enough. Should we look at the relationship between the Islamist movement—Dekmajian estimates 175 Islamist groups, 130 of them “militant”⁶⁵—and the whole of the *Ummah*? Should we confine our gaze to the Arabic-speaking and Sunni “world”? Or should we further limit our survey, in good Western geopolitical tradition, to “national” activity alone?

We know the struggle is being fought most bitterly within the Arabic-speaking states of Sunni Islam. Iran

has had its revolution, and Turkey’s trajectory takes it back into Europe. On the one hand, Arab Islamist groups speak of true and original authority and seek the legal instruments of rule. On the other hand, old-line national regimes—most critically Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia—have physical power and legal recognition, but still seek authority among their own people.

Their own historical behavior shows this. Post–World War Two regimes in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria deliberately sought to create secular states. Their authority was vested in a sort of made-to-order *Mythos* intended to replace Islam’s political vision. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, sought to make Islam a sort of wholly owned subsidiary of the Saud family, thus ensuring its legitimate authority both within Arabia and among the *Ummah*.

In contrast, Islamist insurgency presents itself in existential terms as the voice of Muhammad returned to purify a corrupted world. As we have seen, this is consonant with Islamic tradition. The Islamist cause is perversely aided by Islam’s rigidities in both the *oeuvre* of its civilization and in its narrow tradition of reinterpretation. Depending on analytic vantage, both sides have advanced their cause, both can claim some strategic momentum, and both have suffered reverses.

A secular and socialist Arab cause championed by Nassar and Assad collapsed in the calamity of 1967. Radical Islam emerged in response to disenchantment and defeat. However, established Arab regimes not only clung to life, they now seem to be stronger than ever. As Miller contends,

The current wave of Islamic militancy seems to me at least to have crested, though a victory in any single Arab state could change that. Most Middle Eastern states have found ways, often illegal and morally repugnant, to contain militant fervor. While some analysts portray Arab states as artificial, fragile creations—‘Sand Castles’—one writer called them—modern Middle Eastern states have proved remarkably durable. As I have tried to show, modern Arab regimes—with their armies, police, and intelligence forces—are ever more powerful, and they have mobilized to repress or co-opt militant Islamic challengers.⁶⁶

Miller wrote this in 1995, citing Mubarak’s successful repression in Egypt and apparent Islamist disenchantment in Algeria. Should six years of Al Qaeda and Taliban calamity change that judgement?

On the surface this assessment seems even more carved in stone. U.S. intervention in Afghanistan looks like it savaged both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Americans are well on the way to creating a more Western-looking, if steadfastly Islamic, state in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Islamist face has suddenly changed its mask, and the regime seems to have turned on its own mirrors of official Islamist policy like the thousands of radical *madrassas* it created. Islamist Sudan and Yemen eagerly submit to American will.

But look at the picture from a different vantage, and everything said to this point is incomprehensible.

Militant Islamists like Usama bin Laden paint a picture of *Dar al-Islam* under the boot heel of the United States, whose forces occupy Holy Land. Arab regimes are excoriated as mere collaborators or worse, *murtad*, and marionettes in the American Crusader *regnum*.

The hearkening back to the Crusades is politically astute. Here Islamists can lay claim to some of the most passionate myths of Arab-Muslim identity. Their claims are perversely buttressed by established Arab states themselves. An Islamist narrative would note that since 1973 there has been no renewal, however feeble, of *jihad*. Worse, Arab states entered into open *detente* with the “Crusader kingdom” of Israel. Egypt went on the U.S. payroll while the Arabian princes, after Saddam’s bluster, abased themselves as American client kingdoms. Hillenbrand notes how deeply the crusading era resonates with Muslims:

The Crusades are viewed by some Muslims as the first attempt by the West at colonisation of the ‘House of Islam’. It was, moreover, the successful exploitation of the *jihad* ideal which removed the alien presence of the Crusaders from Muslim soil...To many Muslims in the 1990s Israel is the new Crusader state against which *jihad* must now be waged.⁶⁷

Hillenbrand wrote this in 1998, not yet knowing how powerfully the American military presence in Arabia was playing among Islamists. For decades Israel had been the emotional target of *jihad*, but in many ways Israel served that role poorly, for it too was a mere client state and dependent. But what unwitting change the United States unleashed after Desert Storm! Perhaps we should allow our militant narrator to continue the story:

So then a great empire had invaded the *Dar al-Islam*, corrupting the *Ummah* even more than Israel, and acting wickedly. The Islamist story he tells would go on to stress that having abandoned all thought of *jihad*, the corrupted regimes in fact concentrated their military energies on oppressing the true faith. A generation of lip service and protection money masked a series of savage persecutions: tens of thousands of Islamists massacred in Homs in 1982; the torture and imprisonment of thousands in Egypt and Arabia; perhaps 50,000 killed by the Algerian state since 1995. Not only did the infidel occupy the “House of Islam,” *murtad* Arab rulers were pillaging Islam itself.

Our militant narrator might go on with a legal argument to show that the Islamist struggle was not, as prejudiced Western thought insisted, “Islam as the religion of the sword.” If the situation today recalls the time of the Crusaders and the ferocious Mongol invasions, then this *jihad* must also keep to the legal spirit of those times as well. This *jihad* too is a defensive struggle, for

... neither in the example of the *jihad* waged by Nur al-Din and Saladin nor in the *jihad* propaganda of the Mamluks and Ibn Taymiyya was there any question of *jihad* being taken

to mean ‘waging war’ so as to *convert* the infidel. *Jihad* was waged as a *reaction* to perceived aggression from outside.⁶⁸

Al Qaeda’s *jihad* may thus appear to have failed. Far from expelling the external aggressor, that infidel force is now ever more entrenched, a military Colossus astride Islam. And craven Arab client kingdoms are ever more slavish, groveling at its feet. What has this *jihad* achieved except martyrdom and defeat?

Here again, however, these are the Islamist narrator’s very words. What he might be suggesting rhetorically is that initial reverses may not mean final defeat. And here again the remembered *Mythos* of the Crusader era comes into play. That era spanned almost two hundred years, and “can easily be divided into sections of weakness, strength, demoralization, revival, first steps, climaxes.”⁶⁹

Many struggles end in material failure, but in the River of Islam they are nonetheless celebrated, and men draw strength not from the promise of victory but from the promise of commitment and sacrifice. The act of struggle itself keeps the struggle alive; it mystically extends what might be called an “Islamic strategic space.” For them, strategic space is the river itself. This is not to imply that a material victory today is not greatly desired, only that it must be seen within a greater goal.

As he continues, our imagined narrator talks about the consequences of 9-11. The attack, he says, has greatly accelerated infidel colonization of the *Dar al-Islam*. Soon no one will be able to deny the urgent need, and the spirit of *jihad* will grow among the *Ummah*. The selective martyrdom of Al Qaeda has served to liberate that spirit.

There is a legion of anecdotes to support this notion, and even some data. The data comes from an opinion poll for the British *Sunday Times*. When queried, British Muslim citizens responded like this:

Is Usama bin Laden fighting the right fight?	60% yes
Was he justified in attacking the United States?	35% yes
Would you support British Muslims fighting with the Taliban?	35% yes
Do you consider yourself a British citizen first, or Muslim?	80% Muslim ⁷⁰

Some commentators have gone further, suggesting that moderate Muslims have all but ceded cultural authority to the Islamists in Britain. Dhondy, writing in the *Wall Street Journal*, recalls the reaction to the *fatwa* calling for Rushdie’s death:

There were denunciations of Salman Rushdie in every mosque. Not one mullah—not one—raised a voice in support of freedom of creativity; no mullah ventured the opinion that the *fatwa* was wrong.

