



The Use of Military & Civilian Power for Engagement & Intervention

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Outline for Discussion

- ✓ Strategic Interests: The Threat of Inaction**
- ✓ What Kind of Military Do We Need? Today?
Tomorrow?**
- ✓ Force Development and Planning Considerations**
- ✓ The Challenge in a Complex Environment: Unity of
Effort**
- ✓ Critical Necessity: Attainable Political Objectives**
- ✓ Essential Elements of Success**
- ✓ Concluding Thoughts: Reconciling Ends and
Means**

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The Problem of Three Worlds Makes Future Crises Inevitable!

- ➔ **Advanced societies integrated into the global economy, exploiting information technologies, supporting a high standard of living for an aging, stable population.**
- ➔ **Developing states with growing economies & large populations limited by resource and organizational constraints, facing challenges to government legitimacy and rising popular expectations, amidst unfinished historical circumstances.**
- ➔ **Troubled states lacking viable institutions with large populations suffering frequent violence and deprivation and peoples struggling to assert national identity.**


**More failing states are to be expected.
How do we respond?**

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Seriously troubled states do pose long-term threats to US and European interests!

Strategic interests reach beyond
humanitarian issues & moral concerns.

If allowed to fail, these states may:




- **Fail to integrate into or fall out of the global economy (Indonesia, Ivory Coast)**
- **Threaten access to vital resources (Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela)**
- **Create refugee flows (Balkans, Haiti)**
- **Become sanctuaries for terrorism, organized crime, narcotics trafficking (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Albania/Kosovo)**
- **Become catalysts for regional conflict and instability (Zaire, Yugoslavia)**

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Experiences in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and East Timor tell us about the future.

Future Opponents may seek to stay below the threshold of clear aggression. Further, who are the opponents in civil strife?




Traditional concepts of “national security” and “war” merge with humanitarian concerns and challenge of public order.

Key Question in this Environment: When, Where and How Do We Intervene?

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Questions

- **What is the appropriate role of the military in addressing these problems?**
- **How does the professional military cooperate with non-military agencies to cope effectively in a strategic environment imbued with ambiguity?**



- **Should the basic organization of today’s military be retained?**

Can today’s military become more adaptable? Can Civilian capacities be developed?

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FORCE PLANNING **CONSIDERATIONS**

★ **The Strategic Environment has Changed! This is a function of many factors including society and technology.**

★ **All future American military operations, including warfighting, will be joint, expeditionary and combined in character!**

★ **To cope with the new environment, today's armed forces must reorganize existing assets to operate differently!**

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★ **USAF Expeditionary Forces and Wings are on the right track.**

★ **U.S. Naval Forces have long been expeditionary in orientation!**


★ **US Army Forces can organize into smaller, modular, expeditionary formations the same way.**

★ **But to be strategically agile and operationally flexible, there must be true jointness!**

★ **How?**


★ **New Organizational Structure where required, New Readiness Paradigm, New Policies to Manage People/Operational Tempo.**

**NON-
GOVERNMENTAL
ACTORS** **STATE
DEPARTMENT** **DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE**



**How to achieve essential unity of effort in a
complex world security environment?**

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**Linking the Use of Force
and Diplomacy: How Are
We Doing?**

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U.S. Objectives for Lebanon

1982 Intervention

- Halt Israeli Military Action and remove PLO Fighters Peacefully
- Stablize country/Restore Order
- Prepare for Israeli Military Withdrawal and Rapid Exit of U.S. Forces

[Good Political Vision & Input]
[Result: Success]

1983 Intervention

- Compensate for Sobra and Shatilla
- Support Israeli Plan
- Demonstrate U.S. Military Power - Open-ended military commitment
- Enhance Broader Mideast Peace

[Poor Political Vision & Input]
[Result: Disaster]

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U.S. & UN Objectives for Somalia

1992 UNITAF

- Stop Interference with Relief Operations
- Assist and Coordinate Relief Organizations as Feasible
- Stabilize Country and Encourage Local Institution Building
- Prepare for Relief by UN Force
- Rapid Exit for US Combat Forces

[Good Political Vision & Input]
[Result: Success]

1993 UNOSOM II

- Continue to Support Relief Operations
- Disarm Factions, Foster Pol. Reconciliation, Democratic Institution Building
- Open-ended UN (& US) Military Commitment
- Support by Separate US QRF (temp)

