

IACP DRAFT

Introduction

In the next few minutes I want to talk to you about the value of intelligence for you and your organizations, especially the smaller forces, particularly those that need to improve their efficiency, and do so with limited resources. My goal is to show the value of criminal analysis, make you aware of some of its intelligence products and discuss some current initiatives

I am not too far off target by asserting that as administrators we face two critical challenges. The first is to efficiently manage the overwhelming volumes of information that cross our desks on daily basis. The second is to fuse that information into knowledge and apply it as effectively as possible to resolve operational problems of significant consequence.

In the short time I have, I can only give you a broad brush perspective of what exactly I mean when I use the term "intelligence needs." In this effort, I hope to accomplish two things:

- (1) Motivate you to explore the topic of criminal intelligence and analysis further**
- (2) Serve as the basis for a future exchange of information with your colleagues and other experts.**

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE?

It is a fundamental element of human nature to continuously collect and analyze information regarding their environment, including the actions of other people. In fact, our very survival as individuals depends on this skill. We are constantly gathering perceptions, feelings, intuitions, and data about what is going on.

What is the difference between information and intelligence?

Intelligence is the result of a logical intellectual process, often referred to as the intelligence cycle, which produces new actionable knowledge designed to:

- (1) Corroborate the validity of the information,**
- (2) Understand its importance and linkages with other data,**
- (3) Develop a plan for action (that is a hypothesis), and**
- (4) Use the plan to accomplish a desired goal.**

Of course, it also includes learning from the mistakes we make.

IACP AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, A BRIEF HISTORY

Law enforcement at all levels, has always been driven by impromptu forms of analysis as officers and managers gather information and draw conclusions about the nature of crime, its perpetrators, and its motives. Over the past twenty-five years, various techniques and methods have evolved out of specific needs and have become part of something known as criminal analysis.

In 1985 the International Chiefs of Police (IACP) published a paper entitled, *Law Enforcement Policy on the Management of Criminal Intelligence*, it emphasized the importance of intelligence and criminal intelligence in developing effective strategies in responding to law enforcement problems creatively and proactively; rather than the inefficient approach of reacting to events that already happened.

The IACP study was truly visionary for 1985. In the ensuing 15 years, technology has evolved to the point that even medium to small law enforcement agencies in rural areas have access to computerized tools and the telecommunications necessary to achieve a level of skill in criminal analysis undreamed of when I was a young FBI agent and lived and died by the 3 by 5 card. The trend is here and the change is inevitable.. it means improved efficiency and better service to your communities..

Marilyn B. Peterson author of the influential *Applications in Criminal Analysis: A Sourcebook* has twenty years or analytical experience and is the former president of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts. She has noted that the future of law enforcement rests in its ability to use intelligence analysis, and technology wisely and ethically in support of policy making.

Analysis is the key that links events, problems, and responses into a coherent strategy for law enforcement agencies. Ultimately, it is the basis for effective policies that withstand the test of law, ethics, and experience. After all, it is the primary responsibility of intelligence analysts to provide the information necessary for management to make those decisions.

By 1997 IALEIA produced two pamphlets: *Intelligence Led Policing* and *Guidelines for Starting an Analytical Unit*. Both emphasized that intelligence should serve as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. This is predicated upon the notion that intelligence allows for the efficient use of law enforcement resources, the production of workable strategies and the successful completion of investigations and prosecutions.

Interestingly enough, one of the IALEIA studies recognized that only a minority of law enforcement agencies has bona fide analytical capability.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS

- **Criminal activity forecasts predicting severity of future crime**
- **Crime summaries and charts which analyze criminal activity and indicators to support community and problem-oriented policing.**

For more information on crime analysis you should visit the homepage of the International Association Crime Analysts (IACA) at www.iaca.net.

Tactical Analysis should identify the shorter term issues, in an area which, with prompt action, can prevent a situation from deteriorating or developing; assist in the management of current operations and plans, as well as reallocate resources and efforts according to changing needs and problems.

Further, tactical analysis should provide a detailed picture of the (potential) offender and his associates for subsequent action, thereby assisting operational management in selecting targets, guiding investigations, shaping plans and maintaining supervision.

Strategic Analysis should identify the longer term issues in an area, as well as the scope of, and projections for growth in criminality, allowing law enforcement to establish priorities, determine resource allocations, support business planning and inform senior managers and policy makers.

What is being done to assist you and improve future use of intelligence?

