SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

Flag Conference on Information Strategy

15 December 1995

WAGING WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Mr. Robert D. Steele, Chairman & CEO

OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Group

Challenge of Change: Six Revolutions Changing Threat--Four Warrior Classes/law enforcement as the new legionnaires Changing Dimensions of Time & Space--War/Peace, Here/There, Long/Short Time Changing Fiscal Environment--fewer people, fewer dollars Changing Physical Environment--urban, civilian, international, mixed demographic Changing Knowledge Environment--private sector as center of gravity Changing Technology Environment--virtual intelligence and total vulnerability

Open Source Intelligence--Background Open source roots (OSS, CIA); Copeland anecdote USMC Intelligence Center, lessons learned about OSINT SOUTHCOM and DOE, lessons learned about OSINT and drugs CIA/CSIS lessons learned about OSINT and consumers Joe Nye's Jig-Saw Puzzle: OSINT in perspective OSINT is the foundation for reinventing classified disciplines

The Open Source Environment Information Continuum (Nine Sectors) Schools, Universities, Libraries, Businesses, Private Investigators/Information Brokers, Media, Government, Defense, Intelligence Information Commons versus the Iron/Bamboo/Plastic Curtains Distributed (90%) versus Central (10%) Intelligence Hard Copy (90%) versus Electronic (10%) Information Internet is less than 1% of knowledge CIA Study on Journals Center of Gravity is in the private sector

Overview of Some National Open Source Intelligence Practices

Australia--Pacific Rim Tier 4 burden-sharing option Canada--80% from open sources, unclassified production France--economic intelligence Germany--still a sweat-shop, creeping forward Israel--precision-strike, U.S. information brokers, FOIA masters Italy--you can just imagine... Japan--6,000 newsprint pages a day collected, private sector lead Netherlands--reorganization of collection, analysis; Internet centralized discovery, decentralized exploitation; possible lead for European OSINT Council Quebec--harbinger of future provincial/state endeavors Singapore--National Computer Board, wiring the island Sweden--triad Committee, S&T attaches, Internet, "smart Nation" United Kingdom--C4I (I=Info), DIS, Foreign Office, Board of Trade

Some Generalizations About OSINT Practices in Other Governments

No one has a national information strategy No one has a significant lead on U.S. Government-industry relationships are all terribly ineffective Private sector collection, translation, & analysis capabilities not used Bureaucracy and control of money are the show-stoppers Amount of money spent on OSINT by government is marginal Virtually nothing is spent on technical applications: focus on content Consumers do their own OSINT, Producers do not filter/evaluate

Creating the Virtual Intelligence Community Data, Information, Intelligence: Emphasis on OSINT Achieves Savings, Satisfies Broader Range of Requirements Enables Clandestine and Technical Focus on Hard Targets Secrecy Paradigm is Counterproductive--Quick Open Access is Key Information = Content + Context + Time Obtain Information Before It is Classified Secret Security through Speed and Obscurity Distributed Collection and Filtering "JUST IN TIME" is Critical-- Human Filtering, Leveraging External Overhead Essential Analyst as Manager of Network of Overt Sources Analyst as Manager of Private Sector Outsourcing Analyst as "Recruiter/Handler" of Consumers Vulnerabilities in Both Government and Industry Data Integrity, Availability, Security Cost of Uninformed Decisions

Information Warfare: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities Defining IW--American Focus on Offensive Interruption of Services Defining IW--American Focus on Defensive MILITARY Measures Ignoring IW--American Oversights 80% of the data the commander needs is: -- unclassified -- in a foreign language -- in hardcopy (not yet digitized) 60-80% of the civil and coalition partners can't handle electronic data Defining IW Properly: Virtual Intelligence for the Commander Electronic Home Defense (Continuity of CIVIL Operations) Offensive IW for Deterrence and War Winning Information Peacekeeping for Deterrence and War Winning Eight Points War by other means--very unconventional Acquiring information is more important than destroying information Center of gravity is the civil sector (rear area) rather than the front line Must inventory vulnerabilities across the Nation Must "draft" civil sector communications & computing Must redefine concepts of national security and military mission Must mobilize the population for total war/total peace Applied intellect wins--national information strategy critical Impact on Mobility, Weapons, Command Mobility systems extremely vulnerable to HERF attack by one person Weapons systems lack data as well as functionality for one on one attack Command cannot be exercised using the existing architecture

