

# INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: Innovative Policy Options

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## Abstract

*Information peacekeeping is the strategic deterrent of the 21st Century. It is the foundation for informed policy--successful policy--and it enables both the policy-maker and the commander to avoid battle--the acme of skill--while achieving policy objectives vital to U.S. national security and national competitiveness. Unfortunately, information peacekeeping is also the anti-thesis to traditional warfighting. It calls into question the utility of our existing intelligence community as it is now structured, as well as the wisdom of our existing defense organization, as it is now trained, equipped, and organized. Information peacekeeping requires the abandonment of the concept of a unilateral military focused strictly on conventional armed conflict, and requires that "warfighting"--like peacekeeping--be understood and carried out in a much broader context--a context which recognizes that our home front is our Achilles' heel; that politics, economics, culture, demographic movements, and the environment are "war by other means"; and that the single most vital contributor to survival at the dawn of the 21st Century is truth--the production and exploitation of accurate intelligence.*


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<sup>1</sup> The author is providing this material in his capacity as an interested citizen, with no commercial offerings or equities. Comments are eagerly solicited so that this might be refined into an article for publication in a defense journal. Communicate with the author at <ceo@oss.net>, voice (703) 242-1701, fax (703) 242-1711, or mail to OSS, Inc., 11005 Langton Arms Court, Oakton, Virginia 22124-1807. Two pertinent articles, one with a military thrust and one with a civilian thrust, are recommended and provided to the workshop as background reading: "Creating a Smart Nation: Information Strategy, Virtual Intelligence, and Information Warfare", in *CYBERWAR: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age* (AFCEA International Press, 1996); and "Creating a Smart Nation: Strategy, Policy, Intelligence, & Information", in *Government Information Quarterly* (Summer 1996).


## Changing Nature of War and Peace



### Talking Points:

- 01 Policy options have to start “here”, during violent “peace”, and “now”
- 02 Information peacekeeping is the ultimate global presence
- 03 Information can move at the speed of light and cover large areas
- 04 This means information peacekeeping is the *first* policy option--both to ensure that our own policy-makers have a full deck of cards, and to impact on the cards being held by those whom we seek to influence
- 05 Need to develop an information “order of battle” with related Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment--much of this might be “virtual” and rely on private sector providers of information and information technology
- 06 This means that *intelligence* now has an operational dimension & a civil dimension
- 07 This will require changes in concepts, doctrine, procurement, and security


## Four Warrior Classes



### Talking Points:

- 01 Need to consider information aspects of each warrior class
- 02 Intelligence collection, processing, and analysis deficient for 3 out of 4
- 03 Make no mistake: the foundation for good policy is good intelligence
- 04 Need to hold policy-makers accountable for failing to demand intelligence
- 05 Three of the four warrior classes are already inside our perimeter
- 06 This drives home the *inseparable integration* of law enforcement at home with military operations and civilian policy demarches abroad
- 07 Information is the ultimate *countervailing force* against all four warrior classes

# Information Continuum



## Talking Points:

- 01 In the age of distributed information, "central intelligence" is an *oxymoron*
- 02 90% of the information "power" of a nation is *not* military and not under control
- 03 Networking--"knowing who knows" is the emerging source of power
- 04 How do we create an "order or battle" for national and international information?
- 05 What are the security, procurement, and doctrinal implications?
- 06 What is the role of the analyst in a networked environment?
- 07 How does this change the way the policy-maker and commander do business?