Dhondy paints a bleak picture of Muslim opinion after 9-11:

Outside of British mosques, young men of *jihadi* persuasion bellowed slogans supporting the terrorist attack, exhorting worshippers to ‘join the war’ against America ... When liberal Muslims declare Sept. 11 was an atrocity contrary to the Quran, the majority of Muslims around the world don’t believe them. They accept the interpretation of fundamentalists...⁷¹

Although lacking the granularity we might prefer, these snapshots suggest that Islamists we dislike have more authority than the “moderate” or “liberal” Muslims we like. The latest “poll” comes out of Saudi Arabia itself: 95% of all men between 21 and 45 support Usama bin Laden, and equally from the middle and professional classes.⁷²

So even though these are mere photoflashes of change, they may already presage a shift in historical expectations: that History itself is being held back only by Arab police power and American military power ... and the willingness to use it.

Weaknesses and Strengths

A cultural anatomy of militant Islam, in particular the warrior subcultures of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, suggests some obvious strategic strengths and vulnerabilities.

In the symbolic framework

The insurgency’s greatest strength is the intimacy of its authority within Islam. Its very speech shows supreme confidence in the rightness of its cause. But this sense of being already legitimated in the eyes of God extends to many Muslims as well. The insurgency moves within legitimate Islamic traditions, so even if it is denied official legal standing it has great informal authority.

Militant Islam is said to be vulnerable when it departs from “true” Islamic traditions. As the Taliban have shown, rejection of cosmopolitan culture and the abuse of non-Muslims can seriously diminish the insurgency’s authority—but *only if we insist on seeing the fighting subcultures as future governing regimes*. For political outcomes we should focus on the insurgency’s real leadership—the militant *‘ulama*.

In cultural variation

Some say the insurgency’s greatest weakness is its atomization. As Miller reminds, “... Islamic movements themselves are increasingly divided by personal rivalries, ideological differences, and disputes over money.”

She might have added, “and over cultural differences.” For it is here, operating in ways visible yet unseen, that unity has eluded Muslims for so many centuries. This fractionating tendency is as strong within culture areas as between them, with Arabs perhaps the most fractious of all. It is one of Islam’s historical ironies that the only enduring period of Arab unity was achieved under Turkish rule.

Yet in today’s circumstances is this a weakness? If there are 130 kin-related militant groups does this not

complicate the task of their enemy? If Islam remains a political vision to Muslims that transcends national allegiances then this is surely one of the insurgency’s strengths. Al Qaeda for example had been able to move freely across Islam and operated openly before September 11. And flexible kinship models defined early in Islam reinforce a very real sense of unity and brotherhood.

Furthermore, there are no other reform movements within Sunni Islam. Militant Islam, however rife with rivalry and however disputatious, is not distracted by another vigorous vision of Truth making new converts and claiming new adherents.

In openness to adaptation

It is suggested that militant subcultures are more open to adaptation—what Miller calls “flexibility”⁷³—than Islamic civilization as a whole, but that openness extends only through the time of struggle. It is nonetheless strength. And arguably continued repression of militant Islam encourages creativity, if only to survive. The question is whether such highly motivated flexible thinking will produce a winning strategy.

The greatest strength cultural flexibility brings to militant Islam is the capacity to see things as they really are. If the insurgency can meet the needs and shape the expectations of ordinary Muslims, they will have created the foundation for eventual triumph. For example, Islamist *madrassas* in Egypt created a social welfare and support network among the majority of people discarded by the state. The insurgents were then understood not simply as fighters, but as part of a larger institution filling a vacant civic need. So their authority grew as ordinary people saw them building the civic architecture.

In historical expectations and support

A winning strategy depends on a long-term shift in historical expectations by Muslims everywhere. Lewis has called this insurgency “the most powerful and significant movement within the Islamic world for more than a century.”⁷⁴ However, the only place it has taken political power is Iran because a popular movement gained such momentum that it could not at last be denied. How did this happen? Five elements were present: regime irresolution, long-term conviction, correctly measuring success, surviving adversity, and a great leader. Are these elements present today?

Regime irresolution. Unlike Iran, Miller’s assessment of Arab regime effectiveness still stands. Throughout a generation of vicious repression, each of the main Arab states still stands, apparently stronger than ever.

Perhaps the shah was a lesson to his fellow Arab tyrants. Faced by wholesale citizen uprising, his generals begged him to let them “take the city” (Teheran), but he held them back. Three thousand protesters were killed in the months before his abdication, but at the decisive moment, he had hesitated. As Arjomand

wonders, “We will never know what would have happened if the shah had ordered the army to be brutally repressive....”⁷⁵ Syria’s Assad did just that three years later in Homs when the Islamist militants came after him. Perhaps if they spill enough blood and use enough electricity, hard legitimacy will trump soft authority every time. Perhaps these regimes, underwritten by an invincible American Colossus, will hold on forever.

Long-term conviction. Insurgent movements can gain popular momentum even though their “terrorist” fighters always seem to be defeated. This is because the striking of the blow and their sacrifice may count more than battle success—as we measure success. Yet how can such conviction be proposed, let alone sustained?

The struggle is expected to be long and arduous. It is more important to join the struggle and enjoin it among others than to impose an arbitrary timeframe, level of effort, and casualty threshold on the achievement of victory. That, of course, is how Americans think, and for the United States in a war, that very thinking has been a true strategic vulnerability in the past. In contrast, the Islamist insurgency draws strength from its civilization’s message that eternal struggle is good.

Correctly measuring success. There are two practical measures of success for the insurgency. One is the conversion of Muslims to the Islamist vision. This has been highly successful across Islam, from Indonesia to Pakistan to Algeria, and to Muslims within the United States and Great Britain.

The other measure of success is instilling a conviction in their enemies—not that the insurgency will win soon but that it cannot be defeated. Militant Islam knows that its enemies cannot forever endure this war. Among their enemies, America especially cannot abide a long war. And the United States is the key to the survival of both the Arab *ancien régime*s and Israel. Therefore the insurgency can draw strength from a widespread assumption among terrorists: that their prime enemy’s “war threshold” is fragile and impatient. Survival and continuing attacks are thus the insurgency’s strategic bottom line.

Surviving adversity. What if it cannot survive? Brutal repression in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria has severely dampened insurgent groups there. If the United States can make skittish regimes beat them down in Pakistan and Indonesia as well, there will be no major Muslim society where militant Islam can operate freely. And then American forces will drive them to ground in Somalia and Yemen and perhaps even Lebanon. Then where will the movement go? It will exist only as a legion in hiding, unable to develop new attacks. An insurgency without form and unable to attack is a failing insurgency.

But in contrast, what if the heart of the movement is beyond fighting groups and in the spiritual leadership of a militant *‘ulama*? What if its fighters are sheltered

in places that are politically untouchable like Arabia and Iran?