[Poor Political Vision & Input]
[Result: Disaster]

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NATO'S OBJECTIVES IN THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN

US Grand Strategy

- Maintain a peaceful, prosperous US-led Europe including Balkans
- Convince NATO to transition from Cold War defense to coalition for intervention
- Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct "out of area" military ops
- Demonstrate capability of multi-ethnic, democratic transformation
- Little Concern for Russia or UN

Kosovo War Aims

- Stop the Serbian slaughter & expulsion of ethnic Albanians (NATO/UN Explicit)
- Remove Milosevic from power (US Implied)
- Demonstrate NATO Power and Cohesion (US & NATO)
- Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage or NATO casualties (US & NATO)

European Strategy

- Maintain a peaceful, prosperous & independent Europe
- Prevent spillover into Albania & Macedonia, to Greece & Turkey; stop refugee flow to Italy, Germany, etc.
- Maintain NATO relationship with Russia, give it a role in helping end the crisis
- Preserve UN as Legitimizing Agent

*Public Pronouncements
Concealed Widely
Differing Objectives*

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Clear, Well-Defined, Attainable Political Objectives Do Matter!

SNAPSHOT: The 1956 Suez Crisis

"It was Eden's failure to answer the question of what came after Nasser that most clearly reveals the incompetence of his strategy. Field Marshal Montgomery, soon after he had heard that Eden planned a strike against Egypt, asked him what was his object. Eden apparently replied that it was to 'knock Nasser off his perch.' Montgomery says that he told Eden this was not good enough and that his generals would need to know what the political aim was after Nasser was toppled, in order to plan the right kind of operation."

"The Suez Operation" in Geoffrey Regan's Great Military Disasters, page 159.

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Military Power Compels, But it Does Not Necessarily Persuade!

“No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of the people of the South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can, or should attempt is to give them rope, to develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough military power to check any excesses if they attempt any.”

General William T. Sherman, Commander, US Army, on the subject of reconstruction in the South after the American Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Force Alone Is Not Enough!

Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Executive Summary, 21 August, 2000

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Concluding Thoughts




▶ **The Effective Use of Force in Crisis & Conflict demands reconciliation of political ends and military/civilian means.**

▶ **Without this reconciliation, clear attainable objectives based on a sound political vision will not emerge and unity of effort will be sacrificed!**

▶ **Prevention of failure may avoid intervention!**

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Accurate Advance Assessment and Reasonable Goals
Adequate Resources and the Right People
Get on Top/Stay on Top
Firepower/Restraint/Dialogue

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BACK-UP SLIDES

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When is Intervention Legitimate?

- ⊛ **When do we justify overturning the concepts of state sovereignty and international law that have shaped legitimate behavior in the international arena since the Treaty of Westphalia?**
- ⊛ **When the international community accepts the premise that states that "cannot manage their own affairs" can be invaded militarily, will the media hype the "crisis" to the point where policymakers will decide they have to "do something"? (CNN Factor)**

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BALKAN SNAPSHOT

•No coherent strategy to cope with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Peace Support Operations largely reactive, ad hoc arrangements.

•Political Objectives are unattainable with military power:

☉ Rule of Law and the democratic process are not established. Just because someone drops a ballot into the ballot box, there is no supporting culture or institutionalized thinking to advance the democratic process.

☉ Media are treated as political tools and the truth is an infrequent basis for reporting. Dramatic intervention in 1997 helped, but the problem persists everywhere in the Balkans.


☉ Economic development is stagnant and rooted in the state socialist tradition.

•Ground forces still organized for WW II without modularity, Joint C4ISR, rotational readiness, mobilization and depth. This must change!


Precision Strike has Limitations!

Physical Precision

Psychological Precision



**It can
strike
targets!**




**It cannot
create desired
attitudes,
beliefs, or
perceptions!**

In 135 Years, Little Changes!

“Militarily, we can carry out what the political masters want us to do. The difficulty is the situation. Is this an internal situation? Is it confined to Kosovo or not confined to Kosovo? How far do you go? If NATO acts, more than air strikes will be needed. There is no single mode solution, if there is any solution.”

General John Jumper, Commander, U.S. Air Force Europe, quoted in USA Today, Wednesday, September 16, 1998.

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