## Cognitive Battlefield

<u>Politicians</u>		
Executive Leadership		
Legislative Leadership		
Personal & Professional Staffs		
<u>Government Officials</u>	P	<u>Foreign Officials</u>
Department Heads	O	<u>and Organizations</u>
Assistant Secretaries	L	Diplomats
Program Managers	I	Counterparts
Message Traffic	C	Correspondence
	Y	
<u>Private and Public Sector</u>	M	<u>Autonomous Researchers</u>
Lobbyists	A	Think Tanks
Executives	K	Academics
Citizen Groups	E	Authors
Pollsters	R	Foundations
Individuals		Laboratories
<u>Media</u>	<u>Personal</u>	<u>Intelligence Community</u>
CNN/C-SPAN	Family	CIA
Newspapers	Intimates	NSA/DIA
Wire Services	Church	State
Radio/TV	Clubs	Services
Pool Reporters	Alumni	

### Talking Points:

- 01 Policy-maker is inundated with contradictory unvalidated information
- 02 The *first mind* that must be won is the home policy mind
- 03 The *first heart* that must be won is the home public heart
- 04 Censorship and secrecy are not viable options on the home front
- 05 Traditional PSYOPS will not work in today's environment
- 06 "Multi-channel" precision-delivery of *truth* is the SIOP of the information age
- 07 Winning hearts & minds is an *information-intensive* campaign--and not a cheap campaign either: information costs money to collect, process, and disseminate; information peacekeeping is *not* a low-cost alternative to traditional warfare, but it *is* less expensive


# Net Assessments



## Talking Points:

- 01 Threat changes depending on the level of analysis--threat might not be military
- 02 Military "threat" is meaningless outside a specific civil and geographic context
- 03 "Center of gravity" for any confrontation will vary from level to level and also between military, civil, and geographic--challenge is to find the center
- 04 Cannot mirror pain thresholds and vulnerabilities--cultural intelligence critical
- 05 Each level of analysis has its own timeframe--technical moment, tactical hour, operational day, strategic period--information peacekeeping has same timeframes
- 06 Think about this analysis model in relation to non-state actors: gangs, corporations
- 07 Think about strategic generalizations--aviation temperature, cross-country mobility, line of sight distance, bridge loading, port availability--acquisition today does not really support optimal policy flexibility across varying contingencies

## Knowledge Terrain



### Talking Points:

- 01 Information Peacekeeping must use all available knowledge terrain
- 02 "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" applies to knowledge terrain
- 03 Named Areas of Interest, Target Areas of Interest, Mobility Corridors
- 04 Each of these domains has a multi-layer psychological scale which constitutes the foundation for 21st century "information operations" vice PSYOPS
- 05 Cannot be effective at information peacekeeping without a solid understanding of the preconditions and precipitants of revolution--"information peacekeeping" is the art of instigating revolution along lines favorable to democracy and peace
- 06 Most of the expertise in these areas is in the private sector, and way beyond the ken of the average civilian or military intelligence analyst
- 07 "Information peacekeeping" abroad begins with information networking at home

## Information Peacekeeping Psychology

### Stage One: Individual Excitement

Perception of disequilibrium  
Identity established with others

### Stage Two: Collective Unrest

Competence in organizing  
Investment (dedication) to group

### Stage Three: Formal Transition

Risk adoption becomes common  
Extroversion becomes the norm

### Stage Four: Legalization

Transcendence through integration  
Synergy through success

### Talking Points:

- 01 Starts with the individual: impact on perceptions of the problem, then focus on helping individuals identify with (and communicate with) one another
- 02 Then shift to collective organization, seeking to help individuals organize in a competent and secure fashion, and to reinforce their investment /commitment to the ideas favorable to U.S. policy
- 03 In third stage, those in favor of U.S. policy are empowered to take more risk and to communicate their views to others
- 04 Finally, the information peacekeeping effort culminates with the internalization and legitimization of U.S. policy through integration and success, with tangible dividends perceived as a reward for adopting new behavior or course of action
- 05 Think about how the U.S. Information Agency should play in this arena--they can produce cultural and biographical intelligence, and can communicate ideas, coordinate delivery of "tools for truth"
- 06 "Tools for Truth": cellular phones, fax machines, computers, subsidized access to the Internet, to commercial online services, to international investigative resources
- 07 Bottom line: you can inform, you cannot deceive. Access to information is ultimately the arbiter for democratic success, and the objective of information peacekeeping