“Great” leadership. One thing missing from today’s Islamist movement is a great leader. There have been charismatic captains, but they have been put down or put away before achieving truly great standing. What is “great standing?” It is the realization of mythic authority and its translation into leadership of a movement capable of decisive change. Within Islamic civilization this means leaders like Saladin or Ibn Tumart—the coming of a *mahdi*. Hourani explains what that means:

Men of learning and piety ... could be the point around which there could gather political movements, in opposition to rulers regarded as unjust or illegitimate. In some circumstances the prestige of such a religious teacher could draw strength from a widespread popular idea, that of the *mahdi*, the man guided by God and sent by him to restore the rule of justice ...⁷⁶

“Imam” Khoumeni was such a man for Shi’ia Islam, but what of Usama bin Laden? He began to approach this authority through the attacks of September 11. However, great leaders develop standing through sustained leadership, and for that standing to mature they need a protected place, a locus around which popular affection and expectation can grow to maturity. That place can be a fortress or a villa or even a prison as it was for Nelson Mandela. The Ayatollah Khoumeni was able to build his standing while in exile. But it must be a protected place. No great leader has ever emerged while on the run.

For the Arabic orbit of Islam, its most effective and legendary leaders—Nur al-Din, Saladin, and Baybars especially—have been more classically military and political figures than clerical and ascetic. They also emerged out of politics at the center of Arab Islam, between Cairo and Damascus. If we consider the most emotive Arab antecedents as the strongest leadership model, then the insurgency within Sunni Islam still awaits its champion.

What does Usama bin Laden’s survival tell us? If he is still alive, why has he not been captured? One possible answer is that he has already ascended to a sort of mythic stature—not *Mahdi* perhaps, for he is not *‘ulama*—but an “awaited one” nonetheless, enough so that people would sacrifice their lives, and some Muslim governments their existence, to keep him safe.

The great leader is a hope in myth, waiting for the moment to bring him forth.

RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

This has been like an old French *chevauchée*: a “promenade on horseback,” an expansive excursion. What does our cultural *chevauchée* tell us? About the fighter subcultures, the terror network, the bottom line is this:

- Their tenacity, passion, and creativity inhere within a reality that we cannot touch.
- Their belief system protects them from defeat as we understand it.
- They do not exist in isolation from the larger world of Islam.

And what is their relationship to the larger world of Islam?

- The *Ummah* shares the same eschatology as the insurgency.
- “Modernity” has created change so disruptive that it forces renewal.
- Arab Islam represents a restless group of Muslim societies seeking renewal, and established regimes are not providing it.

The final message:

- Islam and identity are neither separable nor negotiable.

In terms of persistence, authority, and expectation, this is a very strong insurgency. It means that the movement is likely to stick around, that people will continue to believe in it and believe also that it will prevail. The converse apparently is also true: that these same people do not have faith in the established apparatus of rule. It is apparatus and no more.

To win, insurgencies need the power of popular support. This must take the form of a collective perception that History is shifting from the *ancien régime* to the insurgent movement. Thus this becomes the decisive shift in legitimacy. Is it happening in the key societies of Arab Islam?

It almost happened in Algeria in 1991. It may very well have happened in Syria in the early 1980s or in Egypt in the early 1990s in the absence of brutal repression.

If governments were freely elected in the Arab world there would be no insurgency—because Islamists would already be in power. What is striking about the cultural portrait of the military insurgency and the bigger cultural mosaic of “radical” Islam is how far-reaching it is. The “terrorist network” is not classically “extremist” in the sense of being at the margins of society and culture. This insurgency is at the center of both politics and civilization. That it is illegitimate in the eyes of Arab regimes does not make it illegitimate in the eyes of Muslims. Indeed, ordinary Muslims support the insurgency. A *Sunday Times* poll finds that 40% of Muslims are openly willing to voice their support—in Britain, a Western country “at war with terrorism.” The Saudi poll suggests that in Arabia the percentage is much more than that.

Some imply that the insurgency is artificial, a soufflé of Saudi money. There is no escaping the Saudi connection. Saudi Arabia has pushed Wahhabism with a

payroll big enough for every mullah in the United States, or at least 80% of them, as several sources attest.⁷⁷ But the Islamist cause is not simply a venal contract, and many see the Saudi State as even more corrupt than “secular” states like Syria and Iraq. The brief: the ruling princes of “The Kingdom” are using Wahhabism as a plough-like vehicle to maintain themselves in power.

The insurgency is bigger than the Saudi’s official Wahhabism. Islamism in forms called extremist or radical has managed to take over the revival of Islam. As described by Abdal-Hakim Murad,

... the middle ground, giving way, is everywhere dislocated and confused ... The entire experience of Islamic work over the past fifteen years has been one of increasing radicalization, driven by the perceived failure of the traditional Islamic institutions and the older Muslim movements to lead the Muslim people ...⁷⁸

It is precisely this failure of leadership that gave the insurgency its initial authority. In times when the *Dar al-Islam* is under attack, voices of leadership tend to be all the more extreme. The example of the threat of the Mongols in the 13th century is important, for that is when Ibn Taymiyyah’s vision of *jihad* emerged:

It is small wonder that Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas have been embraced enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements. What is less well known are the formative influences that molded his uncompromising stance. ... The Mongols were the most fearsome enemy that the world of Islam had ever encountered, an alien force...⁷⁹

...just like us.

It is not enough to say that most Muslims are not extremists and that therefore they do not support fighting subcultures like Al Qaeda or the Taliban. They might even abhor them as potential rulers, but they nonetheless support them as the defenders of Islam under attack. It is a bigger cause that requires militant action. The fighters are supported because they are fighting the fight, and everybody understands the fight.

Furthermore there is a passionate conviction among both military insurgents and supporters that their cause is not only just but prefigured in its ultimate triumph—and that it is the only legitimate course acceptable within Islam. This cultural authority is perversely underscored by awkward old regime efforts to co-opt the Islamist cause. Egypt, for example, has proclaimed itself an “Islamic” state—promoting a domestic “anti-American consensus”—while ruthlessly repressing its own Islamist movement.⁸⁰ Saudi Arabia of course trumpets its Islamic purity while it muzzles mullahs, nervously flaunting Islamic authority to hide its dependency on the United States. The established regimes themselves thus show little confidence in their own legitimacy. All they have to work with is an inheritance of European colonialism and secular Pan-Arabism that they see eroding away—and their behavior tells us so.

The United States, in contrast, let self-referent definitions and interests define its strategy. Thus we were “engaged” in a “geopolitical region,” the “Middle East.” Our first interest was the “containment” of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the 1970s we added the “support” of Israel. Only after the fall of the shah did we become aware of something we could only call “radical Islam.” But through the 1980s our soiled geopolitical lens obscured even this budding recognition. We continued to think in terms of “crazy states” like Libya or Iran, and then added to this lexicography the neologism, “state-sponsored terrorism.” It was still all about regimes and their putative “nationalist” aspirations. And of course we saw the Russian invasion in Afghanistan only through a heavy Cold War filter. The new insurgency sprouting within Islam was to us just another primitive tribal uprising against an invader.

How wrong we were, how blind we were to the consequences of both our aid to the Mujahidin and our “victory” over Saddam Hussein! But how could we have known? While our energies strained against a mustachioed pooh-bah in British black beret, Algerian Islamists won at the ballot box and prepared to take power. The secular military regime stopped this first Islamic “democracy” dead in its tracks.