What is to be Done? Declassify the threat Change rules of engagement (ROE) Shift resources to research & development Create National Information Foundation Create civil sector continuity of operations plan -- Due diligence law -- National education program -- C4 security standards -- Electronic counterintelligence program -- Military internships in civilian sector (thousands) Explore alternative means of meeting law enforcement, paramilitary, and special operations requirements Create Cyberspace Corps (lead to Signals Intelligence) Develop Information Peacekeeping Concepts and Doctrine Develop National Information Strategy

Some Implications of the Six Revolutions for the Military Traditional (Classified) Intelligence is not adequate Communications & computing security is not adequate Mobility platforms are too big, too obvious, too expensive Weapons systems lack terrain data and target sensing support Rear area security non-existent--command & control at risk Rules of engagement out of date--cannot wait for "rounds out" Mission areas need to be redefined in terms of functionality Role of private sector must be carefully studied: As source of intelligence (e.g. SPOT Image Corporation) As vulnerability to be defended through law and other measures Integration with civilian and law enforcement agencies must be addressed National Information Strategy--The Legislation Connectivity--Global, Corporate, and Individual--NII/GII a good start Content--National Information Foundation/distributed CoE Coordination of Research & Development--Common Toolkits Communications & Computing Security--Standards, Testing, Education

Epilogue: U.S. Military Technology Initiative Evaluations What Did We Learn? Doctrine, not Technology, is the Enabler C4I and Combat Systems Must Merge CIA and DIA Still Do Not "Get It" Connectivity is Overrunning Content Must Plan for Multi-Belligerent/Civil Coalition Operations Pre-Hostilities Rules of Engagement Required What Did We NOT Learn? Electronic Civil Defense is Show-Stopper SEW Assuming that Information Needs Will Be Met Data Acquisition is Ignored--Labor/Skill Intensive Threat is UNCONVENTIONAL Center of Gravity for R&D is in the Civil Sector Civilian Agencies--Domestic and Foreign--Critical Players Still Ignored Power (and Initiative) Now in Hands of the "Mongrels"

Mind Stretch 1895 Lord Kelvin, British physicist: "heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible" 1923 Nobel Laureate Robert Millikan "There is no likelihood that man can ever tap the power of the atom" 1932 University of Chicago astronomer Dr. F. R. Moulton "There is no hope for the fanciful idea of reaching the moon because of the insurmountable barriers to escaping earth's gravity" 1991 Martin Van Crevald, Israeli Professor "The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapons systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap. Very likely it also will put an end to large-scale military-technological research as we understand it today."

Thinking Outside the Box Information Systems Invest in civil sector C3I security--95% of the comms go this way Face the reality of civil-military connectivity shortfalls Deal with encyclopedic intelligence shortfalls, especially mapping Mobility Systems Undersea Troops and Logistics Long-Range Aerial Resupply/Air Head Utility Very fast shallow-water/riverine craft On the fly mine-clearing, bottom mapping critical Focus on distributed ARGs ("pile on") rather than centralized CBGs Instream off-load required in 50% of the contingencies What Happens If You Can't Get Out of Town? Weapons Systems Target is down to single human being Non-lethal is not just against humans COST is an issue! Information as a weapon, FAO as a weapons system Radical Reinterpretation of Mission Areas Strike (down to individual target, anywhere, anytime) Forcible entry (into what? banks, companies, gangs?) Maritime Battlespace Superiority (low slow singleton, loiter) ISR/Information Warfare (sensor to shooter, information peacekeeping) Assessment (mind over matter--sensors in charge of shooters) Deterrence: what are the pre-emptive investment priorities? Bottom Line One bullet can influence one mind, perhaps more, BUT precision cannot be achieved without intelligence War in the 21st Century will be "mano a mano"--we are not ready.