# The Information Peacekeeping Chessboard

## DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE

	POLITICAL-LEGAL	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	IDEO-CULTURAL	TECHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC	NATURAL-GEOGRAPHIC
ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT	ISOLATION OF ELITES INADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE RESTRICTED CITIZENSHIP BASE FOR ELITES	CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH LACK OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT	CONFLICTING MYTHS INADEQUATE SOCIALIZATION IDEOLOGICAL DECAY CORROSIVE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES CHARACTERIZED BY UNRESOLVED PARADIGMATIC ANOMALIES	ACQUIESCENCE TO MEDIA DISTORTIONS FAILURE TO UTILIZE MASS MEDIA EFFECTIVELY INADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCATION	OVER-EMPHASIS ON A SINGLE SECTOR OR PRODUCT FAILURE TO EXPLORE NATURAL RESOURCE POTENTIAL OVERLY FRAGMENTED OR CONCENTRATED LAND HOLDINGS
	LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG THE ELITES FAILURE TO CONSTITUTE THE GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO ENUMERATE ANY PRIORITIES	LOSS OF ECONOMIC INITIATIVE BY THE GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE CON- STRAINTS ON BALANCED, ORGANIC GROWTH	LOSS OF AUTHORITY ("Break- down of the habits of obedience") FAILURE TO PROVIDE AND TO HONOR NATIONAL MYTH SYSTEM	FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE, MONO- POLIZE, OR ASSIMILATE ALL SOURCES OF POWER AND THEIR ATTENDANT PERSONNEL	FAILURE TO INCORPORATE OUT- LYING TERRITORIES WITHIN NATIONAL JURISDICTION
	WEAK OR INEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE BUREAUCRATIZATION	INEFFECTIVE OR INAPPRO- PRIATE FISCAL, MONETARY, OR DEVELOPMENT POLICIES INCONSISTENT, INEFFICIENT, OR INADEQUATE WELFARE SYSTEM	HUMILIATION OF LEADERS LOSS OF CONFIDENCE BY A FRUSTRATED POPULATION	FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE PRIORITIES, ALLOWING A LOSS OF INNOVATIVE MOMENTUM	FAILURE TO PREPARE FOR OR COPE WITH NATIONAL DISASTERS (CLIMATIC CHANGES, EARTHQUAKES)
	EGO-CENTRIC PHILOSOPHIES OF GOVERNMENT PAROCHIAL GOVERNMENT	EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT MOBILITY FAILURE TO SUPPORT AND DE- VELOP THE PUBLIC SECTOR	CYNICISM; OPPORTUNISM CORRUPTION	FAILURE TO ENCOURAGE INNO- VATION AND ENTREPRENEUR- SHIP FAILURE TO EXTEND THE FRANCHISE AND ALL ITS BENEFITS	FAILURE TO PRESERVE SCARCE NATURAL RESOURCES FAILURE TO PROPERLY EX- PLOIT NATURAL RESOURCES
	ELITE INTRANSIGENCE POLITICAL REPRESSION FAILURE TO ADAPT TO CHANGING SOURCES OF POWER BY MODI- FYING INSTITUTIONS FAILURE TO INCORPORATE TRADI- TIONAL GROUPS INTO THE POLITICAL SECTOR	FAILURE TO DEAL WITH CRIME, PARTICULARLY WHITE COLLAR CRIME FAILURE TO RECONCILE GROUP TO GROUP PRIORITIES	FAILURE TO DEAL WITH PREJUDICE DESERITION OF THE INTELLECTUALS	FAILURE TO INITIATE NOVEL PROGRAMS EMANATING THE POTENTIAL OF VARIOUS UNDERPRIVILEGED GROUPS FAILURE TO SUPPORT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED TOWARD NATIONAL (PUBLIC) PRIORITIES	FAILURE TO PRESERVE AND PRO- TECT ALL SPECIES OF BEING FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT AND POTENTIAL OF ALL HUMAN, AND OTHER SPECIES