So many things were happening at once, but we could not see them. So exultant in our victory were we that we missed the coming together of the insurgency. Mujahidin victory over the Soviet, overturning Islamist Algeria, and American entrenchment in Arabia all intertwined into a new struggle. A struggle that had once been championed by secular Arab “nation states” would now be the provenance of civilizational insurgency. Old Arab regimes soon shrunk into a shadow role as clients of the United States. We talk even today about our “coalition in the region,” but what we are doing is simply propping up failed or artificial regimes to prevent Islamic revolution throughout Arabic-speaking Islam.

What should this tell us? The issue is not yet decided, but we must determine what the issue really is and what we want to achieve within Islam. There are alternative means to the ends we choose.

We still lack a clear objective for this war, however. It has been the burden of this report to say that this war is not about “terrorism” but rather about a civilizational insurgency within Islam. It has been the report’s burden moreover to say that our strategy of repressing change within Islam is risky and uncertain over the long term. To better illuminate our choices are six alternative strategies. These are not so much roadmaps and itineraries as they are mental constructs linked to different objectives:

- “**Dragnet**” is a law enforcement strategy whose objective is to keep things in the region just as they are.

- “**Fort Apache**” expands on the former to knock over some select “bad guy” regimes—Iraq—both to reinforce “friendly regimes” and to warn and dissuade major adversaries—Iran. Although it entails some risk, this strategy is intended to sustain a modified *status quo*.
- “**Apocalypse Soon**” describes an unraveling wider war with political Islam, i.e., post-revolutionary Arab successor states. The *status quo* collapses and the only expedient U.S. objective is to neutralize the successor states and Iran.
- “**We Come in Peace**” offers a similar but more measured unraveling in which the United States has the option of occupying and entrenching strategic strong points and treasures in the region while the Arab *ancien régime* is collapsing.
- “**Siren Song**” explores a very different path in which the United States tries to culturally subvert and co-opt popular support for militant Islamic renewal.
- “**Sealed Train**” suggests a more radical strategy: ditch the *status quo* as objective and encourage political change and religious renewal within Islam.

These represent “mindsets” in the sense that their approach and objectives are rooted in deep assumptions about what is happening. Think of them as strategic “worldviews.” The first two are highly conservative and assume that big change can be controlled or at least postponed. The next two are expedient responses to unwanted change that can no longer be controlled. In effect they represent conservative assumptions violently overturned. The last worldviews suggest very different assumptions about both the situation and the dynamic of History. Putting them into play, however, triggers every foreign policy anxiety: of great apparent and unacceptable strategic risk, and perhaps the fateful acknowledgment that U.S. grand strategy cannot control change.

Dragnet (Incarceration)

This is war as law enforcement: “track them down and bring them to justice.” The Clinton administration took this approach to the exclusion of almost all others. The Bush administration seems to be taking an “in-between” approach, an *entr’acte*. Dragnet in the future will almost certainly be interspersed with phases of more classically military activity.

Dragnet is also a strategic concept because it does not threaten Arab regime *status quo*. Its stated aim is straightforward: break the terror network. But this of course means that success is narrowly defined as the pursuit and capture of fighters and direct supporters. It is also a strategy that depends almost completely on our Arab “coalition partners.” The problem here of course is that regimes may be friendly but critically unhelpful. The Saudis have not yet given the United States anything of value on Khobar Towers. All but one of the

9-11 attackers was Saudi, yet we still know nothing about their connections to Saudi Arabia.

This is not a strategy we are likely to pursue in pristine form, because we already know the danger in it: 9-11. But consider its appeal over the long term. After the United States has exhausted all military opportunities available—or *that old-line regimes will accept*—what else can we do?

In this sense Dragnet is the strategic alternative for those who believe that continued strong American action cannot endure more than its politically acceptable initial stages—Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen—without creating unpredictable and possibly uncontrollable spasms across the Arab world. Thus its proponents suggest that it is ultimately more critical to support established regimes than the dangerous course of tracking terrorists to their true sources of support.

If Dragnet avoids an obvious danger, it may create others. Even though success in this strategy is defined very narrowly, an obdurate Saudi state may make even this impossible. This would amount to a substantial defeat made all the more shameful because it would be self-inflicted.

A growing sense of American failure would only encourage the insurgency. Having kept U.S. detectives at arm's length, might not the Saudis feel cocky and comfortable and keep supporting the insurgency, no matter how often, or how softly, the U.S. protests?

Fort Apache (Decimation)

The Fort Apache strategy looks more like the real thing, but the engagements are cinematically reminiscent of the Old West: small troops; sharp, short fights; and a savage place of battle. In contrast to Dragnet we visit places where we are not invited and surely not welcome. At best it is a satisfying sequel to *Blackhawk Down*.

Our objectives too seem tough and uncompromising. This is an “accept no substitutes” approach. We brush off both the screams of the street and the harsh *demarches* from the palace. Or do we?

Fort Apache encourages us to settle old scores, like Iraq. Still, just how risky is going after Iraq? It was agreed to once before. Iraq may be the price the Saudis are willing to pay to keep the U.S. dragnet out of Arabia itself—although the recent Arab League summit in Beirut suggests that the rhetoric of Arab unity will flow unabated.

If the United States is serious, however, about the real sanctuaries of insurgency, it will go into Arabia Deserta and track them down—if the Saudis refuse to do the job themselves. (What will they do, turn in their own princes?) It means the same for Syria, and it surely means entering Lebanon with a hefty ground “footprint” in order to root out Hezbollah.

Such a “serious” strategy, however, would spark a confrontation with Iran. Do we then fight Iran? By that point it won't matter, because any operation against Hezbollah means fighting alongside Sharon and his army. That image alone would wreck our cause in Islam. The more prudent course would be to limit our formal military strikes to Iraq, and use that display of strength and resolve to warn Iran and set up a more active Persian containment if it continues its hostile, nuclear course.

A strictly defined Fort Apache and a tireless Dragnet together describe the boundaries of U.S. strategy today. Other alternative approaches suggest what we might do if we are pushed off our chosen path.

Apocalypse Soon (Annihilation)

America too has an apocalyptic side. Its great wars—of Independence, Civil War, and two “world wars”—have all been wars of revolution, of an overturning of the longstanding and established order of things.

The language tells it best: “unconditional surrender,” “a war to end all wars,” “he has trampled out the vineyards where the grapes of wrath are stored,” “the fateful lightning of his terrible swift sword...” A great and terrible strike on America might well unsheathe that blade again.

Cracking open a reactor, detonating a radiological device, spreading plague, or most darkly, triggering a true nuclear weapon would unleash American ferocity. What practical form might national righteousness take? It is doubtful that even the blackest rage would lead to, say, the nuking of Mecca, let alone one of the great cities of Islam. Even a nuclear attack on America could not push us to make total war against all Muslims.

But we would demand a terrible price. We would likely ditch all residue of restraint or selectivity in our pursuit of “terrorism.” The minimum bar for presidential action: an ultimatum to all suspected of harboring terrorists, “Open your borders to our forces, or we will come anyway and take the killers!” This would mean unavoidable open war with much of Islam, with Iran, Iraq, and Syria certainly and with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan possibly.

The draft is reinstated and the economy mobilized. We certainly expel every alien Muslim and finally confront Wahhabist control of Islam in America. At war's end the region we once called the Middle East, apart from Israel and Turkey, has zero military power. Hundreds of thousands of young Muslim men lie dead on battlefields in a thousand urban warrens and a thousand bunkered caves. Perhaps a million Americans—who knows how many—hold down the enclaves of oil and its passage like the Venetians grimly clinging to their Levantine strongholds, surrounded by Turks.⁸¹ We cannot, after all, occupy whole countries for long without puppet rulers. After all that happened,

Islam would be forever unified against us. Our only consolation would be the strategic clarity that total war offers.

