

OSS '97 Opening Presentation

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I Intelligence in the Balance: The Strategic View

- 1 Slow to grasp concepts of smart nations and intelligence organizations
- 2 Must extend concept of national intelligence to embrace rest of government including state and local governments and the rich resources of the private sector—business, media, academic, and individual citizens
- 3 Must strike a better balance between:
 - national, commercial, and tactical systems
 - collection and processing
 - secrets and open sources
 - technology and human expertise
 - counterintelligence inside of and outside of government
- 4 We cannot do this without a national information strategy and the investment of at least one billion dollars a year in a national open source intelligence architecture, and one billion dollars a year in an electronic security and counterintelligence architecture which protects our intellectual seed corn.

II The End of Bureaucracy & The Rise of the Intelligence Organization

- 1 Bureaucracy is the anti-thesis of organizational intelligence
- 2 Organizational intelligence requires voluntary, self-organizing teams of committed intrapreneurs, each able to access global multi-lingual, multi-media information essential to achieving new insights
- 3 Only free-spirited volunteers linked in a loose network, have the staying power to see through major intellectual and cultural change
- 4 The intelligent organization harnesses both the knowledge of its sources and the knowledge of its consumers—it creates a larger community
- 5 Facing reality depends on full access to the truth—and truth is not, as our keynote speaker notes in his book—always kind. Although truth is liberating, it is also destructive, for it destroys old myths and old habits.
- 6 Ultimately, we must combine open-minded visions with the strength of character to abandon and dismantle that whose time is past.

III For the President's Eyes Only

- 1 Who is the consumer? President? Congress? Public? Allies?
- 2 Are we in the business of collecting secrets? Or informing governance?
- 3 Is the intelligence process secret? Or can it be shared?
- 4 What role—what urgency and what funding levels—should we be seeking for unclassified intelligence support to diplomatic operations, to coalition operations, to combating transnational crime, and to national economic competitiveness as well as global environmental sustainability?

IV Improving National Security and National Competitiveness

- 1 Virtual Intelligence Community
 - Majority of expertise in the private sector
 - Majority of expert knowledge is neither published nor online
 - Acme of skill is to “know who knows” and to be able to create “just enough just in time” tailored intelligence to answer the question
 - Data is raw text, image, or signal
 - Information is data collated and of generic broadcast interest
 - Intelligence is information tailored to support a specific decision
 - Most “intelligence” is not and need not be classified
 - Secrecy is like caviar—a little bit is wonderful, too much smells

- 2 Information Merchant Banking
 - Extends process of intelligence to rest of government and the private sector—requirements analysis, collection management, source validation, action-inducing presentation
 - Distinguishes between roles of the analyst and of the searcher—dramatically empowers librarians with the resources to discover, discriminate, distill, and deliver open source information
 - Institutionalizes the process of “knowing who knows” by creating an international open source “Moody’s” guide, with appropriate evaluative reliability
 - Extends and assures government levels of electronic security to the private sector, to include anonymity—complete security is the foundation for complete openness.

- 3 Information Peacekeeping
 - It is the active exploitation of information and information technology to achieve one’s policy objectives
 - It’s three elements are intelligence, information technology or “tools for truth”, and electronic home defense to protect intellectual property
 - It is not standard information technology in support of conventional diplomatic or military operations; it is not traditional psychological operations relying on deception; it is not covert action operations; and it is not clandestine operations.
 - Information peacekeeping relies on providing low cost unrestricted access to truthful information, and on assuring open connectivity between all interested individuals.
 - Information peacekeeping and open source intelligence operations require reliable electronic security that is not handicapped by imposed government “back doors”.

- 4 Information Strategy
 - Connectivity, Content, Coordination, Communications Security

V Miscellaneous Thoughts

Open source intelligence is not a discipline. It is a sub-discipline within each of the major disciplines, providing commercial imagery, foreign broadcast monitoring, and overt human intelligence as tip-off, context, and cover in support of the all-source process.

Open source intelligence can be all-source in the sense that finished intelligence production which is unclassified can be used to meet critical needs in support of diplomatic and coalition operations, law enforcement, and business.

We must distinguish between open source intelligence (OSINT) and validated open source intelligence (OSINT-V), the latter being unclassified intelligence that has been validated by all-source analysts with full access to all pertinent classified sources.

Intelligence is not synonymous with secrecy. Data is collated into information that is of generic interest and generally broadcast—*intelligence* is information that has been tailored to support a specific decision by a specific person at a specific time and place. [I realize that all will not agree, but it's time we got away from classified encyclopedic broadcasting and more into day to day decision-support.]

The open source revolution begun in 1992 in the aftermath of the first Open Source Task Force has failed. Although both the U.S. and several allied communities have toyed with open source initiatives, all are a strategic failure and generally only lip-service has been paid to the need to give analysts improved access to open sources.

The exclusion of the librarians from the open source planning process, and its dominance, at least in the U.S., by a technical infrastructure, has been one reason for the failure. We must distinguish between human analysis expertise, human search & retrieval expertise (the librarians' forte), and technical support.

The most promising technical solutions are now not in collection, but rather in processing. The technologies for discovering, discriminating, distilling, and delivering information that has been clustered, weighted, mapped, and visualized, are the next frontier and not properly pursued despite a decade of lip service.

Electronically available information (both the Internet and the far more substantial commercial online sources) comprises less than 20% of what we need to know.

The center of gravity for intelligence analysis is the human expert, and the vast majority of those experts is in the private sector and wants nothing to do with either the intelligence or the defense communities. We must rapidly develop new means of interacting with this expertise, to include a dramatic increase in our expectations regarding academic training, private sector accomplishments prior to hiring, and foreign language skills proven in the host country environment, also prior to hiring.

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