	INEFFECTIVE OR NON-EXISTENT TENSION-MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FAILURE TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF THE POLITY	STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION FAILURE TO SUPPORT DEVELOP- MENT OF A NATIONALLY IN- TEGRATED INFRASTRUCTURE AND LIGHT MACHINE INDUS- TRY FAILURE TO IMPROVE PRODUCTIV- ITY IN AGRICULTURE	ELITE ADOPTION OF FOREIGN MORES AND LIFE STYLES FAILURE TO DEAL WITH ALIEN- ATION BY REDUCING ANXIETY WITH CONSISTENT MODERATION	FAILURE TO DEVELOP NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY ING MOBILITY AND SHARED IMAGES FAILURE TO INTEGRATE INDI- GENOUS OR PRIMITIVE GROUPS INTO COMMUNITY	FAILURE TO EXPLORE THE ADVAN- TAGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRA- TION AND INTERNATIONAL RE- LATIONS
	FOREIGN CONTROL OR EXPLOI- TATION OF GOVERNMENT EXCESSIVE, INCONSISTENT, OR ARBITRARY AUTHORITY	MONOPOLY/OLIGOPOLY SITU- ATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF FOREIGN DOMINATION FAILURE TO MAINTAIN STAND- ARDS OF QUALITY	FAILURE TO COUNTER OR AS- SIMILATE FOREIGN IDEO- LOGIES SUPPRESSION OF INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE CENSORSHIP OF DAILY MEDIA	FAILURE TO CONTROL POLICE, ARMY, OR TERRORISTS FAILURE TO PROVIDE CREATIVE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALPHA PERSONS	FAILURE TO RESPECT NATURAL CONSTRAINTS ON GROWTH (FLOOD PLAINS, VOLCANOES, WATER CYCLE) FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR ORGANIC GROWTH
	FAILURE TO ASSIMILATE ALL INDIVIDUALS INTO THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY FAILURE TO PEACEFULLY PRE- VENT INTRIGUE BY BEING RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF SUBORDINATE GROUPS	FAILURE TO SUPERVISE AND COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF NOMINALLY SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS STATUS DISCREPANCIES INADEQUATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC MOTI- VATION	FAILURE TO PROVIDE OR TO "MAINTAIN A SUPRA-COMMUNAL PARADIGM FAILURE OF RELIGION AS A COMMUNAL BOND ABSENCE OF SUBLIMATING MYTHS (HEAVEN WILL COME TO THOSE WHO SUFFER; FROM RAGS TO RICHES)	FAILURE TO PROVIDE A FRAME- WORK FOR PROGRAM AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT FAILURE TO DEAL WITH DISEASE	FAILURE TO DISTRIBUTE POLITICAL BENEFITS BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS FAILURE TO DEAL WITH ENVIRON- MENTAL THREATS
	GARRISON STATES INDUSTRIAL STATES WELFARE STATES	EXCESSIVE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TOWARD MILITARY EXPENDITURE RAPID, UNCONTROLLED GROWTH CHARACTERIZED BY THE MIS-ALLOCATION OF RE- SOURCES THROUGH MARKET MANIPULATION AND EXTER- NAL DISECONOMIES UNSTABLE DEVELOPMENT WITH DISPARITIES BETWEEN REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE; ADVERSITY AFTER PROSPER- ITY AFTER ADVERSITY	CULTURAL PRE-DISPOSITION TOWARD VIOLENCE AS A NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR PATTERN CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION SOCIAL DISEQUILIBRIUM; ATOMISM, FRAGMENTED FANATICISM	EXCESSIVE OR UNREGULATED DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPACITIES; SUPPORT FOR COST INEFFECTIVE PRO- GRAMS EXCESSIVE OR UNREGULATED POLLUTION EXCESSIVE OR UNREGULATED URBANIZATION	RAPID RATE OF ANY KIND OF CHANGE UNAVAILABILITY OF LAND FOR EXPANSION; INEFFI- CIENT LAND TENURE SYS- TEM INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN RESOURCE LOCATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBU- TION