We Come in Peace (Occupation)

We could get to this place via another route—it just takes a little more time. Let's say we skirt the shoals of bad strategy and win. We roust out the fighters, node by node. We excise the Grand Panjandrum himself, Saddam Hussein. Saudi Arabia agrees to stop meeting its worldwide Wahhabist payroll. There is even a modest and quietist Palestinian state.

We cannot, however, defeat change. We achieve victory, but at what price? Not in American lives of course, but in the course of History. Our splendid mastery of war and our knowledge of all things have destroyed every enemy and delivered into our hands every two-bit terrorist on the lam.

There is no doubt now about who rules in Islam. The *Dar al-Islam* is no more, and the *Ummah* itself is little more than the chattel of imperial infidels and worse, of the *murtad*, the apostate rulers among them. This would be the judgement of Muslims. How could they think otherwise? Certainly we should expect an eager class of collaborators, but they would in the main be drawn from an older generation that embraced the Western and the secular.

There would be bright spots of course, perhaps Pakistan. Freed of official Islamism people might reassert their formerly easy-going approach to Islam. Egypt, under the coiled whip of a military aristocracy, might feel only tremors from its most docile people. But other Arabs might feel very differently, especially in Arabia.

Today the Saudis promote and fund Islamic revival while at the same time corrupting it. How much worse it would be if this same regime acquiesces to direct American action against the *jihad*. Here the corrupt Saud dynasty does not survive its final betrayal. We don't know how the story goes, but it ends in the kingdom's overthrow. The United States "beat terrorism" but fatally undermined the footing of its client kings. And like the unraveling of the shah it might come years down the road: the early portents obscure, the warning signs disbelieved, and the final coming apart stunningly swift.

Revolution in Arabia would have all the energy of revolution in Iran. Then what would we do? We could try to leave but Israel would say no. If we stayed we would be in the same strategic bind as Apocalypse Soon: holding oil and the keys to its passage.

Siren Song (Co-optation)

Is there not in every alternative History—even of things to come—action not taken and outcome that

might have been? Might it not have gone differently if only reason had prevailed, or if a simple fortuitous idea had not been capriciously discarded?

Co-optation, quite simply, is a strategy of seduction and subversion. Americans are quite good at culturally seducing and subverting other cultures. It is in fact well established in our national lore, and we point to its success with pride.

Cultural co-optation, American style, has two dimensions. The immigrant dimension creates a community of people who are both nostalgically tied to "Old World" roots and at the same time thoroughly "American." To be American in this dimension means to embody the entire civic center of our civilization. So, for example, an American believes in free markets and democracy of course, but also in a precise civic and legal schema embodied by words like "equality," "opportunity," and "civil liberty." The immigrant American may thus stay culturally connected to old roots in terms of family, language, religion, and select folkways, but these are private "lifestyle" values. All Americans share their public and civic values.

An immigrant community here can also be a superb vehicle for exporting American culture as a universal civilization. It demonstrates that it will not encroach on any culture's intimate and personal elements of identity. This has worked superbly too, at least from the American standpoint. First European, then Latin American, and now Chinese and Indian civilizations have established broad avenues to American cultural fertilization from their own communities in the United States. This process of co-optation is strengthened by an increasing global human intimacy. Internet growth and airline ease make it possible for immigrant communities in the United States to keep a continuous connection with the folks back home.

The Indian example is quite clear. A mere generation of stepped-up immigration and heightened interaction has shifted the attitudes of Indian civilization—especially the Indian elite—inclining them visibly toward American civilization. But India is a culturally flexible civilization, ruled by alien cultures for centuries and itself a highly polyglot culture area. Its people are open to civic values from another cultural source.

Islam is not. Muhammad decreed Islam as a complete blueprint for life and as an ideal, transcending all divisions between politics and social life and the law. Until recently there was near-unanimity in Shari'a that Muslims should not even live in infidel lands and under infidel law. It would be naturally and inevitably corrupting. A Muslim living under the rule of a "good" prince might, it was argued, be able to practice his faith undisturbed. But what if infidel law contradicted Shari'a, and what if civic life went against Islamic practice?⁸²

Of course the Muslim living in the West must still confront these questions, but ordinary Muslims coming to America generally seek what all immigrants seek: the American Dream. Generally they have been happy to accept our civic culture.

This American theory of cultural co-optation has been partly blocked by the domination of Wahhabist mullahs in the United States. American Muslims must now confront not only Islamist proselytizing but also a coercive political message. The Islamist network in the United States is thus a counter to co-optation.

This development should be seen within a bigger development still: the migration of Islam to the West. Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States, and although Muslims are still a small minority here, they are growing constituencies in Western Europe. France, Italy, and Spain are each in the 10% range, not counting large numbers of illegals. The native fertility of these countries is very low in contrast to a very high birthrate among Muslims. In a generation the Muslim and especially the Arab populations in these countries may double.

This accounting of course is not meant to alarm, but the trajectories suggest two further developments for Europe, and thus possibly the United States. The first is continued cultural separation. Very large centers, combined with majority concentration in select areas, permit the emergence of a cultural-tribal autonomy if so desired. The second is growing political leverage. Voting *en bloc*, even a minority population at 10% can have a disproportionate electoral impact. At 20% it can, say, block key foreign policy initiatives even if the majority of the population is in favor. It is not unimaginable that French foreign policy may in twenty years find it inexpedient to support any American initiative in the Arabic-speaking world.

As long as Islamism dominates life in Arabic-speaking societies it will be difficult for Americans to establish a strong and seductive cultural presence there. Thus the Islamists have effectively created a cultural one-way street. They can influence our immigrant Muslim community and look to eventual political leverage in Europe. The United States in contrast, so rich in the tools of cultural persuasion, finds this strategic option foreclosed.

Sealed Train (Legitimization)

As the symbolic framework of the fighting subcultures revolves around a cycle of mythic insurgencies, so the larger framework of Islamic civilization revolves around revolution. "The advent of Islam itself was a revolution," Lewis reminds. He shows how political evolution in early Islam was realized through a series of revolutions. Each new *Khilafat* promised a "restoration of authentic Islam," but would quickly move

away from that ideal and end up within a generation reinforcing its sovereign power because, "By a tragic paradox, only the strengthening of the Islamic State could save the identity and cohesion of the Islamic community."⁸³

Lewis is telling us three things: (1) Islam's original—and thus blessed by Muhammad—path for political renewal is through revolution, (2) any serious renewal movement, even though it begins as a small sect, must aspire to unite the whole, and (3) a successful revolution—a new Islamic state—will always "move further and further away from the social and ethical ideals of Islam." This analysis suggests that a successful Islamist revolution today is possibly the best way to defuse "radical" Islam—*because of necessity it will do the defusing itself*.

Again, Iran is a useful example. Its early radicalism has long been tempered, and now even the ruling mullahs feel their grip on power slipping. The odds are that they will continue to compromise and accommodate changing popular needs and expectations in order to preserve their authority. The Taliban are also useful as a contrary example. Here a young and unsophisticated movement came into power. They could not accommodate both practical governance and a naively pure Islamist theocracy. They failed badly.