IACP (www.theiacp.org)

- **In February 1998 the IACP's Advisory Committee for Police Investigative Operations published a Model Policy for Criminal intelligence gathering which it hoped would create an awareness of and interest in the importance of intelligence gathering and sharing. It provided law enforcement officers in general, and officers assigned to the intelligence function in particular with guidelines and principles for collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence information.**
- **The following October the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center distributed a Concepts and Issues paper on Criminal Intelligence which was designed to accompany the aforementioned Model Policy. This particular paper was designed to be of value to law enforcement executives in their efforts to tailor the Model to the requirements and circumstances of their community and their agency. (These documents may be obtained by calling IACP headquarters.)**

- In the forthcoming year three intelligence-related courses will be offered at basic, advanced and managerial levels. (These may be viewed at the IACP website.)

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analyst (IALEIA)
(www.ialeia.org)

A professional organization of some 1,500 international law enforcement intelligence analysts in fifty countries dedicated to advancing the professional standards of all law enforcement intelligence analysts.

iALEIA has produced a series of studies which are designed to create awareness and assist you:

- 1996 – *Successful Law Enforcement Using Analytical Techniques*
- 1997 – *Intelligence Led Policing*
- 1997 – *Guidelines for Starting an Analytical Unit*
- 1999 – *Local Law Enforcement and Intelligence Led Policing* – which was co-authored by Peter A. Modafferi, Chair of the IACP Advisory Committee for Police Investigative Operations and Phil Lyn, Manager of the IACP Model Policy Center appeared as part of IALEIA produced *Intelligence Models and Practices*.
- December 2000 - updating and republishing of the *Basic Elements of Intelligence*, a classic work. This is a joint venture between IALEIA and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU), a private group of state and local LE agencies begun in 1956 to share intelligence and further intelligence use in LE

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP)
(www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/GCIP)

Issued in February 2000, the GCIP addresses issues identified by a White House Taskforce in a study, *Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities* and was commissioned in 1997... in part, GCIP's goal is to establish a drug intelligence framework that supports operators in the field and improves Federal, state and local relationships. These include: DEA and FBI taskforces, OCEDETF's, HIDTA's, RISS, and the new High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCA's).

It recognizes that Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have similar drug intelligence analyst training and education needs. It highlights the need for an interagency, agreed upon, exportable core drug intelligence curriculum to serve those needs. It proposes a leadership role for the Justice Training Center (at Quantico, VA) to develop these exportable introductory, intermediate and special advanced law enforcement

Is there really a lack of appreciation for criminal analysis?

Even though IACP and other professional law enforcement associations have touted the importance of criminal intelligence and analysis, it appears that there is some reluctance by law enforcement to fully embrace the process. IACP, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and many other Federal agencies do not offer substantial courses on the discipline. In fact, several of the nation's 100 largest law enforcement agencies do not have well developed criminal intelligence and analytical units.

On the academic side, there is only one college in the world that trains undergraduates to become intelligence analysts, while there are hundreds of programs to teach Criminal Justice enforcement skills.

What is the problem?

From my perspective, there are a number of reasons, one of the most important is historic. During the 60's and the 70's at the height of the Cold War, intelligence activities were generally associated with covert operations and dirty tricks. The litany of actual or alleged abuses by national security and law enforcement intelligence agencies is well documented in the media and the courts, and does not need to be repeated here. Suffice to say, while law enforcement has evolved into a high-level of professionalism and operational ethics, the public perception of intelligence is still mired in the past.

During the turmoil of 60's and 70's law enforcement intelligence was driven by a desire to obtain denied information regarding the activities of organizations and individuals involved in political activity, some of which did in fact include criminal behavior. Given the tenor or the times and the skill-set of operatives, analysis was a small element of the process and the analyst's work product was either relegated to a classified file or rarely acted upon.

So-called law enforcement intelligence of that period was driven by collection of data with few, if any, true analytical products resulting. At its best, it was tactical in nature. Most strategic analysis was unknown. This historic perception of limited value and potential trouble has been sustained in succeeding generations of officers and leaders.

Helping sustain that impression in law enforcement is a self-defeating "Catch 22" situation consisting of three elements: leadership, analysts and intelligence products.