## Integrated Information Peacekeeping



### Talking Points:

- 01 Information Peacekeeping starts and stops with *intelligence*--accurate and comprehensive intelligence about all elements of the target's knowledge terrain and psychology, and the *insertion* of intelligence into the target at multiple precise points so as to *alter the knowledge terrain and alter the balance of information power within the target organization or state*<sup>2</sup>
- 02 Information technology is best used to increase access to information for those key individuals and organizations deemed favorable to U.S. policy
- 03 Traditional manipulation will not work--only truth works--U.S. policy must be reasonable and well-informed, or it will fail. *Information peacekeeping will accelerate the acceptance of good U.S. policy; it cannot make a bad U.S. policy successful in spite of itself*
- 04 Information warfare is the *in extremis* element of information peacekeeping--in general, *electronic home defense* is the focus of effort.
- 05 Teaching others how to conduct information warfare on their own people is an extremely hazardous undertaking
- 06 Offensive information warfare is the 21st century equivalent of chemical and biological warfare--it is fraught with long-term consequences we do not understand
- 07 If we do not lie to ourselves and do not lie to others, information peacekeeping could revolutionize the behavior of state and non-state actors, and completely redefine war and peace as we know it

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<sup>2</sup> NOTE: "Intelligence" is information that has been tailored to support a specific decision. Information is collated data of generic interest, generally broadcast. Data is the raw image, signal or print. *Nowhere is it written that "intelligence" must be secret!*

## **Information Peacekeeping--Application Scenarios**

### **POLITICAL:**

Preparation: Net assessment of likely separatist movements--*including domestic separatist movements*--yields new integrated approach to political liaison and economic trade assistance at the province and state level. Emphasis is on properly evaluating cultural imperatives rather than political prerogatives.

Application: Provide open source intelligence support as a good will gesture and to help avoid stereotyping or fear-induced violence. Provide Global Information Infrastructure (GII) grants as part of a "tools for truth" initiative. Help all parties create electronic home defenses against information warfare.

### **ECONOMIC:**

Preparation: Net assessment of poverty--*including domestic poverty exacerbated by illegal immigration*--yields understanding of threat in terms of crime, civil disobedience and violence, information terrorism (attacks on information infrastructure by dispossessed neo-Luddites). Emphasis on economic self-sustainment and wealth re-distribution as long-term program for avoidance of war and terrorism.

Application: Develop the national defense budget as a whole, with specific attention to education, labor, commerce, and justice equities at home, and with a clear understanding that U.S. expenditures and capabilities overseas must provide for the avoidance of economic disparities which induce violence. Redefine foreign aid and military assistance in these terms. Dramatically reduce arms sales subsidies in favor of economic subsidies.

### **CULTURAL:**

Preparation: Net assessment of cultural barriers to democracy and capitalism; candid evaluation of aspects of capitalism which foster white collar crime and "cultural imperialism", development of global cultural "rules of engagement" which lessen tensions between traditional and emerging cultures.

Application: Increase funding for U.S. Information Agency, Peace Corps, and civil government and civil engineering elements of DoD. Negotiate cultural treaties which clearly identify and address host country areas of concern. Focus on host country immigrants to U.S. as a vehicle for bridging cultural gaps.

### **DEMOGRAPHIC:**

Preparation: Net assessment of domestic and international migration, disease, birth rates, and educational levels, with deliberate policies, including monitoring and financial incentives and assistance, to reduce negative impact of demographic change on U.S. security and prosperity.