What if we were to send the historical equivalent of Lenin to Islam's Finland Station? It is true that there is no single great leader, no waiting Ayatollah for the Arabs. This suggestion is rather a strategic approach that supports the religious leadership of the insurgency, assisting them to overthrow, say, the dynasty of Ibn Saud. The result might well resemble—*indeed it should resemble*—Iran in 1979. It would be a thunderclap across Arab Islam. But if it inspired revolutions elsewhere, or even among Arabs everywhere, it would achieve the following:

- It would immediately initiate the political evolution of an effective sovereign authority and its institutions.
- It would probably force a great internal debate on how to achieve effective and productive rule as an Islamic state.
- It would, according to historical precedent, fairly quickly become less Islamist.
- It would lead to a great rivalry among Islamic states as to which would become the new *Khilafat*.
- It would free the United States from its current "crusader" status.

Above all, revolution realized would give us real states to deal with. Unlike the possible outcome of the We Come in Peace strategy, which leaves us at war with the Islamic successor-states, the Sealed Train strategy defines an initially benign relationship in as much as their realization comes through our support.

The sticking point of course would be Israel. Israel is symbolic of wider recognitions we must at some point cease to ignore. In many ways Israel represents the former strategic equation, one that grew out of the end of European colonialism and the surge of secular Pan-Arabism. Today the Palestinian movement seems ever more captured and enraptured by the broader insurgency within Islam. Its cause is migrating to another ideological overlord, and Palestinian fulfillment is now placed within the larger dramaturgy of Islamic renewal. The suicide “martyrs” thus run to a new song. The old anthems are gone. Jerusalem, always a city of ambivalent sanctity in Islamic thought, now veers toward the high holy place it occupied in the *jihad* of Nur al-Din and Saladin. While the United States is distracted by the backward-looking mantle of “the peace process,” the struggle in Palestine is wrapped in a new fold.⁸⁴

Indeed resurgent *jihad* propaganda from the 13th century creates a conveniently linked historical metaphor for today: Israel as Crusader Kingdom, a symbolic affront, and the United States a Mongol Horde threatening Islam’s very civilization.

Each of these “responses to terrorism” at some point leads us to unpleasant recognition, which reads like a syllogism:

- If terrorism is really insurgency,
- And this insurgency is bigger than its fighters,

- Then how do we fight terrorism without fighting the entire insurgency?

The entire insurgency includes a very big chunk of Islam and is supported by our most important “ally,” Saudi Arabia. So our actual strategy is uncovered: keep the *status quo* above all. Preserve those regimes that will comply with American domestic political priorities and hope that what we call terrorism—the continuing military prosecution of the insurgency—can be contained.

Ours is not really a bad strategy. We clearly lack the freedom of movement to stand back and let historical change happen in Islam. Change may well occur anyway, but our current strategy arguably buys us time, which may give us happier options as opportunities emerge or the situation changes in our favor. We should seize those opportunities now, because the situation today is in our favor perhaps more than it will ever be again. We shouldn’t throw this fleeting advantage away. Although we are a conservative power, we should recognize that revolution in Sunni Islam could have unforeseen consequences, even within American society.

What culture urges is that this insurgency’s eschatology of struggle only draws strength from our challenge, so we become unwilling midwives to their awaited rebirth. This implies that at some point this “war” will shift dramatically in form and in purpose. This report has suggested why that might happen. We need to be ready when it does.

SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS

- This war is not about terrorism, but an insurgency within Islam.
- Islamic law and tradition legitimate the insurgency. The *jihad* is properly defensive: the renewal of the *Dar al-Islam* and the casting out of an infidel invader. Moreover, the insurgency operates within its own symbolic framework of reality and cannot be persuaded or reached by us—even in defeat.
- The insurgency is widespread with majority support, for example, from perhaps 60%+ of British Muslim men to 95% of Saudi men. They share the insurgency’s eschatology—which is Islam’s—and they believe there is no other path to renewal.
- The 9-11 strikes were not just another bigger terrorist attack. They decisively altered the historical dynamic in the Arab world and for Islam as a whole. *Jihad* has been formally re-energized and is now believed to be a long-awaited fulfillment of History.
- Seeing this, key allied regimes—Egypt and Saudi Arabia especially—have shifted their strategy. Now their main objective is simply to survive: to deflect the Islamist wave away from them and ride it if possible.
- Thus there is no way for America to regain the unshakeable authority it had in 1991. To the contrary, the more the United States intervenes in the *Dar al-Islam* the more it undercuts the authority of its client regimes—and the greater is the authority of the insurgency.
- The United States has intervened strongly to reassert that very authority. Its strong action offers every prospect of success in the near term. Yet strong action is also dynamic and will bring other change with it.

CIVILIZATIONAL COUNTER-INSURGENCY?

How does the United States fight a war that is more than a war, but about change within a civilization as well? In this war America has chosen to support the *status quo*, which means that its objective is to prevent change within Islam. Furthermore its war strategy directly attacks only the manifestations of change while encouraging established regimes to repress the sources of change.

But the dynamic of change itself suggests that at some point the *status quo* will collapse, and that the United States will face at best chaos and at worst a series of highly empowered new enemy forces. At that point American strategic options will seem very limited. We could then either retreat or choose to fight a war whose new objective would be the defeat—or more truthfully the destruction—of political Islam.

This would mean of course a war against Islamic civilization. What might we hope to achieve in this war? It is difficult even to imagine what might be called “success.” Subjugation? Assimilation? Annihilation? These words themselves smack of apocalyptic scenes. We seem a long way from such a conflict, however. It appears almost absurd to think that we might someday be part of such a terrible war.

As said earlier the situation *at the moment* is favorable to the United States. Furthermore, as a conservative power we should be prudent. It seems reasonable to limit U.S. objectives to the continued pursuit of the terror network and the elimination of an emerging WMD (weapons of mass destruction) threat. From this vantage, overthrowing Saddam Hussein is a reasonable move. It removes one WMD source and puts another on notice. If well executed, a second Iraq war could even strengthen “friendly” regime *status quo* by flamboyantly renewing American commitment and resolve.⁸⁵

Current strategy (Fort Apache) seeks to control big change through a measured display of strength. But in attacking Iraq it strains the limits of its own conservatism and hopes it has correctly gauged limits’ threshold. In a real sense it risks creating change it cannot control.

Friendly Arab regimes may pull away. Israel, peppered by bio-chem Scuds, could lash out. Iran might accelerate its nuclear program. Even a conservative strategy, if active, risks achieving the opposite of what it intends, perhaps promoting the very dynamic of change

it seeks to leash. But doing nothing (Dragnet) arguably would be worse. It is almost always better to be strong than weak. Ultimately the current strategy is rooted in these assumptions:

- The insurgency as a gaggle of groups can be broken and discredited over time.
- Friendly regimes are too weak to give us up, but too strong to be undermined.
- Iran would rather cut a deal or lie low than risk war with the United States.

These assumptions may prove correct over the long term. This report, however, is rooted in very different assumptions:

- The insurgency is an authentic Islamic renewal movement and central to change.
- This war’s dimensions are much bigger than we wish to accept.
- The situation is a “world-historical” dynamic as yet unfulfilled.

Thus it is less important in the short term whether Iran behaves well or badly, or how Saddam goes down. Deeper pressures for change will continue and must at some point be fulfilled. It is not necessary to spell out how and when fulfillment becomes event. However, it is important to decide where we want to be when that happens. Do we want a repeat of 1979, save on a far grander scale? Or would we prefer at that point to be on the side of revolution?