For leaders to buy into the intelligence process or any process, for that matter, you must see a cost benefit, an increase in productivity and it making a difference with real-world problems. In the case of intelligence, that potential value should be evident to you through various levels and types of analytical products that allow your decisions and those of your staff to anticipate criminal activities and other factors that affect your mission, rather than constantly responding to them

The dilemma is how does law enforcement leadership become aware of what an intelligence capability can do for it?

Who is going to produce those quality proactive products if a law enforcement organization does not support its existing analysts, or worse, has no analytical capability? Or in some cases has employees called “analysts,” who are nothing more than data collectors and loaders, who, through no fault of their own, are incapable of producing a true analytical product and are subject to the disdain of their leadership.

This is the Catch 22, for without leadership support, monetarily and intellectually, intelligence entities cannot generate these products because they will not attract the quality personnel needed to understand the intelligence process, develop required skills and create a credible analytical entity.

Another intelligence fallacy is that you must be a large organization to benefit from it. Its benefits can accrue to even the smallest organizations. There is something for everybody.

Can this circle be broken? Yes, through an awareness program, notice I don't say education, which allows law enforcement leadership to judge the value of these products and have an analytical capability.

What are these products?

Generally they fall in three categories: crime analysis, tactical analysis and strategic analysis

Crime Analysis Products try to discover patterns connecting seemingly isolated cases. Products in class could include:

- **Daily analyses of crime patterns and trends relating to incidents by types, locations, times, weapons used and other modus operandi factors.**
- **Crime bulletins with composites of individuals suspected as violators (bolos)**
- **Manual or computerized “pin maps” reflecting geographic particulars of criminal activity in a jurisdiction**
- **Surveys of criminal and crime-related activity**
- **Time series analyses showing trends of crime incidents over time**
- **Crime pattern analyses looking at the similarities and differences among incidents to determine if they have been committed by the same individual or group and when further similar incidents will occur**

intelligence analyst courses. These courses would become available to Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

Although directed toward counterdrug efforts this initiative will benefit law enforcement's intelligence capability across the board.

Generic Intelligence Training Initiative (GITI)

Launched in 1999 GITI is an independent effort by academics and professional intelligence managers, analysts and trainers to design core intelligence training courses which may be used across the disciplines of law enforcement, national security, business intelligence and academia. These core courses would be adaptable to the mission of their various users and tailorable to their specific needs.

With participants from over fifty different national and international organizations, including the HIDTA National Assistance Center and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), GITI's working group will this coming January be evaluating a Introductory Intelligence course put together by its participants last July. Ideally, this first effort and the resultant course will lead to a series distance learning applications. Because of goal compatibility, GCIP implementers are working as GITI participants.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) (www.ncis.co.uk)

The Model is the product of work by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) of the United Kingdom on the behalf of the Crime Committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers of the UK. Research, design and testing of the Model has been completed by police officers, analysts and intelligence specialists from a number of police agencies. It represents the collected wisdom and best practices in intelligence-led policing and law enforcement. The Model seeks to provide the picture that drives effective strategy, not just about crime and criminals, but for all law enforcement needs from organized crime to road safety.

NIM was designed with the desire to professionalize the intelligence discipline within law enforcement. Intelligence in the UK, like the U.S. has lagged behind investigations in the codification of best practice, professional knowledge and the identification, selection and training of intelligence staffs. It seeks to clearly outline the component parts of the intelligence process and clarifies terminology which is all too often misunderstood.

NIM describes:

- the procedures for effective operational decision making (tasking and coordination) at both strategic and tactical levels;**
- the intelligence products needed, and to what standard, in order for sound decisions to be made; and**

- **shows how these products link to a range of analytical products**

Analytical products contained in NIM are:

- **Results Analysis**
- **Crime Pattern Analysis**
- **Market Profile**
- **Demographic and social trend analysis**
- **Criminal Business profiles**
- **Network Analysis**
- **Risk Analysis**
- **Target Profile Analysis**
- **Operational Intelligence Assessment**

Where do we go from here?

I think we're headed in the right direction, but intelligence is never going to be the decisive awareness tool it can be for law enforcement unless leaders buy into it and create the momentum in the U.S. akin to that existing in the United Kingdom.

You need to be shown what intelligence can do at all levels. Concrete best practice models of various products and applications should be created for you to evaluate. You need to hear more about the successes of intelligence such as the New York City Police Department's COMPSTAT. You need to know what intelligence can do and what it can't do. Your buy in is absolutely necessary.

I hope that I've stimulated some interest in you and look forward to our panel discussion.

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