Application: Share information and open source intelligence about trends and forecasted economic implications of trends. Work aggressively, using both information and money, to stabilize global population growth and increase global economic prosperity on a country by country basis.

### **GEOGRAPHIC:**

Preparation: Net assessment of trends toward urbanization, depletion of water and arable land, and general vulnerability of major populations to catastrophic failure of agricultural and transportation "life support" systems--develop clear policies and financial incentives for "organic" self-sustainable growth.

Application: As with demographic--use intelligence to educate and influence environmental sustainment.

## **Improving Policy Options Through Applied Intelligence**

### Seven Steps

- 01 Work with DIA, ISA, and Net Assessments to formulate a global model for developing net assessments for each of the four warrior classes in the larger knowledge terrain context. Note that it would be useful to establish a SOLIC “Top Ten” Key Intelligence Questions focused on the three emerging warrior classes.
- 02 Establish a requirement for an Open Source Intelligence Center located in the Pentagon, perhaps as an adjunct to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, and directly responsive to DoD policy-makers.
- 03 Create inter-agency “tiger teams” to study each of the three emerging warrior classes, and commission wargames (e.g. through the Army War College Peacekeeping Center, or the Marine Corps Wargaming Center) to consider various policy scenarios using only open source intelligence so that international and private sector allies can be included
- 04 Develop intelligence collection requirements as well as funding proposals for establishing global networks of predominantly private sector “sensors” and subject matter experts focused on each policy problem area; manage these as an extension of the Open Source Intelligence Center, but with direct liaison and oversight from within the policy & operations community.
- 05 Begin the process of creating an information “order of battle” in which specific individuals and organizations are the “targets”, and specific kinds of information and intelligence products are the “munitions”. Develop operational plans for altering knowledge terrain in specific instances such as Burundi.
- 06 Recognize that information peacekeeping abroad will not succeed without information networking at home, and that there is a “civil defense” aspect to information peacekeeping--a completely accurate and truthful “net assessment” of the situation to be influenced is a pre-requisite to effective information peacekeeping operations.
- 07 Practice, practice, practice. Develop three prototype operations--one focused on a tribal war, one on a transnational criminal gang, and one on an economic opponent using illegal industrial espionage or information warfare methods--and run them for real, with wargaming, collection plans, net assessments, delivery of information products and tools for truth to appropriate parties, and bi-annual evaluations of the impact of the information peacekeeping operations. Establish a separate funding line for such operations in the next budget.

## **Preliminary Definition of Information Peacekeeping**

*Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information and information technology in order to modify the balance of power between specific individuals and groups so as to achieve U.S. policy objectives. The three elements of information peacekeeping, in order of priority, are intelligence (providing useful actionable information); information technology (providing "tools for truth" which afford the recipient access to international information and the ability to communicate with others); and electronic home defense, a strictly defensive aspect of information warfare.*

### What It Is Not

Information Peacekeeping is not the application of information or information technology in support of conventional military peacekeeping operations, or in support of United Nations or coalition military operations.

Information Peacekeeping is not the development and execution of traditional psychological operations which focus on manipulating perceptions and imposing strategic deceptions.

Information Peacekeeping is not covert action media placement operations, covert action agent of influence operations, or covert action paramilitary operations.

Information Peacekeeping is not clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.

### Gray Areas

Information Peacekeeping may require the clandestine delivery of classified or open source intelligence, or the covert delivery of "tools for truth", as a means of nurturing critical nodes of influence in their early days under oppressive regimes.

Information Peacekeeping may require the covert delivery of assistance in electronic home defense, or selective offensive information warfare operations (either covert or overt) in order to "level the playing field" between emerging democratic and capitalist nodes, and their oppressive opponents.

### On Balance

Information Peacekeeping by its nature is most powerful and most effective when it relies exclusively on open sources of intelligence and overt action, and when it is therefore incontestably legal and ethical under all applicable rules of law including host country and non-Western cultural and religious rules of law.

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