An upsized repeat of 1979 threatens to put us on the road to war with political Islam. It takes us from civilizational counter-insurgency to an all-or-nothing struggle with Islam. But being on the side of revolution or even encouraging it (Sealed Train) is a very tough call. There are milder forms of accommodating change. To actually further our strategy, however, we must show openness before the big change begins. Otherwise any move in that direction will only signal weakness as we vainly try to cover our defeat.

If this report’s assumptions begin to emerge over the long term, the United States should have a strategy in play to deal with change—if possible on U.S. terms. This report does not suggest what such a strategy should look like, or even its objective range, but rather advises that, to have any hope of working, it must be hazarded before historical inevitability sinks in. That is the hardest thing for any foreign policy to do.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- ¹The *Oxford English Dictionary*, Second Edition.
- ²Planning for the raid was revealing on this point. Several memoranda between LeMay and his staff suggest the flavor of their thinking: that “the purpose of this attack is not experimental,” that the raid should “not include many high priority industrial targets,” but should have “the highest density of population found” in Tokyo that was “rated as highest in fire hazard for insurance purposes.” Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon*, Yale, 1987, 266.
- ³There were even qualms during the war itself, though the bombing of Japan was immensely popular among Americans. Stimson told FDR after the bombing that he “did not want the United States to have a reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities.” Sherry, 296.
- ⁴Peter Gumbel, “France Finally Finds the Words for Algeria,” *Wall Street Journal*, 17 October 2001.
- ⁵To give this equivalency some granularity, in the province of Flanders alone Imperial Spain’s inquisitor convicted 1600 citizens between 1550 and 1566, of which several hundred were executed. See the chart in Geoffrey Parker’s *The Dutch Revolt*, Cornell, 1977, 62–63.
- ⁶A stirring account of the insurgency, including original court testimony and reporting, can be found in Richard Slotkin’s *The Crater*, Atheneum, 1981, 541–558.
- ⁷Robert L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them*, Yale, 1984, 66. The actual Roman word was *superstitio*, which they used to contrast Christian anti-civic behavior with their own assurance of what was correct and true, which they called *pietas*. Wilken explains that the distinction was “not a matter of simple bias or the result of ignorance; it expresses a distinct religious sensibility. When Tacitus wrote that Christianity was the ‘enemy of mankind,’ he did not mean that he did not like Christians and found them a nuisance . . . but that they were an affront to his social and religious world.”
- ⁸The early Christians were treated by the Roman state as a criminal cult. But by the end of the 3rd century, after two centuries of growth and forty years of complete toleration—the “little peace of the Church” from 260–302—Christian society had emerged as the main rival to the traditional pagan governing class. So when state persecution was violently renewed in 302, the old ruling class was taking on a political-civilizational movement already partly legitimated and fully its equal. Christianity had become too important to delegitimize. Its authority was great enough then to engineer the conversion of an emperor. This is elegantly analyzed by Peter Brown in *The World of Late Antiquity*, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971, 65–88.
- ⁹A stunning dissection of Hitler’s subversion of Germany is told by David Schoenbaum in *Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933–1939*, Norton, 1997 (2nd Ed.).
- ¹⁰Why the distinction between “culture area” and civilization? Culture area at root describes the membership orbit of culturally related societies whose identities intertwine through language, religion, kinship patterns, and social customs. Civilization might be imagined as a “higher” classification, a “major upgrade” of culture area. Ultimately complex civic institutions and artifacts make up culture, civilization. Anthropologists have classified these variously. But these institutions—like bureaucracy—and artifacts—like writing—all serve to build a unifying vision of political and civic identity. A civilization is a constitutional vision, and because of its vision and civic forms, civilization can be more powerful and palpable than its corresponding culture area. Culture areas have the easy authority of familial associations, while civilizations create and extend new political, economic, and ideational dimensions to cultural identity. Thus the word “civilization” has real meaning in terms of human motivation and allegiance. For Muslims it is the very binding element of identity.
- ¹¹These themes were inspired by Richard A. Barrett, *Culture and Conduct*, Wadsworth, 1984.
- ¹²“Man is the only animal perpetually suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.” Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books, 1973, 5.
- ¹³Jessica Stern, “Meeting with the Muj,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 42–51. <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/jf01/jf01stern.html>.
- ¹⁴Brown, 190.
- ¹⁵Joseph Campbell, *The Hero With a Thousand Faces: Vol. 1-The Adventure of the Hero/Vol. 2-The Cosmogonic Cycle*, St. Martins, 1994.
- ¹⁶<http://www.saudiembassy.net/publications/magazine-winter-99/centennial.htm>.
- ¹⁷<http://www.msnbc.com/news/672063.asp?cp1=1>
- ¹⁸Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Routledge, 2000, 243.
- ¹⁹<http://www.msnbc.com/news/672063.asp?cp1=1>.
- ²⁰<http://www.msnbc.com/news/672063.asp?cp1=1>.
- ²¹Henri Corbin, *Face de Dieu, face l’homme, Herméneutique et Soufisme*, Flammarion, 1983.
- ²²Réda Bensmaïa, “Writing Metafiction: Khatibi’s *Le Livre du sang*,” <http://www.french-ital.ucsb.edu/substance/69.html>.
- ²³Raphael Patai remarked that, “In reading the works of Arab historians . . . one gets the impression of an absence of the awareness of time as a continuous process . . . Even when Arab historians use the term ‘time’ they use it, not in the sense of a period of duration within whose course a historical process is played out . . . but in the sense of a brief time section centered on a great or remarkable historical event.” Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, Hatherleigh Press, 2002 (revised edition), 76. This point is underscored post-9-11: “Arab societies have a very fluid sense of time,” explains Mary-Jane Deeb, adjunct professor at American University and a Middle East specialist. “For them, events like the Crusades, a thousand years ago, are as immediate as yesterday.” Ken Ringle, “The Crusaders’ Giant Footprints: After a Millennium, Their Mark Remains,” *Washington Post*, 23 October 2001.
- ²⁴<http://www.msnbc.com/news/672063.asp?cp1=1>.
- ²⁵Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Warner, 1991, 205.
- ²⁶<http://www.msnbc.com/news/672063.asp?cp1=1>.
- ²⁷Or, “The dead hand of past achievement.” These are the words Veblen used to describe how Great Britain fell behind in industrial technology after 1870. Britain could not discard old standards and old infrastructure because modernizing its industrial economy would have meant building everything again from scratch. This is the problem of “integration.” Just as the integration of Britain’s society as the first industrial nation later inhibited attempts at modernization, so the integration of a culture’s social framework also can become an obstacle to adaptation. Changing one element means changing another and another, because all the pieces of the society’s human framework are sublimely interconnected. Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, Ann Arbor, 1915, 132.
- ²⁸Hillenbrand, 99.
- ²⁹Roy Parviz Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, “The Idea of the Jihad in Islam before the Crusades,” in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, editors, Dumbarton Oaks, 2001, <http://doaks.org/CRO2.pdf>.
- ³⁰Hillenbrand, 186.
- ³¹See for example the argument of Shaykh Abdul Hadi Palazzi of *The Root and Branch Association*, <http://www.rb.org.il/Islam-Israel/commentary/islamcom16.htm>.
- ³²Hillenbrand, 242.
- ³³A moniker popularized by Saddam Hussein. For just one of many references see Kenneth W. Stein, “Western Intrusion Collides With Tradition in the Middle East,” a speech made at the Carter Center, February 1991, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/stk01/>.
- ³⁴“Whenever a group of men sought to challenge and to change the existing order, they made their teachings a theology and their instrument a sect, as naturally and as inevitably as their modern western counterparts make ideologies and political parties.” Bernard Lewis, “The Significance of Heresy in Islam,” *Islam in History*, Open Court, 2001 (2nd Ed.), 293.
- ³⁵Ibid, 292.
- ³⁶Ibid, 292.
- ³⁷Hillenbrand, 243.
- ³⁸Eric R. Wolf, “The Social Organization of Mecca and Origins of Islam,” *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 7, Winter, 1951, 349.
- ³⁹Charles Frazee, “Balkan Christian Communities in the Early Ottoman Empire,” East European Studies Occasional Paper Number 47, *Christianity And Islam In South Eastern Europe*, Charles Frazee; Eve Levin; http://wwics.si.edu/ees/pap_arch.htm.
- ⁴⁰Wolf, 350.

