HUMINT Successes

0 A few exceptional volunteers capably handled

0 Some exceptional technical operations supported

0 Variety of complex liaison relationships maintained

0 Smooth relations maintained with cover organizations (at great expense in dollars and security)

0 Remarkably few officers killed in action

HUMINT Failures

0 Excessive reliance on foreign liaison

0 Self-defeating reliance on official cover

0 Excessive focus on employment of over-achiever officers (lack of patience and incremental gain = lax security)

0 Inadequate preparation of officers for new assignments

0 Refusal to acknowledge value of continuous training

0 Grossly excessive case loads on civilian side, at same time that military requirements are not being met

0 Unwillingness to plan for and provide contingency military assets and stay-behind capabilities

0 No secure tactical communications with agents or incoming military forces

0 Inadequate information technology and data handling (e.g. bio-data on indigenous personnel needed for refugee screening, defector and prisoner handling)

0 No effective institutional memory on local situations

0 No internal program evaluation capability

0 No long-term HUMINT capabilities planning

0 No understanding of other disciplines within management

0 Very limited commitment to overt HUMINT collection HUMINT Possibilities

0 Completely restructure HUMINT requirements & evaluation process, to include automation and provision for tracking satisfaction of military HUMINT requirements

0 Break overt HUMINT away from HUMINT Committee and DDO, dramatically expand overt HUMINT collection and processing, with emphasis on the detailed commercially-available information needed for precision targeting of foreign C3I and infrastructure

0 Establish Center for the Exploitation of Open Sources (CEOS) with participation of business and academia, and business-funded global data entry program to increase national competitiveness

0 Consolidate existing CIA DDO with a new Office for Military Contingencies manned jointly by civilians (DoD employees) and uniformed officers on long-term assignments; provide two-star Assistant Deputy Director

0 Radically increase use of ethnic U.S. citizens and Third World "career agent" personnel, to establish and maintain complex and in-depth non-official cover (NOC) clandestine networks capable of operating under curfew and crisis conditions in all countries of interest

0 Establish improved covert HUMINT capabilities including technical support (long-lasting batteries, life sustainment methods, stealth movement), for use in precision targeting and battle damage assessment

0 Significantly reduce reliance on foreign liaison services for intelligence about terrorism, drugs, proliferation, and other "too hard" areas where "obvious Americans" have feared to tread

0 Integrate tactical management of peacetime HUMINT to provide for mutual support across disciplines, e.g. emplacement of tactical SIGINT and multi-spectral imagery collection devices, etcetera

0 Develop a HUMINT information management architecture which provides the Country Team - including foreign nationals - with a means of handling all available multi-media information so that "shoeboxes" go by the wayside and needed information is available tactically (and at the theater), and is also available across agencies at the national level