- ⁴¹Hillenbrand, 246.
- ⁴²Ibid, 246.
- ⁴³Hourani, 151.
- ⁴⁴Hillenbrand, 226.
- ⁴⁵Halil Inalcik, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, II, 1980, 71–79.
- ⁴⁶Ibid, 71–79.
- ⁴⁷Of course here the Ghazi tradition intertwines with what Patai calls the Bedouin ethos. For a discussion of *gefolgschaft* see Mark Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453*, Pennsylvania, 1991, 221.
- ⁴⁸Olivia Vlahos, Class syllabus and notes for "Families: A Cross-Species, Cross-Cultural Review."
- ⁴⁹Lewis, "The Revolutions in Early Islam," *Islam in History*, 305.
- ⁵⁰Ibid, 305.
- ⁵¹Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Knopf, 1945, 214.
- ⁵²Mark Whittow, *The Making of Byzantium, 600–1025*, University of California, 1996, 202–203.
- ⁵³From Kluckhohn's famous quip that culture is "the blueprint for all of life's activities." Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, New York, 1949, 21.
- ⁵⁴Knut S. Vikør, "The Development of *ijtihād* and Islamic Reform, 1750–1850," *The Third Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: Ethnic Encounter and Culture Change*, Joensuu, Finland, June 1995, <http://www.hf.uib.no/instituttet/smi/paj/Vikor.html>.
- ⁵⁵Cultural integration occurs in a fluid and formative period where new institutions emerge, new rules and relationships are negotiated, and a new cultural architecture is created. The term, "cultural crystallization" was coined by Foster to describe how new cultural patterns emerged in Spanish America. He found that because the initial colonists came from Andalusia and Extremadura their patterns of culture defined and were embedded in America's new cultural architecture. This "southern façade" persisted even though the great majority of subsequent settlers came from northern Spain. George Foster, *Culture and Conquest: America's Spanish Heritage*, Viking, 1960, 227–234.
- ⁵⁶Inalcik, 71–79.
- ⁵⁷Fraze, http://wwics.si.edu/ees/pap_arch.htm.
- ⁵⁸Brown, 30–32.
- ⁵⁹Seymour M. Hersh, "King's Ransom: How Vulnerable Are the Saudi Royals?" *The New Yorker*, October 22, 2001, <http://www.ccnep.org/hotnews/kings102201.html>; Brian Whitaker, "Pressure on the Saudi Safety Valve," *The Guardian*, Tuesday 23 October 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4283479,00.html>. In Pakistan too, of 5000 Ph.D.s awarded since independence, 4500 were in Islamic Studies! A consequence perhaps of Zia's Arab-Islamist course? http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/kashmir.html.
- ⁶⁰Hourani, 60.
- ⁶¹Tim Reid, "Mullah Omar's Troops Enlist in Afghan Army," *London Times*, 17 January 2002.
- ⁶²Rowan Scarborough, "Bin Laden's Cronies Quiet," *Washington Times*, 24 January 2002.
- ⁶³Walter Pincus, "Al Qaeda to Survive bin Laden, Panel Told," *Washington Post*, 19 December 2001.
- ⁶⁴This suggestion remains unmodified because, as Operation Anaconda confessed to us, this is an ineluctable rhythm of the insurgency in Afghanistan.
- ⁶⁵R. Hrair Dekmajian, *Islam in Revolution*, Syracuse, 1995, 57.
- ⁶⁶Judith Miller, *God Has Ninety-Nine Names*, Simon and Schuster, 1996, 472.
- ⁶⁷Hillenbrand, 250.
- ⁶⁸Ibid, 246.
- ⁶⁹Ibid, 249.
- ⁷⁰<http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/041101/dlame24.asp>
- ⁷¹Farrukh Dhondy, "An Islamic Fifth Column," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 December 2001.
- ⁷²Elaine Sciolino "Don't Weaken Arafat, Saudi Warns Bush," *New York Times*, 27 January 2002.
- ⁷³Miller, 471.
- ⁷⁴Lewis, "The Revolt of Islam," 399.
- ⁷⁵Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, Oxford, 1988, 190.
- ⁷⁶Hourani, 157.
- ⁷⁷Among them Steven Schwartz, *Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror*, forthcoming, and Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani in an Open Forum at the U.S. Department of State, 7 January 1999, http://www.islamicupremecouncil.org/extremism/islamic_extremism.htm. John Miller suggests a somewhat smaller percentage. See John J. Miller, "On the House," *National Review*, 8 April 2002.
- ⁷⁸<http://wings.buffalo.edu/sa/muslim/isl/sufi/ForgottenRevolution.txt>.
- ⁷⁹Hillenbrand, 243.
- ⁸⁰Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002, <http://foreignaffairs.org/articles/Indyk0102.html>.
- ⁸¹Diana Gililand Wright, "Bartolomeo Mineo, Venetian Administration in 15th Century Nauplion." *EJOS*, III, No. 5, 1–235, <http://www.let.uu.nl/oosters/EJOS/pdf2/W00.PDF>.
- ⁸²Lewis, "Behind the Rushdie Affair," *Islam in History*, 366–370.
- ⁸³Lewis, "Revolutions in Early Islam," *Islam in History*, 296.
- ⁸⁴Ibn Taymiyyah and other Hanbalite legal scholars criticized Jerusalem, in contrast to Mecca and Medina, as tainted by Judeo-Christian presence and "innovations." But others saw the city in a very different light. Al Muqaddasi wrote of Jerusalem in 997: "Mecca and Medina derive their high position from the Ka'ba and the Prophet, but on the Day of Judgment they will both come to Jerusalem." The city became a spiritual touchstone in the *jihad* renewal of the 12th century. Quoted in Hillenbrand, 141, 149.
- ⁸⁵A viewpoint widely held among conservative commentators: "The Bush administration ... ought to understand that our Muslim friends will be more numerous and steadfast the more forceful and determined we appear." Reuel Marc Gerech, "Appeasing Arab Dictators," *The Weekly Standard*, 8 April 2002, 26.

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Errata:
 P. 8, col. 2, pp. 5. line 4, should read:
 "was," not "were"
 P. 23, last line, should read:
 "All but two of the 9-11 attackers were Arabian..."
 Note 10, line 6, "of" not "up"